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**Morale in the Armed Forces**

A Holistic Approach and a Multi-Dimensional Model

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Moral in den Streitkräften ist (wieder) zu einem Thema in der militärsoziologischen Debatte geworden. Dies mag man dem Jahrtausendwechsel zuschreiben, was jedoch wenig überzeugend zu sein scheint. Vielmehr werden die Gründe für das neuerliche Interesse an Moral, die von Moralität und moralischem Denken und Handeln in dem Sinne von ethischem oder gutem Denken und Handeln deutlich zu unterscheiden ist, in dem vorliegenden Arbeitspapier auf Entwicklungen in verschiedenen Bereichen zurückgeführt. Die Analyse berücksichtigt sowohl die mikro- als auch die makrosoziologische Analyseebene, d. h. es werden die Entwicklungen im internationalen Umfeld wie auch die in den Staaten und den Gesellschaften berücksichtigt.


Summary
Morale in the armed forces has (again) become an issue in the military-related sociological discourse. Some might ascribe this fact to the turn of the millennium, but this seems to be unconvincing. In this paper, the reasons for the renewed interest in morale – which has to be clearly distinguished from morality and moral thinking and acting in the sense of good thinking and acting – are attributed to developments in several spheres. The analysis takes the micro-sociological level of analysis into account as well as the macro-sociological one, that is to say the developments in the international environment are as well taken into consideration as those within the states and societies.

As for the macro-sociological level of analysis, three dimensions are dealt with: firstly the influence of strategic thinking in the era of the East-West conflict, secondly the breakdown of the bipolar world order, and thirdly the impacts of the processes of globalization. On the micro-sociological level of analysis, such aspects as social change and value change are dealt with. These changes on the international scene as well as within the individual societies constitute an obligation for the armed forces to respond to these processes and to adapt themselves to them.

Based on this analysis and following a holistic approach, a multidimensional model for the analysis of morale in the armed forces is developed. This model distinguishes between the military world and the „world out there“ that falls into, on the one hand, the society the armed forces are being embedded, and the international environment on the other. At the same time, this model is not a static one but, since taking the dimension of time into consideration, a dynamic model. Ergo – and this is the hope – it may constitute a fruitful starting point for the analysis of morale in the armed forces.
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1 Introduction: The Puzzle of the Renewed Interest in Morale

To a certain extent this paper originates in Canada. In the summer of 1998, the 14th World Congress of the *International Sociological Association* (ISA) was held in Montreal. One of the sessions of the military sociologists organized in the Research Committee *Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution* (RC 01) was convened by Paul Bartone of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point on *Cross-National and Comparative Perspectives on Morale in Armed Forces*. As he outlined in his introductory remarks when he opened the panel, this issue has an ambivalent history of social research.

To illustrate this, he quoted from a piece on morale by Herbert Blumer written in 1943 which deserves being cited here: „Workers in the psychological and social sciences have been particularly eager to employ the term [morale]. Seemingly, they have been content to start with a specious and obvious notion of it and then to develop conceptions suitable to their interests and biases. The result has been to make its meaning and understanding confused and to lead to a variety of amazing proposals as to how morale should be established. The situation has been sufficiently bad to make a number of students altogether suspicious of the ‘scientific‘ value of the idea of morale and resolved to have nothing to do with it.“ (Blumer 1943: 208)

The very fact that morale has (again) become an issue for military sociologists as this panel was and is proof of poses a puzzle. What are the driving factors behind the renewed interest in a concept which is widely deemed to rest on shaky grounds? Does it indicate a perception or at least an impression that in some way or another morale has become problematic, dubious, or troublesome and that means worth studying?

An answer to these questions may be found in the fact that we are approaching the end of the 20th century. As on similar occasions in the past, the turn to the 21st century is being taken as an opportunity and also a necessity to think about questions of who we are, where we come from and where we are going to. The renewed interest in morale could then be attributed to the fascination emanating from the year 2000 and the imminent step into the next millennium. However, in my view, this is not the primary driving force for studying morale in the military again. Rather, it seems to be the combination
of various very real factors and processes in the world that have reassigned attention to issues of morale.

To evidence this proposition is one goal of the present chapter. The second objective lies in presenting a holistic approach to the study of morale that combines individual, psychological, organizational, sociological, socio-psychological, and situational factors. This approach, then, sketches a multidimensional model for the analysis of morale and a model that takes into account the micro- and macro-sociological transformations of our world and our life. These changes, in fact, constitute the combination of factors and processes referred to in the previous paragraph and may be subsumed under the heading of turbulence. Thus, the outline of this chapter is clear: In a first step, the boundaries between morale and morality are dealt with in order to have some definitional clarity. The examination then moves on to propose a framework for the analysis of morale which integrates the transformations on the micro- and macro-sociological levels.

2 Terminological Confusion Dangers: Morality, Morale and a Definition of Morale

Before we can deal with the processes that may have triggered the renewed interest in morale and with the multiple dimensions of an investigation of morale, it is necessary to delineate right from the start the borders between morale and morality because these terms are by no means identical.

Morality refers to the normative beliefs and convictions of the individual; i.e. norms that are determining ones behavior as a social animal and in questions of good versus bad. Therefore, its focus is on moral or ethical behavior, moral standards, codes and principles. By way of taking resort to the Oxford Paperback Thesaurus (1994) one could find – as synonyms for morality – terms like ethics, goodness, virtue, righteousness, rectitude, uprightness, integrity, principles, honor, honesty, justness and decency. By contrast, under the entry of morale, terms like self-confidence, confidence, heart, spirit, hope, hopefulness, optimism, determination and zeal are given as being – at least partially – synonymous with morale.
One can also infer from this that morality may be viewed as one part of morale and, as could be added, a not compellingly necessary part of morale. „It is erroneous to believe that morale presupposes that people possess a noble doctrine, a highly moral philosophy, or a code of Christian ethics. Similarly, it is faulty to believe that good morale requires a certain kind of moral person.“ (Blumer 1943: 210) As a consequence, morality may be one incentive for morale, but there are other incentives at hand as well. Here, socio-economic benefits for example are conceivable. In addition, there is a forceful logic to argue that a comparative analysis may produce evidence that morales as well as moralities differ depending on the socio-economic, socio-political and socio-cultural context. The morale of a given military unit, a guerilla unit, a Mafia network, a terrorist group, a political party or a sports team may reach similar scores on a supposed morale thermometer, but the incentives (in general) and the moralities (in particular) triggering such behavior may be completely different. They may entail patriotism, ethnicity, religion, greed, money, prestige, a political agenda, fun etc.

This also implies that the morale of a given grouping does not unilinearly correlate with the morale and morality environment of the society at large. The moral and ethical norms of a society may be completely different from those of a smaller grouping; nevertheless, despite this mismatch between the society and the grouping, the latter’s morale can be high. One might cite a terrorist or a Mafia group as evidence for this proposition. As can be seen from the preceding reflections, morale can be studied with regard to quite a number of social groupings. In the following, however, the analysis of morale is predominantly limited to the armed forces.

Furthermore, the propositions above indicate a definition of morale which is psychological, socio-psychological and sociological at the same time. Such a definition is in line with Manning’s (1991: 455) view on morale „as a characteristic of individuals, albeit only individuals in goal-oriented groups“. It also echoes Herbert Blamer’s (1943: 217) conception of morale as „the disposition of a group to act together toward a collective goal and that accordingly its strength depends on how the goal is conceived, on the feelings and interests developed around it, and on the mutual support which the members sense in one another“. These propositions put forward two definitional characteristics of morale: joint endeavor and goal orientation. In another paragraph, Blumer
(1943: 210) coins the following phrase: “For all that is basically necessary for morale is that the people in a group have a goal which they value highly and seek eagerly and a sense of mutual support in their effort to attain it.” Accordingly, morale is more than what is meant, for instance, by the term unit cohesion which is quite often used synonymously with morale. To be sure, unit cohesion is of crucial importance to morale, but it may better be conceptualized as contributing to morale as Manning (1991: 457) puts it.

Neither is morale a uniquely and genuinely military feature. Within the armed forces, morale is often viewed in terms of combat motivation as evidenced by Charles Moskos (1968: 200) who viewed combat motivation and morale as the result of individual self-interest, primary group processes and shared beliefs and convictions of the soldiers. Or one may find conceptions in which morale is restricted to combat effectiveness defined as performance in battle (see the important contributions in Sarkesian 1980). Thus, Anthony Kellett (1982: 6) defines motivation „as the conscious or unconscious calculation by the combat soldier of the material and spiritual benefits and costs likely to be attached to various courses of action arising from his assigned combat tasks. Hence motivation comprises the influences that bear on a soldier’s choice of, degree of commitment to, and persistence in effecting, a certain course of action.“ Accordingly, war is interpreted as „undoubtedly the best laboratory of combat motivation“ (Kellett 1982: 11).

Given the purpose and the objective of armed forces, this is without any doubt a crucial dimension of morale – but not the only one. This is to say that morale exists as well outside the battlefield, apart from the first lines and war in general. Morale is to be found also in the rear echelons and in times of peace. In this regard, it may be important to note that, according to the Vietnam experience, only 14 % of the soldiers do encounter directly with the enemy. (Moskos 1968: 202) Thus, it makes sense to de-link morale from the military sphere and define it more broadly as „the ability to persist in effort in the face of obstacle and adversity“. (Blumer 1943: 226)

The meaning of morale put forward here rests on the proposition that morale „is far too complex to lend itself easily to simple or unidimensional explanations. It varies not only from soldier to soldier but also, for each individual, from situation to situation and from
Morale as conceived here thus combines several overlapping concepts outlined above and several levels of analysis. To a certain extent modifying Ingraham/Manning (1981: 6) there is an individual level of analysis where morale is a psychological state of mind characterized by a sense of well-being based on confidence in the self and in primary groups; on the group level of analysis, morale is a property of primary groups and entails belonging, solidarity, mutual affection, interdependence, trust or loyalty; and with regard to large collectives above the level of face-to-face interaction morale may contain pride in group membership, unity of purpose and devotion to the cause. This then follows the conventional wisdom that people may act together with vigor and determination including the will to endure hardship and to bear grievance when ‘their heart’ is in the enterprise and when they are forcefully animated by a common aim. Ingraham/Manning use the terms morale, cohesion and esprit respectively in order to distinguish the morale on the different levels of analysis. In a later piece, Manning (1991: 458) writes: „Esprit then is a higher order concept, paralleling cohesion at the primary group level, implying above all pride in and devotion to the reputation of a formal organization beyond the primary group, and along with cohesion, necessary for sustained effective performance of soldiers in combat.“ Nevertheless, the impression of the fuzziness of the term morale remains and one could argue that this stems from the very fact that „the levels of analysis are coextensive“ (Ingraham/Manning 1981: 6). We shall have to come back to this point later on.

3 Explaining the Renewed Interest in Morale

Having shed some light on terminological aspects, it is now appropriate to turn to a historical-sociological viewpoint. In this regard it is necessary to stress that morale has long been viewed as important and crucial to military persistence, performance and effectiveness which is documented in famous phrases of military strategists of various times. The role of morale is aptly coined in two of Napoleon’s dictums: „the morale is to the physical as three is to one“ and „in the end, the Spirit will always conquer the Sword“ (both cited in Ingraham/Manning 1981: 3). Given that the features of technological organization and efficient skills, of equipment and strength, may lessen the military’s dependency on morale one could argue that morale is a phase-out model.
Such an assumption is far from true; by contrast, morale has again been becoming a focus of military planning and scientific research. This more recent, renewed interest in morale may be traced back to developments which can be broadly grouped in the macro-sociological and the micro-sociological levels respectively.

3.1 The Macro-Sociological Level

On this level, the analysis deals more specifically with the international dimension and the processes and transformations that can be observed there. In particular, I would like to draw the readers’ attention to three aspects: (1) the impact of strategic thinking in the era of Soviet-American bipolarity; (2) the collapse of the world political order as we knew it; and (3) the processes of globalization. (for a more detailed discussion see von Bredow/Jäger/Kümmel 1997a, 1997b, 1998; see also Waters 1996; Beck 1998a, 1998b)

3.1.1 Bipolarity and Strategic Thinking

Although eighteenth and nineteenth century military practices differ from modern twentieth century ones due to features such as close-order formations, punitive discipline, drill-orientation in military training and ascriptive leadership, the development of mass armies was accompanied by a consideration of motivational factors. The experience of the First World War, the technological and strategic changes associated therewith, the occurrence of demoralization and psychiatric breakdown and the general political, social and cultural trends of the inter-war period worked together to make military establishments much more sensitive of psychological factors prior to the Second World War than they had been before 1914. Within a short period of time after the outbreak of the Second World War, for example, Great Britain established a morale committee (and a war aims committee), and the U.S. did so with a morale branch. Since then, motivational concepts have increasingly been incorporated in military doctrine. Also, departments of behavioral sciences and leadership have been set up at a number of military academies. (Kellett 1982: 4f.)
In the postwar period, the social reality in general presented itself differently in different countries. As for the armed forces in the countries concerned, their experiences and their realities also differed. Whereas both superpowers conducted major military operations and also countries like Israel were involved in wars, for the majority of Western European countries war-like experiences were virtually absent. Thus, in the case of the former, we find a stronger concern for issues of morale as evidenced, for example, in the project *Historical Evaluation and Research Organization* (HERO) established in the US in 1963 with the objective of quantifying non-numerical combat factors (Kellett 1982: 14).

At the same time, for quite a few of the Western European countries and – supposedly for a good deal of countries within the Soviet hemisphere – there was a sense that „[i]n the face of the devastating effects of mass destruction weapons, of industrialized warfare and, last but not least, of a military strategy based on concepts such as MAD [...], the subject, both military and civilian, had become a negligible quantity“. (Lippert 1998: 33) This resonates with van Doorn’s (1975) argument that due to technological advances and a widespread sense of omnipotent socio-technological control a process occurred turning humans into soulless things and making the armed man become a manned weapon.

This process, however, was not unidirectional. Instead, a certain rediscovery of the human or subjective factor in the military organizations of developed industrial nations could be observed in the last stages of the East-West-conflict. Ekkehart Lippert (1998: 33ff.) cites reasons for this renaissance of interest in the subjective factor: The nuclear bomb, because of its character as the absolute weapon, required a trivialization of its effects and simultaneously resulted in a military stalemate. This implied a reversal to pre- or subnuclear concepts of war which attributed more importance to the military subject, i.e. the soldier. Furthermore, the perspective of mutual nuclear overkill meant a strategic stalemate. In order to shift the balance of deterrence in one’s own favor the search for innovations was intensified. Among them, one objective was to optimize the ‚human asset‘. Eventually, the decline in birth rates and the problem of keeping and maintaining the manpower strength associated therewith, led to a view on men as a scarce resource that had to be handled with utmost care.
3.1.2 The Breakdown of the Bipolar World Order and the Emergence of a New World Order

The implosion of the Soviet Union and the ensuing collapse of the Soviet empire fundamentally changed the world political macro-constellation. The rather clear-cut and straightforward structure of international politics as a result of the East-West conflict has given way to a much more messy world order. In this world order, there is no single structural conflict that shapes almost all the other conflict formations in the international system as the East-West conflict has done up to 1989. Instead, there is a whole bunch of conflicts which sometimes overlap and reinforce each other. To a substantial degree, these conflicts do not resemble the conflicts of the past where states were fighting each other. By contrast, conflicts in the emerging world order increasingly stem from internal rifts within states between different groups of society and from state structures falling apart. (Zartmann 1995; Waldmann 1997) Thus, a large amount of present-day conflicts are indeed civil wars; and they are dirty wars because, as Major Ralph Peters, at that time working in the Pentagon put it, the typical enemy of Western soldiers is a legally unconstrained warrior who has morally run wild (cited in Inacker 1995: 5). In addition, technological advances have also altered the characteristics of war and have changed the battlefield. In this manner, Arquilà/Ronfeldt (1993) speak of cyberwar and, almost two decades ago, Hauser (1980: 200) defined the battlefield of the future as „bewildering, complex, fluid, and incredibly violent“. And he added: „The technology will be ultramodern; the psychological stresses on soldiers, as terrible and lonely as any in the history of warfare.” As a consequence, due to the increasing lethality of the modern battlefield, psychiatric breakdown is expected to occur much faster than in the past – a finding that draws on American and Israeli experiences (Ingraham/Manning 1981: 4). Taken together, this leads to the conclusion that the image and the face of war have changed significantly (van Crefeld 1991; Shaw 1991; Holsti 1996; Friedman/Friedman 1998).

In addition to global changes, the regional power structures are changing and are being reshaped. In the new world order each actor is under pressure to redefine his interests and to adapt them to the transformed circumstances. Some actors have proved to be
more skillful than others in doing so, which is to say that some actors have gained in influence whereas others have lost parts of their former power position. In a sense, then, it might be argued that the world for most of its part has not become a safer place. In contrast to hopes of a benign, pleasant, harmonious, peaceful and prosperous world, possibly governed by a much more powerful United Nations (UN), and in contrast to the democratic and market economic triumphalism in the wake of Francis Fukuyama’s well-known proposition of an end of history, the world witnessed the persistence of military conflicts, the unilateral decision over and the ongoing use of military means as well as the continued spending of substantial financial resources on armament production, weapons procurement and arms acquisition. The hopes for a peace dividend were dashed; instead, armies were to be maintained.

3.1.3 Globalization

The end of the East-West conflict occurred in a period of time marked by globalization. Indeed, we are living in the era of globalization, complex interdependence and planetary politics. This implies several assumptions:

- Globalization is the prime mover in international relations. It is not an even, but an asymmetrical process since the costs and benefits of globalization are distributed unevenly between states, between societies, but also within them. As a result, there is opposition towards globalization, as for example expressed in fragmentation of various (political, economic, cultural, religious, ethno-national) brands.

- Globalization as a term whose joint characteristic is debordering or transbordering, i.e. the transgression of territorial boundaries, comprises various processes. In the economic sector it means the emergence of a truly global market in which goods and commodities are traded from country to country. Transnational corporations do no longer focus on the national level, but they increasingly operate on the regional and global level. In financial terms, the flow of investments and financial transactions has spun a fine web across the world and serves as a heavy control mechanism for national policies. Indeed, the ebb and flow of investments can be viewed as ‘punishing’ or ‘rewarding’ a given country and its society for its specific policies. Globalization in military terms refers to the development of modern weapons of
global reach thus establishing a worldwide threat, a ubiquitous menace of destruc-
tion and annihilation. Ecologically, globalization refers to the regional and interna-
tional repercussions and effects of modern industrial production systems. Radioac-
tivity or the depletion of the ozone layer do not stop at national frontiers. In terms of
demography, globalization consists in the migration of people. The causes of migra-
tion movements may differ ranging from natural catastrophes, hunger and drought
to military conflicts, economic plight and persecution because of ethnic, religious or
political reasons, but despite these differences migration in general poses the chal-
lenge of integration to the immigration countries. Lastly, in the issue area of com-
munication, the media, the internet and modern satellite technology have established
a global communication order in which information is – at least potentially – avail-
able worldwide. It is the global synchronicity of information which serves to dis-
seminate the knowledge of the life, the living standards, but also the political and
economic systems and cultural values of people in other parts of the globe.

• Globalization means an increase in trans- and interactions between states and be-
tween members of its societies leading to what Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S.
Nye, Jr. (1977) termed complex interdependence. Although globalization and the
density of interdependence varies across the world because of different interdepend-
ence costs and benefits and because of different degrees of interdependence suscep-
tibility and interdependence vulnerability,¹ the global arena increasingly becomes
the focus and framework of social actions for all societies, but, of course, to varying
degrees. This implies that the security of a given country can be influenced and
threatened by events and developments in far away places. This means, in turn, that
the security policies of each country in the world have to take the global aspects of
security into consideration. Security, in most cases, cannot be established by focus-
sing on the near abroad alone. As a result, in the recent past we have seen an in-
creasing amount of military cooperation on the international scene.

The relevance of these two aspects of change at the macro-sociological level for an
analysis of morale in the armed forces are obvious because they imply a thorough

¹ Therefore we do not yet have what Marshall McLuhan called the global village. And it does not look
as if we are going to have one within the foreseeable future.
change of the framework and the conditions under which armed forces exist and have to operate today (see also Däniker 1992; Dandeker 1998; von Bredow/Kümmel 1999):

- As an answer to the global scope of potential security threats and to the humanitarian impulse, i.e. the 'something must be done factor' (Dandeker 1998: 579), there is a broadening of the range of missions abroad and an increase in the number of missions to be expected. To deal with these issues and the ensuing problems, the actors have intensified their efforts to establish multinational military cooperation. As a matter of fact, we are witnessing the multinationalization of the armed forces (Schnell 1993) – be it in the framework of the United Nations and its peacekeeping operations or in the context of specific alliances and ad-hoc-coalitions. In this regard, Germany, for example, takes part in various bi-, tri- and multinational forces as can be seen when looking at the German-French Brigade, the German-American Corps, the Eurocorps, the German-Netherlands Corps, the German-Danish Corps and the German-Danish-Polish Corps which has just turned into existence. (see Klein 1990; Klein/Rosendahl Huber/Frantz 1999) This process of multinationalization globalization necessarily poses a challenge to morale in the armed forces and issues of interoperability, of mutual understanding and of effective military cooperation are central to multinational armed forces.

- A new sense of the soldier’s mission emerges in multinational peacekeeping operations. The soldier increasingly becomes a „global street worker“ (von Bredow 1997; von Bredow/Kümmel 1999). Studies on past peacekeeping operations, however, have revealed the substantial impact of the „boredom factor“ in these missions due to underutilization, cultural deprivation, lack of privacy and isolation. (Harris/Segal 1998; see also Moskos 1976) To paraphrase David Segal, there is nothing more boring for the individual soldier than a successful peacekeeping mission. As a consequence, the motivation of peacekeepers constitutes an important aspect. (see Battistelli 1998)

- The genuine process of technological innovation has produced weapons of mass destruction with global reach, increasingly precise missiles, modern satellite systems as well as the Global Positioning System (GPS) (Friedman/Friedman 1998;

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2 It should be mentioned that the humanitarian impulse is by no means unequivocal. Even if it is clear that „something“ must be done this does not mean that „all“ can be done. Thus, Wilfried von Bredow (1997: 177) is right in pointing to the „selective humanism which inspires the globalist outlook of Western countries“. (see also Kümmel 1994: 170-173)
Steinmetz 1998). In view of the increasing importance of information and communication systems for modern warfare and strategic thinking we are witnessing today something that can be called information warfare. (Carlin 1998) The wars of the future may most likely be high-tech wars characterized by high-tech warriors (von Bredow 1997: 171) and surgical strikes such as the use of cruise missiles to destroy the communication system of the enemy. Again, there is an impact on morale.

- The migration movements involve the task of integrating the immigrants not only into the society. Over time, then, and increasingly, multicultural societies develop that face the problem of integrating various ethnic and religious groups and segments of the society into the armed forces. (Dreisziger 1990)

- Taken together, these developments underline the assumption of Charles C. Moskos and James Burk (1998: 592) who perceive a transition from the modern mass army and the late-modern large professional army to a postmodern smaller professional military. This will be accompanied by a transformation of the military’s organizational structures towards more flexible and leaner structures. In a similar vein, Moskos (1998a) identified a shift from war readiness and war deterrence societies to warless societies and from combat leaders and managerial technicians as dominant types of military professionals to the soldier-scholar. This, again, poses a challenge for morale in the military.

3.2 The Micro-Sociological Level

As the changes and transformations in the international dimension supposedly have an impact on morale, so does the national or the societal dimension when looking at the micro-sociological level. The development within (nation-)states and their societies which can be subsumed under the headings of social change and value change strongly influences the life of the people, the life of the soldiers and the conditions for the operation of social institutions (see also van Doorn 1975). Here, again, several factors come into play.
• A first attempt to grasp social change and development has been put forward by Ronald Inglehart (1977) in his seminal study on the silent revolution. In this book, Inglehart argues that in modern societies a shift is perceptible from materialistic to postmaterialistic attitudes and value orientations. In opposition to the traditional emphasis on material security and well-being, attitudes and values have emerged that place emphasis on participation, aesthetics and self-fulfillment. Living a good life in a healthy (ecologically safe) environment is deemed desirable by significant and growing parts of society.

• As classical sociological thinkers – among them, e.g., Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Ferdinand Tönnies – have shown in their work, individualization is a central feature in the transition from traditional to modern society. Talcott Parsons has put this in the phrase of institutional individualism which he viewed as a structural characteristic of modern social systems. (Honneth 1995: 21) In advanced societies, this discussion on the atomization and individualization of society has become more intense in the last decade. The German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986) has taken up these thoughts and developed a more radical perspective. According to him, the process of individualization is but in its very beginnings and will gain much more importance and thus social impact in the decades to come. This is due to three socio-structural developments: (1) the double increase of paid labor and of leisure time free of labor has enhanced the opportunity set for the individual and at the same time reduced the socialization impact of social class or milieu;3 (2) the shift from the industrial to the postindustrial society as documented in the growing proportion of the service sector in the national economy, implies a thorough increase in social mobility which is accompanied by a permanent diversification of living conditions and life styles; (3) the dissemination of education has broadened the range of job possibilities and upward mobility – at least potentially; at the same time this has opened more avenues for individual processes of reflection for a greater number of people. As a result of these socio-structural developments, the individual is forced to put itself center stage in conceptualizing its life and dealing with living conditions fundamentally characterized by risks. In the risk society as outlined by Beck the vagaries and vicissitudes of life have to be shouldered by individuals who have lost the

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3 In an empirical study covering the period 1900-1970, Mooser (1984) found ample proof of the process of de-proletarization among the workers in Germany.
A correlated phenomenon to this move to postmaterialism is the emergence of what Gerhard Schulze (1992) calls the 'sensational society' (*Erlebnisgesellschaft*). Taking up cultural sociological analyses of Georg Simmel and notions of Arnold Gehlen, he starts from the same economic constraints and processes as Beck or Inglehart and he bases his analysis on the substantial increase of decisional leeways, of the opportunity set for conceptualizing and living one’s life. This is due to the shift from an overwhelming socio-economic leverage on decision-making processes of the individual to an increased socio-economic security for a mounting number of people. These people, in turn, increasingly base their decisions on questions of alternatives of action on individual longings, wishes, likings and preferences. In the end, it is decision-making based on personal aesthetic preferences. As a result, however, the individual becomes an inward-oriented, inward-looking human being whose central impulse is the search for sensation, i.e. for an aesthetics of existence. Accordingly, there is a trend among the younger generation towards hedonism and fun orientation. This, however, is only part of the story. One might assume that such a society offers hardly any room for solidarist or communitarian impulses. But Schulze shows that there are still obstacles preventing the members of this society to turn thoroughly egocentric and selfish. He locates them (1) in the development of habits by the individual which voluntarily reduces the opportunity set theoretically at hand, and (2) in the longing of the individual for being a social animal. Nevertheless, his analysis shows that the conditions of group formation are being substantially reshaped along the lines of the sensational society.

Also, there is a „demographic revolution“ (Lippert 1993) in advanced societies due to decreasing birth rates and simultaneously increasing life expectancy. The „aging of society“ is accompanied by the erosion of traditional forms of family life and partnership and the prevalence of one-child families. This has led to a change in the normative structure of society and a marked increase of „me-values“ echoing the individualization thesis of Ulrich Beck. The impact this shift has on civil-military relations is substantial because of a growing discrepancy between military and civilian values and value systems. Whereas the former put emphasis on authority, obedience, duty, community, comradeship, discipline, patriotism and giving, the latter...
stress individuality, self-fulfillment, autonomy, cosmopolitanism and taking. (Wiesendahl 1990; Lippert 1995). “There is cultural change, as evidenced by the military’s evolving model of culture, but there remains continuity in its traditional combat, masculine-warrior paradigm.” writes Karen Dunivin (1994: 543). In addition, in democratic societies there is a pressure not only on security politics (see Baechler 1989: 27), but also on the armed forces to instill democratic norms such as decentralization of decision, participation, relatively thorough flow of information and transparency in the structure of the armed forces.

- The pressure for democratization also stems from the growing pluralization of society. Social movements dealing with issues of human rights, ecology, gender, emancipation etc. have put an issue on the agenda of the military which is not easily digested by the armed forces. Instead, it is a highly contested area. This refers to questions of social equality reflected in the debate on including women and homo-

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4 Regarding the military value system, Lepsius (1997: 366-368) speak of military sub-cultures. The debate on the 'incompatibility' of advanced industrial societies and the use of military force goes back to Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and other (Wachtler 1983). In a sense, Wolfgang Vogt (1983, 1986, 1992) has radicalized this idea and developed the ideal-type constructs of civilian logic and political reality these different logics do not exist in pure, but in mixed forms (von Bredow 1995: 22).

Again, these developments have an impact on the morale in the armed forces. All in all, then, the changes and transformations in the external environment, i.e. the macrosociological, international dimension, and in the internal environment, i.e. the microsociological, national/societal dimension, pose a substantial challenge to the military because they enforce a need upon the armed forces to adapt to these transformed circumstances. Moreover, the simultaneity of these changes adds to aggravating the problem because multiple change requires multiple response and a variety of strategies.

4 A Multidimensional Model for the Analysis of Morale

What has been said in the preceding sections is been taken up in the following presentation of a model that may be useful when approaching the question of morale in the armed forces. First of all, and for heuristic reasons, I would like to distinguish two spheres in the analysis of morale: the military world and what could be termed the world out there, i.e. outside the military. In a further step, then, the time factor will enter the analysis.

4.1 The Military World

Within the world of the military, a total institution according to Erving Goffman (1961), a study on morale has both a psychological and a sociological dimension. By this, I mean that we can look at morale on the level of the individual and on the level of differently sized aggregates of individuals thus forming a group. This amounts to saying that there is an individual face of morale and a collective or group face. Applied to the military, this means that although there certainly is overlap and interpenetration we can study the morale of the single soldier and the morale of various military units ranging from the platoon, the squad, the company, the battalion, the regiment, the brigade, the
division, the corps, the military services (army, navy and air force) to the military at large, i.e. the armed forces in general.

4.1.1 The Individual Level

When looking at the individual soldier, a study of his/her morale could include aspects like job motivation, job satisfaction, self-esteem, psychological well-being, motivation, individual discipline, professional ethos, effectiveness, performance and combat morale. Indeed, there are a number of studies that are focussing on the individual soldier (see the classics of Stouffer et al. 1949; Janowitz 1971; Moskos 1970; Brown/Moskos 1976; see also Oetting 1988). A good deal of them concentrate on issues of job satisfaction, job commitment and job attitudes taking up Charles Moskos’ (1998b) well-known institution/occupation model. Examples include the contributions to an anthology edited by Segal/Sinaiko (1987) or the work of Alise Weibull (1998). The question whether being a soldier is just an ordinary job or more than that is discussed in the articles of the Moskos/Wood volume (1988) whereas Hartle (1989) intriguingly discusses the question of a professional military ethic, and Richardson (1978) and Kellett (1982) deal more specifically with combat motivation and combat morale.

There also has been a number of empirical research endeavors using the Combat Readiness Morale Questionnaire. At first, this questionnaire has been circulated within the Israeli and American armed forces. In its slightly modified version in a German study of the mid-1980s (Klein/Lippert 1998), this questionnaire investigates the motivation of the soldiers by looking at four different groups of factors labeled legitimacy, confidence in superiors, military environment and solidarity among the troops. These factor groups contain different items:
**Legitimacy:**
- assessment of the attitudes of the younger generation towards the military;
- confidence in the highest military command;
- handling of arms;
- confidence in the highest political leadership;
- assessment of the attitude of the entire population towards the military.

**Confidence in Superiors:**
- confidence in non-commissioned officers as combat commander;
- confidence in commissioned officers as combat commander;
- assessment of the professional abilities of non-commissioned officers;
- assessment of weaponry;
- assessment of the professional abilities of commissioned officers.

**Military Environment:**
- leisure possibilities on post;
- leisure possibilities in the barracks;
- civic education;
- accommodation.

**Solidarity Among the Troops:**
- trips to the pub together;
- comradeship with one another;
- life with room-mates;
- drinking together.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) In his classical work, Ingraham (1983) pointed out that drug abuse and heavy drinking may facilitate the bonding between isolated individuals. Although this means an increase in interpersonal bondings among junior soldiers, unit cohesion may nevertheless decrease.
The findings from case studies undertaken in the mid-1980s which follow this line of research do not present overarching or general results across the various cases. Whereas in the case of the Bundeswehr as a conscript army motivation was primarily influenced by the attitudes of the society towards the military and only secondarily by factors internal to the military, the case of the Israeli armed forces who found itself in a combat-like situation pointed to a very strong influence by superiors. By contrast, the motivation of the US professional armed forces was primarily shaped by group solidarity and confidence in the weaponry. (Klein/Lippert 1998: 29) Therefore, the result of these studies is that motivation may depend on various factors; it „reflects the different army structures and the manner in which they are embedded in the respective social and political situation“. (Klein/Lippert 1998: 29) The factors that may influence the morale of the individual soldier may include

- intrinsic incentives;
- extrinsic incentives (income, rewards etc.);
- basic needs (food, drink, lodging, health care); biological and psychological needs;
- family relations/partner relations;
- training and education which provide the soldier with a degree of confidence in his skills and also in his physical stamina and with preconceptions of combat;
- mental hygiene (preparation to cope with anxiety and avoid panic);
- self-discipline;
- performance6;
- compatibility of training and actual job position;
- military purpose/goal to be reached;
- norms, political or ideological beliefs and value systems;
- societal acceptance, recognition, legitimacy of the armed forces;
- status and prestige of the military;

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6 Manning (1991: 466) speaks of „the reciprocal nature of the relation between morale and performance. High performance does indeed boost morale, all other things being equal, as well as vice versa.“ (Manning 1991: 466)
• quality of military leadership on various levels;
• situational context (see Kellett 1982: 319; Klein/Lippert 1998: 21).

4.1.2 The Unit Level

Units may be viewed as the intermediary relays station between the individual behavior of the soldier and the macro-level of the military organization at large (Lippert 1985: 13). Scrutinizing morale on the level of the various collective units may focus on aspects such as professional ethos, unit identification, social solidarity, code of honor, esprit de corps, regimental esprit, élan, cohesion, collective discipline, collegiality, discipline, effectiveness, performance and combat morale. The factors that influence the morale of the unit at times overlap with those mentioned before and may include
• logistics and supply;
• medical care;
• weapons procurement and information technology;
• technical and tactical proficiency, training and education (including preconceptions of combat);
• mental hygiene;
• discipline;
• performance;
• military budget;
• quality of unit leadership (leader’s concern for the men, leader example, appropriate level of social distance);
• manpower allocation and manpower policies (specialization; rotation policies);

7 The trust of soldiers in their commanders depends on their professional capability, their credibility as a source of information and their amount of care and attention paid to their men (see Campbell 1956; Roghmann/Ziegler 1977: 179-185; Manning 1991: 464; Gal/Mangelsdorff 1991: section 4). Since technological advances have enhanced the ability of commanders to control the battle from a distance, there is a trend towards „corporals’ wars“ as Kellett (1982: 326) puts it.

8 When it comes to combat situations, there are „intrinsic“ (Kellett 1982: 9), i.e. specific and additional physical as well as psychological stress factors like extreme forms of danger, casualties, losses, injuries, exhaustion due to the scope of the task, battle fatigue, hunger, drought, defeat, corrosive effects of failure etc. (see Dinter 1986; Oetting 1988). This stress of military operations itself, however, may serve to foster cohesion according to David Segal (1989: 123). Nevertheless, there are limits and in combat situations soldiers need times to rest and times of entertainment. The major finding of a recent longitudinal analysis of the American soldiers in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia-Hercegovina conducted by the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe (1998) in relation to the maintenance of their individual morale and of the unit cohesion was to propose a mission duration of four to six...
• quality of military leadership in superior units;
• unit cohesion/homogeneity and unit diversity (social, ethnic, religious)\(^9\);
• instrumental and affective cohesion\(^10\);
• establishing a ‘them’;
• military purpose/goal to be reached; sense of mission;
• exit costs\(^11\);
• commonality of norms, political or ideological beliefs and value systems;
• social support;
• civil-military relations;
• legitimacy and acceptance of the military in society;
• status and prestige of the armed forces;
• strength of the peace movement;
• situational context and instrumental and pragmatic aspects (see Little 1964; Moskos 1970).

Here, it is important to note that there are most probably differences not only among units of different kinds, but also among units of the same kind; i.e. Platoons, companies, regiments, battalions, brigades and the military services (army, navy, air force) are likely to vary when morale is researched in a comparative approach. Another research route would be to look at the morale of different military ranks across the collective units. At the least, it could be rewarding to study the morale of the ordinary soldiers or the conscripts, of the non-commissioned officers and of the commissioned officers.

In the past, there has been a whole bunch of studies dealing with these issues. Demeter (1965) and Bald (1982), for example, have published books on the professional ethos of the German officers and Lau (1988) has investigated the changing norms in the German

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\(^9\) It should be mentioned that there are several ideas of how to achieve this. Among them is a proposal by Ingraham/Manning (1981: 8) who advocate common housing – not only to enhance military cohesion and morale, but also to foster the cohesiveness of the military families. According to them, common experiences should be created and face-to-face interactions – professional as well as private ones – facilitated. They also argue in favor of reducing the high rates of personnel turbulence that undermine sustained interactions and point to the British regimental system in which a service person might spend his entire career within the regiment (on this see also Harries-Jenkins 1990). For critics, this should be noted also, such endeavors are socio-technological in character. Such a critique – with regard to the production of discipline in a historical perspective – is put forward by Bröckling 1997.

\(^10\) These terms refer to the confidence that others in the group can help and will help respectively if the need arises (Manning 1991: 463).

\(^11\) This means the soldier’s perception of the costs and benefits of escaping the unit (Henderson 1985).

Still another perspective is provided by Shils/Janowitz (1948) who worked in the Intelligence Section of the Psychological Warfare Branch of the American Department of Defense during the Second World War and explored questions of cohesion and disintegration in the German Wehrmacht. They put forward the concept of primary group cohesion as a primary determinant of military effectiveness. According to them, ideology, propaganda, and the political issues of the war were far less important to the maintenance of German Army combat effectiveness than cohesion of the small fighting group was. This was also the finding of Marshall (1947). In a similar vein, Little (1964) examined the two-person buddy system in the Korean War followed by Charles Moskos with a look at the war in Vietnam. Moskos underlined the principle of reciprocity in face-to-face buddy relations in combat and conceived of them as being based on something like a pragmatic, rudimentary bilateral social contract driven by a specific situational context and aiming at individual survival. (Moskos 1968: 208, 218f.) At the same time, there is to be something more in order to keep soldiers going according to Moskos because primary groups sustain the soldier in his combat role only if there is an additional conviction, a belief into the value of the larger social system one is fighting for at work. (Moskos 1968: 210) Two years later, Moskos (1970) spoke of this as a „latent ideology“ to describe the general acceptance of the worth of the social system the soldiers were fighting for.

This leads to the factor of ideology, because ideology does not consist solely of a conscious political philosophy. For many soldiers ideological motivations may rest on a sense of the value of their own society and its way of doing things as is implied in Moskos’ term latent ideology. Explicit ideological commitment, though, may be one driving force for morale as can be seen when looking, for example, at the French Revolution (Lynn 1997), the American Civil War (Hess 1997; McPherson 1997) or at the Wehrmacht (Shils/Janowitz 1948). Religious fervor could also be grouped into this
category (Ballard/McDowell 1991; Watson 1994) In some cases, these forms of motivation even transcend the conventional wisdom that the most important variable for morale is the primary group. In the case of the German *Wehrmacht* on the Eastern front, e.g., the primary groups were virtually absent due to the devastating losses sustained. (Bartov 1991; Fritz 1996) This resonates with an argument advanced by Kellett (1982: 327): “A man motivated by ideology is likely to be more well armed against demoralization and to be more prepared for further combat than soldiers without ideological beliefs” (Kellett 1982: 327).

Questions of cohesion are also examined by William Henderson (1980) with regard to the Vietcong (see also Bradbury/Meyers/Biderman 1968), and by John Johns et al. (1984) with regard to the U.S. military. Here, it is often argued that group cohesion may be furthered by similar backgrounds in terms of social class, religious affiliation, age, normative beliefs or ethnicity, but these factors, at times, are less important than leadership style or functional dependence. This may explain why the integration of African Americans, women and homosexuals in the American armed forces did and does not disrupt primary group cohesion, and may, by contrast, even enhance military effectiveness, performance and productivity. (Kier 1998; MacGregor 1981)

Furthermore, there is some research on the dark side of high primary group cohesion so to speak. This refers to cases in which the group cohesion finds expression in ways imical to the military mission, e.g. in cases of desertion or mutinies or the assassination of aggressive combat leaders (Kellett 1982: 320f.). A high degree of primary group cohesion may also be detrimental to the military performance and productivity of the group because it may limit actions that go beyond the group average. Such an effect was observed by Nora Kinzer Stewart (1991) in the case of the Falklands war. In a similar vein, group cohesion may “encourage an active drug subculture, antiwar activities, and collective acts of indiscipline”. (Kier 1998: 16) This could be seen during the Vietnam war where unit disintegration could also be traced back to leadership practices (Gabriel/Savage 1978). Here, the short length of tenure of command positions had a negative impact and contributed to low morale. Thus, it was recommended that the tenure of command positions should be lengthened (Hauser 1980: 208).
In view of the process of military multinationalization there is a certain trend to elaborate a cross-country and comparative perspective, a research program which is likely to grow in the future. When it comes to aspects of morale the study of Alise Weibull on the issue of job satisfaction and job commitment among officers of various armies in Europe can be cited. One of her findings is that good performance can occur without job satisfaction having any serious impact. (Weibull 1998: 390) Roughly a decade earlier, William Henderson (1985) examined small-group or unit cohesion in times of combat in a comparative approach by resorting to the Soviet, the American, the North Vietnamese and the Israeli cases.

Finally, going analytically a bit deeper into the issue area of cohesion and extending Alexander George’s (1971) distinction between hierarchical and peer cohesion, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins has pointed out that there are several dimensions of military cohesion: One can look at cohesion horizontally, i.e. by studying the relationship among peers, vertically, i.e. by investigating the relationship between subordinates and superiors, organizationally, i.e. by putting the relationship to the military as an organization or unit under scrutiny, and culturally, i.e. in terms of civil-military relations. (Harries-Jenkins 1990: 122; 1998: 359)

4.2 The World Out There

When it comes to the world beyond the military world, it may be appropriate to distinguish between the national context and the international context.

4.2.1 The National Context

As Harries-Jenkins already indicated by in his discussion on cohesion, one way to do this is to examine the relationship between the armed forces and the society at large, i.e. civil-military relations. (see, e.g., Huntington 1957; Kroener/Pröve 1996; Bald 1994; Frevert 1997; Vogt 1983, 1986, 1988) The attitudes of society towards the military are subject to various influences depending on the climate within society or the viewpoints

In addition to this, the character of the domestic political system comes into play as a very important factor. In a pluralistic society with a democratic political system and an independent media, civil-military relations are most presumably different from those in a homogenized society in an authoritarian or totalitarian political system and in a dictatorship with the media under the control of state bodies.

Also, the economic conditions have to be mentioned. In times of a recession it is much more difficult to allocate or even redistribute financial resources to defense and to the military than in an economic upswing. The government’s decisions in terms of military budget and weapons procurement can be decisive in shaping civil-military relations. In the case of Russia, for example, the fact that the government is unable to provide the Russian soldiers their salary contributes to a disenchantment of the soldiers and a growing discontent which may further political instability. (Kümmel 1998)

Moreover, the combat morale of a given society may be scrutinized at various times, i.e. in pre- and post-conflict situations as well as in the conflict situation itself. The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, for example, includes a chapter on the effects of strategic bombing on German morale during World War II. Decisions in military targeting, then, do not only have a military dimension in the sense of destroying the enemy’s fighting and military-industrial capabilities, but also a psychological dimension aiming at the lowering of the enemy’s morale both within his armed forces and within his society.

Not surprisingly, then, the field of psychological warfare becomes ever more important. The various ways of disseminating information via the communication technologies at hand and the variety of propaganda activities include psychological mobilization, manipulated information on specific events, rumors of great enemy losses, exaggerated information about the strength of one’s own forces and that of one’s allies, manipulated
information on defeat and victory etc. (see, e.g., Bloom 1991; Watson 1982, but also the earlier pieces of Shils/Janowitz 1948; Daugherty/Janowitz 1958; George 1959; Qualter 1962)

In addition to those named, there are other means to influence and shape morale. At times, they are in one way or another problematical because some of the instruments at hand may rest on ethically questionable grounds; morale is sometimes produced by misinformation, by deliberately not telling the truth. These means can also be found across the levels, i.e. on the individual and the units level, there are tools to shape morale. Examples include specific training, general education (see Reeb 1983; Bald 1997) or specific education concerning, e.g., the creation of a value-based military ethos (see Treiber 1973; Portner 1977). Taken together, this points to another research route which focuses on the issue of what could be termed the engineering of morale.

4.2.2 The International Context

Here, it is important to look at the geo-political, geo-strategic and geo-economic location of the country concerned and its position within the pattern of the global/regional conflict formations. The presence or the absence of military tensions and/or of political, economic, religious or ethnic tensions which could turn into armed conflict supposedly affects the morale in the armed forces or within society. Also, it may be advisable to look at the alliance patterns, the leverage of single actors or states on the country under scrutiny, the policies of international institutions and regimes etc.

The transnational dimension comes into play as a further factor rooted in the international context. Non-state actors like transnational corporations or transnational associations of civil society dealing with issue areas like human rights, development and ecology may have a certain impact on the conditions in a given country which in turn may affect morale. The more inter- and transnational actors are active or present in a given country, the more there are counter-vailing influences and alternative sources for information. In such a situation, it would be difficult for a government which is set to wage war against another country to engineer morale by providing misinformation because this could easily be countered by those other information sources.
4.3 The Time Factor

In the end, one last remark concerns the transience or the instability/discontinuity of morale over time. Morale cannot be maintained on high levels over an indefinite period of time, but is subject to changes, to ups and downs. The same group of people may show amazing morale in one situation; in another it may be devoid of morale. To give an illustration, empirical studies undertaken in the U.S. indicate – not surprisingly – that in postwar situations like after World War II and after the Vietnam War a general demoralization effect is at work. (Segal et al. 1998) Again, this time factor affects all the units and contexts discussed here, from the individual soldier via the units level and the national context to the international dimension. Taking up an idea of Oetting (1988: 238, graph 7) one may also fruitfully distinguish between times of peace, times of crises and times of emergency. As a result of these considerations, there is room for longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses in the study of morale.

By way of conclusion, the following graph tries to summarize and visualize the multidimensional model for the analysis of morale proposed here.
Graph 1: A multidimensional model for the study of morale

- Psychological dimension
- Sociological dimension

- Of the soldier
- Of the unit
- Of the armed forces

- Platoon
- Air force, army, national/societal context

- National/societal context
- International context

Time dimension (with four phases to be distinguished: peace, pre-crisis, crisis/war, post-crisis)
5 Concluding Remarks

What should have become clear from the preceding analysis is that the study of morale is a rich research field for military sociologists. This may be attributed, first, to the multiple dimensions of morale itself, and, second – due to the „new context between the military and national/international society“ (von Bredow 1997: 178) that is emerging – to the huge array of factors and variables that influence and shape morale. Thus, there will not be a single, uniform approach in analyzing morale, but there will be different research routes which also points to an at least partial realization of a hope that has been formulated in 1981 by Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Charles Moskos in a co-authored trend report for *Current Sociology*; in this volume they wrote „that the full potential of using sociological concepts in the study of armed forces has yet to be realized“. (Harries-Jenkins/Moskos 1981: 73) Furthermore, it may be expected that because of the multinationalization of the armed forces there will be a growing number of studies which deal with morale in a comparative, cross-national way.

Such endeavors, however, are and will be difficult because of what Giuseppe Caforio (1998a: XXIII) called „the basic problem of the discipline: the reluctance (or unwillingness, in some cases) of the military establishment to allow itself to be freely investigated by penetrating tools of social investigation“. It may be hoped that this problem can be alleviated by a process at work within the armed forces, a tendency by which the military increasingly becomes a reflective organization. Doing so could be of substantial help because, as Karen Dunivin (1994: 544) writes, „objective self-analysis allows the military to be proactive (versus reactive) in its management of social change“. (Dunivin 1994: 544)
6 References


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