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The Challenging Continuity of Change and the Military:
Female Soldiers – Conflict Resolution – South America.
Proceedings of the Interim Conference 2000 of ISA RC 01

Strausberg, August 2001
Opinions expressed are solely those of the authors.

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Introduction

Gerhard Kümmel

This book is the result of a conference which took place in Strausberg, Germany, from 13–15 October 2000. The Interim Conference of the Research Committee 01: Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution within the International Sociological Association (ISA) was jointly organized by RC 01 and the Bundeswehr Institute of Social Research (SOWI) and found the attention of close to 70 participants from all around the globe. In thirteen panels social scientists in general and military sociologists in particular engaged in lively discussions about The Armed Forces on the Threshold of the New Millennium. As this title indicates, the conference was meant to cover and debate the changes and the challenges the armed forces are confronted with in these days. And, indeed, they are by no means belittling ones, as one easily recognizes when looking at the profound shifts in the recent past both within societies and on the global landscape at large.

In 1964, Bob Dylan, the well-known singer and songwriter, issued an album called The Times They Are A-Changing and reflected on the subject of change in his title song. Change seems to be something like the basic law of societal development so to speak, and there is a good deal of consensus about this among social scientists. Much less consensus, however, is to be found when it comes to questions like this: How much change is there? Is there a direction to which change is heading to or is there no direction at all? How much continuity is there? What are the appropriate strategies by a given social actor – both reactively and proactively – to deal with continuity and change?
Or is Bob Dylan right in his pessimistic perspective laid down in the lyrics of the song just mentioned: “Your older now, but no wiser it’s true”?

These issues also come to the fore with regard to the armed forces as an organization of society and gave reason for the wording of this book’s title: *The Challenging Continuity of Change and the Military*. Of course, echoing Dylan, the present volume cannot provide the definite answers to the questions raised or solutions to the problems associated with them nor does it attempt to. Yet, what it does is to explain and examine three broadly defined issue areas thus following the assumption that, contra Dylan, there is a chance that we might get a bit wiser at least: In the first part of the book the interested reader will find a whole bunch of articles covering the integration of women in the armed forces. In the more recent past, and especially during the last couple of years, this process has made considerable advances which met both full-fledged approval, sometimes even enthusiasm, and fundamental criticism or outright objection in the societies. Thus, this section assembles both case studies from different countries reflecting the differences and similarities in the integration of female soldiers and theoretically oriented analyses of the impact of this move on civil-military relations and of the degree to which gender roles are shifting in society. The second part entails chapters dealing with military and non-military means of conflicts resolution. Here, the contributions range from case studies of India and Mexico to the discussion of the pros and cons of consociationalism; from an analysis of identity problems of soldiers torn between police and ‘genuinely’ military functions via the debate on the format of the armed forces in Germany to the issue of soldierly motivation. The third section of the book, then, is devoted to regional and domestic developments in one part of the globe, South America. Here, three chapters deal with the changing security and economic context of the region, its move
toward economic and political integration and its effect on the armed forces. In addition, by taking Brazil as a case study, the position of the military within the domestic political and judicial system is analyzed revealing certain tensions between the rule of law and military justice.

One last word goes to the SOWI. Neither the conference nor this book would have been possible without the generous support of the SOWI and, pars pro toto, Colonel Klaus Lohmann, the director of the institute. This help is deeply appreciated.
I. Female Soldiers: Integration on the Rise?
Women in the Canadian Forces

Donna Winslow & Jason Dunn

1 Introduction

Military organizations are considered to be conservative organizations that are resistant to social change. Like many other male-dominated institutions in society, the military has been slow in fully integrating women. Traditionally, most militaries banned women from combat positions since war was seen as a man’s world with no place for women. Women were characterized as having a different moral voice, that is, one based on caring and compassion. And even though women have always been casualties of war, the battlefield itself has been considered to be an exclusively male domain (Dunn 1999).

Canadian women have a long tradition of military service. They have been a part of Canada’s armed forces for over one hundred years when trained nurses were first called for active duty during the suppression of the North West Rebellion in 1885 (Schacter 1997: 28; Robinson 1985: 100; Committee on Women in the NATO Forces 1982: 11). Canadian nurses have served continuously in this nation’s forces. During the First World War, they were assigned on hospital ships, in field ambulance units and to overseas hospitals. They have also been wounded and killed in action during the World Wars. By the end of the Second World War, approximately 50000 women had served in the women’s divisions, 5000 nurses had served in the medical corps of
the navy, army and air force and 53 nurses had died while on duty.¹

Canadian servicewomen have been located in combat zones, been taken prisoners of war and killed, and Canadian civilian women have participated in irregular warfare (e.g., espionage, intelligence operations etc.). However, at no time in their military history have Canadian women ‘officially’ participated as combat personnel in military assault units – ground, sea or air (Park 1986: 3). In terms of the integration of women into combat, MacKenzie and Acreman argue that the Canadian Forces (CF) are at the forefront of social change. However, they also tell us that a “concerted effort is required if we are to be successful in overcoming widespread resistance and reactionary attitudes regarding the employment of women in the CF and, in particular, their employment in the combat arms” (MacKenzie/Acreman 1991: 18).

“It is quite clear that acceptance of women in the military service and questions about their ability as leaders have been overshadowed by controversy over whether they should participate in combat and whether they could lead in battle. Much of the debate is rooted in attitudes, and changes in laws and regulations will not automatically alter social tradition.” (Staff Support Branch 1978: 147) Controversy over women in the CF reached a head in 1998 when Maclean’s Magazine published a cover story exposing cases of alleged rape,
gang rape and sexual harassment in the CF. The magazine was inundated with so many letters, email and telephone calls that it brought out the next issue with the same cover theme and continued to publish letters and editorials in subsequent issues. The stories raised questions about the culture of the armed forces and the place of women in that culture. Journalists accused senior officers of ignoring allegations of impropriety or making light of reported assaults (Maclean’s Magazine 3 July 1998). The Canadian public was shocked by cover stories entitled Rape in the Military or Abuse of Power. Following on the heels of the Somalia Inquiry, the military was once again perceived as closing ranks and adopting an attitude of ‘washing your dirty laundry in the family’. Military women came forward on both sides revealing long held secrets of sexual assault or, on the other hand, defending the decency of their co-workers. These articles revealed the increased interest by the media and the Canadian public in the conduct of the armed forces. With increased scrutiny comes the demand for more transparency and accountability.

In this chapter we will examine the integration of women into the CF. The definition of integration has two parts. The first is a legal standard where women and men are incorporated as equals into the military. That is, according to Canadian law women and men have equal access to all occupations within the CF and there is no discrimination based on gender. The second is of a social nature. Here, integration is defined as the full acceptance of women as equals. Thus, it is broader than women being legally allowed to enter male dominated areas such as the combat arms (Dunn 1999). We will argue that the combat arms are more divergent from civilian society. As a result they emphasize

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2 The magazine described 24 cases of sexual harassment and rape which occurred in the early 1990’s.
the values and attitudes of the traditionally male-oriented military organization and, in particular, masculine models of the warrior, thus resisting female integration. As Cotton has pointed out, those with a latent role identity of soldier are more than twice as likely to reject the employment of women in the combat arms than those with a civilian/employee role identity. Those with a combat identity find gender integration to be an emotional issue and feel that the employment of women in combat units would have a negative effect on cohesion and motivation in battle. While those with a civilian orientation are more likely to consider the issue in terms of trends toward increased female participation in the labour force and concerns for equality of opportunity between the sexes. “The basic difference lies in their relative frames of reference; for one, it is a secular issue to do with equal opportunities for ‘qualified’ persons in an employment sector; for the other, it is an emotional issue linked to military traditions and survival on the battlefield.” (Cotton 1979: 85, 88)

This chapter is based primarily upon documentary research on gender integration in the CF. We also examined how scholars have addressed change within military organizations, in particular, how certain sectors of the military react differently to change. This was pertinent to this chapter since we are particularly interested in how externally-imposed human rights legislation has led to change within the CF, in this case, the full integration of women into the combat arms. In addition, informal interviews were conducted with CF personnel. There were approximately 20 unstructured, open-ended interviews done with CF personnel who ranged in rank from major to major-general. There were males and females interviewed, including infantry personnel and CF staff responsible for gender integration. These interviews which were done during the period of January 1997 to November 1998, provided us familiarity with the topic as well as some insight into the
obstacles that women have faced as they attempt to integrate into the CF.

2 Theoretical Perspectives

In the post WWII era sociologists such as Morris Janowitz observed change in the US military because of technological advances. Changing technology, according to Janowitz, created new patterns of combat and therefore modified organizational behavior in the military. In short, the more complex the technology of warfare, the narrower the differences between military and non-military establishments (Janowitz 1970: 143). Building upon the work of Janowitz, Charles Moskos made reference to a “continuum ranging from a military organization highly differentiated from civilian society to a military system highly convergent with civilian structures” (Moskos 1973: 266). This became known as the Institutional/Occupational model. This model assumes a continuum ranging from a military organization highly divergent from civilian society to one highly convergent with civilian structures (Moskos 1988: 57).

According to this model, tension and interplay between institutional (stressing divergence from civilian society) and occupational tendencies (stressing convergence with civilian society) characterize organizational change within the armed forces. Moskos, however, points out that to argue that the military is an institution or an occupation “is to do an injustice to reality. Both elements have been and always will be present in the military system” (Moskos 1988: 57). This seems to be reflected in what Moskos calls the segmented or plural military. The plural military is both convergent and divergent with civilian society and it simultaneously displays organizational trends that are civilianized and traditional. Moskos adds, however, that
the segmented military “will not be an alloy of opposing trends, but a compartmentalization of these trends”. He argues that the plural model does not foresee a “homogeneous military” lying somewhere between the civilianized and traditional poles, instead, “the emergent military will be internally segmented into areas which will be either more convergent or more divergent than the present organization of the armed forces” (Moskos 1973: 275).

Moskos argues that divergent/traditional features in the military will become most pronounced in labour-intensive support units, combat forces and possibly at senior command levels. On the other hand, the convergent or civilianized features will accelerate in functions dealing with education, clerical administration, logistics, medical care, transportation, construction and other technical tasks. The divergent or traditional sector will “stress customary modes of military organization”, while at the same time, “there will be a convergent sector which operates on principles common to civil administration and corporate structures” (Moskos 1973: 277). This implies that different services in the military may have different attitudes towards the integration of women.

In terms of the service environments, the organizational characteristics tending toward convergence with civilian structures have been most apparent in the air force, somewhat less so in the navy, and least of all in the army. This has also been a pattern concerning the acceptance of women. “Where the material technology of a service is similar to technologies found in the civilian labor force, and particularly where that technology substitutes capital intensive automated conflict for more traditional mass face-to-face battle, acceptance of women is higher.” (Segal/Segal 1983: 255) In the US case, women have been integrated most fully into the high technology U.S. air force while the navy, with a more traditional structure but a high technology base, is
experiencing increases in female participation. However, the US military has not yet accepted women serving in the traditionally male ground combat specialities that do not have counterparts in the civilian labour force. Thus, the greatest restrictions to expansion are found in the army and the marine corps (Segal/Segal 1983: 255).

2.1 Convergence and Divergence Theory Applied to the CF

According to CF policy, it is important that the CF be integral to the society it serves, not isolated from it. Therefore the composition of the military should reflect the population it serves. If this is true, then the CF should reflect the diversity found in Canadian society. However, it does not. Even though women make up 51% of the workforce in Canada, in the CF only 13.4% are women (Department of National Defence 1998: 13). However, it is important to note that there are inter service differences in Canada similar to those found in the US military. We can see that the air force seems to be more at ease with the presence of women than the navy and particularly the army. For example, in the SeaOps/Tech there are 298 (4.4%) women and 6500 men. The Air Ops/Tech has 718 women (8.5%) and 7704 men (Tanner 1997: 14). This difference between the services was also found in the late 1980’s. In its 1989 ruling, the Human Rights Tribunal made references to the 1980’s SWINTER (Servicewomen Women in Non-Traditional Environments and Roles) trials and noted: “The evaluation of the air trial concluded that social integration had occurred in a satisfactory manner in a majority of squadrons. Women had performed their tasks well, had received no preferential treatment, and a majority of servicemen agreed that women should be fully employed in previously all male units. The commanding officers believed that this integration was successful and did not compromise effectiveness because both men and women were held to the same
high training standards. In other words, the inclusion of women would not detract from but would sustain the esprit de corps. The air service was, as a result, prepared to develop a workable rule regarding pregnancy, and to re-assess its physical selection standards so as to be gender-neutral in effect as well as intention.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 26)

As of 1987 all restrictions on the employment of women in air force units had been removed. Major General Morton testified to the Human Rights Tribunal that air units were satisfied that women could be employed in combat roles in mixed gender units without compromising the operational effectiveness of the units. He stated that factors such as danger, living space, and environment were less important than physical ability, stamina and acceptance by males. These could be dealt with in a slow and methodical manner. In short, the change could be managed without compromising standards (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 36).

Although these changes were occurring in the air element, the sea and land trials revealed more problematic results. Even though women were judged to perform jobs competently there was unsatisfactory social integration, from the point of view of all parties. Women complained of the fishbowl effect. Men asserted that women lacked the necessary physical stamina and combat motivation, and that there was reverse discrimination. The SWINTER trial report suggested that many of the problems could be traced to initial poor selection and training, lack of identification of special skills needed, inadequate job definitions, and poor organizational or management preparation (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 26–27).

Thus the military in Canada seems to be divided into those who represent what Moskos calls an institutional orientation (divergent
with civilian society) and those who have an occupational orientation (convergent with civilian society) concerning the integration of women. Female participation continues to be highest in the more traditional types of MOC (military occupation) groups for women (e.g. medical/dental and support) and lowest in the operational type MOC groups (Tanner 1997: V). Women constitute only a small percentage of the combat arms: “Effective 30 Nov 97, women comprised 1.9 percent of the total strength of the combat arms officer corps and 0.9 percent of the total strength of soldiers in the combat arms. However, at the same time women comprised only 0.6 percent of the trained effective strength of the combat arms officer corps, and 0.6 percent\(^3\) of the trained effective strength of soldiers in the combat arms. These proportions translate into a total of ten women employed within three different combat arms officer occupations, and 53 women employed within five different combat arms occupations for Non – Commissioned Members (NCMs).” (Davis/Thomas 1998: 3)

2.2 A History of Differences in Attitudes Between the Three Services

Differences in attitudes regarding the employment of women amongst the land, sea and air elements were noticeable in the late 1970’s. In a 1978 questionnaire administered to 4314 CF members and their spouses, the results indicated that the answers given by those serving at sea were willing to “see women serve at sea in support ships” and that there was no clear “majority either for or against women serving in destroyers, but there was a majority against women serving in submarines”. Most of them indicated that they would be willing “to serve with women on board their present ship”. The sailors also believed that “women would either make no difference or improve the

\(^3\) As compared to 10454 men (Tanner 1997: 14).
operational effectiveness in a support ship, but that their presence would have a detrimental effect on operational effectiveness of destroyers and submarines” (these being combat ships). What is also interesting here is that the sailors “were in favour of women as aircrew, but were against the use of women as fighting soldiers” (Directorate Personnel Development Studies 1978: 4).

Answers given by those in land combat units were different from the sailors. “Personnel serving in the land force were strongly opposed (69 %) to women being allowed to serve in the Combat Arms.” They did, however, believe that women should have the opportunity to serve in service units and in combat support. “A majority (56 %) of soldiers believed that the operational effectiveness of the Combat Arms units would be greatly impaired by the introduction of women. They foresaw less serious impairment to the combat support and service units.” What is also interesting here is that soldiers “were prepared to have women serve as aircrew and in some of the field units, notably service and combat support units. They were concerned about the physical and emotional makeup of women and the effect these might have on Combat Arms units’ operational effectiveness. A slight majority were against women serving as sailors.” (Directorate Personnel Development Studies 1978: 5)

The answers of those serving on flying bases were generally in favour of women as aircrew. The majority of the respondents believed that women could serve in all aircraft types except high performance aircraft. “In the latter case, they judged that operational effectiveness would be degraded. Similarly, the majority of respondents considered women capable of serving in all types of air units except Tactical Fighter, Destroyer Helicopter and Tactical Helicopter squadrons.” Again, what is also interesting here is that “a slight majority of the airmen sampled were against women serving as soldiers and sailors.”
As we saw earlier, attitudes within the air element changed towards women and, in 1987, the air force removed all restrictions involving women.

In November of 1977, a poll was conducted by Gallup Canada for the Department of National Defence regarding the employment of females “in active military combat roles” in an attempt to assess Canadian public opinion towards women serving as soldiers, sailors and aircrew. The results indicated that 55% of the respondents were in favour of females serving at sea as sailors, that 53% were in favour of female employment in land combat, and that 62% were in favour of their employment as military aircrew. In May 1978, Gallup Canada did another poll. The results of this poll showed similar results although the percentages were lower. In relation to females serving at sea, 50% of the respondents were in favour of the idea, while 44% were against it. In relation to land combat units, 49% were in favour, while 45% were against the idea. On the other hand, 58% of the respondents favoured females serving as military aircrew and 36% were against the idea (Directorate Personnel Development Studies 1978: 10–11).

These findings, although not recent, are interesting, as they seem to demonstrate the idea of divergence-convergence. The air force as well as the public at large both seemed to have similar favourable responses in relation to the integration of women in the air force. However, in regard to the integration of women in the combat arms, the land personnel seemed to be against integration, i.e. divergent, and public opinion was more divided on the issue. That is, the air force (high technology) seems to be more convergent with civilian society/attitudes and was more ‘open’ to changes. Again, this is particularly evident in the air force’s 1987 decision to abolish its restrictions concerning women.
Differences in attitudes amongst the service environments are also noticeable when we examine the final reports of the social/behavioural science evaluation of the SWINTER trials. In relation to the Aircrew Trial, almost all servicewomen and the majority of servicemen at the five operational trial squadrons assessed as satisfactory the performance of female flight engineers, pilots and navigators. “At all squadrons except one, female aircrew were rated as displaying the normal range of flying abilities. Seventy-seven percent of the aircrew completing surveys in 1985 agreed that women should continue serving as aircrew in some capacity.” (Park/Phillippo 1985: II–III) Also, 93% of female aircrew and 74% of male aircrew believed that women “should be liable for air combat operational duties on the same basis as men” (Park/Phillippo 1985: III). Based on the overall results of the Aircrew Trial social/behavioural science evaluation, “a satisfactory social integration was achieved at four of the five squadrons with a partial acceptance of women at the fifth squadron. At four operational air squadrons, the majority of servicemen agreed that women had performed satisfactorily, did not receive preferential treatment, and should continue serving as aircrew in some capacity in the future.” (Park/Phillippo 1985: IV–V)

In relation to the Sea Trial, there were three major findings. First, women appeared to function effectively aboard the trial ship, the HMCS Cormorant. In particular, servicewomen were consistently rated by their fellow male crewmembers and the ship’s captains during the trial period as capable of performing their trade tasks. Second, work relationships between women and men were repeatedly rated as satisfactory by both male and female crewmembers over the four-year employment. Finally, the majority of service members who completed attitudinal surveys during the four-year period supported the continuing employment of women aboard HMCS Cormorant (Park 1984: II–III). However, the findings did not indicate that a completely
satisfactory social integration of female and male crewmembers had been achieved. Within the mixed-gender crew, the contributions of men and women were not mutually valued. Servicewomen tended to remain segregated from the larger group of male crewmembers throughout the trial period and were accorded only a partial acceptance (Park 1984: III). The evaluation, however, did not “show cause” for excluding women from continuing to serve aboard the HMCS Cormorant (Park 1984: V).

As for the Land Trial, Park tells us that “servicemen and servicewomen in the two trial units did not achieve a satisfactory social integration over the four-year trial period” (Park 1985: II). Instead, “the attitudes and behaviours expressed by men and women in the two trial units showed that servicewomen, at best, were ‘accommodated not assimilated’ (...) during their trial postings” (Park 1985: 39). Almost 50 % of the servicemen in the trials continued to view servicewomen as “women first, tradesperson second, and soldier never”. Women were not considered to be reliable co-workers. Servicewomen themselves were demoralized and understood that they were only tolerated by many men. The servicewomen in the trials were able to identify the primary reason for their unsatisfactory social integration. As one women stated: “It’s not the job (...) it’s the men and the constant putting down. It’s hard.” (Park 1985: 39) Finding little comfort in turning to other women for support, given that “if we stick together, we’re told we’re not trying to fit in”, they also found “the guys who like us won’t stick up for us”. The highlighting of differences between men and women and the voicing of distrust and resentment of each other prevailed throughout the trial period as the two sexes struggled to work and live together (Park 1985: 39). In her report, Park concluded with some interesting observations, “Just as certain women were found ill-suited for a field posting because of their lesser physical strength (...) certain men were found to be ill-
suited for being in a mixed-gender unit because of their inability to work with women.” (Park 1985: 47–48) The distorting of perceptions to fit existing beliefs, the generalizing of one woman’s difficulties to conclude that all women were incompetent and making additional objections once early complaints of the integration of women were found groundless and symptomatic of stereotypic and dysfunctional attitudes during the Land Trials (Park 1985: 47–48). Nevertheless, the most important criterion in determining women’s integration into an all-male unit – the overall impact that women had on a unit’s operational effectiveness – was judged by the unit commanding officers, throughout the trial period, as NOT having been compromised (Park 1985: 52–53). It was therefore concluded that mixed-gender combat service support units were in fact viable if certain steps were taken to facilitate gender integration (Park 1985: 53).

According to Lamerson, the negative attitudes of men towards women entering non-traditional roles can be attributed to a lack of information about women’s abilities in the new role. As the SWINTER Land Trial findings suggest “men’s negative reactions to women were based on unfamiliarity in working with women in field units, failure to prepare men for the introduction of women into their unit, and hesitancy of men in accepting women as potential combatants” (Lamerson 1987: 4). Men may feel considerable ownership of a unit, based on their perception of its roles as ‘masculine’. This is particularly true of the views of combat roles. Lamerson also points out that, from the SWINTER experience, it was recognized that the more ‘masculine’ the setting the more resistant servicemen were to the integration of women (Lamerson 1987: 6). Similarly Park also found that “the more ‘masculine’ the setting, the greater confusion women experienced in identifying appropriate behaviours for themselves” (Park 1986: 20). Although it could be argued that attitudes and other factors that led to
the unsuccessful integration of women in the Land Trial were due to men not being ‘familiar’ with the idea of working with women, successful integration has still not taken place within the combat arms. Part of the explanation lies in the vision of combat as a masculine domain.

3 Women and Images of War

According to Weinstein and White images of war are “overwhelmingly masculine” even though many women have served in armies and have abetted war efforts. They add that many women have died as a result of war yet, the myth of the male warrior has made female warriors nearly invisible (Weinstein/White 1997: 55). However there are stories of female combatants such as Molly Hays (1778), Lucy Brewer (War of 1812), Sarah Borginis (Mexican War), Sarah Edwards (American Civil War) and Flora Sanders (WW I). There have also been influential women such as Maria Clausewitz who edited her husband’s classic On War after his death (Bourke 1999: 306–344; Small 1998).

Similarly, Stoddard argues that the myth persists that women have never served in combat even as the direct combat experience of WW II servicewomen continues to be documented (Stoddard 1994: 4). M. Segal tells us that the reason for this is that public discourse and other forms of social life are socially constructed to support a perception that women are not combatants (Segal 1993: 81). This social construction links women with peace and men with war. “Much of the opposition to women in combat has been based directly on (...) ideological notions of gender.” (Peach 1994: 8) Carroll and Welling Hall argue that when we talk about women and the use of force, we are digging at the roots of what simultaneously makes women
feminine and men masculine. Not a biological determinism that makes males aggressive and females passive, but how we as human beings have constructed and continue to interpret the world (Carroll/Welling Hall 1993: 20). Thus, there is a widely held view that women have a role in society quite different from that of men. Women are seen as the bearers, not the takers, of life, and as the embodiment of peaceful rather than aggressive qualities. These attitudes made the idea of female front-line troops unthinkable (Charter Task Force 1986: 3).

Segal and Segal point out that the military has traditionally been an “exclusive male province characterized by prototypic masculine norms” (Segal/Segal 1983: 165). Military women are thus seen as disrupting both traditional stereotypes of women’s roles and the traditional ways in which men have demonstrated their masculinity. Shilts seems to argue along similar lines when he says that “the issue of women in the military was never about women; it was about men and their need to define their masculinity” (Thomas/Thomas 1996: 70). Herbert remarks that the military holds the male soldier, and particularly the combat soldier, as an ideal type, and that by seeking to emulate that which they are not and can never be, women are marginalized within the military (Herbert 1992).

In their study of military wives in Canada, Harrison and Laliberté tell us that the military uses its “socially constructed polarity” between masculine and feminine in order to use masculinity as the “cementing principle” which unites military men in order to distinguish them from non-military men and women (Harrison/Laliberté 1997: 36). Similarly Thomas and Thomas maintain that when women can do “a man’s job”, that job can no longer be used as a sign of manhood (Thomas/Thomas 1996: 70). Robinson’s work shows that hostility towards integration of women in the military has nothing to do with women’s capabilities, but it has a great deal to do with the fear that
women in combat would disorient men and deprive them of their unique role (Robinson 1985: 102–103).

These beliefs affect female recruits in the CF. In her report on gender integration Davis tells us that women must cope with symbols and behaviors which perpetuate and maintain male ideology in the CF. Davis describes how as women enter the “man’s world” they are struggling not only with questions surrounding their capability to do “men’s work”, but with issues surrounding their identity as women. She adds that the male identity of the organization is “strongly evident through sexualized behaviors and norms, such as male attitudes of paternalism, sexist male talk, joking and innuendo, pinups and calendars, and sexual harassment, in the day-to-day environment of work” (Davis 1997: 185–186). Thus women, represent a “difference” which the organization as a whole has not fully embraced and integrated (Davis 1997: 195).

Ideological identifications of the military as being masculine allows men to be the standard by which women are often evaluated (Peach 1994: 7). This helps to perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in this institution, especially in combat positions. According to Weinstein: “The issues of women in combat and sexual harassment make it clear that women are still not readily admitted into that hallowed inner male sanctum of the military. Military women are expected to be strong and independent (masculine norms), yet if they are too strong and/or too independent they are viewed as dykes. If, on the other hand, military women are too weak and too dependent on the men (feminine norms) they are viewed as incompetent drags on the system (they limit unit readiness).” (Weinstein 1997: XVII)

However, as Chandler, Bryant and Bunyard, point out women’s participation in real combat situations has rarely been fully tested and,
“where analyses of women’s wartime performance have been undertaken, they largely confirm their positive contribution” (Chandler 1995: 127). Even when studies have demonstrated that women do not degrade and may actually enhance the performance of their units in combat-support tasks, the impact of women on military effectiveness has been the subject of debate (Wilcox 1992: 311). It is often argued that the integration of women threatens the cohesion of combat units thus affecting combat capability – the core of military activity and identity. In addition, it has been argued that women are not able to meet the physical requirements for combat thus threatening the safety of the units they are in.\(^4\)

Some members of the Canadian military consider themselves to be unique and different from other government departments. The Conference of Defence Associations, in a paper called *Recovery Measures For The Canadian Armed Forces: Advice For The Minister Of National Defence*, argues that the insistence of government on the matter of women in the combat arms: “is an example of how Canadians often move from naivety into the realm of stupidity. It is yet another example of the inability to grasp that armed forces are in fact unique within society. Recent policy directing the army to establish 25% of combat arms as females by 1999 – by lowering standards if all else fails – simply means that the combat effectiveness of the forces will fall and they will no longer be capable of guarding and advancing the national interest. It also illustrates ‘civilianization’ since it puts the armed forces on the same footing as other uniformed parts of government.” (Conference of Defence Associations 1997: 7)

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\(^4\) Lack of privacy has also been cited as a reason for resisting the full integration of women, particularly in relation to deployment overseas and on field exercises where there is difficulty in supplying separate latrines, showers and sleeping quarters.
One of the military’s differences is “unlimited liability” which is the obligation to risk one’s life as a member of the military. Unlimited liability is yet another argument against women in combat. It has been argued that the idea of women coming back in body bags would demoralize fighting units and threaten cohesion. Moreover, male soldiers might put themselves, their unit and the mission at risk in order to protect their female comrades. In an interview with the Ottawa Citizen, Retired Maj.-Gen. Dan Loomis stated that “the problem with women isn’t that they’re not strong enough, isn’t that they’re not brave, isn’t that they won’t die well like the rest of us (...) The problem is group dynamics in a small group. You cannot get away from the basic nature of our species. There’s a natural protectiveness of men.” (Ottawa Citizen 19 December 1997)

Yet the position that women in the combat arms will degrade a unit’s operational effectiveness is not borne out by studies. Despite the presence of women during the SWINTER trials, no degradation in operational effectiveness was reported. Robinson commented: “Nevertheless, much speculation and many assumptions concerning women have been offered in attempting to justify the continuance of an outdated, discriminatory policy. These opinions are based primarily on myths and prejudicial stereotypes about women. No hard evidence has ever been produced in support of such attitudes. In fact, all evidence confirms that women have been combatants in times of war and continue to be; and, scepticism aside, they have conducted themselves just as well and, in some cases, better than their male counterparts.” (Robinson 1985: 101)

What is evident in reading some of the literature available on women in combat and arguments which surround their inclusion or exclusion is that for practically every argument used against women, there is a counter-argument that can be made. This is particularly true in the
case of physical standards where there is a perception that women cannot live up to these standards. This has helped perpetuate the stereotype that women do not belong in the military, particularly in combat positions. In a position paper prepared for the Canadian Department of National Defence entitled *The Impact Of Gender Integration On The Cohesion, Morale, And Combat Effectiveness Of Military Units*, D. Segal argued that there was no question that women and men were different (on the average) in a wide range of physical traits related to military performance. However, he did note that “physical conditioning increases the capabilities of women, and that while average differences between the genders persist after conditioning, the gender distributions tend to overlap. Thus, where these abilities are relevant to particular military trades, it is rational to screen for the ability rather than for gender, thereby selecting the most qualified individuals.” (Segal 1986: 24)

Cropsey believes that the problem with women in combat has nothing to do with their ability to become pregnant, their strength and so forth. Instead, “sexual attraction between men and women is as likely to destroy camaraderie as it is to produce constant dissension among men in a group. The difficulty is not (...) that men instinctually protect women, but that both men and women in couples will protect one another to the exclusion of what is good for the unit.” On the other hand, Robinson argues that it is “ludicrous to think that, in the heat and dirt of battle, there would be time for romantic liaisons. Close attachments would perhaps be formed, because there have always been close friendships among combat soldiers. Such ‘bonding’ transcends romantic attachments and stimulates combatants to fight more fiercely when one of their number is killed (Robinson 1985: 101). Segal concluded that “despite the fact that in the short run, as a new phenomenon, gender integration is frequently met with resistance which in turn may constrain cohesion, there is no indication
that gender integration negatively affects the performance of military units” (Segal 1986: 19). He also found that while there were problems when previously all-male military formations were gender integrated, there was no firm scientific evidence that would justify the categorical exclusion of women from combat units on organizational grounds (Segal 1986: 24). In short, the arguments used against integrating women in the combat arms seem to be more emotional than grounded in fact.

It should be noted here that the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal made some interesting comments in relation to Segal’s findings. For example, it cited his observation that the major basis for the categorical exclusion of women from combat units are cultural values regarding appropriate roles for women and resistance from male military personnel. The Tribunal concluded that: “Women are, with training, capable of combat roles. The experience of women in combat in the Second World War bears this out. The decision of the air force bears this out. Performance was not an issue as a result of SWINTER trials. Cohesion and the physical and environmental elements are susceptible to management. Integration policies and practices can be designed and applied. We agree with the report of Dr. Segal that attitude is a major factor in making integration work (...) Behaviour can to some extent be mandated, with sanctions and rewards as inducements but attitudinal change may not keep pace, and it is this element that must accompany the implementation of an integration policy. Leadership and commitment to integration are essential at the mid and upper levels of command because it is in the operational units that integration must take place.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 60) In brief, allowing women to enter combat positions is a controversial and emotional issue as it challenges the traditional ideology that war is a man’s world where women do not belong.
4 Externally Imposed Change

In this section we will examine the sources of ‘external pressure’ which led to changes in the combat status of women in Canada. In particular, we will focus on the 1970 report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women; the 1978 Canadian Human Rights Act; Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985) and the 1989 Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s decision on the status of women in the CF (combat arms). It was these laws, regulations and rulings from civilian sources that eventually resulted in the opening of combat positions for women in the CF (full integration of women).

4.1 Royal Commission on the Status of Women (1970)

The report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women marked a turning point for women in the CF. It put pressure on the Department of National Defence to improve conditions of service for military women (Davis 1997: 180; Robinson 1985: 100). Of the 167 recommendations made for changes to provide a climate of equal opportunity for women in Canada, six pertained to women in the CF. These six recommendations were that: all trades in the CF be open to women; the prohibition on the enlistment of married women in the CF be eliminated; the length of the initial engagement be the same for women and men; release from the CF because of pregnancy be prohibited; the CF Superannuation Act be amended so that its

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5 The importance of the hearings was that it was the resolution of an issue of general societal concern and of broad public policy. That issue was, should women generally be permitted to train for and enter into occupations and to perform roles which are combat related, occupations and roles that were at the time closed to them; would the operational effectiveness of the CF be adversely affected by the introduction of women into such occupations and roles; and could this assessment appropriately be made by professional military judgement. (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 1–2)
provisions would be the same for men and women; and finally, women be admitted to the military college operated by the Department of National Defence (Charter Task Force 1986: 3–4). Several of these recommendations were dealt with immediately. Married women could be enrolled in the CF. Women who had children would no longer be released, and women and men became subject to the same initial engagement and superannuation terms. However, it took much longer for the military colleges and all occupations to be opened to women.

The Canadian Forces Defence Council directed that there would be no limitations on the employment of women other than in the primary combat roles (Simpson et al. 1979 cited in Davis 1996: 7). A decision was also taken to increase the number of women to a total of between 8000 and 10000 by 1981. By March 1974 there were 2373 women in the Canadian Forces, employed in 33 of 95 trades. This represented an increase from 1.8 percent of the total force in 1970 to approximately 3 percent of a total force of 81000 (Davis 1996: 8). Over the years, roles for women in the CF continued to expand. By 1978, women made up 5.9 percent of the CF and were employed in 81 of 127 classifications and trades (Davis 1996: 8). Thus, although external pressure led to change the military still did not allow women to be fully integrated into the CF.

4.2 The Canadian Human Rights Act (1978)

In 1978, the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) was passed, bringing more external pressure to bear upon the CF. The Act prohibits discrimination on ten grounds. They are: race, national or

6 Women became eligible for subsidized education at civilian universities, in other words, the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), but they only entered the military colleges with full cadet status in 1980 (Hellstrom 1996: 93).
ethnic origin, colour, religion, age, sex (including pregnancy and childbirth), marital status, family status, a pardoned conviction, and physical or mental disability (including disfigurement and dependence on drugs or alcohol) (Pinch 1994: 7). The CHRA forced the complete reassessment of military policy as it stipulated that there should be no discrimination against women, except under bona fide occupational requirement (Suh 1989: 171). Thus, the Act prohibited discrimination in employment practices with the exception that “a job could be refused to a person who could not perform it safely, efficiently and reliably” (Davis 1996: 9). Now, the CF had to demonstrate why it was not possible for women to go into combat.

Hellstrom (1996: 94) tells us that the CF attempted to justify discrimination against women through the SWINTER trials. “The purpose of the SWINTER trials was to determine the impact of employing mixed groups in various environments, and the main criterion against which the trials were to be assessed was the effect of mixed gender groups on operational capabilities. Because of the importance of these trials in the determination of future policies for women’s employment, and indeed for the justification of exclusion of women from some occupations (in contrast to the declared principles of the Canadian Human Rights Act), considerable time and attention was paid to the design and assessment of the trials.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 19–20)

The aim of the trials (which were to last five years) was to assess the impact on operational effectiveness of women’s inclusion in near combat roles such as combat service support, field ambulances, aircrew in transport, and search and rescue squadrons; at remote

7 When the SWINTER trials began, the number of women in the regular forces had risen to over 5000. This was three times greater than in 1970 (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 19).
39

locations (such as Alert); and at sea, in the navy’s only non-combatant ship, HMCS Cormorant (Hellstrom 1996: 94–95). In the mid-1980’s the results of SWINTER trials were made available. In spite of methodological difficulties\(^8\) it seemed clear that a \textit{bona fide} occupational requirement restricting the employment of women could no longer be sustained.

4.3 Section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1985)

On 17 April 1985, when the SWINTER trials were near completion, the equality section (Section 15) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into effect. Section 15 ensured that discrimination on the basis of sex (among other things) would no longer be tolerated unless \textit{bona fide} occupational reasons could be established. A parliamentary committee was set up to examine areas that might be in conflict with Section 15 of the Charter. In its 1985 report, the Parliamentary Committee on Equality Rights recommended that “all trades and occupations in the Canadian Armed Forces be open to women” (MacKenzie 1990: 3–4). According to the Human Rights Tribunal, “The Parliamentary Committee’s recommendation that all restrictions on women’s employment be dropped was based on its belief that excluding women from so many job opportunities, most of them related to combat in an indirect way, had adverse consequences: it closed to women many well paid jobs after military service, because military training was not available to them; it hindered their promotion in the Forces because they lacked experience in occupations and units

\(^8\) Certainly the reliability of the results of the SWINTER trials can be questioned. This is because combat situations cannot be easily simulated and because women were simply not assigned combat duties in the SWINTER trials. The Human Rights Tribunal found that, “The limitations of the trials, the research methodology, the design of the tests and so on made the ‘results’ less definitive than many had hoped.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 28)
that were combat linked; and it excluded them from experience and training in leadership.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 29)

The Committee concluded that “the Canadian Armed Forces must revise its present policy, a process that has begun but is proceeding all too slowly” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 30). The Canadian Government’s response to the Committee Report was short: The Government is fully committed to expanding the role of women in the Armed Forces and will ensure that women will be able to compete for all trades and occupations. The Government shall vigorously pursue this policy in a manner consistent with the requirement of the Armed Forces to be operationally effective in the interests of national security (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 30).

Within the CF, a task force was created to flesh out the Government’s response to the Committee Report. “A Charter Task Force was set up, one senses with some urgency, to determine the effect on CAF policies of the Government response concerning the employment of women, sexual orientation, mandatory retirement (...) to examine relevant information (...) and to develop options so as to meet Government policy objectives (i.e. enhancement of individual rights and freedoms) within requirements of operational effectiveness and efficiency.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 30) The Charter Task Force recommended an expansion of the roles for women in the CF and that a program be developed to provide detailed policy guidance and leadership training concerning mixed-gender employment (Davis 1996: 10).

In June 1986, Canadian Forces Administrative Orders 49-14 and 49-15 were issued to the regular force by the Chief of the Defence Staff. Administrative Order 49-14 outlined a general employment policy for
the CF. This opened up all units or occupations to female members of
the CF, and laid down one caveat: “any limitation on eligibility for
employment resulting from the requirement that a member’s
participation be able to contribute to operational effectiveness will be
confined to the minimum that must be imposed in order to achieve the
required standard of operational effectiveness of the regular forces in
general.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 31) At the same
time, Administrative Order 49-15 addressed mixed gender
employment and reiterated a justification for the exclusion of women
in some occupations and units.9 The military was resisting gender
integration on the basis that it affected cohesion and morale:
“Empirical evidence gained throughout the history of warfare has
proven that the operational effectiveness of an armed force is
decisively affected by a combination of human factors (...) The
stresses encountered in battle drive members of the units involved to
their physical and psychological limits. The ability to continue to
perform effectively under these extreme conditions requires a high
level of physical and mental strength and stamina. Most importantly,
effectiveness in battle is vitally dependent on a strong bonding among
the members, which is essential to units’ cohesion and morale.
Empirical evidence has shown that human stresses are compounded
by the added complexities of mixed-gender groups. Concern that such
additional stress would seriously jeopardize operational effectiveness
has resulted in every major nation in the world maintaining limits on
mixed-gender composition in their armed forces, particularly in units
which are most likely to face an enemy directly in battle.

9 The annexes to Administrative Order 49-15. The annexes listed 21 units designated as
single-gender male, some of which included destroyers, submarines, artillery, infantry and
armoured units. Months later, five of these units were opened to mixed gender employment.
They included supply ships, field ambulances and military police. Approximately 40
military occupations were also designated single-gender male, including infantry, artillery
and many naval trades. Again, some months later four of these were opened up to mixed
gender. They included pilot, flight engineer and air navigator. (Human Rights Tribunal
Decision 1989: 33)
Consequently, in order not to jeopardize the operational effectiveness dictated by the needs of national security, the composition of some units will remain single-gender male. As a result, a number of military occupations will be restricted to men, and in a number of others, there will be a minimum male component.” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 32)

In 1987, a new set of trials were announced called CREW (Combat-Related Employment of Women). According to MacKenzie and Acreman, the aim of the trials was not to “test women” but “to evaluate the impact of mixed gender units on operational effectiveness” (MacKenzie 1990: 4). At this time, ten army units and four naval units were classed as single-gender male only. They were combat units such as submarines, destroyer, infantry, armoured, artillery and so forth. Thirty-three military occupations were single gender male while fifty-two had a minimum male component (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 39). Hellstrom tells us that the CREW trials aimed to bring women initially into the hard sea trades, in signals, field artillery and infantry, with follow-on trials in air defence artillery, field engineers and armour. The air force had already opened everything to women, including the fighter pilot classification, so it was not included in the CREW trials (Hellstrom 1996: 96). Again, this demonstrates that women seemed to be more accepted in the convergent sectors (air force) than in the divergent ones (land combat arms). However, the CREW trials had hardly begun when a complaint of discrimination on the basis of sex, under the Canadian Human Rights Act, was launched against the CF by four individuals – three women and one man – which ended in before a Human Rights Tribunal. We will now examine some of the conclusions that were made by this Tribunal.
In 1989, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal ruled that “all trials of women in non-traditional roles were to cease and that women were to be fully integrated into all Canadian Forces roles, except service on submarines, during the following ten-year period” (Davis 1997: 181). The case that was before the Tribunal involved three people who complained that they were individually denied entry to combat support or combat employment because they were women. The fourth complainant was a man who alleged that limiting the risk of combat duty to men discriminated against them. The complaints were made under Sections 5, 7 and 10 of the Canadian Human Rights Act “which prohibits discrimination on specified grounds, in this instance, sex, in the provision of services and employment, and which prohibits the establishment or pursuit, by an organization, of a discriminatory policy or practice” (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 1). The issues in this case were: should women generally be permitted to train for and enter into occupations and to perform roles which were combat related, occupations and roles which were closed to them at the time; would the operational effectiveness of the CF be adversely affected by the introduction of women into such occupations and roles; and could this assessment appropriately be made by professional military judgement (Human Rights Tribunal Decision 1989: 1–2).

According to Hellstrom, the CF’s arguments before the Tribunal were similar to those used following the SWINTER trials, at the Parliamentary Committee hearings, in internal policy documents and in the Charter Task Force Report: the exclusion of women from combat, although discriminatory, was justified as a *bona fide* occupational requirement which ensured the operational effectiveness of the combat arms (Hellstrom 1996: 97). “They cited specific areas
contributing to operational effectiveness where, they believed, women’s presence could be detrimental. These included physical capability such as strength, endurance, the impact of pregnancy and child-related issues; environmental conditions such as lack of privacy, primitive toilet and sleeping facilities and the costs of modifying these; social relations and cohesion where the presence of women might be a complicating factor because of fraternization, harassment and favouritism. Eight years later, these arguments sound almost archaic, but it took the tribunal two years of hearings to find that the policy of designating certain occupations and units male-only was discriminatory.” (Hellstrom 1996: 97)

However, the Human Rights Tribunal found that the exemption from the Canadian Human Rights Act based on the occupational requirement could not be supported by the evidence. According to Pinch, despite the best professional opinion and scientific evidence that could be mustered, the CF were unable to convince the Tribunal that restrictions should remain (Pinch 1994: 8). Therefore, the Tribunal ruled that CF policy which designated specific units and occupations as male-only was an unjustified discriminatory practice. The Tribunal directed that all occupations and units in the CF be opened to women (with the exception of submarines because of privacy issues). It also ruled that the minimum-male requirement be eliminated; that gender-free selection standards be developed; that the integration of women take place with all due speed in order to achieve complete integration in both the reserve and regular forces within ten years; and that this process be subject to external and internal monitoring (Hellstrom 1996: 97).

1999 was the expiry date of the 1989 Human Rights Tribunal Ruling which ordered the CF to carry out full integration of women in the next ten years. With the conclusion of the Tribunal order, the
Commission no longer has a direct responsibility to monitor the CF’s activities and thus the CF is left to its own devices and willingness to remove the barriers to women entering and staying in combat positions. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal expressed its disappointment over the CF’s progress in integrating women into the combat arms over the ten year period. “Our view is that the Tribunal objectives have not been met”, said the Chief Commissioner. “In 1989, women represented 1% of all those in combat positions, while the current data provided to the Commission show women now represent 3.1% of those positions. No matter how you define ‘full integration’, the numbers demonstrate that integration has not been achieved.” (Falardeau-Ramsay 1999) The Commission believed that the reason for this failure was the attitude of some members of the CF towards female participation: “The Tribunal Order required a fundamental shift in the manner in which the CF and its members viewed the role of women and their place in fighting units. Despite the results of studies conducted by the Forces itself prior to the Tribunal decision, which demonstrated that women and men could successfully work together in these environments, it is apparent that not all members have been able to make this adjustment. Resistance continues even now.” (Falardeau-Ramsay 1999)

5 A Question of Attitudes

Cotton and Pinch argue that many of the decisions regarding women’s employment and careers in the military are made by men who are not “entirely positive in their attitudes toward women’s participation”. They add that “In general, the trials have shown that the most serious problem has proved to be traditional male attitudes” (Cotton/ Pinch 1986: 244–245). Although the CF tried to resist change through trials such as SWINTER, their resistance was ineffective as the CF was
‘ordered’ to integrate women. Thus, external pressures forced change in spite of resistance. In this case, external pressures forced the full integration of women. As the Canadian Human Rights Commission reported: “Sometimes it takes nothing short of a binding order to remove a systemic barrier, and even then it may meet with considerable reluctance. This has been the case in the military profession. A tribunal order was required before women were fully accepted into combat and combat-related positions in the Canadian Forces, even in principle.” (Canadian Human Rights Commission 1994: 58)

However, in examining these changes we have not described additional obstacles that women have to overcome. These include certain attitudes towards change in the CF. The Canadian Human Rights Commission tells us: “The Advisory Board’s third report (...) detailed a number of continuing attitudinal and procedural problems that make combat-related duties unduly difficult for women. They range from subtle signals from superiors that they are not welcome, to patronizing assignments and sexist remarks. Such behaviour indicates a lack of sustained support for the integration of women into the CAF (Canadian Armed Forces). (...) Given the Board’s findings, and the current lack of statistical data, we can only be left wondering just how much progress has in fact been made since 1989.” (Canadian Human Rights Commission 1994: 58)

Similarly, in its 1996 annual report, the Human Rights Commission reported: “The Commission has made it very clear to the Canadian Forces, at the most senior levels, that the integration of women is not receiving the attention it needs. The end of the ten-year deadline is almost upon us, and their representation in combat occupations appears to be stalled at a very low level. Incidents involving the treatment of a woman officer that came to light around the end of the
year seemed to suggest that the Armed Forces’ culture was still far from welcoming to women members. The Canadian Forces can hardly claim to be taking the tribunal order seriously if integration of women is not given a much higher priority, along with corresponding resources and a more active involvement of senior management.” (Canadian Human Rights Commission 1996: 53)

In April 1995, the Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the CF issued its fifth annual report called *Half-Way Through The Transition: A Mid-Term Review Of The Progress Of Gender Integration In The Canadian Forces 1989–1994*. Once again, the Board made some interesting observations. While systemic barriers to the employment of women were gradually being eliminated in the CF, attitudinal barriers were still present among some of the supervisors and leaders. The Board, however, concluded its report on an optimistic note: “This review has touched only lightly upon some of the issues that will be added to the matrix of change during the next five years (...) The MABGICF (Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces) is confident that, given the evidence of ability and willingness to change, and to investigate further institutional options evidenced to date by the CF, the commitment that has been observed in the mid-term review will, if sustained, monitored and adapted in a timely and responsible manner, allow the institution to meet the requirements of the HRT decision, the expectations of the Canadian public, and the principles of equitable employment during the five years that remain in the transitional period. There is much that remains to be done; but a solid base for continued development has been established.” (Minister’s Advisory Board on Gender Integration in the Canadian Forces 1995: 35)

However, a recent study by Davis and Thomas indicates that the concerns of the Human Rights Commission over the years have not
been exaggerated. Women in the combat arms are still finding themselves in an environment that often does not foster an atmosphere of acceptance. Their study, *Gender Integration Study: The Experience Of Women Who Have Served In The Combat Arms* (1998), found that women regularly experienced an environment that was characterized by discrimination and harassment and that often conveyed messages of non-acceptance. It was also an environment that women perceived as having subjective and inconsistent performance standards: “As gender issues in the combat arms are acted out, it appears that issues related to physical strength and stamina provide the curtain that masks other issues. As long as women are not as strong as men, it does not matter whether they have met the standards or not. The research suggests that when women meet the standards, the standards are questioned, the social and sexual activities of women are scrutinized, women’s leadership ability is questioned, and women’s perceptions of harassment and inequitable treatment are questioned.” (Davis/Thomas 1998: 7)

Davis and Thomas also tell us that women expressed considerable frustration that they were not “even given a chance”. Women understood that they were not accepted nor welcomed within the combat arms (Davis/Thomas 1998: 11). “The environment has been defined by men and maintained to train and employ men. The world that women enter is a world that defines and reinforces gender roles in a way that is in conflict with the role of a woman in the combat arms. Consequently, a woman’s motivation to take on a ‘male role’ is suspect. Within the combat arms, the motivations and behaviours of each woman are interpreted in a way that leaves no room for women to be there because they ‘want to do the job’. On the other hand, women understand that they will have to become ‘one of the guys’ if they are going to succeed. In the end, there is no where for them to go
because they cannot achieve either of these conflicting roles.” (Davis/Thomas 1998: 13)

For these women, the mental and physical demands of the work were not the real challenge of entering a traditionally male occupation. The real challenge was enduring the systematic rejection and bias against them that was evident in both ‘covert and overt’ attempts to get them out of the combat arms (Davis/Thomas 1998: 19). Asked to give advice to young women considering a career in the combat arms, many answered with a quick and decisive ‘DON’T DO IT!’. Many emphasized that a female combat arms candidate should make sure that she knew what she was getting into, and make sure that she was physically and psychologically prepared to enter a male-dominated environment that, for the most part, did not want women (Davis/Thomas 1998: 28–29).

6 Promoting Integration

What can be done in the present to further the integration of women in the CF? A number of important initiatives are already underway. The CF has established the Defence Diversity Council and an Advisory Committee on Gender Integration and Diversity. The diversity training program has begun to sensitize all members in the chain of command to the issues. The CF has also developed a more effective harassment policy and has targeted recruitment of women as a priority. In addition there are efforts underway to redesign equipment from rifles to rucksacks so that it is more suited to the female physique. However, vigilance is necessary in order to remove barriers to women entering and staying in the CF and continuous research and monitoring will remain an important component of this task.
Moreover, future leaders in the CF will have to face an important number of challenges if they are to successfully address the issue of female integration. How long can women work in the CF while they are pregnant? Will the CF enable a woman to take a maternity leave of absence and return to her career without being sidelined as a result? As women enter the combat arms there will probably be an increase in the number of dual service marriages. How will commanders deal with a married couple in the same unit. How will this affect the employment and deployment of these individuals within the unit? How will the CF tackle the question of postings and overseas deployments when there are children to be cared for and careers to be advanced? This question becomes even more pertinent in the case of single parent households. Will women be asked to jeopardize career advancement because they cannot be posted away from the family for six months? And on a daily basis how will single parents be able to meet the demands of the job and the family? What allowances is the CF willing to make for single parents or dual service couples? Policies concerning family support will need to be reviewed and enhanced in order to meet these new challenges.

As we have seen, although women have been allowed to enter the combat arms since 1989, they still face many barriers that are rooted in the negative attitudes of their male peers who still believe that combat is a male domain. This said, the long-term societal trend is clear: women will continue to enter the paid workforce, by choice or by necessity, and more will make the commitment to long-term careers. The CF must be in a position to take advantage of that trend if it is to meet its recruitment goals. In addition, the young men who will enroll in the CF of the future will be more at ease with women as colleagues and, hopefully, more supportive of them in new roles, than are many of the current middle-aged members of the CF. Thus, inter-generational attitudinal differences may resolve themselves in time. In
the interim, leadership must do everything possible to create a climate of tolerance and acceptance for women.

7 References


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Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces: From Visibility to ‘Eclipse’

Helena Carreiras

1 Introduction

The Portuguese armed forces for the first time included women in 1961, with the creation of an all-female corps in the air force. These first women were trained as parachutists with the mission of providing nursing assistance during the war in the Portuguese overseas territories in Africa. They served in combat areas in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau during the 13-year colonial war. Notwithstanding the fact that these women participated in difficult rescue missions in combat areas, their position was still rather exceptional. Not only were they placed in a separate corps and limited to support roles, but they also had a particular perspective regarding their participation in the war. One of these nurses declared: “I went overseas to help those who needed me, never to participate in a war. I was given a gun for personal defence, but I never used it. Besides, our vision was very different.” (Reis 1978).

In addition, the whole experience may be considered rather limited, since no more than 50 nurses graduated during the whole period and at the end of the war only 16 of them remained in active duty. Moreover, the immediate interruption of female recruitment after the end of the war brings the Portuguese case into the historically dominant pattern: women’s recruitment during war periods, followed by their ‘dismissal’ and return to traditionally female occupations at the end of the conflict.
More than two decades later, the situation had changed dramatically. Following the general European trend, the Portuguese armed forces opened their ranks to women. In 1988, two young women were accepted by the Air Force Academy for careers as pilots and from this moment on the three services gradually allowed women into their various establishments, including Service Academies, without rank restrictions.

Portuguese women found this an attractive opportunity. During the years of 1992 and 1993 around 3500 candidates applied for the army, navy and air force, and, in fact, the number of female candidates has always been much higher than the number of those actually incorporated. In the year 2000 almost 3000 women are serving as volunteers in the Portuguese armed forces, in a wide variety of services and positions.

The most remarkable point is, perhaps, that this change has taken place without public, political or military controversy. How then did this change come about?

More specifically, why, when and how did the Portuguese armed forces start to recruit women? To what extent was this related to changes in terms of force structure and military accession policies? Why do Portuguese women decide to enlist? How many are they? What functions do they perform? What problems and exclusions do they face? What was the reaction of political parties, women’s associations and the media to gender integration in the armed forces? Did ‘public’ attention shift throughout the decade?

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1 The exact numbers were the following: 1204 for the army, 662 for the navy and 1557 for the air force.
2 The Military

2.1 Women’s Recruitment, Force Structure and Military Accession Policies

Women’s military participation is affected by a wide variety of factors – deriving from military organizational features, social/economic structure and cultural and political values. In one of the very few essays aimed at explicit theory building in this field, Mady Segal has outlined a systematic theory of the conditions under which women’s military roles may expand or contract, assessing the relative and combined effects of those variables (Segal 1995). In her proposal, as well as in various other studies, one central observation is that different aspects related to the organizational structure of the military, such as the force structure and military accession policies, have always had a major importance in determining women’s military roles. Despite the decisive influence of other macro-social variables in creating the conditions that have explained the military appeal to women, the reasons that originated the process from within the armed forces often had a relatively more instrumental nature. Recruitment difficulties together with an imperative need to enlarge the armed forces’ social base have constituted the driving force behind the expansion of women’s presence in the military.

Certainly, recruitment shortages alone cannot explain the shift from the strict auxiliary status women had in the armed forces to their full military integration and the expansion of jobs and career opportunities. Recruitment needs have not emerged with the same intensity in different countries, depending, for instance, on the existing system of military service – conscript or volunteer; neither has the process followed similar patterns, had identical rhythms, sequences or results. It is also important to distinguish between the first recruitment
of women, or the increase in their number, and the conditions and circumstances for statutory change (equalization of status, hierarchical progression, salaries, suppression of all-female corps, etc.), access to jobs, specialities and combat positions and opening up of military schools and academies to women.

When evaluating patterns of women’s integration inside the military, it is thus important not to under-estimate the effective impact of the changing pattern of women’s social and political participation in the direction of greater equity, at least with regard to the formal and institutional criteria for their participation.

In any case, recent studies have clearly confirmed the fact that shortages of qualified men tend to increase reliance on women to fulfil military recruitment needs. It has been shown that nations considering a transition from conscription to a volunteer system tend to include plans to expand women’s military presence. Haltiner, for example, in his research into the end of the mass-armies in the West, emphasized the importance of the Women’s Ratio, considered to be ‘an excellent indicator of the Army format’: “the higher the WR, the lower is the mass army format of a force and the higher the degree of organizational role differentiation and specialization” (Haltiner 1998: 54). The author anticipates that, as a consequence, “the degree of women’s participation (…) will only substantially increase if conscription is abolished and the personnel will have to be recruited entirely on the labour market” (Haltiner 1998: 54). He further believes that the existence of compulsory personnel for the military is the largest obstacle to an increase in the Women’s Military Participation Ratio. Other authors seem to share this view, even if proposing a slightly different interpretation. Mady Segal, for instance, describing

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2 The percentage of women compared with the total armed force.
the same global tendency, claims that, “regardless the method of accessing personnel, the crucial determinant of the number of women brought into the Armed Forces is whether the supply of men meets the number needed to fulfil the military’s mission(s). The greater the need beyond available male labour, the greater the number of women.”³ (Segal 1995: 766)

Anyway, it seems to be unquestionable that, in general, modern nations with voluntary systems of military service have also been increasing women’s military roles more rapidly than those with conscription (notably Canada, United Kingdom and United States).

After one decade of slow but steady transformation, the Portuguese armed forces are presently initiating a similar process of transition to an all-volunteer force. This shift can be seen as the culmination of a process of structural transformation, in the context of which the recruitment of women took place. I shall thus examine the specific military conditions that have determined such change in the human landscape of the Portuguese armed forces.

2.2 The Portuguese Armed Forces in Transition: From Conscription to the All-Volunteer Force

From the beginning of the 1990’s, a slow but clear – albeit not always peacefully accepted – tendency has developed towards what has since been called the professionalism of the Portuguese armed forces. Plans to change conscription into an all-volunteer system of military

³ One should of course notice that indicators like the Women Ratio refer to a limited aspect of women’s military participation, that is, their relative numbers, leaving undiscussed more ‘qualitative’ variables such as the specific roles that women are assigned to within military forces. These are sometimes considered to depend more on other type of variables such as cultural values on gender equality (Segal 1995).
service were drawn. The approval, in 1991, of Law No. 22/91 – a revision of the military service law of 1987 – was an important step in the direction of ‘professionalization’. A semi-professional system was created, on the basis of volunteer and short-term contract regimes. New volunteer members were expected to progressively replace the pool of conscript soldiers. Two main changes were introduced:

- Reduction of the time of conscript service from the previous 12/15 months in the army and 18/20 months in the navy and air force to a mere four-month period;\(^4\)

- Creation of new short-term regimes of ‘voluntary’ and ‘contract’ service. The first, lasting between 8 and 18 months, is a precondition for applying for a ‘contract’ term of service which varies from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 8 years.

Both measures are to be understood in the context of a deep transformation of the Portuguese armed forces in terms of personnel reduction, re-equipment and global re-dimensioning. From 1989 to 1998 there was, in fact, a reduction of 39 % in the total force, corresponding to a decrease from 72085 to 44200 service members. There were two main reasons for this: a reduction in the number of conscript soldiers (Figure I) and a similar reduction of career personnel from the Permanent Structure (QP) (DL. 202/93).

The objective of this last measure was to achieve a re-equilibrium of the hierarchic pyramid, which had become completely distorted after the end of the colonial war.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Service is extendible, in exceptional circumstances, to 8 months in the army and 12 months in the navy and air force.

\(^5\) In fact, the pyramid was almost inverted, with an excess of personnel in the higher ranks and a clear deficit in the lower officers’ ranks. Because colonels were the most affected by this legislation (many of them were forced to compulsory reform) it came to be known as ‘the Colonels’ law’.
Figure 1: Evolution of the Number of Conscript Soldiers in Portugal (1980–1998)


Note: The increase in 1992 is explained by the reduction of time of conscript service to 4 months and the corresponding increase in the number of annual incorporations.

The reduction of conscription time to 4 months was one of the first indications of a shift towards what was referred to, in the law as well as in other documents and promotional material, as “a new conception of military service”, based on the key-concepts of modernization and professionalization. However, the most important element of the model was the second measure: the introduction of special recruitment regimes of a voluntary nature. Under the new frame, after 3–4 months of basic training (SEN), volunteer soldiers could serve for a period of up to 18 months – the ‘Voluntariado’ regime – and then apply for a fixed-term contract – the ‘Contrato’ regime. A set of economic incentives was established in order to make these new regimes attractive to young people. These included vocational orientation,
access to education, professional training, social security, financial allowances, fringe benefits and support in re-integration in civilian life after the end of the contract.

In the frame of a clearly ‘occupational’ campaign, including television spots and other promotional initiatives, military service was presented as an opportunity for professional development and as an instrument for personal fulfilment. Although more ‘institutional’ values were not totally absent from the recruitment appeal, the rationale behind the arguments used was dominantly ‘occupational’: “the proposed legal model aims at raising awareness among young people about military service as a demanding professional activity (...) countervailing the inconvenience of its short duration with appropriate stimulus to the reinsertion of the citizen in active civilian life (...)” (MDN n.d.).

Notwithstanding its initial ambitions, the model started to show major weaknesses soon after being implemented. The following problems have been outlined (MDN 1998a):

- In terms of cost-efficiency, it was considered excessively expensive because it required the co-existence of two separate recruitment systems;

- It was also considered operationally inefficient due to its short duration, producing a large contingent of “ill-trained” soldiers, with “dubious usefulness”.

- Due to organizational difficulties and lack of infrastructure, only a limited percentage of fit recruits were being incorporated. This had been the case throughout the 1980’s (and even before), but between 1992 and 1998 the incorporation rate decreased continually from 52 % to 31 %; therefore, the system was seen as impeding equal treatment and fairness, since only a few of all fit citizens were actually recruited.
- Conscript soldiers had to be used in an extension of their 4 months period to make up for the lack of candidates for the ‘Voluntariado’ regime, which in theory was to consist of voluntary soldiers only; a notable number of conscript soldiers were also being used for short periods in general services that did not require a military specialization. This was later recognized as affecting “the sense of usefulness of the armed forces” and as frustrating for young people’s career aspirations.

- Finally, the system created instability, as a result of the continual rotation of conscript soldiers.

Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, it was recognized that the system assured the transition from the old conscript model to a more versatile system and that it would lead to the adoption of various measures concerning the reorganization of the armed forces: “It was a political decision, which, by allowing the institution of a mixed system, has helped the creation of a new model of armed forces based on an all-volunteer force” (MDN 1998a: 7).

Despite the fact that the above-described ‘occupational’ orientation proved to be more intense in its discursive and symbolic dimensions than in reality, the trend towards ‘professionalization’ intensified throughout the decade. The constitutional reference to conscription was eliminated during the last revision of the Portuguese Constitution in 1997. In 1999 a new military service law – to be implemented after the publication of regulatory legislation – established what may be seen as the most challenging of measures in the reorganization process: the establishment of an all-volunteer force in peace time, to be completed by 2003 after a four-year transition period.
According to recent national surveys, Portuguese public opinion has also slowly but clearly shifted to support a totally voluntary military service. In 1996 around 2/3 of the population supported the all-volunteer force, against 31.5% who still preferred conscription (Carrilho 1997).

In view of such a profound change in force structure and personnel accession policies, there is presently the fear that serious problems in recruitment and retention will arise. This fear is exacerbated because of a generally accepted failure of the social-economic incentive system that ought to have been established following the '91 legislation, but which in fact was never adequately developed. Complementary regulatory legislation was never issued for many of the proposed measures. This is seen as partially accounting for the failure in attracting the necessary number of candidates, especially in the army.
These problems have different impacts on each of the three services. While the air force does not have conscript soldiers and only a small percentage of navy personnel come from the conscript group, the army relies extensively on conscription to fulfil its needs in terms of personnel. It is thus in this last service that the situation is considered more problematic. Figure 2 and Table 1 summarize the contrasting profiles of the three services in terms of force structure.
As shown in Table 1, two years before the approval of the new law, the ‘professionalization ratio’ was already 100% in the air force, while conscript soldiers still accounted for 28% of the army. Being responsible for the heavier territorial structure of the armed forces, this service is more dependent on large contingents of complementary personnel. Simultaneously, due to its technical specificity, the qualifications required by the army are probably those that have the least interest or equivalents in the labour market, thus making it less attractive for young people concerned with their return to civilian life after relatively short periods in the ranks. It is thus not surprising that the army has shown greater resistance to the introduction of the all-volunteer force and posed more obstacles to proposed changes during the discussion of the law. According to MoD sources, the process will consequently move more slowly than initially expected, namely in terms of the reform of command structures, centralization of resources and inter-service recruitment co-ordination.
This may indeed constitute a real obstacle, since centralization is presented as one of the basic principles of the new model: “The all-volunteer model requires a recruitment structure able to respond efficiently to the need to attract young citizens to serve in the military, to prepare and keep them for periods that simultaneously fulfil the armed forces standards and assure their later integration in civilian life. This requires a concentration of efforts and is definitely not compatible with decentralized systems at the branch level.” (MDN 1998a: 11)

Besides centralization at the organizational level, various measures have been proposed to face the challenge of professionalization, especially the need to attract sufficient numbers of qualified personnel:

- first, and probably the most important axis of the model, a renewed policy of socio-economic incentives, including all the previously programmed – vocational orientation, access to education, professional training, social security, financial allowances, fringe benefits, return to civilian life after the end of the contract – and some additional measures aimed at preferential treatment of ex-soldiers in public programs and institutions;
- emphasis on the public relations’ dimension of the recruitment policy;
- possible rise in the proportion of civilian personnel and of women.

Whether the increase in the number of women will become a reality will depend on the specific implementation of the new law as well as on the impact of global social-economic conditions on military recruitment. This is where previous female recruitment policies become important, since they lay the ground for future developments. Why, and under which conditions have the Portuguese armed forces
2.3 ‘Ex-post Pragmatism’: The Portuguese Way to Gender Integration in the Military

At the beginning of the 1990’s, that were no policy documents which concretely referred to women’s recruitment as an element of the new semi-professional frame. However, the political conditions and the organizational atmosphere were already there, favouring women’s presence in the ranks or, at least, ensuring the absence of serious resistance. This must explain why no obstacles were placed in the way of the two women who, already as early as 1988, ‘knocked at the Air Force Academy door’ and were welcomed even in the absence of specific legislation. After that, according to senior officers in the Air Force Academy, the law had to be changed in order to conform to reality.

However, the whole process developed unplanned, in a markedly contingent way. Not only was there a total absence of previous preparatory studies, but even policy makers admit that a true policy definition was lacking and that decisions were being taken on an ‘ad-hoc’ basis; indeed, frequently also on an ‘ex-post’ basis, that is, a merely reactive attitude on the part of the services was dominant when dealing with the most immediate concerns regarding women’s presence: uniforms, logistics, physical tests, pregnancy, maternity, etc. One of the most obvious examples of this ‘pragmatic’ approach was the way in which decisions were taken concerning which functions

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6 Apart from some short prospective essays written by officers in the framework of promotion courses in Military Institutes, there was only one sociological study at this time: Carrilho 1990.
and occupational areas that should be open to women. Practical considerations (even if accompanied by somehow obscure justifications such as ‘easiness of women’s integration’) explained, above all other reasons, the initial selection of support areas (Carreiras 1997). Very often the number of available posts for women or even their access to certain functions was exclusively determined by circumstantial and material conditions, such as the existence of adequate accommodation or sanitary facilities.

Curiously, the same dominant pattern would explain the rather surprising lift in 1996 of all previous formal interdictions to women’s access to combat arms in the army. According to the testimony of an officer responsible for policy definition at the Army Academy, this interdiction was lifted after a women cadet was admitted to the artillery course of the Military Academy. Once again, the law had to be changed accordingly.

Despite the almost anecdotal element in these reports, ‘ex-post pragmatism’ seems to have worked out extraordinarily well. The various services have demonstrated a notable capacity to adjust to the new situation and to rapidly find adequate solutions. This may account for both the smooth start of the process and the ‘eclipse’ of the subject from public and political attention just a few years later. Progressively, all three branches opened up to women – the air force being the absolute pioneer and the navy the most cautious – including all Military Academies and schools. Except for some specialities in the navy – manoeuvres, divers and the marine corps –, women are theoretically accepted in every military speciality. However, in practice combat areas have never been opened to female personnel.
Presently, in the frame of the transition to a voluntary system, the need for recruiting women was, for the first time, included as a relevant objective in the official discourse. A significant increase in the number of women is considered an important element for the success of the new model and a target of 8 to 10% of women has been set: “The voluntary enlistment of women in the armed forces will considerably enlarge the recruitment pool and the number of service women is likely to grow. The incorporation of women and their participation in units deployed abroad has been a success; this reveals great possibilities for the future. It is thus foreseeable that the existing female contingent, which represents around 5% of the active duty personnel will grow to 8% to 10% of the total force.” (MDN 1998: 14) Apparently, politicians became aware of the importance of recruiting women in order to meet the needs of the future all-volunteer force. The instrumental nature of this decision is clear in the legal text that focuses explicitly and exclusively on the functional aspects of women’s participation. In fact, concerns about citizenship are still absent from the political discourse. One recent decision illustrates this well.

Among the innovations of the new Military Service Law, one specific measure aims at strengthening the relation between citizens and the armed forces: the institution of a ‘National Defence Day’. According to art. 11 of Law 174/99, at the age of 18 all young people must attend a one-day program where they will be given information regarding the objectives of national defence, the organization, missions and resources of the armed forces, the existing possibilities in terms of military service, etc. With only two exceptions – the case of prolonged sickness or residence abroad – attendance is compulsory. Penalties are to be applied to those who do not comply. However, rather astonishingly, through somehow obscure legal rhetoric, the regulatory

...
legislation in practice exempts women from this obligation. According to a privileged informant in the Ministry of Defence, only economic considerations justify this paradoxical decision. Once more, instrumental considerations overcome political principles and the proverbial double standard is kept.

The bottom line is that women seem to be seen, as in so many other similar situations, as a kind of labour-force reserve, which the armed forces had to mobilize in order to face present or anticipated lack of qualified personnel available in the labour-market. A series of questions thus remain to be answered: will the new socio-economic incentive schemes – in the presumption that these will be effectively applied – be sufficient to attract young women as well as young men? If this is so, and admitting an eventual lack of male candidates, to what extent will policy-makers wish to raise female percentages in the total force? How much will the cultural/political rationale for setting ceilings (even if not explicitly recognized as such) lose ground to the more instrumental imperatives of necessity? Above all, knowing that the number of female candidates has been high in the past, the crucial question is: will these incentives be enough to retain women in the military? Will these provide adequate answers to the type of problems and difficulties women usually face inside the armed forces? Knowing that no specific family policies have been designed; no monitoring or mentoring programs instituted; no clear policy on sexual harassment drawn up, the answer is most probably a resounding NO.

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7 While the exemption of women is not directly stated, the regulation exempts from the National Defence Day all those who have not been submitted to military registration, which is the case of women.
3 Women

3.1 The Situation of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces

If we consider the most recent process of women’s military participation in western industrial societies – and take NATO countries as the empirical data source – a major observation is that there is great variation regarding the extent to which different countries have integrated women in their armed forces. Such variation, ranging from an almost total numerical absence, rank limitations, segregated training and functional restrictions to relatively open career patterns, access to combat roles and higher ranks, existence of specific family and equity policies, is due to a complex set of factors that in each case have differently affected policies and practices. However, despite this strong heterogeneity, at the beginning of the present decade all NATO countries will have admitted and generally increased the number of women in their armed forces. In 1999 more than 300000 women served as volunteers in the armed forces of seventeen of the nineteen NATO nations.
Table 2: Women in the NATO forces (1998/1999)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3810</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3486</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6155</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2172</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2954</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3121</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4073</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>16146</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>27092</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6663</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>220000</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>300071</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers refer to active duty forces.
Portugal has not been an exception to the general trend, even if it is among the latecomers. After one decade of sustained numerical growth, in the year 2000 there are almost 3000 women serving in the Portuguese armed forces. They represent 6.6% of a total military force of around 44000 soldiers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>24497</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>1638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>10332</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>6447</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>41276</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>2925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence.

In the Portuguese case it is probably too soon to analyze the evolution of women’s representation since the process is still in its initial phase of development. As mentioned before, the present period is also one of predictable growth considering the forthcoming transition to an all-volunteer force. Remarkably though, the number of women has almost doubled over the decade, even if this increase has differed from service to service (Figure 3).
While, as mentioned, the navy has the smallest absolute number of women, showing an extremely moderate growth and a tendency to stabilization, the army reveals a trend of accelerated growth, both in terms of absolute as well as relative numbers. In fact, 56% of Portuguese service women are found in the army, 12.4% in the navy and 31.6% in the air force. Having been the pioneer service in women’s recruitment, the air force has slightly reduced its relative weight in 1998 and grew again in the last two years. The particularities of the various services, namely the difficulties associated with service aboard ships – and their transformation in order to accommodate women –, as well as the greater territorial component of the army help to explain the existing distribution.
If we look at the situation of women in terms of the functions they perform, a fairly common pattern can be seen: they are concentrated in the support functions, that is, administration, personnel, logistics and finance (Figure 4).

**Figure 4:** Occupational Distribution of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces (2000)

![Bar chart showing occupational distribution of women in the Portuguese Armed Forces.](chart)

Source: Ministry of Defence (Portugal).

Table 4 shows the proportion of women in each occupational area. Here again we find them over-represented in the health and support functions, making up for 19.8% and 12.2% respectively of the total service members employed in those functions. It should, however, be noted that women represent 5.5% in the technical areas (Engineering/Communications), a percentage one point below the average, but still higher than the mere 1.9% of female personnel in operational functions.

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**Table 4:** Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces by Occupational Area (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>%W</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational (CombatArms)</td>
<td>5191</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support (Adm/Pers)</td>
<td>8100</td>
<td>1141</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>2563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>2263</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical/Legal</td>
<td>1098</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16652</strong></td>
<td><strong>1640</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>10331</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Ministry of Defence.

**Note:** Conscripts excluded.
Turning now to the position of women in the rank structure, we can see that they are (still?) mostly employed in the short-term contract service as complementary personnel (Figure 5) and are concentrated in the lower ranks (Table 5). In the year 2000 women made up 4.7% of the officer ranks, 4.3% of NCO’s and 13.4% of enlisted personnel. It would seem, however, that their relative numbers are bound to increase, as they already represent 11.3% of cadets in the Military Academies. Most remarkable is the situation in the Air Force Academy, where 20.6% of all cadets are female.

**Figure 5:** Percentage of Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces by Type of Contract and Service (2000)
Table 5: Men and Women in the Portuguese Armed Forces by Rank (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Posts</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MW</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>%W</td>
<td>MW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>3210</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO’s</td>
<td>7446</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted</td>
<td>7410</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>3264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadets</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18642</td>
<td>1568</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10882</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Defence.
Note: Conscripts excluded.
To sum up, if we compare Portugal to other countries with longer experience of women in the military, similar overall tendencies emerge. Even taking into consideration the specificity of the Portuguese case, namely in terms of the timing of the process, a few aspects can be stressed regarding the situation of military women:

a) limited – even if rapidly growing – representation in the total force;

b) over-representation in complementary personnel structures and in traditionally female areas;

c) under-representation in higher hierarchical levels and operational functions.

3.2 Motivations, Expectations and Professional Identities

As mentioned before, a trend towards occupationalism seemed to emerge from organizational recruitment policies in the Portuguese armed forces when women joined the ranks. But what can we say about these first women’s individual orientations? What kind of values and expectations did they bring to the military? Were they motivated by economic related aspects, by an institutional sense of calling, or by ‘pragmatic professionalist’ values (Segal 1986: 363/64)?

It has been predicted that, due to their usually disadvantaged position in the labour market, women tend to adopt, more than men, a ‘market-oriented’ approach, seeking to maximize economic advantages in terms of salaries, fringe benefits or job security. Despite the fact that historically women have always proved to be ‘institutionally’ driven, conceiving military service as a vocation or a ‘calling’ (as was the case of military nurses during World Wars I and II), the new context is seen as potentially revealing a different motivational pattern. As stated
by Patricia Shields in an article evaluating Moskos’ I/O model, “according to the occupational thesis, variables such as wages and unemployment are critical in explaining enlistment, attrition and reenlistment. If these variables are effective at predicting female military participation patterns, they would certainly support the contention that women are attracted to the armed forces for occupational reasons” (Shields 1988: 103).

Empirical research carried out in Europe and the United States during the 1980s seemed, however, to highlight an opposite tendency. Drawing on the results of various studies on enlistment motivations, Shields shows that, paradoxically, women do not see the armed forces as simply another employer but rather are attracted by unique characteristics of the military such as discipline and adventure. One of these studies, referring to American military women, has revealed that the opportunity for travel and the feeling of being different from civilian women were present among the most important motivations for enlistment: “theirs wasn’t just another job – it offered excitement, adventure, discipline and structure” (Shields 1988: 104). While job security is still indicated as a relevant reason for enlistment, the more ‘institutional’ characteristics of the armed forces (absent in the context of other civilian organizations) are dominant. Reynaud pointed to the same effect in the case of the French military, underlying the way in which the search for a structured environment and an organized life as well as the need to escape routine has among women’s motivations (Reynaud 1988). In a study of the first one thousand women to join the Portuguese armed forces (including officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel) carried out in 1994, these results were confirmed to a certain extent (Carreiras 1997). Sixteen indicators were used to measure I/O motivations. The results are shown in Table 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivations</th>
<th>Import.</th>
<th>Not import.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional factors (core dimension)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desire to work in a disciplined and structured atmosphere</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The desire to serve my country</td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of participating in a prestigious institution</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to good civic training</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional factors (life-style dimension)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of pursuing a career that was traditionally closed to women</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To escape routine and live an active life</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The attractiveness of the uniform</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of travelling and getting to know other places</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupational factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better professional opportunities than in civilian life</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No employment alternatives</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Circumstantial factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The opportunity to leave parents' home and to start an independent life</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military influences among friends or family</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing access to university</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possibility of training/education at a low financial cost</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Carreiras 1997.
A factorial analysis of principal components revealed the existence of four main factors that were named in terms close to the conceptual dimensions of Moskos’ I/O model. The results show that some of the items included in the core ‘institutional’ dimension acquired a major importance. “The desire to work in a disciplined and structured atmosphere” was in fact the main reason given by a large percentage of women in their decision to enlist. Immediately following were “the desire to serve my country” and the “possibility of participating in a prestigious institution”. One of the ‘life-style’ dimensions of institutional factors also had considerable weight: “possibility of pursuing a career that was traditionally closed to women”. As in other cases, Portuguese military women seem to have been attracted by the uniqueness of the armed forces, more than by mere circumstantial factors or the search for labour/economic security. More than a job or an ‘occupation’, military service is above all a challenge and a distinctive activity where structure and innovation coexist. This seems to be the main conclusion here, even if occupational dimensions are not unimportant. In fact, almost 3/4 of the women still consider ‘job security’ or the chance to find ‘better professional opportunities than in civilian life’ important reasons to join the armed forces. If only the initial motivations for enlistment are considered, it is thus possible to identify the common presence of ‘institutional’ and ‘occupational’ features, a pattern that has been defined in theoretical approaches as ‘pragmatic professionalism’ (Segal 1986).

It should, of course, be noted that such tendencies might vary depending on the positions individuals occupy within the organizational structure. Traditionally, officers trained in military academies and schools or those employed in combat-oriented functions tend to score much higher on institutional features than the remaining personnel. Even if women are under-represented in top hierarchical positions, they may be expected to develop institutional
orientations as they move into higher ranks. To the extent that they are excluded from these positions, their future ‘institutional’ orientation may however be diluted. Referring to career combat soldiers, Shields argues that “the values that tie these men together and produce unit cohesion are institutional. Hence, as long as women are excluded from this inner circle, their institutional orientation in average will not reach its full potential. (...) The military is giving women a message that undermines female institutional values and, by implication, promotes an occupational orientation” (Shields 1988: 110).

If we take the Portuguese case, it is possible to observe an interesting tendency when the question of change over time regarding motivations or expectations is addressed. Corroborating previous research findings, the results of the present study have also revealed a strong emphasis on the core dimension of institutional values by women cadets of military academies, as well as by those in ‘operational’ specialities (pilots, parachutists and air police). However, despite this tendency, it is also among these groups that a greater awareness of difficulties and obstacles to women’s integration has been reported. Even if the collected data does not allow for a longitudinal analysis, it has been possible to identify an increase in critical evaluations over time. The longer the permanence in the military, the higher the percentage of those who declared themselves to be discontented, wishing to leave or anticipating problems in the near future (Carreiras 1997).

Considering the existence of different types of motivations, an hypothesis has been raised that explicitly addresses the possibility of change: institutional orientations may not be sustained or may at least suffer some erosion in the absence of material/economic incentives. Especially for those women who remain in the military and proceed with their military careers, the maintenance of high levels of
institutional affiliation may thus depend, to a large extent, on the existence of guarantees in the fields of material security and economic reward.

This supposition does not apply exclusively to the case of military women. In an analysis of the potentialities of the I/O model in policy making, Wood has argued that only if minimum material requirements are met individuals will accept the hardships associated with military activity, as long as they perceive themselves as working for the common good of society (Wood 1988). To the extent that such an objective is diluted, or material conditions are considered to be particularly deficient, their commitment will suffer and they will tend to adopt the occupational orientation characteristic of the specialist.

In the case of military women, however, the conditions under which a specific orientation may develop – and potentially influence role performance, career paths, attrition or re-enlistment decisions – are related to other variables that seem to affect women in ways not experienced by men. It is thus important to ask: which factors influence change in professional orientations? How do they vary in the different institutional locations (e.g. rank, type of job, etc.) and social characteristics (e.g. age, class, race)? What type of relation is there between motivational patterns/expectations and women’s career development? Beyond the scope of policy decisions that define women’s roles at the organizational level, social structure dimensions, such as family and maternity, together with cultural aspects, must be considered. Some of these variables are crucial in explaining the military roles of women and deserve adequate attention.
In 1990, the first – and only – prospective study on the topic of women in the Portuguese armed forces (Carrilho 1990: 30), aimed at evaluating the conditions and constraints for female recruitment, concluded that there was in the Portuguese society a generalized deficit of information, debate and interest regarding the problem. This was especially the case of political actors, with successive governments and opposition parties showing a clear lack of will to introduce the issue in the political agenda; but it was also true for the military, where the lack of interest may well account for the above mentioned *ex-post pragmatist* approach to policy definition. To a lesser degree – and with at least one exception – the same could be said about women’s organizations.

The main political and civic sectors of the Portuguese society adopted an attitude of relative openness towards the issue of gender integration in the military, even if one born out of a mixture of ignorance and indifference. None of the political parties represented in parliament expressed a formal position. During the parliamentary discussions of the new Military Service Law in 1987, where female voluntary service was mentioned for the first time, only casual references were made to the question. The positions of individual members of parliament were hesitating, unclear and cautious. Generally favourable to women’s presence in the armed forces, they underlined the need to ensure equity and conditions of equal treatment between military men and women. The same problems were stressed by most women’s associations and NGOs, but here positions diverged more clearly. The main governmental organization on women’s issues – ‘Comissão da Condição Feminina’ – was extremely favorable, mobilized to debate the issue, organized some meetings, one seminar and even funded the publication of a prospective study; the remaining women’s
associations maintained a passive attitude, expressing rather general positions and only when directly consulted. Some of them supported the measure and stressed the need to ensure equal opportunities for women, others opposed it on the basis of anti-militarist or pacifist principles. This situation mirrors to a certain extent the ambivalent attitude that has frequently been identified on the part of feminist movements vis-à-vis the question of female involvement in military activities (Boene 1999: 89).

The coverage of the issue by the written media is another possible ‘observation platform’ of public opinion concerning the topic of women in the military. It may be taken as an interesting, even if limited, ‘barometer’ of public sensitiveness to the debate, both for what is revealed and for what is ignored. Table 7 shows some preliminary data from an ongoing research project that includes content analysis of newspaper articles published in Portugal over the last decade. Although it is not possible to present results of the content analysis yet, a first striking observation regards the small number of articles – 108 – which have been written.8

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8 Besides consultation of the database of the Ministry of Defence – where systematic data collection covering the period 1994–2000 was carried out by the press services – direct research has been conducted in three of the most important Portuguese daily and weekly newspapers: Público (PUB), Diário de Notícias (DN) and Expresso (EXP). Since some of these sources also keep general archives, including thematically indexed articles from other newspapers, it was possible to compare information.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Daily Newspapers</th>
<th>Weekly newspapers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DN</td>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>CM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–1990</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1994</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–1996</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997–1998</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Not surprisingly, more than half of these articles was published during the years '92 and '93, immediately after women started to join the armed forces. This was the peak of public curiosity and, accordingly, the moment of highest visibility. In the following years, the interest of the media underwent an accentuated decrease.

As shown in Figure 6, despite some oscillations, the reference to women in the military has become residual. Most remarkable is the fact that this tendency has remained unchanged over the last two years when, due to the approval of the new military service law in 1999, we could have expected some renewed emphasis on the ‘women’s issue’ in the context of the discussion about military personnel policies.

**Figure 6:** Number of Newspaper Articles on Women in the Military in Portugal (1988–2000)
It is thus a question for the future to know whether this ‘eclipse’ is a lasting one, or if eventual recruitment and retention problems will bring new public visibility to the issue of women soldiers.

5 Conclusion

Referring to discussions about the participation of women in the armed forces in Italy, Lorenza Sebesta wrote that “the debate on women soldiers has developed following a logic of political opportunities, legal ‘pruderies’ and scandalous curiosity of the media without ending up in any coherent policy in this field” (Sebesta 1994: 41).

This same observation could probably be made regarding the characteristics of the debate in various other countries. In the Portuguese case, the same lack of coherent policies is an observable output. Two differences, however, must be pointed out: in the first place, it is less an absence of coherence than it is of policies as such; secondly, this has resulted from somehow less extreme situations than those depicted by Sebesta. In fact, at the political level there was no real debate, only opportunities; the legal framework has been rather open and ‘progressive’ at a general level, but empty in terms of concrete regulations. The ex-post logic dominated: ‘If problems have not yet been experienced, or at least have not proved to be so serious that informal ad-hoc decisions wouldn’t be enough to face them, why create regulations?’ The flexibility allowed by such a procedure – which can be a positive element when it comes to avoiding normative rigidity and over-regulation of practice – may however show perverse effects if it allows discretionary and arbitrary solutions.
As for the media, curiosity has not been so ‘scandalous’; in fact, the predictably intense initial interest in the issue has rapidly vanished. Moreover, only a negligible number of newspaper articles addressed ‘problematic’ topics such as sexuality and sexual harassment. In the time-span of ten years, ‘women in the armed forces’ became a non-issue in the public agenda. We could well say that the early 1990’s were characterized by public visibility, political indifference, and military caution. Ten years after, we may instead talk of a public eclipse, growing political awareness (opportunism?), and military tolerance (acceptance?).

As for the women, it is certainly time to conduct new research. The advent of the all-volunteer force will give a new impetus to female recruitment and probably give military women higher visibility in the public arena. Whether future political debates will contribute to reverting the dominant instrumental approach to women’s integration is still an unanswered question. In any case, the prevalence of such orientation whenever economic factors pressure policy decisions, together with the total absence of specific policies aimed at confronting ‘erosion factors’ – in areas such as family, parenthood, sexual harassment or equity – may pose rather serious questions to the development of the new model of military service in Portugal.

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Affirming Gender Equality: The Challenges Facing the South African Armed Forces

Lindy Heinecken

1 Introduction

There is no doubt that even with greater numbers of women in the ranks and their proven capabilities that the military remains one of the most prototypically masculine of all social institutions. The reasons for this are diverse, historic as for centuries men have been viewed as the protectors, women the protected, compassionate, for fear of women’s safety in the hands of captives, but largely, the motivations stem from the concern the expanded utilization of women within the ranks may have on the so called ‘operational effectiveness’.

This article focuses on the issues, concerns and challenges pertaining to the utilization of women not only in combat, but in general as their numbers increase and they bring to the military uniquely female concerns foreign to this male ‘owned’ institution. As a starting point, the different feminist positions are outlined and how this impacts on the attitudes both within and outside the armed forces. The various military, societal and cultural factors that affect the participation of women in the armed forces cross-nationally is provided, followed by an overview of issues that arise concerning their utilization. These include whether women should be permitted the right to serve in direct combat specialities (the equality debate), their physical and psychological suitability for combat (biological inferiority) and the effect of women on cohesion and morale (the impact on military

1 The article is based on a study commissioned by the Chief of the South African National Defence Force on behalf of the Chief Directorate Equal Opportunities in June 1999.
effectiveness). Then the uniquely female concerns, the effect of pregnancy on deployability, parental and family concerns and the issue of sexual harassment will be discussed.

Taking this as the general background, each of these issues are related to the challenges facing the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Recently, in the wake of constitutional reforms the SANDF was forced to acknowledge the right of women to serve in ‘all’ ranks and positions, including combat roles. In this regard, South Africa provides a rich empirical case study highlighting the interplay between military, political, societal and cultural factors including race, class and gender that shape perceptions and influence gender equality within the armed forces.

2 Feminist Views on the Military

Feminist sociologists have been largely responsible for developing theories of gender inequality, although there is little agreement about the causes of this inequality or what actions should be taken to end it. The main split is between radical feminists who ascribe the exploitation of women to men, the Marxist and socialist feminists who name capitalism rather than patriarchy as the source of women’s oppression and the liberal or equal rights feminists, who fight for the equality of both men and women within the existing order (Haralambos/Holborn 1995: 592).

From the radical feminist perspective, society is viewed as ‘patriarchal’, dominated and ruled by men who are the primary benefactors of the subordination of women in society. As the family is seen as one of the primary institutions perpetuating women’s oppression, only revolutionary change in the structure of society can
offer their liberation. Although there are many different factions within radical feminism, in essence they aspire towards a social order based on matriarchy, recognizing the ‘special qualities’ of women. These special qualities reside in the biological differences between the sexes and certain social practices, which explain why men and women respond differently to war (Cock 1992: 17).

Radical feminists forwarding the ‘special qualities’ argument have different views on this. The ‘sexists’ propagate that women should be excluded from the ranks of the military as their physical inferiority makes them unsuited for fighting (combat). The ‘pacifists’, maintain that the female tendency towards peacefulness and caring, for the giving and nurturing of life runs contrary to militarism. They contend that all forms of gender discrimination and violence can be found in the connection between war and militarism (Haralambos/Holborn 1995: 592). Virginia Woolf’s pacifist feminist position, for example, seeks equality between the sexes not through admitting women to combat, but liberating men from militarism (Cock 1992: 17). By implication they are antagonistic towards a pro-typically male institution such as the military and express their dismay at women’s interest in wanting to serve in the armed forces (Miller 1998: 37). On the contrary, other anti-militarist radical feminists support women’s inclusion in the military, alleging that their unique feminine characteristics contribute to altering the nature of war as well as their capacity to influence security policy from within an institution that perpetuates violence (Hudson 1998: 45).

Unlike radical feminists, Marxist and socialist feminists do not attribute women’s exploitation entirely to men, but see capitalism rather than patriarchy as the principal source of women’s oppression as they are the main beneficiaries of women’s relegation to lower paid and inferior status jobs (Haralambos/Holborn 1995: 593). Although
Marxist and socialist feminists agree with radical feminists that women are exploited, they see greater scope for cooperation between women and working-class men (as exploited groups) than do radical feminists that want a social order based on matriarchy.

On the attitudes of Marxist/socialist feminists towards the armed forces there does not appear to be a clear-cut position, although one may assume that this will invariably be determined by the legitimacy afforded to the military by the people. Given the emphasis on class rather than gender such feminists would probably adopt a more egalitarian approach to women in the armed forces depending on the prevailing social order. Some evidence to support this view is the role played by women in many revolutionary movements fighting for social and political change. However, this will depend on the political ideology that prevails hereafter, as many examples show that women are often relegated to their previously inferior status after the revolution (Segal 1999: 566).

Most radical and Marxist/socialist feminists ‘broadly’ share the same aim as liberal feminists, namely equality between the sexes although their approach to bring about this equity differs. Liberal feminists strive to bring about gender equality through the existing social order, using the democratic system to reform the political, economic and social systems that perpetuate sexism and discrimination against women (Haralambos/Holborn 1995: 593).

Equal rights feminism stress women’s right to achievement, power and opportunity, including the right to work and go to war (Cock 1992: 16). This branch of feminism pushes for the fullest inclusion of women in the military, from conscription to the utilization of women in combat arms. They contend that “the best way to insure women’s equal treatment with men is to render them equally vulnerable with
men to the political will of the State” (Jones as quoted in Miller 1998: 38). Unlike some pacifist feminists, they deny the traditional linkages between women and peace, asserting that it is only through social conditioning that women have learned passivity (Stephenson 1982: 291). Women are considered no more peaceful than men and just as capable as men to serve in the armed forces. Physical differences are considered unimportant and the sexual division of labour based on ongoing traditions concerning the proper areas of labour for females and males, used to reinforce the image of ‘men as fighters’ is rejected (Yuval-Davis 1985: 651).

This brief evaluation of the various feminist positions reveals that there is no consensus among feminists with respect to women in the armed forces. On the one hand liberal feminists plead for gender equality in the military. On the other, some radical feminists oppose such collaboration with the matrons of patriarchy and consider women unsuited for warfare given their nurturing nature. Others again contend that the inclusion of women may reform the military, change the nature of the institution and warfare (Hudson 1998: 43). Nonetheless, in many countries these feminists represent the female voice that pressure armed forces to assess and review policies and practices towards women.

Within South Africa, unlike the liberal feminism of Western societies the feminist stance has historically been associated with the revolutionary struggle, leaning towards Marxist/socialist feminism, asserting the equal right of women to take up arms with men against repression and injustice. As illustrated by Cock (1992: 21), “the widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the armed struggle and the notion of a just war means that the Western connection between feminism and pacifism is loosened in the South African context”. For
black women, women’s rights were subservient to the issue of race and the social, political and economic oppression they experienced. Only recently have women begun to challenge this “triple repression”, but even so this has not been from a feminist perspective aimed at empowering women, but rather liberating them (Gouws/Kadalie 1994: 218).

Currently, the women’s movement in South Africa is growing in statute with a number of women participating in politics at both national and regional level, pushing for a wide range of gender reforms through various gender caucuses and gender commissions. Official acknowledgement has been given to the plight of women in the Constitution of the RSA, 1996 (Section 187) and a Commission for Gender Equality was established in 1997 to develop an inventory of legislation which discriminates against women. Areas of particular concern have been the need to amend patriarchal customary rules, the need to develop gender sensitive policies and laws within all government departments, the institutionalization of means to reduce violence against women and the need to integrate gender considerations into macro-economic planning and national budgets. An Office of the Status of Women (OSW) was also established in the office of the Deputy President and one of the tasks has been to establish gender units within the various state departments, including the Department of Defence, to monitor and audit the progress of gender equality.

As such, the reform of policy relating to women in the military is legally and politically driven rather than through the intervention of

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2 The term ‘black’ collectively refers to all races other than whites. ‘Africans’ in this context refers to black Africans and not white Africans. Afrikaans speaking whites oppose the use of the term African to mean only blacks as they assert that their forefathers have lived in the country for generations and too claim to be Africans.
any particular ‘feminist’ lobby demanding equal rights for women. Only recently has a small but active feminist voice emerged among the senior female officer ranks pressing for greater participation of women in decision-making and greater sensitivity to gender. These voices will no doubt gain more momentum once the Gender Forums established in 1997 to address gender issues, discrimination and barriers that limit women from advancing to higher echelons are firmly established at unit level.

Giving impetus to their cause, is the appointment of a woman Deputy Minister of Defence in 1999 who has given ‘political clout’ for a more ‘gendered’ approach to peace and security, to policy formulation and the advancement of gender equality within the Department of Defence (Madlala-Routledge 2000). A definite ‘liberal’ feminist position appears to be emerging among military women, which is supported, but at the same time challenged by the more pacifist position of civilian activists. This came out clearly in a recent conference on Women Making Peace in Africa held in Pretoria during August 2000, which drew together a diverse group of women involved in peace-building and peace-making in Africa. Heated debates surfaced among feminists calling for the redistribution of military spending to social upliftment and development, versus the women in uniform who were advocating for greater participation of women in decision-making and policy formulation from within the ranks. Slowly, with legislative backing the SANDF is being pressurized by feminists both within and outside the military to recognize the role of women in ‘peace and war’.
Behind these debates lie the legal and political requirement for the SANDF to implement gender equality. But this has posed certain challenges given the peculiar history, social and cultural uniqueness of South Africa. As is the case elsewhere in South African society, the participation of women in the armed forces has been significantly influenced by the legacy of apartheid. In the past, only white women were recruited into the former South African Defence Force (SADF) and it was not until 1970, when a shortage of qualified white males was experienced during the height of the Border War, that they could join the permanent force. Although not in separate corps, their functional role was limited to supportive mustering, such as finance, personnel, logistics, intelligence, medical services and welfare (Cilliers/Heinecken 2000: 253). This differed from the role of mainly black women serving in Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the revolutionary force of the African National Congress, where they did serve in many frontline positions. Many of these women now integrated into the SANDF have come out strongly in favour of gender equality.

Unlike many European countries the recent expanded role of women in the South African armed forces has not been due to a shortage of qualified men, nor due to perceived threat to the nation, a shift to an all-volunteer force or change in mission definition. The driving force

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3 The Border War refers to the war between South Africa/South West Africa and Angola, which ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin Wall and withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

4 Stiehm (1998: 39) points out that in nations where women served equally with men in the revolutionary struggle, they often return to their pre-war subordinate status because government failed to rewrite its family law affecting the status of women. This relegation of women to inferior positions once the revolutionary war was won, is more likely to occur in societies were the women were previously suppressed, than in societies that emphasize equal rights after the revolution has ended. In South Africa, the rights of women are protected in the constitution, although African women in particular are still subject to customary law, relegating them to subordinate status within society – although this too is changing.
since 1994 has been legislative and incidentally this has coincided with the shift to an all-volunteer force and in mission focus as peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and internal deployment become the most likely future roles of the SANDF.\footnote{Segal (1995: 762), found that in societies with low threats to national security, but with cultural values supporting gender equality, women’s military participation increases. This has been the case in South Africa.} But this has not had any dramatic impact on the gender composition of the armed forces. For example, in 1989 ten percent of the full-time permanent force component were women, compared to thirteen percent in 2000. What has changed significantly, is the racial gender profile as up to 1994 the women serving in the South African armed forces were almost exclusively white. In April 1994 when the new SANDF was formed, there were a mere 712 black women (mainly from the former MK) compared to 5714 white women serving in the military. By April 2000, white women were in the minority, 3907 compared to 4966 black women, although the more senior women ranks are still held by whites (Sedebe 2000).

Labour force considerations also play a role in the inequalities by race and gender within the SANDF. For example, 61 percent of women compared to 39 percent of men in South Africa have no education or are functionally illiterate. Of the women with higher education degrees and certificates, 14 percent were held by white, 4 percent Indian, 2 percent coloured and 1 percent by African women (Sadie/van Aard 1995: 84). Of all women, black women have the least education and an estimated 37 percent are employed in elementary, unskilled occupations (SAIRR 1998: 247). The highest level of unemployment is among African women (53 percent) between the age groups 18 and 24 – the age group from which the military generally recruits (SAIRR 1998: 260).
As labour force characteristics have a direct bearing on recruitment, the Department of Defence experiences difficulty in recruiting and retaining highly skilled or qualified black women for both civilian and uniform posts, although general recruitment for the ranks is not a problem. Because it takes a number of years to progress to higher ranks, between 18–20 years for to the rank of colonel, white women who have served in the South African armed forces since the seventies have been the main beneficiaries of gender advancement. The historic as well as the lower level of education of blacks have meant that African women are underrepresented in the senior officer ranks, although there is an active affirmative action program to accelerate their advancement.

Another cultural factor is that African tradition supports high fertility rates and women start reproducing at a very young age. The percentage first birth before the age of 20 is 33.1 percent for Asians, 18.4 percent for whites, 41.2 percent for coloured and 53.2 percent for Africans (Mostert et al. 1988). As this is the age group from which the SANDF recruits, many African women may already have children upon joining the military or become pregnant in their formative years of military service. It is therefore not surprising that military women are presently petitioning for greater consideration for pregnancy and childcare facilities.

As the number of African women serving in the SANDF increase, this has brought to the fore a number of cultural considerations, hitherto unknown to the former ‘white male’ dominated SADF. Segal’s (1995: 770) studies show that the social construction of gender, the importance attached to gender differences and cultural interpretations of gender have considerable implications for the inclusion and participation of women in the military. The greater the emphasis on ascription by gender the more limited women’s participation, the more
egalitarian the social values, the greater women’s participation in the military.

Although South African women are experiencing a sense of ‘liberation’ brought about by the removal of discriminatory legislation, they are still subject to cultural encapsulation specifically within the context of customary law. In fact, Section 211 of the Constitution reinforces the importance granted to the preservation of cultural traditions of the various groups that make up society, but many of these traditions or customs are based on gender ascription and subordination. African women remain subject to a patriarchal system that relegates them to a subordinate position economically, politically and socially. Despite legislative provisions prohibiting discrimination based on gender in the Bill of Rights, African women (particularly within the rural context) are still treated as minors, have limited access to land and property and are subservient to their husbands. They carry the full burden of raising the children and this responsibility is reinforced with the customary practice of polygamy (Sadie/van Aardt 1995: 87). Women are seen as mothers and wives and their participation in the labour market is marginal.

These cultural values invariably spill over to gender relations within the armed forces, as can be seen from the results of a recent survey conducted by the Directorate Social Work among members of the SANDF. Almost half (46.5 percent) of the men responded that it is natural for men to have control over others, that wives should do what their husbands tell them (41 percent) and that a man must do whatever he needs to do (including using violence) to ensure that his wife behaves properly (DSW 2000: 36).
4  Placing Women in Suitable Roles

As is the case in other armed forces, once women participate in the military in greater numbers and in certain non-traditional roles, the debate shifts to concerns regarding their utilization in certain capacities. Should they be permitted to serve in all combat specialties? Should this be voluntary or compulsory? Are women physically and psychologically suited for combat? What effect will women have on cohesion, morale and ultimately operational effectiveness? Then there are the uniquely female concerns such as the effect of pregnancy on deployability, parental and family concerns and sexual harassment.

4.1 Implementing Gender Equality

The same holds true for South Africa, although the issue is no longer whether women should serve in the armed forces, but in what roles and under what circumstances. In South Africa, there are no provisions limiting the career path of women and the SANDF is among the most liberal nations in this regard. Whereas prior to 1994 women were only permitted to serve in support roles and were not appointed to any position that could result in close combat, direct enemy fire or positions with substantial risk of capture, they may now be trained and serve in all ranks and positions including the infantry, artillery and armoured corps of the army, as pilots and can serve on ships at sea. Women officers, who were previously excluded from studying at the Military Academy, now comprise almost a third of the student body and in 1999, the predominantly male student body elected the first female to serve in the prestigious position of student captain.
Yet, despite the formal provisions permitting women can serve in any position, opinion is divided both within society and the military on whether women should serve in combat roles. An opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Security Studies and the Human Sciences Research Council in 1996 testing public opinion on the question “should women be allowed to volunteer for combat duty”, society was almost equally divided on women serving in the frontline (Cilliers et al. 1996: 6). Similarly, within the SANDF during the same period the Centre for Military Studies conducted a survey testing SANDF officers’ opinion to the question whether “women should be allowed to do combat duty in the frontline”. Of these officers, 40 percent were in favour, 12 percent unsure and 48 percent disagreed (Heinecken 1998: 228–229).

With women now serving in combat roles, a more recent survey conducted by the SANDF’s Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate (EOCD)⁶ in February/March 1999 among all military personnel revealed some interesting findings. When military women were asked whether they would “go into frontline combat if given the chance”, most African women (75 percent) and Coloured women (58 percent) said they would compared to 34 percent of whites. Similar findings were reported by race when asked whether they would be willing to

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⁶ The survey was carried out in February/March 1999 and a total of 3307 completed questionnaires were received. The information was obtained by means of a structured questionnaire (Attitude and Opinion Survey: Women in Combat) and compiled by Section Effect Analysis in co-operation with the Equal Opportunities Chief Directorate. A comparison with the sample characteristics according to arm of service, gender, population group, rank, former force and service system was representative of the Department of Defence population. The questions required respondents to express their views or attitudes on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). Factor analysis, the procedure used to group together those items which are related in a statistical sense was used to identify underlying patterns and relationships within the data. In this study factors were extracted by the method Principal Component Analysis (PCA). The PCA was carried out on the data of the total sample (N = 3307) and only factors with eight values greater than 1,00 were selected. Reliability analysis (Cronbach’s Alpha) was used to determine the homogeneity of the questions in each factor.
trade a supportive role for a combat role. Opinion was divided on whether women should only receive such assignments if they choose, 41 percent supporting the volunteer option, compared to 47 percent who felt it should be compulsory for all, with the remainder being unsure.\footnote{A possible explanation for the willingness of black women to serve in the frontline is the legacy of black women in the liberation movement and racial repression they have felt, compared to white women, who see the utilization of women in combatant roles rather in terms of employment equity.}

What is apparent, is that white women’s views are in line with international trends in that they want the choice to serve in combat roles, while African women seem far more prepared to serve in the frontline. This may possibly be ascribed to the role of women in the revolutionary struggle and also the fact that white women appear less willing to serve beyond the borders of South Africa (Heinecken 1999b: 57).

4.2 Biological Suitability for Combat

Even where women meet the job specifications and have the ability to serve in combat, opinion remains divided especially in those positions where physical demands may exceed the physiological capabilities of women. To overcome this most countries are striving towards ‘gender-neutral policies’ that specify which specialties (combat and non-combat) require muscular strength, endurance and cardiovascular capacity (Report to the President 1992: 7). The insistence on gender-neutral physical qualifications also offsets the argument that standards will be lowered if women are admitted.
This has been the policy adopted by the SANDF. Currently men and women receive the same training and there is no gender specific training ‘policy’, although in practice gender separation does take place for some exercises during basic training. In general women are more positive about their capabilities than men. The EOCD survey revealed that while only 28 percent of women felt they did not have the ability to serve in demanding combat roles, 41 percent of males held this view. Once again the views differed by race, with more Africans (42 percent) than Coloureds (37 percent) and whites (30 percent) expressing the opinion that women do not have the physical capability to serve in combat. These sentiments were most strongly held by African men, as 60 percent of African women felt they had the physical ability to perform in combat (van Rensburg 1999: 14). This is an important point in race/gender relations within the South African context, given the subordinate role of women within traditional African culture.

Besides the physiological reasons limiting the possible utilization of women in physically demanding roles, the opinion also exists that women are psychologically unsuited for combat. Many claim that women do not possess the ‘aggressiveness’ to fight and if necessary kill, nor the ability to withstand the grinding fear and stress of the battlefield. These arguments are based on the inherent nature of females to nurture, love and care for others. Some pacifist feminists support this position, while other liberal or equal rights feminists’ claim that this argument is used to perpetuate patriarchy. While studies indicate that women have a lower propensity towards violence and aggression, this is largely ascribed to cultural socialization where women are expected to be more passive, submissive and gentle. (Giddens 1995: 364)
On the psychological dimension of coping with the horrors of war, African women more than anyone else have borne the burnt of violence and rape within South African society. They are probably more ‘psychologically’ conditioned to confront the stresses women soldiers may face in war zones than white women, who have not been subject to the same abuse as their ‘black’ sisters.

4.3 Impact on Social and Task Cohesion

Another argument frequently raised against the inclusion of women in combat units is their potential effect on male bonding and the subsequent impact on cohesion and morale. The same sentiments hold true in South Africa, where 56 percent of males and a remarkable 47 percent of females supported the view that the integration of women will have a detrimental effect on unit cohesion, morale, male bonding and operational effectiveness. In general, Africans (56 percent) felt more strongly than whites (49 percent) that this is so. This may seem contradictory given the role played by African women in the ANC’s liberation army, but can be explained by yet another division within the SANDF, namely the attitudes of members of the former black homeland or TBVC armies (van Rensburg 1999: 13). According to the Department of Defence personnel statistics there were virtually no women from the TBVC defence forces integrated into the new SANDF. The virtual absence of women from their ranks signifies their lack of exposure to the capabilities of women and together with cultural considerations probably influenced their attitudes.

In this regard, I would venture to say that given the racial tensions that exist within the SANDF, that both social and task cohesion is stronger by race than by gender. Concerning social cohesion, the overriding
factor is differences in culture and language between whites and blacks. As regards task cohesion, (which is associated with the ability of the unit to harness the collective, knowledge, skills and experience of all members to meet unit objectives), it relates to perceived differences in standards and levels of training. Within the SANDF there are some serious differences by race on the impact of affirmative action on operational effectiveness. Many white officers feel resentment towards what they see as the promotion of inexperienced blacks to position not on merit but on race (Heinecken 1999a: 194–200). The EOCD findings not only substantiate this, but show that these sentiments are on the increase, particularly among whites and coloureds who are of the opinion that affirmative action, which includes the rapid advancement of women, has a negative effect on the SANDF’s effectiveness (van Rensburg 2000: 14). Whereas perceived double standards for men and women have been one of the factors affecting morale and cohesion in Western armed forces, within South Africa the impact is clearly linked to race and gender, with the emphasis on race.

4.4 ‘Uniquely’ Female Concerns

One of the most contentious issues within the SANDF is the issue of pregnancy and childcare and the creation of a more ‘woman friendly’ environment within the SANDF. Women in the military together with the Deputy Minister of Defence have been forthright in stating that pregnancy must not be used against them, but must be taken into consideration when planning and deploying women (Madlala-Routledge 2000). This is bound to pose a great challenge to the SANDF in the future. As means of comparison, during the Gulf War it was found that women were three times less deployable than men, primarily due to pregnancy (Report to the President 1992: 20).
In this regard it is of interest to note the findings of the EOCD research about “the effect which the admission of women into combat situations will have on mothers with small children, pregnancy and sexual harassment”. Almost 50 percent of respondents expressed their concern about the effect mothers with small children at home, pregnancy and sexual harassment may have on combat situations with only 31 percent expressing no concern and the remainder being unsure. More women (56 percent) than men (46 percent) had their reservations about these issues. Comparative to previous findings on the willingness to serve in combat, white women (64 percent) and Coloured women (61 percent) were more concerned about the impact these issues may have on the assignment to positions that may involve a high probability of direct combat, than African females (31 percent) (van Rensburg 1999: 14).

One must question the ‘reality’ of these findings, given the fact that African women have more children than whites and are often single parents and primary breadwinners in their families (Sadie/van Aardt 1995: 85). Miller (1998: 55) indicates that single parents are seen as the greatest burden to the military because of the restrictions childcare places on the parent. In South Africa, the majority of black women carry the full share of household responsibilities, although this appears to be changing in urban households (Dreyer 1989: 73). The extended families associated with traditional African culture may provide the support base, alleviating women from their childcare responsibilities whilst deployed. For decades African women have been separated from their children in search of employment, leaving their children in the care of the elderly or relatives – something few white women have had to deal with. This may explain the response to the question in the EOCD survey, “do your domestic affairs allow you to be deployed easily outside the RSA for three months and longer on peacekeeping
operations”. Here 75 percent of African women said yes, compared to 58 percent of Coloured women and only 35 percent of white women.8

Nevertheless, with the breakdown of these traditional values and a growing number of single women serving in the SANDF, the full impact of pregnancy and childcare responsibilities on deployability is still to be seen. International findings indicate that the impact of pregnancy on deployability is especially high in units that are disproportionately female or understaffed (Harrel/Miller 1997: 41; Shields 1988: 108). Should as Maj Gen Jackie Sedibe hopes to “have 50 percent of women in management positions”, this will no doubt pose definite challenges for those responsible for future force preparation and force deployment (Sedibe 2000: 8).

4.5 Harassment and Abuse of Women

Sexual harassment is another issue associated with female integration. Within the SANDF, both sexual and gender harassment is a rising concern. At present the Department of Defence does not have a sexual harassment policy that stipulates precisely what sanctions can be imposed if found guilty of sexual or gender harassment (Heinecken 1999a: 201). Only recently, based on the requirement by the government Office on the Status of Women, has a draft policy been formulated. Reports are that black women experience sexual and gender harassment more frequently in the workplace than whites. Not only is harassment from male colleagues said to be widespread, but in gaining employment women are expected to provide sexual favors to prospective employers (Sadie/van Aardt 1995: 85). Similar rumours exist within the SANDF, although the extent of both gender and

8 Additional results obtained from Section Effect Analysis, Department of Defence, 1999.
sexual harassment within the ranks is unknown, nor whether there is any variance by race, rank, gender or work environment.

What has evoked far greater concern is the increase in incidents of rape and violence against women within the SANDF, a reflection of trends evident in broader society. While internationally the abuse of women is discussed mainly within the context of female combatants and prisoners of war, women and particularly black women are the disproportionate victims of violence within South African society. A recent national study on the experiences of 1000 women in metropolitan, urban and rural South Africa indicated that 63 percent of women have experienced sexual abuse. The average reported rape cases increased by 23 percent between 1994 and 1997 and these trends continue unabated (SAIRR 1998: 44).

The DOD has formulated a policy on *Violence against Women and Children* in which it declares not only to reduce conflict against women and children during armed conflicts, but within the SANDF, among its members and their dependents. The safety of women is a grave concern not only when leaving the unit late at night, but when deployed in the field in remote and isolated circumstances offering little protection and privacy. These concerns are justified, in light of recent findings within the SANDF that 36.6 percent of female employees and 29.9 percent of military wives report having been subject to abuse or a violent relationship (DSW 2000: 41). Where women are subject to violence even within their own home, one has to raise questions about their safety when deployed in potentially dangerous environments.

African conflicts in particular are associated with rape, plunder and murder, a reality which women serving in the frontline may have to face as the SANDF prepares to take on the responsibility of regional
peacekeeper (Vickers 1993: 21; Siders 2000: 41–54). In Africa, with HIV/AIDS infection being as high as 60–70 percent among some Sub-Saharan armed forces, the deployment of women becomes even more condemning. Evidence from Rwanda shows how HIV infected soldiers raped and used HIV as a weapon of war in the ethnic conflict between Hutus and Tutsis (CMA 1995: 3). Such realities bring to the fore another security dimension associated with female deployment on the African continent that stretch way beyond the politics of gender integration associated with Western societies.

5 Conclusions

For women serving in the SANDF, the issue is no longer whether they may serve in combat, but whether they will do so in a ‘gender friendly environment’. Legally and politically the mechanisms are in place to ensure that policies are implemented, but true equality cannot be achieved where the support structures are absent and attitudes that render women inferior and subordinate remains unchanged.

Military women themselves are divided, with vast differences in attitudes between white and black on almost every front. White women in general have not adopted a ‘feminist’ stance aimed at transforming the patriarchal culture of the organization. While they have supported equal rights, they prefer the choice whether to serve non-traditional roles as is clearly seen in the unwillingness to serve in combat roles, or to be deployed beyond the borders of South Africa. In contrast, black women have come out strongly even militantly in support of equal rights from a far more ‘radical’ feminist perspective, pressing for recognition of the special qualities of women and a more
‘pacifist’ approach to security. This can be directly related to the cultural subordination they experience within society, the greater childcare responsibilities they carry and the fact that they have been the disproportionate victims of violence and rape in South Africa. These issues raise questions not only for leadership and deployability of women but for their personal security when serving in isolated environments and when returning home after late night duties. Then there are the realities of African deployment, where women have been the target of abuse, are often at a disadvantage in sexual negotiations and more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS infection.

Immense human resource challenges lie ahead in implementing gender equality, that stretch way beyond the politics of gender integration associated with women in combat. In South Africa, gender affirmation is embroiled in issues of race, cultural subordination and violence against women – both within and outside the context of combat. Although active attempts are being made to address these issues, existing attitudes and budgetary constraints will invariably constrain the SANDF’s ability to turn policy into practice, especially where this relates to providing the support structures for women to enable them to function as equals.

As women in the military strive for the ideal of *making and keeping peace in Africa*, they will without doubt come up against the realities of African conflict, where women themselves have been used as weapons of war. A daunting task awaits women soldiers in South Africa that stretch way beyond the politics of gender equality, but touches on real issues of personal security, violence and the nature of

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9 These sentiments emerged strongly during a South African Broadcasting Production, *Two Way*, on “Women in the Military”, 7 August 2000. Repeatedly the military women participating stated the “women should come forward as women”, and play their role in transforming the “militarist” culture of the institution.
warfare. Not only will the SANDF have to take these realities into consideration, but also the impact increasing numbers of women within the ranks will have on force readiness. Only time will tell whether the more ‘gendered’ approach to security has been too ambitious, or as ‘traditionalists’ claim at the expense of both organizational and operational effectiveness.

6 References


Women in the South Korean Military

Doo-Seung Hong

1 Introduction

In November 1997 a woman colonel became a regiment commander in the army for the first time in the history of the Korean armed forces. Almost a year later, in October 1998, a woman major took the commanding officer post at the training center for draftees in an infantry division for the first time. In a popular monthly magazine published in June 1997, more than 10 pages of space were allowed to report an interview with the first woman infantry company commander (Monthly Chosun 1997: 440–450). As of May 1999, ninety-three women served as a company commander or platoon leader. The assignment of women commanders at various levels of units has attracted attention from the press because it is a new phenomenon in Korea. This very attention stems from the fact that women have begun to participate on an equal basis in an organization that traditionally has been male-dominated.

Over the past three decades, advanced industrial countries have discussed the utilization of the female labor force in the armed forces. Advocates assert that equal opportunities should be given to women serving in the military while skeptics worry that the presence of women in the military may hinder efficiency of an organization they deem more appropriate for men. These two contrasting views are not necessarily contradictory nor mutually exclusive. However, what is

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1 The author would like to thank Col. Min Kyung-ja, Chief of Women’s Affairs, ROK Army, who provided valuable comments and suggestions for this paper.
clear is that the view of skepticism has been gradually losing its legitimacy.

By global standards, throughout the 1990s women played a more active and visible role in the military than before. As French military sociologist Michel Martin indicated, women have now stepped into the “center” from the “periphery” (Martin 1982). The fact that 6.2 percent of the American military personnel who participated in the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991) were women is not a surprising finding. Despite the differences by nation, it is a global trend that the area of utilizing females has been expanding. However, the increase of female representation in the military may cause emergent intra-organizational problems. Thus, the issue of efficiency for military goal attainment as induced by the presence of women in the military becomes a theme to be investigated by military decision-makers and academics. Korea is no exception in this vein.

This paper examines the status of women in the Korean armed forces and the future plans proposed by the military policymakers. It also explores gender integration in the military by looking at the positive and negative aspects of women’s presence in the military as perceived by their superiors, colleagues, and subordinates, both male and female. The overall trend of changes in policy towards the utilization of women in the military reflects enhanced women’s rights during the period. Since the 1970’s, gender discrimination has been critically challenged and the participation of women in the labor market has rapidly expanded. At the same time, military leaders’ attitudes towards women soldiers have also changed. Even in the early 1970’s, for example, military leaders in the United States were reluctant to recruit women to the service academies. The utilization of women in the armed forces and the proportion of women in the military vary,
even in Western societies. In Asia, servicewomen occupy 4.2 % of the total force in Japan (3.1 % of the officers) (http://www.jda.go.jp/) and 4.5 % in China (Li 1993: 74).

2 Military Women in Korea: A Historical Overview

In the case of Korea, during the past half-century, women have played a minor and non-substantial role in the Korean armed forces due to constitutional and cultural restraints. Since 1949, only men have been obliged to serve in the military while a small number of women have been allowed to handle auxiliary functions under certain limited conditions.

2.1 Women in the Army

In September 1950, during the Korean War (June 1950 – July 1953), the Army Women’s Volunteers Education Center, the first military training institution for women, was established under the Army Second Training Center. Training in the center was carried out by women reserve officers who were called to active duty after the outbreak of the war. These officers had been commissioned as second lieutenants of the reserve a year earlier in July 1949 as a part of the program to train female high school students. After three weeks of training, 491 women soldiers were assigned to non-combat administrative support missions. Of these, 44 women were directly commissioned as officers and mainly assigned to the newly-inaugurated TI&E (troop information and education) battalions or as platoon leaders of the education center.
In October 1950, the education center was replaced by the Women Volunteers Training Center, which then disbanded in November 1951. Thereafter, the function of training women was dispersed to various branch schools such as the Army Infantry, Adjutant General, and Signal Schools, as well as to the Nonsan Army Training Center until July 1955 when the Army Women’s Training Center was established. During the war, women served as TI&E personnel and POW investigators, and as personnel who used radio broadcasts and leaflets to urge the North Korean military to surrender. After the war, the duty of women was mostly centered on shorthand, communications, typing, finance, and clerical work.

The issues of marriage and childbirth for military women have been very controversial. In 1950, only single women aged 18–29 were eligible to volunteer as soldiers, but in 1959, eligibility was modified to allow married women with no children under seven years old to apply for the officer’s training course. In 1963, the regulation was again revised to disallow married women to apply for both officers’ and enlisted training courses.

From the time when Korean women first entered the military, no written regulation about marriage for servicewomen existed. However, in 1959, enlisted women who were already in the army were not permitted to marry during the period of obligatory duty, except for those in the rank of sergeant first class or above. In 1964, marriage itself was totally banned during service. However, the regulation was changed for women officers to permit marriage but not childbirth, so if the women became pregnant, they were discharged from active service.\(^2\) Yet non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were

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\(^2\) In 1965 nurse officers were allowed to get pregnant.
prohibited from both marrying and giving birth to a child. In 1984, women ranked sergeant first class or above were permitted to marry, but still childbirth was not allowed for both officers and NCOs. In 1987, childbirth was eventually allowed by army regulation because the prohibition of marriage and of childbirth for military women caused a constitutional violation. Thus, the proportion of those who applied for discharge from active service decreased considerably.  

Missions of servicewomen expanded and diversified. In June 1969, three company-grade women officers (non-nurses) were dispatched to Vietnam for the first time and served as information, administrative, and civil-psychological warfare officers. In the same year eight enlisted women completed airborne training in a month for the first time and became black-berets (airborne troopers). In 1975, a women’s company was formed within the Army Special Warfare Command. In January 1974, the entry-level rank of enlisted women was raised from a private to a staff sergeant. Opportunities for education and training for high-echelon staff officers were opened to women in 1963 when a woman lieutenant colonel was admitted to the Army War College (AWC), but admittance was not followed by another woman until 1990 when the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) was officially abolished. On 1 August 1989, all women officers in active service were transferred to seven different branches, such as infantry, intelligence, quarter master, adjutant general, TI&E, finance, and medical administration.

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3 As of May 2000, forty percent of women officers and 35 percent of women NCOs are married. And 28 percent of women officers and 20 percent of women NCOs have a military spouse (ROK Army Hq. 2000: 264).

4 Army nurse officers had been already dispatched to Vietnam as early as September 1964.
2.2 Women in the Navy and the Air Force

Women’s presence in the navy and the air force was minimal in the early period of the armed forces. The policy of admitting women to these services has only recently been adopted. Interestingly enough, the marine corps admitted women during the war. In August 1950, when the marine corps augmented three infantry battalions to carry out amphibious operations, 126 women volunteers were recruited to perform support duties in the rear areas. After forty some days of training, they were commissioned as officers, NCOs or enlisted in the reserve. They carried out jobs such as nurses, propaganda personnel, clerks, etc. However, within a year, all were discharged except for a few officers who stayed in service until 1955. Until quite recently, there were no women in the navy. As for the air force, in February 1949, the Women’s Air Training Center was established under the Army Air Command, and 15 women were recruited. The commanding officer of the center was a woman ex-pilot who was commissioned as a first lieutenant a month earlier. However, the center was disbanded during the war, and thereafter, only a few women served as officers for several years.

2.3 Nurse Corps

With the formation of the Korean armed forces, women nurses were recruited to the military. In August 1948, thirty-one nurses were commissioned as second lieutenants in the army for the first time (ROK Army Headquarters 1998). The navy produced nurse officers in April 1949. In 1949, the nursing section was established as a subdivision of the medical department in the Army Surgeon General’s Office. In March 1951, nurse cadets were admitted to the Army Medical School and commissioned as officers after two years of
training. In August 1967, the Army Nursing School was founded, and the first graduates of the school were produced in October 1970. In January 1971, the Army Nursing School was transformed and renamed the Armed Forces Nursing School as part of the program combining medical personnel from the three services. In December of the same year, flight nurse officers appeared. In October 1974, a small number of male nurses were admitted. In December 1980, the school was changed to the Armed Forces Nursing Academy (AFNA) and upgraded to a four-year college to award a bachelor’s degree.

With regard to the activities of nurse officers, six nurse officers were dispatched to Vietnam as members of the ROK Armed Forces in Vietnam in September 1964. In January 1991, the ROK Armed Forces Medical Support Unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf. In September 1994, six nurse officers were dispatched to West Sahara as members of the first echelon of the peacekeeping operations. In April 1997, the Eighth Echelon was dispatched. In 1977, the first female naval nurse officers after the war was produced. Since 1983, the navy has recruited a few nurse officers each year among the graduates of the AFNA and assigned them to various units in the navy. In May 1996, women nurse officers participated in naval operations on ships for the first time in the ROK Navy’s history. In March 1993, four army nurse officers who were transferred to the air force became the first women in that service since June 1950 when the channel of recruiting women in the air force was closed. At the same time, three nurses were commissioned as second lieutenant from the AFNA. These seven nurse officers formed the Air Force Nurse Officers’ Corps (Army Headquarters 1998).
From Segregation to Integration: From the Women’s Army Corps to Women in the Military

In January 1990, the Women’s Army Corps was abolished as an independent corps and women were reassigned to various corps of the army. In 1990, thirty-five new women officers were produced in seven branches. In 2000, the number increased to 102 in fourteen different branches. Today, all but a few branches such as artillery, armor and chaplain are open to women. The Ministry of National Defense aims to increase women’s presence in the armed forces from the current 1.4 % to 5.0 % and to open almost all the branches by the year 2020. In 2020, about 7000 women are expected to make up about 5.0 percent of the total officers and NCOs in the three services. According to the army’s plan for utilizing women, the percentage of women officers will raise to 6.3 % from the current 2.5 % and NCOs to 3.9 % from the current 1.6 % (see Table 1).

Table 1: Long-term Plan for Recruiting Women Officers and NCOs*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2085</td>
<td>1183</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>7038</td>
<td>3103</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.0%)</td>
<td>(6.3%)</td>
<td>(3.9%)</td>
<td>(4.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in parentheses indicate the percentage of the total.
Military education and promotion are executed equally. Women are admitted on an equal basis to the officer’s basic course (OBC), officer’s advanced course (OAC) and the Army War College for officers, as well as to the specialty training course for NCOs. Today, four women majors are attending the Army War College. In 2003, the Women’s Army School is expected to close, the officer’s training course will be integrated into the Korean Third Military Academy, and the NCO’s course will be taken over by the Army NCO School. Furthermore, up to the rank of major, those who are to be promoted will be selected by open competition regardless of gender.

The utilization of women in the military is limited, however. Women are not allowed in the units that perform combat missions, but are assigned as company commanders and platoon leaders at the army training center, or as instructors and drill personnel of the education and training units. By regulation, women are prohibited to participate in combat directly in order to protect femininity. Therefore, those women who are already assigned to the training battalions of the infantry divisions as company commanders or platoon leaders will be replaced by men in wartime.

In 2000, the navy and the air force started to accept women for their officer’s candidate schools (OCSs). Both disclosed the timetable to utilize women NCOs in the future. This year, the air force announced that it will recruit women NCOs for the first time in its history. Single women aged 18–27 with high school education or over are eligible for admission. After a fourteen-week training period, they will be commissioned as staff sergeants in May 2000 and will be obliged to serve for four years with options of an extension or long-term service (Gukbang Ilbo [Defense Daily], 30 September 2000). In 2003, all corps in the navy are expected to open themselves to women, including crew in combat vessels positions, except for submarine and
special warfare specialties. In the air force, fighter pilot positions will be open to women as well.

Above all, it was an epochal decision to admit women to service academies. During the campaign for the 14th presidency in 1992, Democratic Liberty Party presidential candidate Kim Young-Sam had promised, if elected, to open service academies to women as part of his campaign strategies. After Kim was elected as President, the newly formed Administration Renewal Committee of the government demanded the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to open three service academies simultaneously to women starting in 1997. However, the MND reluctantly counter-proposed a stepwise approach regarding the acceptance of women; at the first stage, only the Korean Air Force Academy (KAFA) accepted women and the other service academies would wait and see how well the co-education process was. The MND also expressed its view that since service academies were established to produce combat commanders, women were not appropriate for the academies. Politicians strongly urged the government to keep the election pledge, and the ministry in charge of women’s affairs supported them.

The debates ended with a stepwise implementation of admitting women to service academies. The KAFA became the first service academy to admit women in 1997, as followed by the Korean Military Academy (KMA) in 1998 and by the Korean Naval Academy (KNA) in 1999 (Ministry of National Defense, MND Newsletter, 13 May 1997). Each service academy admits 10 percent woman of the total number of incoming cadets each year. Admittance for service academies is highly competitive. For example, during the 1999 academic year, one out of 20 female applicants for the KMA was selected, while one of eighteen for the KAFA and one of fifty-six for the KNA were admitted as well. The admittance of women to the
naval academy is partially responsible for the KNA’s highest level of competition in 1999.

Academy graduates are utilized in the entire corps while OCS officers are assigned to technical, administrative, and special corps. The personnel management guideline of the armed forces stipulates that in principle there is no sexual discrimination, but women tend to be assigned to the posts that are deemed specifically pertinent to women. They disclose that, for the time being, duties are not to be assigned to women, such as being in the forefront of battlefields or in remote and isolated areas, as well as physically difficult duties. Yet women are often favorably utilized in corruption-prone posts.

4 Perceptions of Military Women

Now that women have been admitted into the military, their effectiveness becomes a critical issue. How do military personnel, both male and female, perceive women’s role and effectiveness in the military? The Korean Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) has been conducting a research project on the recruitment and utilization of women soldiers since June 2000. For part of this project a sample survey was carried out with 989 officers and NCOs, both male and female, from the army, navy, and air force during the month of August 2000 (Dohkgoh 2000).
Table 2: Attitudes towards Women Soldiers (unit: % of affirmative response)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement (“Military women …”)</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>% dif.*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have no plan for long-term self-development</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack in the sense of professionalism and challenge</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>-15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are passive in self-expression</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>-10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack in comradeship among themselves</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show expertise on jobs as good as men</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are not inferior if chances are given to exhibit their ability</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are precise and meticulous in work</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a strong sense of responsibility and do their best</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show a strong sense of co-partnership in work</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are superior in administrative clerical work</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are good at management of and consultation with soldiers</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Render vitality to units</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>801</td>
<td>166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dohkgoh 2000.

* Indicates percentage difference between men and women (women – men).

The respondents were composed of 639 officers and NCOs in the army, 234 in the navy and 119 in the air force. According to rank, there were 378 field-grade officers, 292 company-grade officers.
(including 4 warrant officers), and 307 NCOs. The preliminary report of the project revealed the results as shown in Table 2. Overall, the evaluation towards women in the military seemed positive, although gender differences were detected on the role of servicewomen.

As expected, military women were more positive than their male counterparts on all aspects of military life. Men were also positive, but to a lesser extent. The most conspicuous results were women’s characters, which were often believed to be precise and meticulous in their performance, particularly in administrative clerical work. Percentage differences between men and women showed that women were more likely to feel that they possess a strong sense of co-partnership in their work and of responsibility. Also if equal opportunities were rendered to women, there would be no reason for women to perform duties poorly as compared with men. Men tended to feel that military women carried out their duty properly, but in certain aspects they had some reservations on women’s roles and functions whereas women appeared to be highly motivated and well prepared to serve in the military just as well as men were.

The majority of military men and women recognized women’s inferiority in physical fitness, but discrepant views existed on other kinds of ability between men and women (see Table 3). Women soldiers believed that there were no differences between the sexes in self-confidence, leadership, ability to succeed in the military and response to stress, whereas men were somewhat reluctant to accept this view. A large number of men were certain that women were inferior in leadership, response to stress and self-confidence, and to a lesser extent, mental strength and ability to succeed in the military. Nearly half of the women respondents believed in women’s superiority over men in mental strength, while the other half believed that there was no gender difference in this sense.
Table 3: Assessment of Women’s Ability As Military Personnel vis-à-vis Men (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th></th>
<th>No difference</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>Inferior</td>
<td>Superior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical fitness</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-confidence</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental strength</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response to stress</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to succeed in the military</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dohkgoh 2000.

5 Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale: Positive and Negative Aspects of Women’s Presence in the Military

In the 1960–70s it has been controversial among policy makers and politicians to keep women in the military in the sense that physical features of women limit their use in combat missions. Therefore, it is costly to maintain women in the armed forces. However, criticism can be alleviated by highlighting the advantages of women’s presence in the armed forces.
The armed forces have to be socially representative. The military is an organization that exercises and manages violence legitimately, so their presence should be morally supported by the people. Social representation stems from citizenship. Military service is a right as well as an obligation as a citizen. If being a citizen means carrying out one’s obligations in order to guarantee membership in society, then disallowing opportunities limits one’s citizenship (Hong 1996: 213–224).

Social representation in the military implies that military organization reflects the socio-demographic composition of the entire society. Therefore, it must not under- or over-represent specific strata or groups, nor recruit a disproportionately large number of individuals from an economically – and/or socially – deprived stratum. The U.S. armed forces have already experienced such a phenomenon under the all-volunteer system. The percentage of African Americans in the whole population is about 11–12 %, but 48 % of enlisted in the army are African Americans. Caucasians occupy 78 % of officers and 55 % of NCOs. The issue of gender cannot be equated with that of race, but discrimination and prejudice are widely perceived in a similar manner. In this context, representation of women in the military seems natural.

The percentages of Korean women in other professions show that 17.6 % are medical doctors, 19.0 % dentists, 7.8 % oriental medical practitioners, 57.6 % pharmacists, 55.6 % primary school teachers, and 23.6 % high school teachers. On the other hand, women are underrepresented among government officials; 13.3 % in the national government and 23.3 % in the local government (KWDI 1999: 354–357). However, the proportion of women in these fields has kept growing. The appearance of women is becoming more prominent in
various kinds of civil examinations. The 1997 statistics indicate that 8.1% of those who passed the examination for judges, prosecutors and lawyers were women. Likewise, women consisted of 11.2% for the mid-level government officials, 20.0% for diplomats, and 3.3% for technical specialists, all of which marked a substantial rise as compared to the early 1980s.

5.2 Women and Military Culture

The presence of women in the military may affect military culture. Traditionally, the military has been regarded as a men’s occupation and in fact, in many fields masculinity is required. However, the contents of military occupation have changed and the areas that overlap with the civilian sector have expanded. The sharing of military and civilian areas implies a possibility of utilizing civilians in the military to a greater extent. The advance of science and technology weakens the importance of physical prowess. Therefore, the area that was once viewed as ‘pure’ military has been decreasing and instead, can be replaced by civilians. Science and technology that were developed in the civilian sector enhances military technology, and vice versa. For example, computer networks have their roots in military communication systems.

Utilization of civilian manpower in the armed forces is coterminous with that of females. Their presence in the military may integrate the military organization with civil society. Participation of women in the military by no means implies masculinizing women soldiers, but filling the deprived areas that might be present in the male-dominated organization. In the civilian sector, internal conflicts are less likely to appear in the organizations that comprise both sexes than those that are single sex. Therefore, the presence of women in the military may
contribute to forming a ‘new’ military culture in the sense that women may contribute to narrowing the distance between military organization and civil society. It will also help to convert military culture from a “militant society” to that of “industrial society” (Spencer 1967). The culture in militant societies has such characteristics as collective orientation, hierarchical rank, ritualism, uniformity and institutionalism, as opposed to the individualism, specialized role system, rationalism, diversity and occupationalism that are equated with industrial societies.

5.3 Recruitment of Good-Quality Labor Force

The expansion of opportunities in the military to women may enable the ability to recruit a good-quality labor force for the armed forces. Gender discrimination still persists in the labor market, so a great number of qualified women do not have equal opportunities for employment as men. As women’s desire for participating in the labor market rises, more women will pursue their career than before. Therefore, recruiting women soldiers to ensure quality manpower in the armed forces is a good strategy. Recently, recruitment of qualified young officers and NCOs has become an issue at stake. It is advisable to allocate women soldiers to positions where men are not required. Furthermore, supposing the downsizing of the armed forces in the future, it is also thinkable to replace military personnel with civilians and to transfer those in active service to ‘pure’ military missions.
6 Concluding Remark

The utilization of women is a social trend in the civilian sector as well. However, in a gender-mixed organization, women’s active commitment to claim equality in the organization is required. This might place a burden more on women. The success of utilizing women in the military depends on how servicewomen respond to the expectation from the people and the military. Women do not play a supplementary role to men, but constitute a full-fledged membership of the organization. Still there are quite a few military leaders who are skeptical of the effectiveness of female soldiers, and who hold a raison d’être against the utility of women in the military. Military women have to exert great efforts to overcome prejudice that might remain in the minds of their male colleagues, superiors or subordinates in the military by committing self-sacrifice and by participating in the military organization more actively.

7 References


Challenging Gender Roles? Male Soldiers and the Complete Opening of the Bundeswehr for Women

Gerhard Kümmel

1 At the End of the Millennium: Women in the Bundeswehr – The Story So Far

When the German armed forces came into being in the mid-1950’s as a result of the international tensions due to the cold war between the east and the west, almost nobody thought of female soldiers. It took another decade until this issue began to be discussed in society and in politics. This discussion took place in the 1960’s in a context that was shaped by significant socio-cultural and politico-cultural changes in terms of a substantial momentum towards a wide-ranging democratization. Starting with the so-called student movement, various parts of German society which later on were to develop into important social movements called for political and societal participation. Among them were the various groups of the women’s movement who claimed emancipation and gender equality as laid down in various UN documents and thus criticized the patriarchically-structured society in Germany. Of course, within this endeavor, they also demanded equal access and participation in professions that had hitherto been considered as male-exclusive domains. As the Bundeswehr, the soldierly profession, was one such sector, the pressure from society soon translated into the political sphere and put the issue of women in the military on the agenda (Kraake 1992; Albrecht-Heide/Bujewksi-Crawford 1991; Fischer 1997).

The German government of the time, a coalition of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Liberal Party (FDP),
responded to these societal concerns by establishing the enquête-commission *Women and Society* in late 1973. As one result, Defence Minister Georg Leber (SPD) implemented the opening of the Bundeswehr for women. Thus, in autumn 1975, the year the UN had declared *Year of the Woman*, women entered the Bundeswehr. This, however, was constrained to the medical service where in the early 1970’s substantial recruitment problems had occurred leading to a gap of 1300 longer-service volunteers in the career of officers (Seidler 1998: 223, 225). After some time, the access to classifications and trades was extended to military bands because in the case of an emergency the soldiers of the military bands are transferred to the medical service. In the early 1980’s the discussion about an extension of areas where women soldiers would be allowed to serve gained some new momentum. In 1981, an independent Long-Term-Commission had analyzed the shifts and the trends in the demographic composition of the society with an eye on satisfying the Bundeswehr’s needs in terms of personnel. One year later, the Commission submitted its report in which a paragraph could be found recommending to think of such an extension in the framework of a voluntary service of women in non-combat functions. However, throughout the 1980’s, no such political move was initiated, but the issue was by no means totally removed from the agenda of societal and political debate.

As a result, then, further steps were taken to enlarge the representation of women in the armed forces. Since the beginning of 1991 all the careers of the medical and military musical service were made accessible to women (cf. also the findings of Anker/Lippert/Welcker 1993; Klein/Kriesel 1993; Schaffer 1994) and, in 1994, Verena von Weymarn became Surgeon General and hence the first female general in German military history (Seidler 1998: 227). In the late 1990’s, female soldiers made up for about 1.2 percent of all the German
soldiers. The number of women came close to 60 in the military bands and to 4350 in the medical service. Among the latter were more than 400 medical officers, more than 700 medical officer candidates, more than 2300 non-commissioned officers, more than 200 non-commissioned officer candidates and about 100 in private ranks (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 1999). In addition to these numbers, there were close to 50000 women who worked as civilian employees either in the armed forces or in the Federal Armed Forces Administration.

2 The Opening of the Floodgates? – The Case of Tanja Kreil and Its Consequences

Towards the end of the millennium women in the Bundeswehr were still confined to non-combat roles, i.e. to the medical service and to military bands whereas in other countries the integration of women had progressed, sometimes substantially.1 Although the women soldiers were trained in the use of weapons, their utilization – except for cases of self-defense – was forbidden according to the then interpretation of Article 12a of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). This situation was to change fundamentally at the turn of the century and this is to no small extent due to a woman named Tanja Kreil who, in the media, has been described as embodying the – foremost male – “nightmare of a woman with a gun in her hand” (Kipphoff 2000: 39) and as indicating the end of the rule of men (Zielke 2000).

1 The literature on women in the military has become legion in the meanwhile and it is still growing, most likely even on an accelerated level due to the steps taken in a number of countries to further open the military to women. For an overview, see the following selected references: Quester 1977; Lippert/Rössler 1980; Goldman 1982; Enloe 1983; Elshtain 1987; Isaksson 1988; Hurni et al. 1992; Howes/Stevenson 1993; Vickers 1993; Segal 1994; Seifert 1996; Dandeker/Segal 1996; Heinecken 1998; Trompette/Saglio/Dufouton 1998; Benard/Schlaffer 1999; Segal 1999; Soeters/Meulen 1999; Klein 2000.
In the year 1996, the 19-year old trained electrician Tanja Kreil applied for voluntary service in the area of maintenance. Her application, however, was declined by the Bundeswehr arguing that women serving in combat functions and with weapons in their hands was forbidden by law. Tanja Kreil did not accept this decision and went to the courts. Part of her charge was that her application could not have been turned down by using a gender-specific argument because of a respective collision with a 1976 European Union (EU) directive which demands the member states to follow the principle of equality of treatment in the workplace, i.e. prohibits discrimination in the workplace for reasons of gender. The Administrative Court in Hanover found it necessary to have this checked and, in mid-1998, decided to suspend the court proceedings and to ask the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg for an interpretation. It took a while and eventually on 11 January 2000 the ECJ ruled the EU directive to be thoroughly valid for the specific workplace of the armed forces (Europäischer Gerichtshof 2000) – and hence to be superior to the arguments of national sovereignty put forward by the German government.

In an analysis, then, the further steps in opening the Bundeswehr for women do not stem from genuinely political initiatives as one may have thought, but from a court ruling which required the political sphere to take some action (cf. also Bruns 2000; Stelzenmüller 2000). As a consequence, for the German armed forces, the new millennium began with a caesura, the prospect of including women into the military on a much larger scale than before. To be sure, this caesura is part of a larger picture of reform, restructuring and profound changes, either already under way or impending. Its main objective is for the Bundeswehr to develop a “new profile of capabilities”, as laid down by Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping in his so-called ‘Cornerstones’-Memorandum (Bundesminister der Verteidigung
Following the ruling of the ECJ, there was a lively and controversial debate on the topic of women’s inclusion in the military both within the armed forces themselves, but also within the larger German society and in academia. And one of the issues discussed was the depth or the degree of the integration and thus the question whether, in line with the text of the ruling of the ECJ, certain areas, classifications or trades should be defined in which access would be denied for women or whether there should be a complete opening of the Bundeswehr.

The Ministry of Defence eventually chose the latter option, an option which an expert opinion by the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research (SOWI) had advocated in mid-February 2000 already (Kümmel/Klein/Lohmann 2000). The organization and implementation of this political decision was to be conducted in such a manner that, starting from January 2001, women would be able to enter all the classifications and trades, i.e. beyond the trades hitherto already open for women (medical service and military bands). The premises of this further step in the inclusion of women in the armed forces were twofold:

1. Within the decision-making process, it was agreed upon to follow the principle of voluntariness. Accordingly, women would enter the military services voluntarily, there would not be an introduction of conscription for women as is still the case for men.

2. The integration was to be based on the principle of equality of treatment. Thus, there was to be a gender-free or gender-neutral assessment of those who applied for military service, i.e. they would have to pass the criteria requested for the position they want to enter irrespective of their sex.
In the summer of 2000, the first job interviews and aptitude tests were conducted with female applicants. Simultaneously, steps which most of the people involved deemed necessary were taken to revise the German constitution. At the end of October and in early December respectively the German parliamentary bodies, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, with two-thirds majorities, voted for the revision of Article 12a of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). And in January 2001, altogether 246 women entered the Bundeswehr in trades hitherto precluded for females. As regards their distribution according to the services, 153 chose the army, 76 the air force and 17 the navy. As of late December 2000, more than 2500 women expressed their interest to join the armed forces in these non-traditional classifications and trades, among them close to 1950 in the categories of rank and file and non-commissioned officers and almost 590 in the category of officers. These numbers are somewhat less than expected – especially when compared to data from Italy where a similar process takes place –, but may be explained by the current turbulences regarding the future structure and size of the Bundeswehr. Nevertheless, since from January 2001 onwards every two months further cohorts of women will enter the armed forces, it may be assumed that in the course of the year more than 1000 women will move into these non-traditional classifications and trades. And in the long run, the percentage of women among all the German soldiers (currently 1.2 percent) will increase to something between 7–10 percent (around 14000–15000 total) according to the present estimate of the Defence Ministry. This expectation is in line with the experiences of Germany’s partner countries in NATO.
3 Attitudes and Perceptions in the German Armed Forces

The moderate numbers of female applicants so far may lead to the assumption that the further integration of women into the Bundeswehr will not cause major frictions and that the ‘noise’ around this issue is too much. However, this view seems to be somewhat rash. When taking into consideration the history of the inclusion of women in the military in several other countries, it can be seen that the whole process is by no means smooth, but faces substantial opposition especially when it comes to women in combat roles. This resonates with the findings to be found in the field of gender studies, in feminist writings and in military-sociological research. According to them, once the images and perceptions of the roles of women in society start to change, the gender system as a whole cannot be left untouched by this. Instead, the change in role images for women also means a change in role images for men (Zulehner/Volz 1999) and for the gender system as a whole (Meuser 1998; Connell 1999). In addition, the integration of women and, in particular, the unrestricted and complete opening of the armed forces for women, including combat functions, severely touches the commonly held and cultivated image of the soldier as a male warrior (Seifert 1996; cf. also Johnen 1992). However, it may be questioned, if not doubted, whether, in the case of Germany, this will assume such dramatic manifestations as sensed in parts of the German media. In the end, this issue boils down to the question whether the military has been affected by the trends of shifting gender roles and perceptions to be observed in society at large or whether the armed forces have managed to ‘insularize’ themselves from these socio-cultural processes and to attract only or mostly those men who resist the change in the gender system.

In such a vein, it may be helpful to analyze male soldiers and their opinions and images coming up around this issue of women in the
military. How do male soldiers perceive and judge the integration of women into the Bundeswehr? Which problems do they anticipate? And what do they expect or even fear? In the following, the findings of a survey on these topics done by the SOWI will be presented.

3.1 The Research Project

The research project was commissioned to the SOWI during the implementation stage of the further integration of women (for this section see Kümmel/Biehl 2001). Its main objectives were to get information on the attitudes and perceptions of male soldiers towards the inclusion of women into the military; to find out whether the soldiers have reservations against women soldiers; to single out in which areas, classifications and trades these reservations are more pronounced than in others; and to identify soldiers or groups of soldiers who display more reservations than others. For this purpose, we administered a questionnaire which contained items related to the scope or the degree to which the Bundeswehr should be opened; to the effects anticipated for the military itself following the extension of women’s integration; to the external implications of such a move; and to the gender images of the soldiers. The soldiers surveyed in April 2000 (i.e., before the political decision was taken to open the Bundeswehr without restrictions) were asked to place their agreement or disagreement to each item on a six-point-scale ranging from Agree Completely to Thoroughly Disagree. Later on, the responses were binarized in Agree and Disagree. To manage the problem of acquiescence, i.e. the tendency of the respondents to agree to positively formulated items which may lead to significant distortions in the responses, some items were formulated positively, others negatively (Bortz/Döring 1995: 215f.).
Concerning the data, it is to be mentioned that we received close to 2650 responses of about 3300 questionnaires mailed which were analyzed by using SPSS, version 8. The sample does not meet the criteria for an optimum, representative sample (cf. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 1999: 16). This implies that certain caveats are necessary regarding the transfer of our findings to the Bundeswehr at large. When looking at the rank structure of our sample, an overrepresentation of officers is to be noted which means that our sample carries a higher level of education compared to the Bundeswehr at large. This may result in a more positive attitude of our sample towards the integration process all the more so since there may be a sponsorship bias at work: officers because of their rank, their career orientations and their relative closeness to the military and political leadership of the Bundeswehr may tend to respond by social desirability and political correctness (cf. Bortz/Döring 1995: 229; Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 1999: 32). Furthermore, when looking at the services, our sample is characterized by an underrepresentation of the army. Taking into consideration the findings of research done on the present topic in other countries, one may assume that this leads to a more negative attitude of our sample towards the inclusion of women. Nevertheless, with these caveats in mind, our findings may be taken as a rough and imperfect indicator.

3.2 The Findings

According to our data (cf. Kümmel/Biehl 2001) presented in Table 1 below, it seems safe to assume that the integration of women in the military will not proceed in a smooth way and free of problems and difficulties. Thus, the integration process and the every-day cooperation of male and female soldiers in the military (as a workplace with genuine, specific characteristics) requires constant
efforts from all those involved and affected. At the same time, this does not mean that the pessimists will be right who predict an outright failure of the integration process. Instead, the pattern of responses given by the male soldiers is proof of mixed feelings on their side. This ambivalence in attitudes consists of a mixture

(1) of scepticism/reservations concerning change and curiosity about the future;

(2) of classical/traditional prejudices against women and understanding combined with sympathy for the new or modern role of women in society and

(3) of fears of a rising competition of women in the workplace and respect for the capabilities and the performance of women.

**Table 1:** A Synopsis of Male Attitudes towards the Integration of Women into the Bundeswehr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Agree (in percent)</th>
<th>Disagree (in percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women should not be allowed to serve in the military.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should only serve in the trades currently open to them.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be no restricted classifications and trades for women.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are not suited for trades requiring a high level of physical fitness.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are not suited for the difficult life in the fields.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are a disruptive factor in the military.</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Agree (in percent)</td>
<td>Disagree (in percent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces with women soldiers do not lose in combat power.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With women the Bundeswehr will not be able to accomplish its military missions.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are not suited for positions as superiors.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With the further integration of women there will be more problems in military every-day life.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The extension of women’s integration will lead to an increase of problems related to sexuality.</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There should be no preferential treatment for women in the armed forces.</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women in the Bundeswehr take away the jobs from the male soldiers.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women can very well be used in missions abroad which require negotiation skills.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women soldiers will change the tone in the armed forces.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the integration of women is to proceed, conscription should be introduced for women.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The integration of women has a positive effect on the image of the Bundeswehr within society.</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The integration process furthers the emancipation of women.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is easy to imagine working with women in my own unit.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women are to be protected.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I can easily imagine being defended by a woman with a gun in her hand.</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About 69 percent of the male soldiers interpret the new steps in the inclusion of women in terms of its positive effect on the image of the Bundeswehr within society. More than that, almost nine out of ten soldiers are basically in favour of having women in the military and three fourths support an integration of women which moves beyond the present stage of integration, namely a restriction of women to the medical service and military bands. A thorough inclusion, without any restrictions in terms of classifications and trades closed for women, is supported by a slight majority of those surveyed.

At the same time, however, these data imply that there are soldiers who view women in the military as a matter of principle and therefore are strictly opposed to any measures and policies taken to include women in the military (15 percent). In addition, 27 percent of the respondents prefer to stay with the status quo. The reasons given refer to the consequences the integration process is anticipated to have on every-day life in the military. Close to one third of the soldiers deem women not to be suited for the challenging life in the fields. More than 65 percent firmly believe that, in general, there will be more problems in their specific workplace once women will be there. When it comes to a particular dimension, to all the problems revolving around the issue of sexuality, this number is even higher. In this respect, roughly 84 percent anticipate an increase in the number of problems related to sexuality.²

Further on, the soldiers responses indicate the persistence of traditional images concerning the role of women in society and vis-à-vis the men. Almost 45 percent cannot imagine to be defended by a female soldier with a gun in her hand. Obviously the classical gender-

² This issue points to the larger theme of sexuality in organizations and the attempts of those leading a given organization to construct an ‘asexual’ organization (cf. Rastetter 1994). On the topic of sexual harassment in the military cf., e.g., Firestone/Harris 1994.
role ascriptions – the man as the protector and the woman as the protected – are still adhered to by a significant number of soldiers.

Yet, there are areas in which an erosion of traditional gender images can be observed. In this regard its mere scope may come as a surprise to the reader because about 70 percent of the respondents do not expect any disadvantages or damage to the realization of military missions due to the integration of females. In a similar vein, more than 60 percent do not anticipate any losses in combat power due to female soldiers. Also, almost four fifths of those surveyed take women to be suited for positions as military superiors and close to three fourths claim to have no problems in thinking of women in their own unit. In some dimensions, particularly positive effects of the integration of women are perceived. Thus, about 75 percent think that the tone, the way of speaking in the German armed forces will change following the increase of the number of female soldiers. In addition, two thirds of the respondents hold the communicative (and thus deescalating) skills ascribed to women in high esteem, in particular when it comes to military operations other than war.3

Furthermore, the data show a certain uneasiness, if not fear, among the male soldiers not only about an increasing competition in the workplace as a result of the inclusion of women, but also about the possibility that male soldiers will be put at a disadvantage (reverse discrimination). More than one fifth of the men are open in arguing that the women in the Bundeswehr take away the jobs from the men. Thus, they explicitly stress the necessity of equality of treatment. An overwhelming majority of 86 percent demands that there will not be any preferential treatment given to women just because they are

3 On the changing roles of the military cf. Bredow/Kümmel 1999. In this context it is interesting to observe that the British military has tried to recruit women precisely on the basis of their specific ‘female’ competences (cf. Reng 2000).
women. Similarly, two thirds want to see conscription introduced for women, too.

4 The Roots of the Men’s Reservations

In the further analysis of these responses, an attempt was made to put them into a sufficiently coherent framework of interpretation. According to this endeavor, the male soldiers cultivating reservations against the integration of women into the armed forces may be grouped on the basis of the different sources that structure their thinking and nourish their reservations. Here, two categories may be distinguished (for more details cf. Kümmel/Biehl 2001):

The first type or group consists of what we call the traditionalists. Their images of the military, the soldier, of men and women and of the division of labor among the sexes within society are the classical, traditional ones. The preference for denying access of women to the military and for confining them to certain classifications and trades is thus based on the binary construction of men and women which, _inter alia_, ascribes to males the roles of fighting, killing and protecting and to females the roles of caring, being protected and of giving birth to and bringing up children; male aggressiveness is juxtaposed to female peacefulness (Mitscherlich 1985; Elshtain 1987; Batscheider 1993; Dunivin 1994; Seifert 1996; cf. also Meuser 2000). In this sense, it might be inferred that the military in general (and the Bundeswehr also) may be particularly attractive to men who deem the military to be a place where the world is still in balance, i.e. where the traditional gender system is still valid. When trying to locate the traditionalists it may not come as a surprise that they can be found more among the soldiers of the army than among the soldiers in the navy and the air force.
The second type or group, in turn, entails those whom we call the *statusinconsistents*. First, they perceive women as a socio-economic threat because of the increasing competition in the workplace due to the presence of female soldiers. This perception is based on the grounds that their socioeconomic and professional situation and hence their future is insecure. Second, they fear that they themselves will be discriminated against and that women will be given preferential treatment. In their view, it is them who are put at a disadvantage and not the women. The *statusinconsistents* can rather be found among the contract soldiers, i.e. the shorter- and longer-service volunteers. Here, indeed, the socio-economic, workplace-related competition by women is much more real than for career servicemembers. In addition we found markedly strong reservations among the male soldiers in the medical service. At first glance surprising, it is therefore the male soldiers who have already been working with women in their specific workplace who display significant reservations. It could have been assumed that gender relations in the medical service, i.e. in an area where the integration of women into the military has a substantial history, were or in the meantime have become smooth. Yet, once, e.g., the fact is taken into account that women in the medical service had been exempt from guard duty in the past – a task which then had to be done by the male soldiers in the medical service –, it becomes clear that the reservations of men had some real substance and that there is a subjective feeling of having not been treated equally and a sense that justice in gender relations (cf. Bierhoff/Cohen 1986) has not been given in the workplace. Because of this suspicion of or belief in reverse discrimination they explicitly point to the necessity of equality of treatment of men and women in the armed forces.

In the empirical reality these two types overlap without any doubt. Nevertheless, distinguishing them analytically is important because underlying them are two different sources motivating negative
attitudes towards the ongoing inclusion of women into the armed forces which in turn necessitates a broader approach in managing this issue and therefore different routes in dealing with these attitudes.

The two types we have identified, the traditionalist and the statusinconsistent, resonate with the findings of recent socialpsychological research on stereotypes. Negative attitudes towards women – just like those to ethnic or racial minorities – may be seen as stereotypes and prejudices following the classical definition by Gordon Allport (1954). In the past, some decades ago, stereotypes and prejudices against women were openly expressed. This situation has changed remarkably because of the significant shifts to be observed in the socio-economic, socio-cultural and politico-cultural spheres (cf. Inglehart 1989; Schäfers/Zapf 1998). In general, for women, living conditions, education and job opportunities have made substantial progress in the recent decades; also, socio- and politico-culturally, women are increasingly considered as equal to men which points to the formation of perceptions in society which are based on images of egalitarianism (Spence/Hahn 1997; Twenge 1997). Nevertheless, it is hardly possible to argue that gender-based discrimination in the workplace and in society at large has meanwhile been completely eliminated in modern societies. Rather, discrimination against women is still at work as can be seen when looking at the division of labour in the families and at the ratio of women working in the top echelons of business, politics and academia (cf. Wetterer 1992; Helwig/Nickel 1993; Barkhausen/Niemann-Geiger 1994; Hoecker 1995; Schmermund 1998; Reynolds 1999; Bauer 2000; Menzel 2000).

However, in the recent past, the phenomenology of these discriminating attitudes towards women has changed. Open, manifest expressions of prejudices against women have become less visible whereas subtle forms have increasingly shaped the gender landscape.
In the literature on sexism at least two forms of sexism are distinguished (cf. Tougas et al. 1995; Swim/Cohen 1997; Eckes/Six-Materna 1998; Schmermund 1998):

(1) traditional sexism characterized by an emphasis on differences between the sexes, a belief in the inferiority of women compared to men, an adherence to classical gender roles, and a strong opposition towards women assuming non-traditional roles and

(2) modern sexism consisting in denying the persistence of discrimination against women, criticizing the economic and political demands of women and strongly opposing any affirmative action measures on behalf of women.

5 Conclusion

The gender system in Germany as well as in modern societies in general is subject to change. In the analysis of Norbert Elias (1989: 33–37), this is part of what he calls an ‘emancipatory trend’. Hence, the overall direction seems to point to full-scale equality of women vis-à-vis the men both in formal and in real terms. Nevertheless, this process might neither be one-dimensional nor smooth. Although quite a few men have changed their gender images in the meantime or are used to modern conceptions of a man’s and a woman’s role, the very fact of the perceptible changes in the gender system may provoke resistance and a renewed emphasis on the traditional images (Faludi 1995; Zulehner/Volz 1999: 288; Meuser 1998: 303). Hence, focusing on men, one may distinguish four different types: the traditional man, the insecure men, the pragmatic man, and the new men which reminds us of the necessity to speak of masculinity in terms of masculinities (Zulehner/Volz 1999; Connell 1999).
The question then is whether and in how far the German armed forces are involved and affected by these processes. The preceding analysis points to an affirmative answer, i.e. the Bundeswehr cannot distance itself from developments going on in the larger society (cf. also Schaffer 1992). The shifts in the gender system impact on the armed forces. The debate on the further integration of women into the military following the ruling of the ECJ and the ensuing political decision to open the Bundeswehr to women in all its areas, classifications and trades have activated and aroused attention, interest and reflection on this issue among the soldiers precisely because they are individually, personally involved. The findings presented above indicate a good deal of ambivalence among them. Positive and negative effects are anticipated in the wake of the inclusion of female soldiers and a pragmatic approach is taken. Whether this may be interpreted as an (incipient?) erosion of the male warrior paradigm of the military and thus of a disentanglement of masculinity and the military or whether this is confined to certain areas, classifications and trades with others stubbornly resisting change remains to be seen and needs further investigation. Also, the debate on feminization (= weakening) of the military (Mitchell 1989) versus militarization of women (Enloe 1983) as a result of the integration of women into the armed forces and the discussion about its impact on German society at large will have to await further analyses.

What has become evident, however, is that there is unrest, fear and opposition to be found among the male soldiers of the Bundeswehr which may translate into manifest behavior when male soldiers meet female soldiers in their workplace. It will be these opinions, attitudes, expectations and reservations based on traditionalism and/or on status inconsistency that the German armed forces and their political and military leadership will have to accommodate and manage. They are thought to be addressed by the implementation of a gender training
program, for example. The successful integration of women will be contingent on the soldiers feeling that the Bundeswehr is dealing with these issues in a sincere and authentic way. Equality of treatment will be crucial in this regard. The male soldiers, in turn, are asked to be open towards their female comrades and to be ready to question their role and their understanding of being a man and a soldier and to modify traditional images of what a woman is and can be.

6 References


Die ‚Soldatin‘ in den Printmedien der Bundeswehr:
Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung

Sylvia Schiesser

1 Einleitung und Fragestellung


Im Zentrum der Analyse der Darstellung von Soldatinnen stehen die durch ihre ungewöhnliche Geschlechtsstatusrolle aktivierten Weiblichkeitsstereotypen ‚Mutter/Ehefrau‘, ‚Verführerin‘, ‚soldatische Kameradin‘ und ‚Flintenweib‘. Abschließend werden die Ergebnisse zusammengefasst; ansatzweise will ich versuchen zu zeigen, welche Auswirkungen und Funktionen diese stereotypen Zuschreibungen von ‚Weiblichkeit‘ im militärischen Binnensystem haben können.

\(^1\) Dies meint die durch eine auffällige soziale Kategorie einer Minderheit in einem Handlungskontext ausgelöste Wahrnehmungsbereitschaft, die zu stereotypen Zuschreibungs- und/oder Interaktionsdynamiken führt.

2 \textbf{Theoretischer Ausgangspunkt}


\(^2\) Die Grundlage der Analyse bilden die Zeitschriften *Bundeswehr aktuell, Heer, Luftwaffe, Marine/Blauer Jung, Wehrwissenschaft, Truppenpraxis, Information für die Truppe, Europäische Wehrkunde/Europäische Sicherheit und Wehrmedizinische Monatsschrift.*
schaftlich bedeutsame Konstruktionsprozesse von 'Männlichkeit' stattfinden.


\(^3\) Theweleit hat diese Entfremdung vom 'Weiblichen' und das Ausgrenzen weicher Anteile aus dem Selbst des soldatischen Mannes und die hieraus erwachsene Konstruktion von gepanzerten Körperrn in dem zusammengefügten Truppenkörper als 'Ganzheitsmaschine' herausgearbeitet. (Theweleit 1993: 206f.)

\(^4\) Wie z. B. gemeinsame Rituale wie Singen, Marschieren, Zapfenstreich, öffentliche Gelöbnisse etc.
Vor diesem Hintergrund berührt die Sozialfigur der Soldatin in ihrer Funktion als nunmehr männliche Beschützerin zwei zentrale symbolische Ebenen, die männlich codiert sind: zum einen die öffentlich-kollektive Ebene durch das Repräsentieren des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols und der Idee der Nation, zum anderen die individuell-emotionale Ebene der Maskulinität, den Kernbereich der männlich-soldatischen Geschlechtsidentität.

Evident wird, dass die Soldatin die traditionelle Rollen- und Gewaltteilung in Frage stellt und damit die hierarchisch konstruierte dichotome Geschlechterdifferenz der Stereotypen ‚aktiver, kriegerischer Soldat‘ und ‚passive, friedfertige Zivilistin‘ „stört“: Sie verkörpert die Decodierung von ‚Männlichkeit‘ und Militär, d. h. sie wirkt sich damit destabilisierend auf die Genderordnung aus und unterminiert gleichzeitig die identitätsstiftende Funktion von Maskulinität, den männlichen Beschützermythos (Seifert 1993: 316).


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5 Seifert zeigt hier beispielhaft die emotionale Irritation und Verunsicherung männlicher Identitätsvorstellungen von Bundeswehrsoldaten angesichts der Diskussion um eine weibliche Kampfbeteiligung auf.

maximalen Frauenanteil von 5–10 % in der Bundeswehr aus, der sich derzeit noch bei 1,3 % bewegt.

Beschreibbar ist die Situation von Soldatinnen daher mit dem Terminus des „Tokenismus“; hiermit werden Individuen bezeichnet, die infolge quantitativer Gruppenzusammensetzungen einen Minoritätsstatus und aufgrund zugeschriebener Charakteristiken ein ungewöhnliches Statusrollenmerkmal in einem bestimmten Handlungskontext besitzen (Dietzen 1993: 83f.).


7 Die durch den Seltenheitsstatus produzierten Wahrnehmungseffekte werden dabei erhöht, je stärker die soziale Kategorisierung visuell deutlich wird, je neuer und seltener sie im Setting der dominanten Gruppierung ist.

3 Mütterliche und erotische Elemente im Bild der Soldatin


Der Hinweis auf das ‚Kochen‘ für ‚ihre‘ Jungs unterstreicht das Bild mütterlicher Pflege; gleichzeitig wird ihre Aufgabe als kommunikative und verständnisvolle Stütze und Vertrauensperson hervorgehoben, die primär für emotionale und leibliche Bedürfnisse zuständig ist. Die soldatische Berufskompetenz wird erwähnt, bleibt aber tendenziell unsichtbar bzw. wird angesichts der Festlegung auf die Mutterrolle symbolisch ad absurdum geführt. Dass die militärische Ausbildung nur Mittel zum Zweck ist, militärische Leistungen eher marginal und hintergründig sind für das eigentliche Ziel – der Pflege und Betreuung männlicher Soldaten – offenbart die Textpassage in Bundeswehr aktuell: „Auf der Sanitätsakademie in München steht ein Fahnenjunker- und Offizierlehrgang auf dem Programm, woran sich als weitere Station eine Tätigkeit als Ausbilderin anschließen wird. Achteinhalb Jahre aber wird es noch dauern bis sie sich dann
hoffentlich als Stabsärztin um „ihre“ Soldaten kümmern kann.“
(Bundeswehr aktuell 28.02.1991: 3)

Da männliche Sanitätssoldaten im gleichen militärischen Arbeitsfeld tätig sind, läge die Vermutung nahe, dass diese auch in diesem fürsorglichen, pflegerischen Kontext dargestellt und beschrieben werden. Dies ist allerdings weitgehend unzutreffend; männliche Sanitätssoldaten werden kaum mit den Attributen aufopfernder Pflege und Zuwendung verknüpft. Bildliche Darstellungen mit männlichen Soldaten im Bereich des Sanitätswesens sind z. B. untertitelt mit „Ganzheitliches chirurgisches Wissen ist immer gefragt.“
(Bundeswehr aktuell 23.12.1993: 1 [Hervorhebung, S.S.])

Mittels der stereotypen Etikettierung der Soldatinnen als ‚Mütter‘ kann das evozierte Bild pflegender Mütterlichkeit zur Grundlage


immer ein offenes Ohr. Alle haben meine Telefonnummer, doch viele wollen sich nur mit mir verabreden‘, sagt Tanja schmunzelnd.“ (Heer 5/1994: 3f. [Hervorhebungen, S.S.])

Der verführerische Stimulus, den diese Beschreibung beinhaltet, kann hier als Grundlage dienen, die soldatische Kompetenz der Frau zu negieren bzw. in Frage zu stellen: ‘Verkehrte Welt‘. Anerkannt wird die ‘hübsche‘, ’flotte‘ und ‘schmunzelnde‘ junge Dame‘, die sich mit ‘schmachtende(n) Blicke(n)‘ konfrontiert sieht, primär in ihrer Rolle als attraktives Lustobjekt, kaum aber in ihrer Rolle als Vorgesetzte und Ausbilderin: die von der Unteroffizierin abgeforderte ‘Stärkemeldung‘ der männlichen Soldaten wirkt angesichts des Widerspruchs militarisierter-autoritärer Männlichkeit und weiblicher Verführerin lächerlich und grotesk.


Als verlockende und attraktive Exotinnen charakterisiert, ziehen die Soldatinnen nicht nur ‘wohlwollende Blicke‘ auf sich, auch die Attraktivität ihrer Bekleidung, der Uniform, wird ins Blickfeld gerückt. Wichtig scheint, dass die Soldatinnen als Frauen erkennbar bleiben und sich von männlichen Soldaten unterscheiden. Modisch,
attraktiv und weiblich sollen die Soldatinnen aussehen: „Barett und Schiffchen werden als modisch unzulänglich, aber nicht unmöglich eingestuft. Der blaue Rock jedoch, der zum gewöhnlichen täglichen Dienstalltag gehört, ruft allenthalben Unmutäußerungen hervor. Schnitt und Länge werden bemängelt, und auch einige der umstehenden Herren zeigen sich nicht gerade begeistert von dem Kleidungsstück.“ (Luftwaffe 7/1989: 21)


4 Ehefrauen

Die Soldatinnen der Bundeswehr sowie die anderer Streitkräfte werden in den Printmedien der Bundeswehr oftmals in einem weiteren, typisch weiblichen Zusammenhang idealisierend präsentiert: als (zukünftige) Ehefrauen. Zum Abschluss eines Berichts in Luftwaffe über den Aufenthalt von Unteroffizierin Carola Glöckner in


Der Ausdruck ‚natürliche, weitere Verbindung‘ suggeriert die Annahme einer grundlegenden essentiellen, quasi genetisch-natürlichen Verknüpfung von Mann – Soldat – Militär, indem die
musizierende Ehefrau und Mutter eine Irritation – einen versinnbildlichten Widerspruch – im männlichen Militärapparat darstellte.


Die in den Beschreibungen der Bundeswehrzeitschriften vollzogene Figurierung der Soldatinnen als zukünftige Ehefrauen könnte zwei Assoziationen wecken: einerseits sind Soldatinnen als (zukünftige) Ehefrauen ‚ungefährlich‘ und ‚harmlos‘. Sie stellen in dieser wahrgenommenen Funktion keine wirkliche soldatische Konkurrenz im Militärapparat dar. Andererseits kann sich die Frage aufdrängen, ob das Interesse von Frauen im Militär nicht in erster Linie darin begründet liegt, einen potenziellen Ehemann zu finden.⁸

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⁸ Dies war/ist in der Tat ein unter männlichen Militärangehörigen weit verbreitetes Vorurteil: „Frauen, so war die Annahme, waren halt im Militär, um sich einen Mann zu angeln. Hatten sie es geschafft, so würden sie das Militär verlassen (…).“ (Truppenpraxis 2/1988: 189)
Die Printmedien der Bundeswehr berichten auch über Soldatinnen anderer Armeen. Diese werden vor allem in nicht-militärischen Bedeutungszusammenhängen dargestellt; sie dienen primär der Zierde und Verschö nerung bei offiziellen Ehrungen, Festlichkeiten und militärischen Länderrepräsentationen, als ‚reizvolle‘ Symbole der Freundschaft, internationaler Zusammenarbeit und Friedlich keit:

„Auch Warten auf einen Minister kann seine Reize haben: Der Inspekteur des Heeres, Generalleutnant Helge Hansen, nutzte (...) die Gelegenheit zu einem Plausch mit Staff Sergeant Elisabeth Dorsey (...), die zusammen mit weiteren Mannschaftsdienstgraden und Unteroffizieren der in Deutschland stationierten verbündeten Streitkräfte und der Bundeswehr von Verteidigungsminister Volker Rühe zum traditionellen Adventskaffee eingeladen worden war. (...) So sollte diese Einladung zu der vorweihnachtlichen Begegnung vor allem Ausdruck der Verbundenheit sowie der Zusammengehörigkeit mit den alliierten Soldaten sein.“ (Bundeswehr aktuell 15.12.1992: 1)

Dienstbetrieb sollten die beiden „Ladies“ einmal mehr als nur Kasernen und Truppenübungsplätze (...) kennenlernen. (...) Noch ganz fasziniert von ihren Reiseerlebnissen, machten die beiden Soldatinnen (...) keinen Hehl aus ihrer Begeisterung, (...) viel zu schnell seien die schönen Tage in ihrer „zweiten Heimat“ vergangen.“ (Bundeswehr aktuell 22.07.1985: 1)


Die primär auf weibliche Rollen und Stereotype reduzierende Darstellung von Soldatinnen ist vor dem theoretischen Hintergrund zu bewerten als eine bewusste Konstruktion und Festschreibung des
Antagonismus ‚Frau’ – ‚Soldatsein’, aufgrund der durch weibliche Militärteilhabe destabilisierenden Wirkung auf die Genderordnung im Militär.


6 Die soldatische Kameradin

Einen weiteren Frauentypus stellt die ‚soldatische Kameradin’ dar. In den Printmedien der Bundeswehr war dieses Rollenstereotyp jedoch unter anderem durch die bisherige Festlegung auf den Militärmusik- und Sanitätsbereich nur ein marginal angedeutetes Konstrukt. Im Gegensatz zu den klassischen, primär ästhetisch figurierten Frauentypen zeichnet sich das Bild der Kameradin als ‚professionalisiertes, (geschlechts)neutrales Wesen’ durch Qualifikationen, hohe Leistungsorientierung und eigene Zähigkeit aus. Dieser Typus – ähnlich dem einer Karrierefrau – konterkariert die normativen

Da die von diesem Frauentyp ausgehende Konkurrenz im Militär am größten ist, wird das Bestehen des Einzelkämpfergrundlehrgangs wie folgt kommentiert: „Sicherlich Zufall, aber dennoch ein Signal!“ (Bundeswehr aktuell 12.04.1994: 3)

Von dem Hintergrund einer Abstrahierung von 'Weiblichkeit' und Geschlechtlichkeit ausgehend, ist zu erwarten, dass mit der nunmehrigen Öffnung aller Einsatzbereiche ohne Einschränkungen diese neutralisierenden und professionalisierten Wahrnehmungen im militärischen Binnensystem zunehmen werden, die dann einzustufen wären als eine maschinelle geschlechtslose Funktionsbestimmung von Menschen in technokratisierten Militärapparaten.

7 „Flintenweiber“?


Dass die Soldatinnen keine ‚Mannweber‘, ‚Flintenweiber‘ oder ‚Monster‘ sind, die die militärische Männlichkeit gefährden, wird durch den Heiratswunsch der Frauen ‚bewiesen‘: „Den Typ ‚Flintenweib‘ sucht man bei den Bewerberinnen vergeblich. So wird spätere Heirat von ihnen auch nicht ausgeschlossen. Ob die lange Verpflichtungszeit da nicht eine Belastung wäre und den Verzicht auf
Kinder zur Folge hätte, wird Stephanie Jung gefragt (...).“ (Luftwaffe 1/1989: 11)

Die Dokumentation der Affinität der Soldatinnen zu traditionellen weiblichen Rollenmustern, Hochzeit und mögliche Mutterschaft, scheint die Verunsicherung und emotionale Irritation zu minimieren und die nicht vorhandene Existenz des weiblichen Feindmotivs zu bestätigen. Letztendlich wird die Erschütterung der vorherrschenden Geschlechterstereotype von ‚Männlichkeit‘ und ‚Weiblichkeit‘ angesichts der Existenz von Soldatinnen im Militär abgewendet durch die folgende Feststellung: „Harte Männer wollen sie nicht werden, die ersten Unteroffizieranwärterinnen der Bundeswehr (...).“ (Bundeswehr aktuell 07.02.1991: 2)

Infolgedessen muss eine soldatisch-männliche Konkurrenz im eigentlichen Sinn, die Vereinnahmung des sui-generis-Charakters des ‚Männlich-Soldatischen‘ durch Frauen im Militärapparat kaum befürchtet werden.

8 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick

In der Analyse zum ‚Bild der Soldatin‘ in den Printmedien der Bundeswehr manifestieren sich die durch den signifikanten Minderheitenstatus von Frauen im Militär aktivierten Wahrnehmungen der Auffälligkeit und Stereotypisierung von ‚Weiblichkeit‘.

Mittels der Pointierung mütterlicher und erotischer Elemente in der Darstellung der Soldatinnen, deren partielle Figurierung als Ehefrauen, ihrer Versinnbildlichung als verlockend-weibliche Attraktion und Werbeobjekt sowie durch die verstärkte Präsentation im Kontext nicht-militärischer Bedeutungszusammenhänge wird
versucht, das traditionelle, komplementäre Geschlechterverhältnis im Militär symbolisch durch diese tradierten stereotypen Zuschreibungen zu reproduzieren. Das Akzentuieren weiblicher Eigenschaften und der dem Rollenangebot des Sanitäts- (und Militärmusik)wesens der Bundeswehr entsprechenden emotionalen, pflegenden und altruistischen Tätigkeitsmerkmale ermöglicht es, die militärische Komponente der Tätigkeit und deren Relation zum militärischen Auftrag tendenziell zu verhüllen und die Rollenambivalenz ‚Frau – Militär‘ zu glätten.

Subsumierend lassen sich die verschiedenen Typisierungen im Bild der Soldatin als Bestrebungen bewerten, ein konträres, abgrenzendes Korrelat zur bildlichen Norm eines ‚männlichen‘ Soldatentums zu konstruieren, um somit weitgehend einen komplementären und polaren Geschlechterdualismus zu zementieren.9


In diesem Sinne haben die aufgezeigten Entwürfe klassisch-idealisierter Typisierungsschemata von ‚Weiblichkeit‘ in den


Printmedien der Bundeswehr sowie die geschlechtsspezifische Gewaltrollenverteilung auch funktionalen Charakter in Form einer „Bewältigungsstrategie“ von Gender-Irritationen: zum einen für männliche Militärangehörige, deren Männlichkeitsbild wesentlich durch Abgrenzungsbemühungen von „Weiblichkeit“ vermittelt ist; zum anderen aber auch für die Soldatinnen selbst: deren mögliche eigene Rollenkonflikte und Ambivalenzen im Selbstbild könnten somit minimiert werden, da die Militärtätigkeit zu einem relativ konfliktfreien, weiblich-konnotierten und zivilen Handlungsmuster erklärt wird.

dominant verhielten, wurde dies von den Untergebenen als weibliche Entwertung ihrer ‚Männlichkeit‘ empfunden.“ (Zirngast 1995: 60)


Solange sich das Größenverhältnis im Militär nicht ändert, bleiben die durch den Minderheitsstatus der Soldatinnen hervorgerufenen differenz-konstruierenden Wahrnehmungseffekte erhalten, die einerseits zur Isolation der Frauen und andererseits zur Verstärkung des männlichen Zusammenhalts führen. Diese Polarisierungen können
in institutionellen Zusammenhängen somit zu einem Mechanismus der Ausgrenzung und Konkurrenzaabwehr werden, der verhindert, dass die Soldatinnen an informellen und sozialen Netzwerken teilnehmen können. In diesem Kontext ist mögliche sexuelle Diskriminierung von Soldatinnen nicht nur eine Folge der vorliegenden demoralisierenden Weiblichkeitsstereotypen, sondern beschreibbar als ein Vehikel zur Wiederherstellung und Demonstration militärischer Maskulinität aufgrund weiblichen Eindringens in den Männerbund und des damit gestiegenen Leistungs- und Konkurrenzdruks.\footnote{Im Hinblick auf die internationalen Erfahrungswerte ist Frauenfeindlichkeit in Militärapparaten keine Einzelerscheinung, sondern ein strukturelles, militär-system-inhärentes Problem, das die größte strukturelle Barriere gegen eine gleichberechtigte Integration von Frauen ins Militär darstellt. (Zirngast 1995: 53f.)}


\footnote{Im Hinblick auf die internationalen Erfahrungswerte ist Frauenfeindlichkeit in Militärapparaten keine Einzelerscheinung, sondern ein strukturelles, militär-system-inhärentes Problem, das die größte strukturelle Barriere gegen eine gleichberechtigte Integration von Frauen ins Militär darstellt. (Zirngast 1995: 53f.)}

9 Literaturverzeichnis


The Gender Perspective of Civil-Military Relations in Israeli Society

Uta Klein

1 Introduction

During the Israeli election campaign in the year 1999 a surprising newspaper advertisement appeared: Under the heading “Gentlemen, it’s impossible without the ladies”, it showed the candidates of the big parties. From left to right the heads of Dan Meridor, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Ehud Barak, Benjamin Netanjahu dressed in women’s clothes. The ad called for more women in the Knesset. The surprising and unusual thing, however, was the text beneath the photo. It says: “Don’t forget that every second voter is a woman. It is true: you all might be born leaders and excellent officers, but only women candidates on safe places on the party lists can represent the whole electorate.” It was especially unusual in mentioning the connection between the political success of male aspirants who had a military career (Lipkin-Shahak had been lieutenant general, Barak chief of general staff) and the political failure of women.

The exceptional centrality of security to the national existence of Israel has led scholars to investigate the impact of the military on the political and civil system. Nevertheless, this research had been limited in scope. As the main result – generally speaking – Israel had been viewed as a unique case of a system which maintains a democracy during protracted wars and prolonged conflict (see Horowitz 1982;

According to Baruch Kimmerling (1995), ideological and value-loaded considerations blurred the issue. Only recently have studies begun to address some problematic subjects related to civil-military relations, among these the connection between military and political elites (Etzioni-Halevy 1996) and various aspects of military-industrial relations (Carmi/Rosenfeld 1989). Scholars began to explore whether the predominance of security and military power has led to a militarization of Israel. Ben-Eliezer (1995) talks about ‘militaristic politics’, Kimmerling (1993) uses the term ‘civilian militarism’. The newer ‘generation’ of scholars emphasizes the effect of armed conflict on larger society, on its attitudes and values.

One subject, however, which has been neglected so far is the gender perspective. This is astonishing because Israel is unique in the sense that Jewish Israeli women have been conscripted since the foundation of the state of Israel. Thus – seen in numbers – Israel serves as a very interesting case study about the impact of the most advanced integration of female citizens in the defense forces on society and on the defense forces themselves. What I am going to present here are some of the results of a research project I have conducted during the last years mostly in Israel. I am going to concentrate on two findings:

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1 As main reasons for the persistence of democracy, the permeable boundaries between the military and the civilian sector had been stressed and thus the mutual influence and “civilization” of the military. It has been claimed that the army is a “Citizen army”, that Israel is a “nation in arms”, and that thus the army thus does not reflect a specific group in society.
2 In China women are also conscripted, but as not even 10 percent of each age group are being called, this is negligible.
3 The whole of this study is published under “Militär und Geschlecht in Israel”, Frankfurt am Main 2001.
Although (Jewish) women are conscripted, the military in Israel is the main force in shaping male identity; military service can be understood as a rite of passage to male adulthood.

- The dominance of security and of the military discourse leads to gender inequality in society at large.

2 The Military, Military Service and Masculinity

As a result of agreements between the religious parties and the ruling party Jewish men and women are conscripted on unequal terms. A woman is exempted for religious reasons if she hands in a signed declaration that religious reasons forbid her from doing military service and that she follows a kosher diet and observes the Sabbath, whereas religious men are not exempted only if they attend a yeshiva (a religious institution of higher education). Women – but not men – are further automatically exempted for family reasons, which means those women who are either mothers, pregnant and married (sic).

The length of service is different: men have to serve for three years, women for two years. It is disputed how many percent of the female population are drafted and how many complete their whole length of service. About 90 percent of the men are drafted, versus 60 percent of the women. In a recent paper Stuart A. Cohen (1997: 93) states that 80 percent of the male recruits complete their statutory length of service. In comparison, only 15 percent of female conscripts complete 24 months. What is called ‘universal’ conscription is selective rather

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4 The legal arrangement was changed following the elections in 1977. The Likud-Coalition lowered the formal requirements demanded from women requesting exemption on religious grounds.
than universal, when the female population is concerned. Furthermore, only men are regularly called to reserve duty up to the age of 50 or 52 years.

A result of another element of conscription policy is to be seen in a gender context: men are taken regardless of education, while women must have eight years of formal education. On the one hand, this means that the average qualification of female soldiers is higher; on the other hand, this practice “reinforces the social handicap of those women” (see van Creveld 1994: Fn. 3). Ten years ago, according to Reuven Gal (1987), the low level of education/intelligence was the second largest category of women exempted from military service.

Until a new law was passed the parliament at the beginning of 2000, women were not allowed to serve in combat roles. On the one hand those factors (conscription on unequal terms, different length of service, combat restriction) block the career of women in the forces. Among the officers, the percentage of women in the rank of major general 1995 was 0 percent, brigadier 0 percent, brigadier general 0.8 percent, colonel 2.2 percent, lieutenant colonel 10.3 percent, major 22.5 percent. In a ranking which David and Mady Wechsler Segal and Bradford Booth (1999) used to compare the integration of women and homosexuals in a cross-national survey, Israel was listed with 8.3 as the mean rank for women (in a scale with 1 serving as the most integrated and 18 serving as the least integrated). The United States, Norway, Canada and Great Britain had a better mean rank. (The study was done before the bill for opening all jobs passed the parliament.) All in all, in spite of the presence of women in the forces, the military is perceived as a male peer group, as a place of male comradeship, as a place of brotherhood.
On the other hand inequality in military service and roles has a symbolic impact on society. In Israel – as in other nations around the world – men are regarded in society as the protectors and women as the protected (Stiehm 1982). Military service is seen as an inherent part of maturation for Israeli Jewish males. It is seen as a rite of passage to male adulthood. Military service is seen as essential to a boy’s right to belong to the inner circle of adult males. It fulfils typically male adolescent desires like intense thrills, adventure and peril, and it “provides the specific cultural context for the Israeli transition to adulthood” (Lieblich/Perlow 1988: 45).

Even in school, Israeli Jewish youths are prepared to join the military forces. Members of the defense forces hold lectures to give information and impressions of life in the Israeli army. Some youths volunteer for special units or undergo pre-induction courses. Almost every Jewish Israeli pupil takes part in the yearly Jom Hakheilot, a one-day seminar which is held in cooperation by the schools and the army. This Jom Hakheilot shows that military service for males is a bodily experience. Boys and girls are separated. Films showing soldiers in action and the exciting military life are shown to the boys. The young men are told that physical exercise is essential in preparing for military service. Girls, however, do not see films about women in action. Physical performance is scarcely ever mentioned. The main emphasis of lectures and talks lies in emotional questions involving military service like separation from parents.

We must not forget the historical component. The notion of masculinity was central to the Zionist movement. As a reaction to antisemitism and persecution, the Zionist ideal of manliness served as an antithesis to the popular picture of the Diaspora Jew. Physical strength and readiness to defend one’s honour by fighting were the desired characteristics of the new Jew. The pioneer, with an emphasis
on the male body, became the icon of the Zionist project (Boyarin 1997; Klein 1998). After the establishment of the state of Israel, the IDF-soldier took the place of the pioneer of the pre-state period. Women participated in the national project by undertaking auxiliary roles. The main tasks of women in the military became supporting by providing social work and nursing and by teaching (e.g. teaching of new immigrants). Thus a sexual division of labour within the IDF developed which reflected the societal gendered roles of defense as a male duty and motherhood as a female duty. No wonder that in the public consciousness the soldier as a defender is male. Houses to commemorate members of the forces who have died in uniform (which you find in each town, city or settlement) are called Yad lebanim (translated: House of the sons) and war memorials show women bidding farewell from sons or husbands going to war (for example the memorial at Balfuria from Mordechai Kafri) or women nursing wounded soldiers (at Nitzanim from Moshe Ziffer).5

3 The Dominance of Security and Military Issues and Gender Inequality in Society

The centrality of the military and of security in society leads to a marginalization of women on a symbolic level (because they are not regarded as capable of defending the country and taking part in security discourse) and on a practical level: Jewish Israeli men gain from their military service by accumulating social capital, by establishing contacts for their professional careers (networking) and by achieving material and symbolic benefits. Men accumulate what Pierre Bourdieu calls social and symbolic capital, which grants them

5 One exception is the memorial at Hulda by Batya Lishanski. Three portraits are carved in Jerusalem stone: one of an anonymous soldier, the other of Efraim Chizhik, leader of the Jewish forces in the 1929 battle of Hulda, the other of his sister Sarah Chitzhik, who fell at Tel Hai 1921.
advantages in civilian life. The capital Jewish women accumulate is not valued very highly on the civilian labor-market.

Service in the higher echelons of the army is a pathway towards positions of importance and influence in public life. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) provide a stepping stone for most of the senior officers who pursue a civilian career. A military background is regarded as a necessary precondition for public office. The percentage of women in the Knesset since the establishment of the Israeli state had never exceeded 10 percent until it reached 12 percent in the current parliament. Beside the exclusion of women in the orthodox religious parties, the predominance of military experience in the society as a whole is responsible for that. Men convert their military rank into analogous positions of power in political parties.

4 Conclusion

Although the Israeli army is still perceived as the main mechanism for building a national identity, it has particularly become the basis of a male self-image and a source for male social mobility in society (Klein 1999). The military turns out to be the main agent of society in shaping gender roles, constructing masculinity, and thus it serves as the main source of gender inequality in society. In spite of the participation of women in the military, the Israeli experience shows that ideologies of manhood and the dominant position of the military in society are deeply intertwined.

Research shows that messages related to military roles are transmitted through rituals even at kindergarten level (Furmann 1999).

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6 I should add that because most Palestinian citizens of Israel are excluded from military service the military becomes an ethnic border marker.
Nevertheless, we can observe an increasing public discourse on the centrality of the military and on Zahal\textsuperscript{7} itself – remember the advertisement mentioned at the beginning. Another example is the discussion about sexual harassment in the army. What had been denied in the past, seems now to have become an issue of public debate. Since the introduction of the 1998 Sexual Harassment Prevention Law, the highest number of complaints filed has been in the Ministry of Defense. When the former general and then minister of transport, Yitzhak Mordechai, was recently investigated on suspicion of sexual assault against an employee in his ministry, several women charged that Mordechai had harassed them as well during his army tenure (IWN 2000).

In some circles, there is a lot of confusion and alarm about a decline in willingness to serve. (although motivation in general is still high). The movement New Profile, which works for the acceptance of conscientious objection in Israel, might be marginal, but at the same time it shows that there are young people refusing to take over an obligation for military roles. In my perspective a gender democratic society can only develop with a volunteer force selecting people according to ability regardless of gender. To recruit women is not enough to change gender roles. The other side of the coin is to stop to oblige each man in society to take over a military role. Some weeks ago I had planned to finish my paper with the heading of a newspaper article in Israel (of Doron Rosenblum 1994), which was: “Honey, the soldiers have shrunk.” I fear that the actual disastrous situation in the region contributes once again to a growth of the soldier.

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\textsuperscript{7} Zahal = Zva Hagana Le Israel = Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
5 References


Civil-Military Relations and Gender Equality in the South African National Defence Force at the Beginning of the New Millennium

Rialize Ferreira

1 Introduction

South Africa has a rich and diverse military history, with relatively stable and unproblematic civil-military relations stretching from the beginning of the 19th century until the emergence of the present South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in the late 20th century (Williams 1998: 28). The new patterns of civil-military relations and military culture developed after April 1994 from the integration of eight different, opposing armed forces. These various South African armies have distinguished histories in their own right and played important roles. They were the former conventionally trained South African Defence Force (SADF) and the four homeland armies of the Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda and Ciskei (TBVC) known as the statutory forces, as well as the guerrilla trained Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People’s Liberation Army (APLA), known as the non-statutory forces (Ferreira 1999: 1). These seven forces all became part of the SANDF on 27 April 1994. After negotiations with the Inkatha Freedom Party the KwaZulu-Natal Self-Protection Police members were later directly incorporated, not integrated, into the military system on a preferential basis (Cilliers et al. 1997: 26). The integration process was conducted under the guidance and supervision of a British Military Assistance and Training Team (BMATT). The process implied far-reaching effects for the relationship between the SANDF and South African society. This background now serves to underlie much of the nature of the present civil-military relations.
Within a relatively short period of time the new democratically elected government managed to establish a set of mechanisms, legislation and processes to ensure appropriate civil control over the newly integrated SANDF, by means of a new Constitution and a White Paper on Defence in 1996.

In addition to structural and operational changes in the SANDF, such as the creation of a civilian Defence Secretariat and a civilian Ministry of Defence, societal forces were driving the military to become fully representative of civilian values, inter alia, gender equality, so as to be accountable to a democratic society. The acceptance of the Constitution of 1996 also meant that defence policy and legislation were changing to embrace societal values.

The Constitution of 1996 determined the roles, functions, composition and responsibilities of the SANDF and called for its posture to be primarily defensive, its composition to be representative of the country’s population, which also meant that equal opportunities should prevail in the system, and its activities to be sufficiently transparent to enable effective civil control and oversight.

2 Research Methodology and Theoretical Framework

This paper is based on a qualitative documentary study, conducted by means of content analyses of secondary sources regarding civil-military relations in South Africa and gender integration and equality in the SANDF. Underlying this methodological technique is the functionalist perspective. The main premise is that military matters of institutional nature are regarded as an organized system of activities directed to reach specific goals or fulfill manifest functions (balanced
civil-military relations and gender equality) in order to survive as a system in the greater South African society.

3 The White Paper on Defence 1996

The South African White Paper on Defence 1996 presents the defence policy of the Government of National Unity which should be in harmony with all other aspects of government policy. Aspects relevant to this paper are addressed in Chapters 2 and 5 of the White Paper on Defence, as well as Chapter 10 of the Defence Review of 1998. They are issues of civil-military relations and human resources. Civil-military relations include civil control, military professionalism and rights and duties of military personnel, which imply that military members are citizens and enjoy the same fundamental rights as civilians. The constitutional provisions on fundamental rights cover, inter alia, the respect for multi-cultural diversity and gender equality (White Paper 1996: 10). Human resource issues include integration, force structures, demobilization and rationalization, defence labour relations, staffing the SANDF, future size, composition and management of the DoD, representativeness, affirmative action, equal opportunity and management of diversity and education and training.

The White Paper on Defence, also called ‘Defence in a Democracy’ advocates a democratic transformation on defence policy in the SANDF, a process which is supported by the Defence Review of 1998. The Defence Review elaborates on policy framework through comprehensive long-range planning on various matters, such as posture, doctrine, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, human resources and funding. For the purpose of this paper, only civil-military relations and gender equality will be discussed.
The Constitution of 1996 lays out the basic design for civil control by using a pluralist perspective which entails that many different political parties have an input to influence military decisions (Popenoe et al. 1998: 363). Constitutional checks and balances keep the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches of government from gaining too much power. This encourages decentralization of political control. Thus, the mechanism used to bring about civil control, provides for the shared overseeing or control of the military by the legislative, the executive and the judiciary in order to exercise democratic control over the armed forces and defence policy.

Whilst Cilliers & Heinecken (2000: 251) are of the opinion that the South African military was not subjected to any civil supervision before 1994, although firm executive control existed, General Otto (1995: 55), former Chief of the SA Army has a different viewpoint. He maintains that it is a fact that the SA Army was indeed subjected to civil control and claims that various mechanisms were in place at the political level before 1994 to control the military, but if these mechanisms have not been put into full practice, the military cannot be blamed. After April 1994 when democracy was instituted civil control of the military became compulsory to ensure that the military operated according to the Interim Constitution of 1993 and Parliament. This was welcomed, especially by the African National Congress (ANC) who still feared that the ‘dangerous SADF’ would stage a coup and usurp power (personal communication with MK Col Solly Mollo). They felt that the former SADF should be controlled effectively by a civilian Defence Secretariat. Civil control was therefore incorporated and reflected in the White Paper on Defence prescribing a new system of civil-military relations appropriate to a functioning democracy.
The South African Defence Amended Act of 1995 provides for a restructured Department of Defence (DoD) which comprises the SANDF and a civilian Defence Secretariat as part of the South African democracy-building process. With the institutionalization of the Defence Secretariat in March 1995, the advantages of the Secretariat for the armed forces and for parliament were highlighted as follows (Steyn 1995: 6):

- It will free the armed forces (CSANDF) of many of their non-traditional functions like accounting responsibilities and parliamentary liaison and allow them to concentrate on their primary task to prepare for and execute war.

- It will take responsibility for many of the political functions of defence management like parliamentary and interdepartmental liaison. The secretary will act as a buffer for the armed forces against the unwarranted intrusion and meddling of politically inclined instances.

- It will civilianize many of the defence functions like finance, aspects of logistics, personnel and auditing.

- It will take primary responsibility for the coordination of defence policy. The secretary will ensure that a wide range of players like the military, foreign affairs, government departments, civil and political society are involved in the formulation of defence policy. This ensures that a rich and varied mix of inputs are received in the formulation of this policy. Such an open, incremental and collaborative approach is a key ingredient for the formulation of good policy anywhere in the world.

The restructured DoD entrenched democratic civil-military relations upon society, which refer to the division of powers within the DoD itself, to the hierarchy of authority between Parliament and the armed
forces, as well as to civil supremacy over these forces (Frankel 1998: 157). Civil-military relations thus depend on the balance of power within society amongst the political elite, the military elite and civil society itself (Williams 1998: 28). Such relations could change when the balance of power shifts and different formal relations prevail.

According to Williams (1998: 32) the shift of power from the military to the polity during the post-April 1994 period was most visible in the activities of the newly established Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence. The committee insisted to be involved in all major aspects of defence policy and planning and refused to accept key policy documents emerging from the Department of Defence (DoD), without being consulted first. The transfer of the departmental accounting and defence policy functions to the newly established civilian Ministry of Defence (MoD) deprived the armed forces of much of their institutional power possessed during the period before April 1994. The appointment of civilians to senior positions such as the Secretary of Defence, the Chief of the Policy Division and the Directors of all key policy positions within the DoD proved the significant role of civilian bureaucrats in the administration of military issues (Williams 1998: 32). However, the finance, logistic and personnel departments, as well as the civilian secretariat still relied heavily on both serving and former military members (who overnight became civilians serving in the secretariat) for the execution of their functions. The new members will yet take some time to learn all the rules, regulations and functions of the different departments. This fact has definitely limited the extent to which effective civil control can be instituted in the South African military system.

According to Chuter (2000: 26) the minimization of the power of the military is not the only issue of interest in civil-military relations, since the military always has a useful role to play in society. This role
cannot be limited to actual military operations alone, but the influence that the military as an institution has on other institutions and on people’s lives, both directly and indirectly, must not be underestimated. The military influences the formulation of many government policies, e.g. foreign policy options which would otherwise not exist. Therefore, “the military and the whole bureaucracy of defence have to be brought into the general process of government” (Chuter 2000: 27). This notion refers to the concept of civil control, which should not be confused by the concept civilian control. By civil control is meant the obedience and loyalty which the military, as an instrument of the state owes to civis, the state, to uphold order by advising on the formulation of defence policy and by helping to implement it. It is therefore preferable to use the concept civil control instead of civilian control, because the military takes orders from the state and if something is wrong with civil-military relations, it is because the military is not prepared to acknowledge this partnership and does not follow these orders (Chuter 2000: 28). How a particular society achieves successful civil-military agreements between the military and parliament depends upon the nature of that society. Effective civil-military relations are achieved through the extent to which political, military and civilian partners find agreement and accommodate each other by having consensus on the values and objectives of the armed forces. Partnerships must include a mutual respect for civil supremacy. When a breakdown in trust between these partners occurs a disruption of stable civil-military relations follow. The DoD is therefore obliged to comply with the constitutional order and the spirit of expanding civil-military relations.

The functions of the main role-players or partners in civil-military relations in South Africa, namely the Minister of Defence, the Defence Secretary and the Chief of the SANDF (CSANDF), are described below. Each has a role to play in ensuring healthy civil-
military relations and this model is called the “balanced model” within the South African defence community (Steyn 1995: 5). This new system outlines an important departure from the spirit and practice of civil-military organization in the past. Effective functioning of the balanced model requires military compliance though, so as to prepare it for the requirements of the 21st century (Frankel 1998: 159). The following are key elements in the balanced model. The roles and functions are intended to complement and interrelate with one another to promote collaboration in the military system as a whole.

- The Minister of Defence (MoD) who heads the DoD is responsible for conveying the needs of the DoD to the elected government, while also conveying political guidelines and policy regulations to the DoD. He is responsible for the defence functions of government and is accountable to the president and parliament for the management and execution of this function (Frankel 1998: 157). The Minister appoints civilian experts on military matters on behalf of parliament. He directs and controls performance of the military functions through the statutory Council on Defence, where the Secretary for Defence and the CSANDF are equals and co-chairpersons of the Defence Staff Council.

The DoD has to respect the rights and duties of the democratically elected parliament to exercise independent and critical judgement on defence policy and practice, whilst parliament’s responsibilities require the building of a close and cooperative relationship between the DoD and the parliamentary committees, such as the Joint Standing Committee on Defence which has capacity to investigate and recommend on functions relating to parliamentary supervision as may be prescribed by law (Frankel 1998: 157). The DoD has a duty to provide sufficient information to ensure adequate parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate on defence matters.
- The Secretary of Defence manages the secretariat and is responsible to the DoD. He is also the principal advisor to the Minister regarding all aspects of defence policy and matters investigated by the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. The Secretary of Defence performs the financial accounting and the budget within the DoD, a function previously fulfilled by the CSANDF, and takes responsibility for inter-departmental and parliamentary liaison on behalf of the DoD (Frankel 1998: 159). He acts as principal advisor to the MoD on matters regarding defence policy, human resources and the fiscal and administrative duties as delegated by the minister. He performs such duties as necessary for democratic and civilian management of the defence functions to enhance parliamentary and ministerial control over the SANDF. The Secretary has to monitor compliance with the directions given to the CSANDF by the President or the Minister. The Defence Secretariat, and especially the Policy and Planning Section, is the DoD’s link with the Department of Foreign Affairs and no interdepartmental interaction should occur without their involvement.

- On the other hand, the CSANDF has executive military command over the four arms of service (the army, navy, air force and medical services) and executes the defence policy, directs the work of defence headquarters and manages the overall functioning and operations of the SANDF. He is responsible for decision-making in areas that relate directly to the execution of tasks within the framework of civilian supremacy. He is the principal advisor to the Minister on military, operational and administrative matters regarding the execution of tasks. The CSANDF and the Secretary of Defence now operate at the same hierarchical level under the MoD, but with distinct responsibilities. The Secretary is the departmental policy advisor, while the CSANDF is the departmental military advisor.
To summarize: The respective functions of the Secretary of Defence and the CSANDF at Defence Headquarters are thus based on the following guidelines. Firstly, civilians formulate policy and the military executes the policy. Secondly, civilians are responsible for the political dimensions of defence. The contributions of military officers to policy formulation on the basis of their functional expertise are welcomed. This is a reciprocal action that stands to benefit the military. Balanced advice from a large body of civilians is given to assist the MoD.

Six years after the institutionalization of the Defence Secretariat in March 1995, and with the wisdom of hindsight, the South African military has however, come to the conclusion that the balanced model is not a flawless one. It has many uncertainties and contentious issues to deal with. A proper clarification of roles for the CSANDF and the Defence Secretary is needed to make a better contribution to the management of the defence force. According to Frankel (1998: 159) the balanced model remains a point of conflict and “the notion of an essential functional equality between the military and its civilian masters is still relatively uninternalised in the minds of many important military leaders at this early point in transition”. This model will have to be revisited in the near future, since it was found in practice that there were disadvantages to the institutionalization of the Defence Secretariat in South Africa, namely:

- The duplication of unaffordable costs and functions involved in strategy and planning caused conflict of interests.
- Unclear delimitations of defence policy resulted in complex approval situations for staff and took too long to reach decisions.
Two heads complicated administration of the DoD. Should the Secretary of Defence or the Chief of the SANDF be the head who reports to the MoD?

These problems led many observers to question whether a new model should be instituted by parliament to head the SANDF.

It is, however, relatively easy to establish a general outline as to how civil-military relations should work. No guidelines, process charts and diagrams can create good civil-military relations in itself. For relations to be effective they require two essential ingredients, namely: 1) the creation of a political culture that allows civil-military relations to thrive and, 2) continual interaction between all the actors involved in the defence community (Steyn 1995: 7). These challenges should be met before healthy civil-military relations will be established. At the moment civil-military relations are still in a transitional phase, where the secretariat is a novelty and civilian skills (predominantly from a guerrilla background) are not up to standard yet. Although defence is a highly sophisticated, complex function, it is currently criticized to be overmanaged and underled in South Africa.

Frankel (1998: 166) refers to the “ongoing faultline” between the secretariat and the mainstream military establishment, where both actors differ over the idea of good policy appropriate to the new system of civilianization and democracy. This reflects the lack of clarity as to what constitutes the national interest and the protective role of the armed forces. Even while the secretariat has objective control over the military backed up by legislation and constitutional devices, it still needs to have subjective control, indicating a stable system of civil-military relations. Many officers still have difficulty to grasp the link between civilianization and military autonomy in a democratic society. Despite the efforts of the secretariat to illustrate its
positive characteristics to the soldiers, there are still mixed feelings about this ‘policing’ agent (Frankel 1998: 166). However, the DoD has a strong commitment towards democracy so as to prepare the SANDF to be fully effective in the new millennium, despite the tentative nature of civil control in South Africa.

5 Human Resource Issues

The secretariat, as outlined, is responsible for defence policy within the DoD. After extensive debate regarding sensitive issues on whether affirmative action should apply only to black personnel or to include women as well, the implementation of affirmative action policies were eventually instituted during mid-1996. The assignment was “to establish in conjunction with the Defence Secretariat and then maintain within the SANDF, the Department of Defence’s policy with regard to equal opportunity and affirmative action” (Frankel 1998: 114). This will ensure prevention of unfair discrimination amongst SANDF members. The policy eventually provided for black officers and in-service women, as well as other previously disadvantaged personnel, which meant those who needed adult basic education. Human resource issues are dealt with in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review and include issues such as representativeness, referring to race and gender equality, which are relevant here.
6 Representativeness

Given the South African legacy of apartheid, the principles of representativeness and equality have been entrenched in the Bill of Rights in the 1996 Constitution. To address racial imbalances in the government system, of which the SANDF is part of, it is stipulated that the system must be broadly representative of the South African population.

As part of the defence policy framework, Chapter 5 of the White Paper on Defence and Chapter 10 of the Defence Review are dedicated exclusively to human resource issues. The Defence Review determines that representativeness be applied in the SANDF following the integration of the eight former armed forces. As an integral part of transformation, representativeness at top management and command levels of defence was instituted and marked improvement has been made in the representative nature of the top structure, but the same cannot be said of the transformation of middle and lower management as yet (Matanzima 1998: 61). It was the intention to transform all levels in the same manner to ensure representativeness. By 1999 58% of the full-time force were black, 12% were coloured, 1% was Asian and 27% were white. It still does not reflect the demographic composition of the South African population. To rectify that, the new structure of the DoD has to include 50% black representatives and 30% women appointed in management posts by December 1999, as stipulated by the Defence Review guidelines. However, as Genl Matanzima (1998: 65) said: “The road to representivity cannot be traveled overnight, except if you are prepared to lower your standards and your operational preparedness significantly.”
To substantiate the idea of representativeness in the SANDF, the former MoD Joe Modise (1996: 2) explained that since members of the SANDF come from many different backgrounds the best of these different strands must be developed by the SANDF to bind a common identity, and therefore representativeness is needed. No level of the SANDF can be based on primarily one group. Standards and values must not be seen as those of any particular group. According to Modise (1996: 2) standards must accommodate human talent and potential.

The way to correct imbalances of the past regarding race and gender is by means of Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action programmes. The DoD is addressing disparities in the levels of training and competency of all members of the new SANDF by means of these programmes. To ensure representativeness, candidates who are not trained according to professional standard yet, must be afforded the chance to achieve those standards (Matanzima 1998: 68–71). Special attention was simultaneously given to opportunities for women. The overarching goal of the human resources program of the SANDF is to establish a new institution which is professional, efficient, effective and broadly representative, with no gender inequalities according to democratic principles necessary for the 21st century.

According to Cilliers & Heinecken (2000: 254) the gender composition of the SANDF by rank as of April 1999 reflected a small female representation. Only five women are generals out of 152, “as are 6 percent of the colonels, 12 percent of the lieutenant colonels, 22 percent of the majors, 34 of the captains, 25 percent of the lieutenants, and 32 percent of the second lieutenants” (Cilliers/Heinecken 2000: 254). The enlisted women accounted for the rest of the total of 13 percent of uniformed women in the full-time forces.
Gender Equality

The policy framework broadly states that discrimination in the SANDF on the grounds of gender is prohibited. Since 1993 the armed forces have moved to full integration on all levels. To underline the importance of gender equality in a democratic South Africa, former president Nelson Mandela stated at the opening of the first democratically elected parliament in 1994, as follows: “Freedom cannot be achieved unless women have been emancipated from all forms of oppression. To this end we have acknowledged that the objectives of our reconstruction and development will not be realized unless we see in visible and practical terms that the condition of women in our country has radically changed for the better, and that women at every level have been empowered to intervene in all aspects of life as equals with any other member of society. My government is committed to a re-allocation of resources to ensure the achievement of this objective.”

Therefore, women in the SANDF have to be affirmed in order to compete with their male colleagues on equal terms in all spheres of the military. Discrimination against women on the basis of gender will not be allowed in the SANDF (SA 1998).

Gender equality is defined as a “concept that acknowledges that women and men lead different lives by virtue of their gender and that although different treatment of women and men may sometimes be required to recognize different life conditions or to compensate for past discriminations, gender based differences must never be used to limit the life choices of either women or men. Gender equality is based on the equal valuing of society of both genders. It means equality between women and men including, equal employment and opportunities, equal access to resources and rewards and equal power
to influence decisions made in society. It does not mean that men and women are biologically the same, but that opportunities and life chances will not depend on their sex.” (SA 1998) This empowerment equity is already taking place in the broader democratic South African society.

In the former SADF women were prohibited from service in many corps positions, but they can now serve in all uniformed posts throughout the SANDF. The 13 % of uniformed women in the SANDF can now be trained and employed on the same basis as men and no longer do they have to serve only in supportive roles like nursing, administration and logistics (Winkates 2000: 464). Today the career path of women in the SANDF is the same as that of their male counterparts, however, historically the warrior role has been relegated to men and therefore, the combat role of women is still debatable. But, the DoD is aiming at getting the SANDF representative in terms of gender and women are now allowed to serve in combat roles as stipulated in Chapter 5, page 24 of the White Paper on Defence, stating: “The DoD acknowledges the right of women to serve in all ranks and positions, including combat roles.”

To substantiate this, women have recently been integrated into the infantry, artillery and armoured corps of the SA army and now also serve as pilots in the air force and on warships in the navy, with the exception of the submarine flotilla. Women receive the same training as men and the only gender discrimination that is allowed is with respect to different facilities for women and men for the sake of privacy and with respect to certain drill adaptations. These adaptations are considered to be fair and just discrimination pertaining to gender equity because they are based on the physiological difference between women and men. The official policy regarding women’s positions has
thus undergone a radical transformation, which is surely an achievement for the SANDF and for democracy.

The issue of more training facilities for women to put them on an equal footing with their male counterparts, especially at the lowest level, was stipulated in Chapter 10, Par 61 of the Defence Review. Training facilities have to be made available to increase the number of women recruits in order to compensate for the inevitable loss rate, so that the number of senior women can be increased.

Despite all these formal legal provisions, both the military and South African society still express strong resistance to women serving in all kinds of military roles, especially in combat positions. A survey was done by Schutte and Cilliers in 1995 finding that 59% of respondents felt that women should not be allowed to do combat duty or serve on the front line. Cultural attitudes and stereotypes prevented women from being seen as suited for positions that could involve risk or danger. At the time of the survey respondents saw combat as a male domain and they felt that the integration of women will have a negative effect on unit cohesion and operational effectiveness.

During the period February to March 1999 another survey was conducted by the Section Effect Analysis of Chief Joint Training amongst the personnel of the DoD on their attitudes and opinions regarding the role of women in combat situations (SA 1999). It was found that 48.4 percent of the respondents in the total sample felt positive about the integration of women in combat roles, whereas a third was negative, and the rest (18.5%) were indecisive. It was significant that a higher percentage of females (54.3%) than males (45.8%) and a higher percentage of African females (60.1%) than white females (53.5%) thought that integration of women in combat role would be an advantage to the military (RSA 1999). Only 44.8%
of the former SADF members were in favour of women’s integration into combat roles, while 58.7% of former MK/APLA members were in favour thereof. This could perhaps be better explained in terms of their previous combat histories. While women in the SADF were limited to noncombat and supportive roles, women in MK/APLA were fully utilized in the guerrilla forces as scouts, couriers and bringing ammunition in and out of countries (Cilliers/Heinecken 2000: 253).

It was also noted that different perceptions exist among the services, with the SA navy being the most positive and the SA army the most negative regarding the integration of women in combat roles. However, there are also viewpoints that deployment of women in combat roles could be seen as token gestures. Such window-dressing could be detrimental to both the token members themselves and to overall operational effectiveness.

Pregnancy and maternity related needs are addressed by looking at the possible introduction of flexi-hours in the work environment. There must be commitment at all leadership levels to ensure that women are fully integrated into combat units, since the DoD has no intention to reverse its decision to allow women to choose to serve in combat roles. It is therefore a challenge to sensitize and educate men and women regarding the equal role of women and to bring about a change in perceptions in the SANDF to eventually fit into the new millennium.

From this extensive survey it was evident that different opinions were held regarding the integration of women into combat roles in the SANDF and that some time will have to pass before women can really be integrated fully into combat roles in the SANDF.
One should also keep in mind that, even when gender equality in the military is made possible and actively practiced at the formal level, barriers to such equality can still exist at an informal level. Examples are the so-called informal networks and glass ceilings that act as barriers for women to distinguish themselves as comparable to their male counterparts. South Africa also has a history of patriarchy that places women at a disadvantage and at a higher risk of downward social mobility. Breaking down this complex system of institutionalized patriarchy and gender inequality in society at large is therefore a prerequisite for gender equality in the SANDF.

8 Conclusion

To adhere to the challenges of the new millennium, the South African Department of Defence has come a long way since the first democratic elections in April 1994. After the successful integration of eight former armed forces, transformation was required to create a military reflecting the multicultural diversity of the South African population so as “to remain relevant ten years down the line across the borders of the new century” (Frankel 1998: 147).

The White Paper on Defence is based on constitutional imperatives which include civil control over the military, representativeness and gender equality as consequences of a democratic society. According to this, the DoD established a civilian Defence Secretariat and implemented affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes to ensure legitimacy of the armed forces. The civilian Defence Secretariat entrenched civil-military relations upon South African society, but at the moment criticism is received against the management of both the secretariat and the department of the Chief of the SANDF. A new model will be investigated to be effective in the
new millennium. The DoD has shed the past and entered into the 21st century where “militaries are no longer used by governments and despot to trample on basic human rights, but to build peace and friendship” (Bulletin 36/2000). Gender equality has been instituted in the SANDF and women can now compete with their male counterparts on an equal footing and serve in all corps and ranks. But, given the South African cultural history of patriarchy, this is an obstacle still to be overcome and it will yet take some time in the future to fully rectify women’s positions. However, the new SANDF is prepared to take up the challenge to eventually become a newly transformed, representative, legitimate force under civil control which can serve South African society in the new millennium.

9 References


Dutch Female Peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo: Between Marginality and Acceptance

Liora Sion

1 Introduction

My aim in this paper is to examine the life of the Dutch female peacekeepers that serve in Bosnia and Kosovo and to analyze their acceptance by their male peers and by the other women. By focusing on women I would like to demonstrate two mechanisms:

1. The exclusion of the women by men.
2. The lack of social support among the women themselves.

The first mechanism, as we shall see later, is a result of macho perceptions, while the second is also an outcome of women’s personal strategies. I argue that the women are not completely accepted by their male peers, they have adopted the men’s way of thinking and it seems that they ‘have become their greatest enemy’.

I chose to focus on women during deployment because of the growing importance of peacekeeping missions in the Dutch military. Today, peace missions together with training for war are the most important tasks of the military. Therefore, examining the role of women in deployment reflect their position in the military itself.

I shall do so by focusing on the women in two peacekeeping units: an artillery battery that was situated in Kosovo from December 1999 until June 2000 and an infantry company that has just recently finished its mission in Bosnia. I accompanied both units for almost a
year from training to deployment. By using methods of participant observation together with interviewing, I would like to draw a picture of the women who serve there. The number of women in these units is very small: only three women served in the artillery unit, one of them as an artillery combat soldier, and the others as a driver and an administrative worker. The infantry company had two women; both served as drivers in its staff platoon. The rest of the female soldiers in Bosnia and Kosovo joined the units only for the deployment and served mainly as paramedics, drivers and in different administrative functions. Only three of my 16 interviewees were officers: a medical doctor, a social worker and an engineer platoon commander. Besides them the other women that I interviewed had marginal positions. This is not surprising considering the fact that women’s absence in the Dutch military has been conspicuous especially among high-ranking NCOs and officers (van der Meulen 2000: 112).

2 The Background

My analysis is derived from the theory that western militaries today are shifting from a ‘modern’ mass army to a ‘postmodern’ military (Moskos/Williams/Segal 2000; Moskos/Burk 1998; Dandeker 1998). I do so by studying the Dutch military in this state of transition. Transition away from the ‘modern’ army, which was characterized by its clear tasks, to a ‘postmodern’ military which involves not only a more ambiguous constabulary work, but also participation of women and minorities, groups that traditionally were excluded from combat units. According to Charles Moskos (2000: 22), a particularly revealing way to understand the trend toward postmodernism in the armed forces is to look at the role of women in the military. In other words, a full integration of women into the armed forces is an important indication of its postmodern tendency.
The bulk of literature that deals with women in the military mainly focus on the acceptance of women by men (Marsden 1986; Howes/Stevenson 1993; Barret 1996; Yuval-Davis 1997; Hicks Stiehm 1998; Fenner 1998; Miller 1998). Most of the research stress the point that in the armed forces women are conceived as a potential threat to the cohesion of military units and cultural values regarding gender roles (Feld 1978; Hooker 1988; Quester 1982; Segal 1982; Tuten 1982). Yet, research on female soldiers tend to look at them as one piece, neglecting differences that can occur between women in different roles and ranks.

3 The Findings

From my data, most of the women in low ranks in the Dutch military are very young, and usually they join the military when they are about 17 or 18. They see their military service as an experience in life, not as a career. They tend to use their short stay in the military for studies and most of them think to leave after one contract (2.5 years) and have a family in an early age. They also have a quite conservative point of view about life and women’s position in society.

The women in the military camps in Bosnia and Kosovo are few, not more than 10 or 15 in a camp that contains about 500 people. This is even lower than the official numbers of 7.4 percent women in the Dutch military (van der Meulen/Soeters 1998; van der Meulen 2000: 111–112). The low number of women, their job marginality and relatively invisibility makes the military into what most of the soldiers call a ‘men’s world’. A female officer said: “The military is a men’s culture. There are very few women in the military, especially in the ground forces and you can see groups of men together and a lot of bravado, of course.” A female soldier said: “My girl-friends think that
the military is a different world. The women in the military are in men’s world and it is not pleasant.”

Research has shown that the number of women in a group may make a difference in the extent to which women’s influence is felt (Bystydzienski 1993: 41). In groups with highly skewed sex ratios, when women are few, they become isolated and invisible (Kanter 1981). In groups where women compose less than 15 percent of the total membership, they do not influence group processes in any significant way (South et al. 1982; Spangler et al. 1978; Yoder et al. 1989). However, in groups that are between 15 and 30 percent female, women “have potential allies among themselves, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group” (Kanter 1977: 209). It is surprising, therefore, that the women, who are so numbered, did not crystallize and support each other in any way.

According to Karen Davis (1997: 184), women encounter two rules when they enter male-dominated organizations: it’s a man’s world, and it’s man’s work. She claims that as women enter the ‘men’s world’ they are struggling not only with questions surrounding their capability to do ‘men’s work’ but with issues surrounding their identity as women. I would like to demonstrate it first by examining the ways by which the women are excluded from military life and men’s company, and second by demonstrating the ways by which the women handle it.

The exclusion of women from military life and men’s company is done mainly in three ways: functional, physical and sexual. By functional I mean the exclusion of women from military functions and missions by using their sex against them. Some women said that they wished to serve in a combat role but were refused on the base of being a woman. Many were very bitter that in the deployment their roles
were changed. Instead of the functions they chose and liked to do before the peacekeeping mission, they got a simple and not challenging administrative work. The most prominent example is of the only woman who served as an artillery combat soldier. Although in Kosovo her male colleagues had to work around the clock, she was not allowed to join them. The reason was that she was posted in an emergency team, which was supposed to function only in case of emergency. Therefore, although before the deployment and during the training she served as an artillery soldier, in Kosovo she was completely isolated from her male colleagues, waiting for an emergency situation that never happened.

It also seems that in Bosnia and Kosovo, women, more than men are restricted to the camp area. This happened mainly because most of the women were engaged in diverse supportive functions inside the camp, but not only. It seems that the Dutch commanders were afraid of exposing the women to the local people. In Kosovo women mentioned the astonishment of the locals to the sight of female soldiers and to the fact that they were blond. In Bosnia, in which the locals are much more used to peacekeepers, a female soldier claimed that when she asked to join the soldiers on patrol, she was told that the locals would not tolerate women’s presence. Hence, it is not surprising that some of the women were frustrated of being in the camp all the time and even called it a ‘prison’.

The second way of exclusion is physical. Women’s body is used against them as a way to restrict and exclude women from military activities and roles. Some women mentioned the problems they underwent during training, not allowed to take showers. There is a very strong military ethos not to shower while training, even if the training is two weeks long. Only women during their monthly period are allowed to shower with a special permission after explaining their
commander, who is usually a man, why. This regulation is a clear 
source of embarrassment and problems for many women and serves as 
the most common excuse of soldiers and commanders for why women 
cannot serve in a combat unit.

The third way of exclusion is sexual. By sexual I mean the way men 
treat women and their attributions toward their sexuality. An 
important source of frustration among many women was the self-
restriction that they had to impose on their behavior, in comparison 
with the men. The most common complaint was that men wore what 
ever they want, while women had to be careful in order not to attract 
attention and sexually arouse the men. One woman said: “Men can 
wear bathing suits when they sun or a towel on their way to the 
showers while we have to think twice before wearing a sport gear or 
otherwise men will look strangely at me and ask questions.” Another 
woman said: “I don’t understand it, after all, I do not go naked in the 
camp. Maybe they do not have difficulties with me wearing shorts and 
they just pretend. They love to look at us but at the same time 
comment on the way we are dressed.” Another said: “It is difficult 
when men look at you. But if you are irritated by this attention they 
blame you for being too sensitive and a complainer.”

But at the same time, it seems that the women, although not very 
happily, accept these restrictions and understand the men. As one 
woman said: “A woman should be careful about what she wears 
because men are away from home for a long time”, and another one 
added: “The men here think only about sex! During all the 
deployment and they make it clear. The men here are a bunch of horny 
dogs. Women think about sex as well, of course, but they will never 
mention it”. What these women and others meant is that men should 
be understood and forgiven because it is harder for them to control
their sexual needs. Hence, women should adapt themselves and not evoke problems, because after all this is a ‘men’s world’.

Many women think that being a minority in the military is a great advantage from the sexual point of view. The male doctor of one of the camps said: “Certain women who prefer the environment of men’s world choose for the military. Women here like being a minority among men and some of them take advantage of it. Some women here have four, five, six, seven, eight different boyfriends and than you get a certain name. And for women it is very easy to have a name. But I understand it. If we men were the minority here we would do the same.” A woman said: “There are so many men here and so few women and I think that the men are jealous at us.”

It seems that officers, doctors and psychologists who have a more global look on women in deployment tend to have a negative image on female soldiers. Many officers are ambivalent about the participation of women in peacekeeping missions. On the one hand they see women as a welcome addition to everyday life in the camp, because they “soften the masculine atmosphere”. But on the other hand they think of them as very problematic. “It is hard to choose”, said an ex-commander of a unit in Bosnia, “between their contribution to the camp’s life and the drama they create.” By drama he meant problems such as suicide attempts and other scandals, mainly sexual. High ranking officers and military psychologists estimate that the number of female soldiers who were abused sexually or in other ways by their family members is very high – about 60 % of female soldiers who consult military psychologists and social workers. They also claim that many of the women who join the military have a borderline personality and therefore look for a highly structured environment as the military. Surprisingly, most of the male soldiers do not share this
feeling and have a much higher estimation towards their female colleagues.

As the doctor said before, it is very easy for a woman to have a bad reputation in the military. According to Irene Padavic (1991: 281), men adjust to women’s presence by developing collective interpretations of experience that allow them to preserve male ideology while still accepting women’s presence. Women in turn shape their work identities in response to these interpretations.

Women, it seems, prefer to be a small minority. Most of them think that being 10 or 15 women in a camp is too much and express strong feelings of dislike toward the other women. More than that, they prefer the company of men to that of women and complain that there is a competition among women over men’s attention and friendship. They all said that men make better friends than women do, while a female officer whose best friend was a woman insisted that gender had nothing to do with it and said: “Only by accident my best friend is a woman. Usually I prefer to have friends among officers in my rank instead of female soldiers.”

According to Mills and Murgatroyd (1991), in male dominated organizations women must cope simultaneously with symbols and behaviors, which perpetuate and maintain male ideology and develop identities as women which satisfy the organizational culture. At the same time, male identity of the organization is strongly evident through sexualized behaviors and norms. In addition, socially constructed views of how women and men should behave and work capacity form an important aspect of women’s work experience.

The women that I interviewed tend to view the rest of the women in a very stereotypic way, while the rhetoric and explanations that they use
were that of self-hatred. They claimed that women like to fight more than men do; that women never forgive or forget; that they are very jealous at each other and are not very sincere; and that women like to gossip and to come up with stories. My interviewees emphasized the bad qualities of women by comparing them to the good qualities of men. Men, unlike women, do not like to fight, it is easier to get along with them and they are not jealous nor do they gossip. Therefore, men make better friends than women.

More than that, by emphasizing the bad nature of women, my interviewees actually excluded themselves from being one. By blaming and detesting the other women, my interviewees declared themselves not as women. Therefore they justified why they are actually belonged to the male group. One female soldier explained that the women who choose for the military were very brutal by their nature, “the kind of people that can bite you”. And were also very arrogant. Another mocked at women because all the time they came with stories and had a lot of ‘bla bla bla’. A third woman soldier said: “Women become very quickly catty to each other. I mean, I can also be like that, but I forget very quickly and if I get angry I’m over it after ten minutes. The other women cannot understand it.” Another said: “I’m not like the other women in the tent. They love stuffed animals and to get cards and this kind of things. This is not interesting for me at all! I’m happy to get things from home, cards and so on, but to hang them on the wall? That I’ll never do. But the other women (she imitates them in a mockery way): ‘Look, it is so wonderful! I love it!’ I will never do it, never!” And a female officer said: “Sometimes it is not easy because, how can I say it? Some women joined the military not because they want to serve but only because of the men. And they make it hard for the rest and give us a bad name: ‘ho, yes, women in the military!’ says everybody.”
This contempt might not only be the result of an internalization of a macho perception by the women, but also a personal strategy they choose. This is a strategy that emphasizes individuality rather than a common feminine identity or solidarity; that presses the women’s personal goals for joining the military as seeking for adventures or exploring their sexuality and reject the creation of a common identity that sees the women as one.

4 Discussion

Literature on the Dutch military (van der Meulen 2000: 17–18) suggests that the military aim to enlarge the number of women and to open all military professions for them. In practice it is still very hard to be a woman in the military, especially in combat units. Charles Moskos (2000: 15) claims, that one characteristic for postmodern military is full integration of women. In that sense, the Dutch are still far from being postmodern.

The difficult situation of women in the military is the result of two reasons: first, the functional, physical, and sexual exclusion of female soldiers from military functions and activities and from men’s company. Second, the lack of social support among the women themselves. The women cope with the ‘men’s world’ by adopting its ideology and values rather than supporting each other and creating their own group. The interesting question is why. Do most of the women, as they claim, prefer men at the first place and therefore chose the military? Or is the indoctrination process they go through together with their young age and luck of confidence the main reason?

But what ever the reasons are, the women are not welcome to this ‘men’s world’ no matter what they do. I would like to finish with an
anecdote. By the end of their peacekeeping training the infantry company had a ‘rite de passage’, a night of trials that symbolized the acceptance of the soldier to the unit. The two women drivers joined it as well and in the morning I asked their male colleagues how were the women. About one woman her group complained that she was physically very weak and they had to carry her all night. And how was the other woman, I asked? “Terrible”, they answered. “She behaved like a real man, functioned better than us.”

5 References


Women Soldiers: The Enemy Within

Marcia Kovitz

1 Posing the Problem

The integration of women is an issue facing many armed forces today. Alongside pressure from advocates of women’s equal opportunity, the shift to all-volunteer forces and the decrease in the cohort of eligible men has meant an increase in the number of women recruits. But, despite the military’s need for women, there is considerable evidence that they face varying degrees of resistance. This ranges from a female-hostile environment permeated by sexist jokes, pornography, marginalization, discrimination and sexual harassment, to more extreme forms of sexual abuse – up to and including rape. This paper explores some of the reasons for this resistance and why women’s military service has been so controversial. Based on a study of the Canadian armed forces and a review of the anthropological literature on war and gender, it suggests that in order to understand why women’s integration has been so fraught with difficulty, we need to take a broader, more comparative perspective. We also need to include questions that problematize the military’s masculinity in order to understand what women represent in this context.

The debate surrounding women’s military integration has been highly contentious. Supporters of the military recruitment of women wish to “ensure equal rights and responsibilities of all citizens”, whereas opponents are concerned with ensuring combat effectiveness (Segal 1982: 269; Fenner 1998). Feminists involved in the debate are also split. Some promote women’s equal rights as citizens ‘to lay down their lives for their country’ and gain access to the career
advancements afforded by combat service. Pitted against these are pacifists who either reject, outright, women’s participation in favour of peaceful conflict resolution (Ås 1983; Brock-Utne 1985: 147; Ruddick 1989), or who encourage women’s military enrolment, anticipating that, Trojan-like, they will change the military from within. Vickers, however, disagrees with Boulding’s suggestion that women infiltrate the military in order to change it. In her view, “the more likely result is that militarization will change women” (Vickers 1993: 19).

Regardless of the arguments, there is ample evidence that the military has been, and continues to be contested territory for women. For example, in Canada, although a 1989 Human Rights Tribunal ordered the Canadian Forces to integrate women into all military occupations (except for submarines) by 1999, the Human Rights Commission’s final ten year assessment concluded that there had been a failure to achieve full integration, and less than a full commitment to its achievement.¹ That women, who constitute about 11% of the Canadian Forces, continue to face considerable resistance within the organization is something that military women have known of, and experienced for some time. That they have acted on this resistance through a higher rate of attrition, especially in the combat arms and related occupations is also known (Davis 1997; Davis 1994; Davis/Thomas 1998). However, these adverse experiences received little publicity until media coverage in 1998 of the sexual abuse of

¹ According to the Commission’s final assessment, “An examination of the overall statistical information regarding the number of women in the combat occupations at the end of the 10 years indicates that ‘full integration’ has not been achieved. As of 1 January 1998, the most recent data for which the Commission has reliable information, women accounted for 10.6% of the members of the regular forces but only 3.1% of the members of combat occupations.” (Canadian Human Rights Commission [CHRC] 1999: 4) The Commission also indicated, through its concern, that harassment remains a problem for women, and that the lack of “a comprehensive plan, with targets and timetables” suggests less than a full commitment to “achieving results” (CHRC 1999: 4).
Canadian female soldiers. Compounding questions around the abuses themselves were the dismissive and/or repressive responses of military authorities. These included: interference from superiors in military police investigations into sexual assaults; attempts by superiors to keep sexual assault charges out of civilian courts; the quiet removal of perpetrators from the base where the assault took place; and pressures on victims to remain silent (Branswell 1998; O’Hara 1998, 1998a). Similar examples have been documented for the United States. Two well-known cases are the Tailhook scandal which saw American naval officers sexually assault their women colleagues and guests during a flier’s convention in 1991 (Dobie 1993), and the incidents in 1996 at Aberdeen Proving Ground in which several female trainees alleged rape by male drill instructors; as a result, a company commander and two drill instructors were charged with crimes ranging from rape to obstruction of justice (Rosen/Martin 1998; Titunik 2000). In light of this and other evidence, Francke (1997) concludes that the denigration of women is an essential part of military culture. Does this mean that such incidences are inevitable?

Even if we answer in the negative, the overwhelming evidence is that women’s integration in the military is a problem, and a persistent one. This raises two issues. The first concerns the reasons for the problem’s persistence, especially in the context of the military’s highly disciplined and supervised environment, where soldiers are usually in the habit of following orders, and where both the work and personal lives of military members are carefully monitored and controlled. What does this treatment of military women tell us about the military as a gendered – and gendering – organization, and about the military leadership’s response?\(^2\) Second, the difficulties surrounding women’s

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\(^2\) More than a year after the appointment of an ombudsperson to address the complaints of military personnel against their commanders, he had still not been given a mandate (Gazette 22 May 1999, A10).
integration prompts us to question how these difficulties have been investigated and understood. Why has most research around gender integration focused on women’s problems, women’s strengths, weaknesses, and debilitating effects on (the military’s ultimate measure of) ‘operational effectiveness’ in comparison to the “deafening silence” (Lustiger-Thaler 1996: 196) on military men and masculinity? That the military is masculine is generally taken for granted, which has had the effect of normalizing its gendered structure, and rendering its more contentious practices, specifically its violence, invisible (on the latter, see Morgan 1990). Morgan (1994) calls for specific, comparative analyses, noting that the links between masculinity, the military and violence have become more complex and contradictory.

It is these, and other, similar questions that are developed more fully in the larger study (see Kovitz forthcoming) of which this paper is a part. That is, although this paper focuses on military women and resistance to their service, its broader research context is an investigation of military men’s views on women’s integration in order to develop an understanding of the military’s construction of gender, and particularly its masculinity/ies. Women’s integration is employed as a prism into military masculinity/ies. The goal is to expand our understanding of the military and its gendered practices, and our understanding of how and why we think differently about military men versus military women, especially in the sphere of combat and death in battle. To this end, the larger study periodically shifts our gendered gaze away from the more familiar male/female axis/es of opposition towards the male/male axis/es in order to explore how tensions in the military ranking system – through which are dispersed multiple, differentiated masculinities – are masked by the ideology of a uniform military masculinity. As becomes clearer in the latter part of the paper, it is the latter (uniform military masculinity) that serves as
silent counterpoint to the several forms of female sexuality and femininity that constitute the basis for resistance to women’s military service.

2 Conceptualizing Gender

A brief point about how gender is theorized in this paper. Rather than equating gender with the attributes and practices of individuals – although gender is certainly attributed to them (Kessler/McKenna 1978) – it is conceptualized here as a feature of historically located structures, organizations and cultures into which individuals are born, through which they become gendered beings, and which they negotiate, resist, and/or change. Characteristics with which gendered individuals or groups are associated may be “models of and models for other domains of social action and experience” (Shapiro 1988: 1), metaphors for how we think about significant social issues, experiences or preoccupations. In this sense, gender is, in part, a totemic cultural device to metaphorically represent the social world using the (inferred) natural world as a logical model; categorical oppositions such as those between abstract/concrete, self/other, culture/nature, male/female “map onto one another and become mutually defining” (Shapiro 1988: 8). To illustrate, amongst the New Guinea Hageners, male/female opposition has less to do with dividing men and women into two social categories than with the representation of the contradictory demands of self-interest versus the social or collective good. The means of expressing this opposition and privileging group action is to symbolize them as male and female, respectively (Strathern 1981).

The paper begins by briefly placing Western gendered warfare practices and meanings into comparative cross-cultural and historical
perspective. It then examines whether there is historical continuity in women’s treatment within the Canadian military, and considers what meaning women and their femininity have for the Canadian military today. Based on my research on gender in the Canadian Forces, I argue that understanding the military as contested territory for women requires an understanding of how the military constructs multiple femininities (and masculinities) on the basis of their support for, or interference with, the principle goal of ‘operational effectiveness’ (a euphemism for combat readiness, Pinch 1987: 2). Understanding the resistance to women soldiers requires an examination of the military’s organizational mandate and its gendered division of labour and meanings.

3 War and the Military in a Cross–Cultural and Historical Perspective

A review of the anthropological and historical literature (Kovitz 1998) suggests that the organization and practice of war – which incorporates far more than combat – is, like other social practices, characterized by a gendered division of labour and meanings. But, this is not to say that war is everywhere or has always been exclusively masculine or male-predominant. As a gendered practice, warfare is a prism into the society that wages it. In different times and places, women have been among those to encourage and endorse, as well as participate in all of their societies’ war practices, whether recruiting warriors through calls for revenge, exhortations to heroism, or accusations of cowardice (for a Canadian WWI example see Keshen 1996); supplying warriors for their journey; sustaining their spirits

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3 This paper is drawn from a doctoral study entitled Mining Masculinities in the Canadian Military (Kovitz 1998). It used narrative analyses of (unclassified) written military texts and oral interviews of military officers, as well as semi-participant observation over a period of five years.
through careful ritual observance; tending their wounds; deciding and/or imposing sentences on prisoners of war; or taking up weapons for offensive or defensive purposes. Where war has been monopolized by men it has been for structural reasons: for example, women have been strictly excluded from all knowledge of, or participation in, their society’s armed conflicts where they have married in from enemy groups and therefore have divided loyalties between their families of origin (fathers and brothers) and procreation (husbands and in-laws).

Women have also been excluded from armed combat where they have been numerically scarce. The Yanomamö of South America, who practice female infanticide and are polygamous, are one such example; not only do women not bear arms, during murderous raids they are immune except as booty (Chagnon 1977). In the West, there were also long periods of demographic imbalance whether due to female infanticide, neglect, poor nutrition, and the hazards of childbirth; for many men, women were also scarce because of polygamy and concubinage. During the Middle Ages, women had shortened life expectancies due to strenuous work as producers and reproducers; they were also more susceptible to the violence of the age – especially abduction – and were in greater demand than males in the still-active slave-trade (Herlihy 1985).

Yet, despite their exclusion from combat, women could be counted among those who supplied militaries with services such as food, laundry and mending so long as European armies remained hybrids of public and private enterprise with many tasks subcontracted to civilian entrepreneurs (van Doorn 1975). It is only with the institutionalization of armies under direct state control during the military revolution of the mid-sixteenth to seventeenth centuries that women were excluded from their association with armed forces (Hacker/Hacker 1987).
But, if women have been, and continue to be, active participants in various war practices, how do we explain the Western insistence that war and the military are masculine? And how do we explain the absence of women from its past war narratives? What may partly explain the appearance of female combatants in the historical discourse of certain eras, and their disappearance or their appearance of passivity in others, is the predisposition of (male) witnesses to either acknowledge or overlook this behavior. This is what Elshtain (1982) suggests in her periodization of dominant images of women’s war-related roles. In the first, or Mirror stage of the pre-Christian heroic era, women were the warrior’s mirror on the battlefield, reflecting back his bloody glory so as to enhance it. Disputing those who have thought women of Greek tragedies to be pacifists, Elshtain notes that they were often bloodthirsty and revengeful; what they mourned were the effects of war. Since the Other is partly, “a projection of repressed or unacknowledged parts of the self” (Elshtain 1982: 32), and the human subject in Ancient Greek and Germanic barbarian societies was insufficiently complex to split into parts to be embraced or rejected, the warrior mentality could not allow for female pacifism, if it did exist.

In the Christian era, the human subject becomes “complex enough to split” (Elshtain 1982: 33) and women shift from men’s Mirror to their Other, possessing qualities that dominant men must deny within themselves: love, compassion, mercy, forgiveness, close ties with nature, charity, nurturance, reciprocity, and pacifism. Women have vacillated between a peacetime posture of pacifist moral superiority opposed to an essentialist male bellicosity, and a wartime posture of patriotic fervour that supported, though failed to endorse, war. This combination of pacifism between wars and patriotism in wartime served to absolve women of responsibility for military violence.
Elshtain’s third and contemporary stage is that of militarized feminism. This rejects both the second stage’s essentialized pacifist Other along with its opposition to male militarism and its destructiveness. Militarized feminism represents a regression to something akin to the Mirror phase: the Other and what it represents is suppressed, and war is again wholeheartedly endorsed. Immersed in the warrior code, Elshtain’s militarized feminist casts off her role as enhancer of male bellicosity, androgynously embraces the soldier’s identity, and aims to join him on the battlefield.

Elshtain’s narrative can certainly account for the lobbying that has sought and realized an expansion in military occupations open to women as well as their right to serve as equal citizens alongside men in combat. But can it account for the contrary argument that there is a need to protect the ‘manliness of war’ (Lloyd 1987: 64 citing General Robert H. Barrow)? Lloyd looks at equal employment opportunity in the military through the lens of the Western philosophical connection between war, citizenship and gender. In this tradition, sacrificing one’s life in battle has long been conflated with masculinity, and has been constructed as a right – even a privilege – of male citizenship (Lloyd 1987). Women are “symbol(s) of attachment to individual bodies, private interests and natural feeling – (...) all that war and citizenship is supposed to contain and transcend” (Lloyd 1987: 76). Going into battle entails discarding the feminine. Men’s patriotism is demonstrated in the masculinity of war and self-sacrifice; women’s is demonstrated in the surrender of sons to “significant deaths” (Lloyd 1987: 76). This would explain why admitting women to combat is so disruptive to the military: in addition to the symbolic value of

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4 Women have this right in four countries: Belgium, Canada (except submarines), Denmark, Norway (Department of National Defence 1999: 3).
5 Enloe (1994: 102) notes that the right to participate in violence “under state discipline for the sake of sacrifice for the nation ... [remains] the norm for ‘first class citizenship’”, at least in the United States.
maleness and femaleness, this symbolism has been “incorporated into the gender construction of real men and women” (Lloyd 1987: 76).

Elshtain’s bifurcated model (Christian male warrior/female Other) and the Western political ideals of the masculinity of war (Lloyd 1987) provide a broader theoretical context for understanding what women and their femininity represent to Western militaries. Linda Bird Francke (1997) provides empirical support concluding that, despite the need for women by American armed services, opposition to women in combat is based on the military’s deep cultural need for masculine exclusivity.

4 The Canadian Case

Turning to the Canadian military, my own study (Kovitz 1998) suggests considerable historical continuity in a gendered division of labour that has confined women to subordinate, traditional roles first as ‘nursing sisters’ in Saskatchewan during the 1885 Northwest Rebellion, then with the Canadian contingent in the Boer War, and later with the Canadian Army Medical Corps during World War I (Davis 1994; Pierson 1986).

Later, during the second World War, even though the numbers of women greatly expanded, women were, again, relegated to traditional roles. And although World War II was promoted as an emancipatory watershed for Canadian women, both military and civilian, and although a small minority of servicewomen did eventually move into skilled blue collar trades, most remained segregated and subordinated

6 In the United States during World War II, military women were also generally confined to “feminized jobs”, gender-specific restrictions were imposed on their service, and it was framed as “temporary and emergency” (Fenner 1998: 7).
in jobs identified as women’s work (Pierson 1986: 13). Moreover, women, as a group, were subordinated to men: women officers could command women, but in divisions that were under male authority (Dumont et al. 1982). Within an institutional division of labour which distinguished the operational or combat end from administrative or support functions, women were recruited to fill the shortfall of male military support staff. They only ever filled a tiny percentage (1.4% of the Canadian air force and 2.8% of the army) of jobs considered suitable for women, and this in order to free men for combat duty.

Double standards also prevailed, for example, in pay and other benefits; in officer qualifications7 (Dumont et al. 1982); in parental status; and in designating enlisted men as ‘soldiers’ and women as ‘volunteers’ (Prentice et al. 1988). Only men were provided with condoms and prophylactic kits, whereas women were portrayed as purveyors of sexually transmitted disease. Uniformed women symbolized the threat that the war posed to traditional sexual morality and the gendered social order (Pierson 1986: 16). But, what may have most marked the gender divide is that, unlike men, women were exempt from the severest penalties under military law: penal servitude, imprisonment, detention and the death penalty by court martial. Bearing out Lloyd’s argument, these exemptions reflected deeply binarized notions of war and peace, life and death, and notions about people as essentially gendered beings. Women were seen as the bearers of human life, therefore exempt from killing, and also needing protection from death in battle. To men was reserved both the right and, again, what was deemed as the privilege, of dying for their country. And this is how they were used by the military elite: “as cannon fodder by the high command” (Pierson 1986: 127–128).

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7 Women needed a university degree or equivalent, whereas men needed only seven to ten years of schooling.
This is the gender divide that has carried through to today, and in its breach, ordered by the Human Rights Tribunal in 1989, poses the greatest threat to the Canadian Forces. Despite a more frequent role as peacekeeper since World War II – notwithstanding the recent participation in the NATO bombing of Kosovo (Spring 1999) – the Canadian Forces remain legally mandated and structurally organized for war. Their primary goal remains ‘operational effectiveness’. The military meets its goal of perfecting the techniques of death and destruction through an organizational structure that recruits and constructs different kinds of lives and deaths. Embedded in its ranked and authoritarian organization are multiple oppositions: war/peace; friend/enemy; defender/defended; military/society; operational effectiveness/ineffectiveness. It is onto every facet of its organizational structure and onto these oppositions that a dualized, militarized gender, splintered into multiple femininities and masculinities is mapped – though, as noted earlier, the emphasis is on a masculine uniformity. Understanding the social construction of gender in the Canadian Forces requires mapping it onto the armed forces’ organizational structure and requirements, manifested both materially in bodies and in the symbolic association of men and women with different social spheres which are seen as either supporting or undermining aspects of the military endeavour. Here lies the gender boundary that military men establish, mark, and defend.

The example of female sexuality illustrates this point. Although seemingly contradictory at first, two forms of female sexuality seem less so when traced to their source in the military’s structure, needs and practices. Thus, on the one hand, female sexuality can serve as the object of men’s sexual desire to affirm their masculine...
heterosexuality\(^8\) that is conflated with violence. On the other hand, as seduction, female sexuality can distract and debilitate men’s violent resolve, and is considered especially lethal in the form of ‘fraternization’ (sexual liaisons between members of different ranks), threatening the military’s very foundation: its hierarchy. It is this aspect of female sexuality which military men most resent, a form of power that they say women can use to influence instructors and superiors (Davis 1997).

Femininity is another example illustrating gender roots in military organizational requirements. Like female sexuality, femininity is also splintered into multiple, sometimes contradictory, attributes. Nurturing femininity (a component of Elshtain’s second stage) acts as a welcoming counterpoint to that military masculinity which is lived out in a largely antithetical world: aggressive, competitive, dirty, gruff, vulgar, harsh, brutal and deadly. It is in this context that one of my respondents referred to women as “soothing”. As weakness, femininity can also mark the antithesis of soldiering: reminding soldiers of what they must not be, and representing the sphere of the defended, thereby providing the military with a key raison d’être and soldiers with their identity as defenders. Yet, as weakness, femininity can also debilitate. The family is a principal site of this contradiction: incarnated in military wives, femininity services male military members just as corporate wives service their husbands (see Harrison/Laliberté 1994), and even more so because of soldiering’s

\(^8\) Thus, despite the earlier reading of “the Riot Act to (...) [the] troops over sexual harassment and outdated attitudes toward women” (The Gazette, 18 September 1998), a regimental dinner in Sherbrooke, Québec, held in early September 1998, featured a pornographic film projected on a flag, a streaker, and “a hooded chorus line of men in G-strings” (The Gazette, 26 September 1998, A13).
extreme conditions. But the family also makes demands that conflict with the armed forces’ and can disrupt operational effectiveness. Thus, when one of my respondent’s informed his commanding officer that his wife was depressed, having been left alone with a new baby for two and one-half months while he was away on exercise, the response was, “Get a grip on your wife.”

5 Conclusion

In the case of both militarized female sexuality and femininity, much of the threat derives, not from women themselves, but from their identification with those social spheres or attributes which are antithetical to the military’s core organizational imperative of operational effectiveness. Each of the armed forces’ organizational requirements has structural referents that can be found in official and unofficial narratives manifested in, or associated with, gendered identities, social practices and meanings. In-so-far as the military’s operational effectiveness is aimed at the enemy – about which military discourse is strangely silent – and, in-so-far as the enemy can be said to represent whatever might impact negatively on the military, from within or without, women come to represent, and thereby to embody, the Enemy itself. Whereas women have worked alongside military men, in the past gender boundaries were well marked and institutional efforts were made to defend them. Today, military women face differing degrees of resistance varying with the military environment and whether they are considered to be fulfilling traditional or non-

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9 The military’s dependence on the unpaid services of military wives was recognized recently in a monument entitled ‘Home Fires’, set up in a park on Canadian Forces Base Petawawa. The monument, which, according to the commander of Land Force Central Area, Brig.-Gen. Walter Holmes, is long overdue, intends to be a visible sign of appreciation. The monument is engraved with a stylized picture of a mother and child, each with tears engraved on their faces, and holding a candle (Gazette, 13 September 1998).
traditional roles. It is in the combat arms that women face the most systematic rejection and bias, manifested in overt and covert attempts to oust them (Davis/Thomas 1998). What makes women’s entry now so threatening is that, despite the military’s reliance on a dualized gender system, it is under orders to integrate women on an equal footing, even in combat and combat-related occupations. This has the potential of challenging and disrupting not only men, but the military’s very goals and methods. It is this that makes women the ‘enemy within’.

6 References


II. Conflict Resolution: Different Means, Different Challenges
Conflict Resolution through Non-Cooperation: Cases from India

Bandana Purkayastha

1 Introduction

The resurgence of a variety of protest movements around the world have resurrected questions about the limits of nation-states (Calhoun 1997; Smith 1995). Cohen (1997: ix–x) points out that, for the 200 nation-states in existence at present, there are at least 2000 nation-peoples, and “such peoples are only imperfectly, and sometimes only violently, held within the confines of the existing nation-states”. Such conflict, which arises from the relationship of marginalized groups and the state, forms the background of this paper. I specifically focus on conflict resolution and examine one non-violent conflict resolution method – non-cooperation – which has been adopted by groups to resist the power of the state. I draw on two well-known cases from India to illustrate how the use of non-cooperation offers alternatives for dealing with complex forces of marginalization. I begin this discussion with a brief outline of the bases of conflict within nation-states and focus especially on the ideas of Indian savants Rabindranath Tagore and Mohandas Gandhi who proposed alternative ways of thinking about human freedom and organization of society. Next, I turn to conflict resolution and use the Chipko and Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) movements in India to illustrate how two marginalized groups successfully challenged ideological hegemony and state sanctioned force in India. The paper emphasizes that non-co-operation as a means of peaceful conflict resolution often better fits the needs of marginalized members of pluralist societies.
While the focus of this paper is on groups within states, both cases also touch on the question of marginalized groups and societies within the international order.

2 Conflict and Control

Despite the rhetoric of equality and progress, the failure of existing models of democracy and development to ensure the well-being of large numbers of people has led to widespread grassroots dissent against social injustice and polarization (Routledge 1993; Wignaraja 1993). Such conflict is grounded in the organization of nation-states within institutionalized relations of advantage/disadvantage and unequal access to social resources. The state is no longer conceptualized as a neutral arbitrator among different interest groups, but as “the agent of a concrete historical collectivity, situated in relation to other communities” (Connell 1987: 127). Nation-states attempt to homogenize the populations within its territory in order to centralize power. Homogenization is carried through internal and external colonization – through dominant discourse, structure of institutions, and force. Nandy (1996; 1998) argues that the colonized are induced, through rewards and punishments, to accept norms and cognitive categories that uphold the power of the dominant and ensure the continuing submission of the marginalized groups. Colonialism seeks to alter cultural priorities of all “others” and uses violence, psychological and physical for managing dissent. Institutionalized violence, both through the arming of militaries and police forces as well as repressive measures introduced through bureaucratization, serve as instruments to support the hegemony of the dominant group/s in power. Such forces lead to the marginalization of women, rural and urban poor, lower castes, subordinated races, religious and ethnic minorities and many such “others” (Glenn 1999; Omi/Winant 1993).
The rise of various mass (e.g. Wignaraja 1993), nationalist (e.g. Shafir 1995), pan-ethnic (e.g. Espiritu 1991; Padilla 1985) and women’s (e.g. Basu 1995) movements are testimony to how groups resist such forces of assimilation and subordination.

Processes of marginalization take place at multiple levels and lead to the creation of related but dichotomous, unequal categories such as private vs. public. Such separation of spheres affects various facets of civic life. Pertinent to this paper is how such dichotomies affect citizenship (e.g. Aklesberg 1988; Glenn 1999; Gordon 1994; Pateman 1988; 1989) and paid vs. unpaid work (e.g. Barrera 1979; Barrett 1980; Blauner 1972; Bose/Feldberg/Sokoloff 1987; Reskin/Roos 1990; Prugl 1999). Scholars of race and gender argue that principles of equality and democracy prevail among those in power while “those excluded from full participation in the national community (...) become the objects of control and exploitation and (...) are subject to the repressive powers of the state without the basic protection of citizenship” (Glen 1999: 22). Defining who is a citizen has involved both categorical exclusion of non-citizens and the creation of stratified rights based on criteria such as economic productivity. Activity in the private sphere is labeled “unproductive” and millions of people who are so classified are cut off from social benefits available from the state. As they are relegated to the periphery, their knowledge systems are devalued, their access to resources limited and their traditional rights overturned. Women’s movements and movement of the masses “mobilize horizontally to deal with oppression of a vertical kind” (Kothari 1993: 69).
3 Roots of Non-Violent Conflict Resolution: “Nationalism” of Tagore and Gandhi

Non-cooperation as a means of conflict resolution, that is highlighted in this paper, is drawn from the writings and activities of Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) and Mohandas Gandhi (1869–1948). Their speeches and writings on nationalism, which were developed within the context of India’s struggle for independence from Britain, anticipate many of the “new” problems of social conflict within nation-states that are currently being studied. Neither Tagore nor Gandhi supported the ideology of the nation-state as the organizing principle that would ensure freedom and justice for the people in the pluralist Indian society. Neither men wanted “their society to be caught in a situation where the idea of the nation would supersede Indian civilization, and where actual ways of life of Indians would be assessed solely in terms of the needs of an imaginary nation-state India” (Nandy 1994: 3).

Tagore believed that the organization of nation states was like applied science: rational, impersonal, lifeless, accurate, and monotonous. Nation-states, through their bureaucratic structures, replace indigenous, loosely-knit patterns of social relations with inflexible, relentless rules – iron chains of organization – which bind and restrict diversity, freedom, and ultimately diminish humanity (Tagore 1917). Such structures are violent, albeit of a rationalized, sanitized, scientized kind. Tagore discussed the complex dependencies of people belonging to multiple cultures and races with the nation-state and doubted whether one set of rules would ever ensure true freedom (swaraj) for all. He unlinked patriotism from reification of the nation and cultural exclusivism (Berlin 1996; Nussbaum 1996; Sen 1997) and advocated a vision of society based on acceptance of real difference between people, yet one which constantly strove for some
basis of unity (Nandy 1994). He emphasized that rigidifying boundaries between “domestic” matters and concerns of the “public” world promotes exclusivism and rejects “an authentic Indian self capable of serious relationships with other Indians and Indian-ness” (Nandy 1994: 42).

Although Tagore and Gandhi disagreed on many issues (see e.g. Bhattacharya 1997; Dutta/Robinson 1998; Nandy 1994; 1997) Tagore’s insights about the limits of nationalism were shared by Gandhi. The latter felt that violence in the name of service to the nation was imperialism in disguise; only non-violent nationalism was a necessary condition of civilized life. Conceptualizing patriotism as service to humanity (sarvodaya), Gandhi questioned the moral and ethical basis of nationalistic structures that bred imperialism and ethnocentrism. To Gandhi, any system that used violence, psychological or physical, blunted a society’s moral sensibility and rarely achieved lasting results. Every successful use of violence inured people to that level; increasingly larger amounts of violence would be required to achieve the same results.

As an alternative, Gandhi offered the idea of satyagraha, a process by which marginalized groups could confront the opponent by first trying to work out a mutually agreed upon solution, and if that failed, by disobeying the law, refusing to carry out the opponent’s orders or cooperating with the opponent, including “patiently and uncomplainingly suffer[ing] whatever violence was done to him (...) [h]is opponent saw him as an enemy (...) he refused to reciprocate (...) since his sole concern was to evoke a moral response in his opponent” (Parekh 1997: 55). Gandhi’s idea of non-violent conflict resolution rose from a deep appreciation of the idea of oneness/interconnectedness of the universe. He marked out a new domain of public intervention by insisting that the method of fighting an objective was
an integral part of the objective, and the goal did not exist at the end of a series of actions, but was part of it. Thus no action for a just society could be conducted by unjust/violent means. Non-violent means of conflict resolution (satyagraha) described above, was the only way which reflected unity of belief and conduct, and therefore the ethical way of resolving social differences.

In promoting the idea of satyagraha, Gandhi, like Tagore, rejected the abstract, rational, institutionalized violence that is central to the structure of nation-states. Instead, Gandhi drew on “feminine” principles for action in the public arena, particularly the “superior capacity for suffering and self-sacrifice rather than forceful intervention to protect self interests” (Menon 1999: 10). The two central symbols associated with Gandhi in the anti-imperialist struggle – spinning khadi and making salt – were quintessential “domestic” tasks. Gandhi effectively used these symbols to breach the symbolic dual spheres divide, legitimate the participation of women and other peripheral groups into the public political arena, and demonstrate a process by which marginalized people could resist psychological and political colonization in a non-violent manner. He popularized these ideas through mobilization of the masses, who, lacking weapons of violence or access to legal channels, would engage in non-cooperation as a means for expressing dissent and/or resolving conflict. “It has become disloyal, almost sacrilegious to say no to the government. This deliberate refusal to co-operate is like the necessary weeding processes that the cultivator has to resort before he sows” (quoted in Bhattacharya 1997: 26). According to Gandhi, by refusing to co-operate with marginalizing forces, by resisting without violence, and by becoming victims of state sanctioned violence, the dissenters could wrest the moral power from the ruling elite, and restore some dignity and power of their communities.
In sum, in Tagore and Gandhi’s life and work were the roots of an early challenge to the organization of nation-states. Both men attempted to challenge separation of the center and periphery in society and negate the dichotomy between private and public in order to work for a deeper – economic, political and mental – independence conceptualized as swaraj.

4 Dissent and Conflict Resolution through Non-Cooperation

The two cases discussed here – Chipko and SEWA – are both well known in various parts of the world; I use these well-known examples because they illustrate the multi-faceted power of conflict resolution through non-violent means. In both instances the leaders were Gandhians, who believed in the ideas of satyagraha, swaraj, and sarvodaya (constructive work for the larger community), and they used these cultural tools for organizing dissent. Both movements initially targeted the Indian state but later carried their message to an international audience. Both were dominated by women activists, and in essence, challenged the current gender/class biases of economic-political institutions. Both cases also illustrate the complexities of conflict resolution through peaceful means.

4.1 Chipko

The Chipko movement, which developed in the Garhwal Himalayas in northern India, was triggered by the rapidly declining access to resources necessary for survival of the hill communities. Environmental degradation and withdrawal of lands from public use – both the creation of reserve forests by the state and appropriation by individuals – formed the context within which activists organized a
movement against the state. In the late 19th and early 20th century, swaraj and sarvodaya were part of the nationalist agenda. In the hill areas of India, the programs to implement these ideals led to several environmental protest movements, some of which included protecting trees. Nevertheless, the name Chipko (“cling”), is now most associated with a multi-pronged environmental movement that began in the early 1970s. The following account of the Chipko movement is gleaned primarily from the writings of Vandana Shiva (1999; 1993), Radha Kumar (1993) and Vimla Bahuguna (1990).

The move of several disciples of Gandhi, in the first half of the 20th century, to the Garhwal Himalayas, led to the initiation of a number of decentralized efforts to promote swaraj among the hill communities. Listening to the local folk songs that described forests with multiple species of trees, the Gandhian activists started to draw explicit connections between floods, droughts, and shrinking resource base with deforestation and the spread of plantations in the hill areas. Colonial forest policy based on British needs for wood promoted both deforestation and the planting of species such as pine or eucalyptus which were ill-suited to provide fuel, soil conservation, flood control and resource needs of the local people. In addition, the British attempted to create reserve forests which excluded indigenous people from gathering forest resources. Similar trends were apparent after India’s independence, as the needs of the large urban centers and “the nation”-became more important than the needs of the local people. The social forestry programs, with their focus on single species, single commodity production plantations, best served the needs of those within the sphere of formal markets and the money economy. The effect of activism, from 1930, on part of Gandhian workers challenged and changed, to a certain extent, the discourse around forests so that protecting forests was redefined as a sacred task rather than a rational economic activity.
The Chipko movement against commercial forestry, which destroyed forests and water resources in the hill areas, began in 1972, at Purola, the site of an earlier “anti reserve forest” agitation. When part of the forests were auctioned off to private owners for lumbering, the women from the villages confronted contractors and guards and declared that they would embrace the trees and prevent them from being cut down. In an interesting analogy some of the women explained that they would cling to the trees just as they would hug their children to protect them against a wild animal: by offering themselves as first victims. The movement spread across the Garhwal and Kumaon Himalayas as the news of non-cooperation filtered through the decentralized networks of the hill women. The activists organized *padayatras* (marches on foot) like Gandhi’s salt march, to mobilize public opinion against cutting of trees. For instance in 1975, in Reni, villagers heard that a portion of the local forest had been auctioned. The men in the village, already alerted by movement activists, decided to protest to the authorities in town. While they were away the contractor decided he would start cutting down some of the trees. He was confronted by a band of women chanting religious hymns. The women also tied sacred threads around the trees as a token vow of protection. When the contractors returned with armed police, each tree was being guarded by three volunteers, and the outsiders had to turn back. Through the 1970’s, in village after village, the women faced down armed guards and legal authorities. The non-cooperation movement grew to include other ecological issues that destroyed the resource base of marginalized people to serve the interests of those at the center.

While contractors used the legally sanctioned violence – armed police or guards – the women used non-cooperation as a means of conflict resolution. Accused of not knowing the value of forest products, i.e. timber and resin, the women argued that they were very aware of resources the forests produced i.e. soil, water and pure air. A crucial
aspect of this conflict was focused on whose knowledge, ownership, and expertise would count. The attempts at homogenization by the state meant that outside experts, outside knowledge, and imported seeds devalued and replaced indigenous knowledge, local seed stocks, and local expertise. The forces of centralization, as Tagore had predicted half a century earlier, directly impinged upon the freedom and rights of the local people. Nevertheless by attempting to control the power of symbols and meaning making, the Chipko movement successfully created a terrain of resistance, a geographical area of contested control (Routledge 1993). As Itwari Devi, a Chipko activist, stated: “Shakti comes to us from these forests and grasslands, we watch them grow (...) all this gives us not just nourishment for the body but a moral strength, that we are our own masters we control and produce our wealth (...) our power against Gujral comes from these inner sources and is strengthened by his attempts to oppress and bully us (...) we have offered ourselves, even at the cost of our lives, for a peaceful protest to close this mine, to challenge and oppose the power Gujral represents.” (quoted in Shiva 1993: 250)

The discourse of the Chipko movement embraced multiple issues relating to work and life. The relations of human beings and the environment, the separation of the secular and the spiritual – all became central issues in a movement striving for swaraj through non-cooperation. Their example inspired similar movements, among those without access to formal power in society, in places such as Karnataka, Santhal Parganas, and Chattisgarh. Sarala Behn, one of the earliest organizers of rural upliftment in the Garhwal Himalayas, reflected on the Gandhian legacy in her 75th year. “From my childhood experience I have known that the law is not just; that principles that govern humanity are higher than those that govern the state, that a centralized government, indifferent to its peoples, is a cruel joke in governance, that the split between public and private
The message of Chipko activism has attracted a great deal of attention within the ecofeminist movement. The theoretical perspectives of deep ecology and ecofeminism which decry the frenetic plunder of ever more resources for ever more unequally distributed economic gain to dominate nature is very similar to the indigenous knowledge of the Chipko activists such as Itwari Devi. Although there are debates about the philosophical underpinnings of ecofeminism vs. feminist environmentalism (see Agrawal 1997) the general nature of the conflict, which groups have the right to define knowledge, access resources, and garner power is becoming a common theme around the world. Ecology is being claimed as people’s concern, and in the process there is an attempt to link issues of health, resources, rights of marginalized people, justice and peace, in ways that challenge the current separation of these issues within nation-states and at the international level.

4.2 SEWA

SEWA or the Self Employed Women’s Association, (an acronym which suggests sacred service) began in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. This movement offers another example of a marginalized group – female workers who work episodically in an informal labor market – which successfully challenged bureaucratic definitions of work through unionization. Prugl (1999) points out that through the world,
bureaucratic instruments such as censuses and employment surveys fail to count women’s economic contribution, partly because of how work is defined as paid employment and activities carried on outside the homes. SEWA activists challenged this categorization as they organized and unionized women “who work in their homes, on the streets in cities, in the fields and villages in rural India, with no fixed employer, carving their small niches in the economy, day by day, with only their wits to protect them against vulnerability, invisibility, and poverty” (Rose 1992: 16).

The number of women who work in the marginalized sector, outside formal employer/employee relationships, are very high in Southern societies. In urban areas such as Bombay the number may rise to 50 % of the workforce (Rose 1992). In India such self-employed women include, for instance, women who make fine lace at home for export, women who transport vegetables to daily markets in baskets, women who are travelling acrobats, or woman who work as “daily help” in the construction industry. Because such work transcends the home/place of employment divide, combines domestic and income earning activities, and shifts economic activities as seasons and markets demand, it has traditionally fallen outside the bureaucratic categorization of work in all countries.

SEWA began in 1971 when a Gandhian activist Ela Bhatt was approached by a group of women who earned their living carrying loads on their heads, for help in their demands for standardizing their wages. Ela Bhatt, who had hitherto been involved with formal labor struggles, came to know about the struggles of these “non-workers”, who were at the mercy of those in authority (the contractor for home workers and the police for street-vendors). These informal workers neither received regular wages, nor were they able to demand fair wages (Kumar 1993).
SEWA’s work began with an initial project to provide credit for poor women so that they could begin to accumulate some assets (however meager) on their own. Cut off from mainstream channels for accessing credit, the poor women of SEWA, were constantly in financial crises as they were forced to pay exorbitant interest rates to money lenders, when they borrowed money for family emergencies or for working capital. Initially SEWA tried to help the women borrow money from nationalized banks. However, the hiatus between the realities of their marginalized lives and the middle and upper class biases in banking procedures (people had to be able to come during restricted hours, be literate, have fixed addresses etc.) made this effort a failure. Next, SEWA created its own bank, creatively making rules that would fit the needs of its members: there was no lower limit to the amount of money women were allowed to put in, the bank used photographs instead of signatures, bankers went to customers’ homes or places of work, the bank provided meeting and socializing space for networking and it remained open during ‘non-traditional’ hours. These efforts paid off as the bank began to operate with very low rates of credit default. The bank also represented a contested terrain in the sense that the needs of the marginalized groups were being given precedence over the institutional structures that fit middle class experiences.

Other overlapping projects developed from these initial efforts. Investigation of loan defaults led to the realization that these informal workers suffered from a high rate of maternal mortality. As workers who were paid by the day, these women could rarely afford to take time off. SEWA instituted practices of insuring women so that they received cash and food benefits during the postpartum period, and began training health care workers to meet their needs of support and health care. In a radical break from established practices, SEWA defined this service as an occupational health issue rather than a
maternal health issue, and lobbied the government to provide funds to expand the service.

SEWA also successfully created a number of all women’s co-operatives to increase women’s ability to control their own assets. Overall, the strategy has been to increase self-employed women’s access to social resources, decision-making, planning and ability to implement their programs through training, technical aids and collective bargaining.

In spite of organizing and working for the rights of informal workers, SEWA had a difficult time getting registered as a trade union. Under the Indian Trade Union Act only workers in particular factories or employment categories could be recognized as unions. The network of women who constituted SEWA, in a multitude of employment and work spheres, did not meet the bureaucratic classification of paid workers. SEWA activists argued that unions should not be based on static definitions of work but on workers rights. SEWA was defined as an association that developed workers; hence it had the right to unionize. Development was defined as freedom from exploitation, assurance of regular work, and access to opportunities for advancement. Eventually the association was registered as a union.

While SEWA worked at the grassroots level to reorient the modern market sector towards home-based work, it also worked at the national level to create a space for home based work. The Indian government created a national commission for self-employed women and appointed Ela Bhatt as the first head. Initiating a study of 18 Indian states led to the first systematic study of informal work organization, including an assessment of the existing legal protections and their implementation. This report described the struggles of marginalized women as well as the failure of anti-poverty measures to address some
of the real needs of these women. Family planning, forest and water management policies, lack of adequate, relevant and accessible training, inadequate education and health care support – the complex list of factors identified as affecting the women is monumental.

Apart from its activism in India SEWA has been at the forefront among home-workers organizations lobbying, networking, advocating for an International Labor Organization conference on homework. “SEWA considered the convention a tool with which it could improve the lot of home-based workers in India (...) [it ended up] institutionalizing a global network of home-worker advocacy organizations” (Prugl 1999: 112). Since its activism covers gender issues along with labor and co-operative movements, SEWA has also lobbied several key international trade unions to increase the salience of marginalized, invisible women’s work into the mainstream of international deliberation. SEWA insisted that it was “not demanding charity but their rightful place in the labor movement” (ILO 1994: 59). On its agenda are issues such as who is liable for the safety of the home environment (where many women work), what is occupational health, what is just pay, how can work hours be computed when people work at home and similar issues that offer a radical challenge to the organization of work as it has emerged at the end of the 20th century (Prugl 1999).

SEWA’s struggles to achieve these multi-faceted objectives have been based on Gandhian principles of non-violent protest, arbitration, and reconciliation. For instance when SEWA women who sold vegetables wanted to protest their eviction by municipal governments, they peacefully occupied their customary vending spaces and refused to move despite official threats of violence. Adoption of such strategies, as in the case of the Chipko women, made it difficult for authorities to remove the women on the excuse that they were creating law and
order problems. Their strategy at the national and international level has been to press the claims through relentless arbitration. As they continue to include more and more women by trade groups, they continued to focus on the process of the struggle as much as the objective of the struggle. In this way they have moved women who were isolated in limited work worlds to a collective, political world of worker unions.

As in the Chipko movement, SEWA activism is aimed at challenging the center-periphery dichotomy and is designed to restore some power to marginalized communities. As the Chipko movement demanded the right to define their resources, the women of SEWA have demanded the right to redefine the meaning of work by challenging the separation of work and home, and their rights as workers to demand state resources and support. The current negotiations at the ILO on home based work and home-workers unions are an outcome of this early mobilization by a peripheral group.

5 Reflections on Non-Violent Conflict Resolution

These two cases illustrate several aspects of non-violent conflict resolution. Both adopted techniques of non-cooperation which emphasized their ability to resist violence with non-violence and consequently acquire greater moral force and status in society. Both groups challenged the increasing divide between those who are full participants in a democratic process and the masses who are left out of it by asserting their right to define and determine what is appropriate for people like themselves. These cases of activism illustrate both the potential and limitations of non-violent conflict resolution.
By not cooperating in the dominating and destructive forms of state sanctioned violence, such movements created new spaces of resistance in civic society (Routledge 1993). In both cases, women used their networks to collectively decide on what they considered to be just, and remained firm in their demands. Their willingness to meet violence with non-violence won them many sympathizers in larger society. By following a non-violent ethos as articulated by Gandhi and Tagore, the means and objectives of the conflict resolution were addressed in ways that empowered the powerless. The success of their tactics becomes clearer if we compare it to other rural uprising over disappearing resources at Dhulia, in Maharashtra (Kumar 1993) or Srikakulum in Andhra (Vindhya 1990). In both instances, tribal women, who were faced with the rapid erosion of customary rights to land, joined men in an armed uprising. Although they were able to prevent land re-allotment for some time, ultimately they succumbed to the greater power of state-sanctioned violence. Unlike these tribal communities, both the Chipko and the SEWA women were able to sustain their activism for a significantly longer period of time. And as their efforts were publicized, they were able to achieve higher status because of their refusal to compromise in the face of threatened violence. Thus non-violent techniques provide strategic advantages to the marginalized against the vastly superior coercive power of the state.

The methods of conflict resolution adopted by these two movements helped participants achieve some, although not all, aspects of swaraj. The rationale for non-cooperation, the attempt to control indigenous resources and knowledge, contributed to the power of the local community. The Chipko movement breached the sacred/secular divide institutionalized in modern democratic polity through the assertion “our power (shakti) is nature’s power” (Shiva 1993: 250) and by redefining conservation as a sacred trust. While the technocratic
approach to development adopted by the state fragmented and separated spheres of forestry, agriculture and water management, non-violent confrontations adopted by the Garhwali women emphasized holism, decentralization, plurality and interdependence. While these women were not able to force others to follow their directives (nor would such power be consistent with their Gandhian approach), they were able to challenge and reframe some of the discourse surrounding resources and human-environment relations in a just society.

Similarly SEWA activism exemplifies a basic (and in some ways radical) challenge to the separation of home and work in modern states. At the grassroots level SEWA worked to create greater independence – economically and in the sphere of decision making – among its members. But at the discursive level, it challenged the ideological structures that marginalized the work of informal workers and issues crucial to women and other marginalized people as domestic issues. And like Chipko, the cumulative effort of SEWA was directed towards preserving and dignifying these women’s knowledge and skills as a way of restoring some power to them individually and collectively.

These cases exemplify struggles of people who are marginalized by the process of modernity which seeks to centralize power and homogenize populations. Centralization of power has inherently spatial underpinnings; “it involves the appropriation (and) domination (...) of space in the interests of private capital and the state’s ruling elite’s (...) increasingly at the expense of others” (Routledge 1993: 124). Particular places become sites where the relations of power and domination intersect, where marginalized communities attempt to resist the state through social conflict. The two cases described here resisted this spatial domination and asserted their right to practice alternative ways of life. Their activities, while conducted outside the
arena of formal interest group politics, contributed to a more participatory form of democracy. Through the formation of networks and through their discourse, these groups were sharing in a process of defining resources and their use, within a political space they created and claimed through their activism.

Use of non-violent methods of conflict resolution also contributes to the overall unity of a society. Research into social conflict has long indicated that violence between groups rigidifies boundaries between in- and out-groups (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956; Jayaram/Saberwal 1996; Olzak 1992). Non-violent conflict resolution, by its nature, promotes more permeable boundaries and a greater possibility of sustaining ties between groups. The success of Chipko and SEWA is based partly on the ability of these movements to maintain loose networks among several sets of activists from a wide range of occupational and kinship groups. In societies with multiple cultures, leaders of disaffected groups frequently draw and strengthen factional identities as a way of garnering power. Non-violent methods, such as those described here, have the potential of bridging and/or minimizing some of these factions and diffusing emergent social cleavages.

Although the two cases described here had a majority of women participants, the issues they raise are not uniquely women’s issues. Their position of marginality is based on interacting class, gender, and other social attributes, and their concerns are concerns of all marginalized people. Although some of the current literature raise the notion of unique feminine values (see e.g. Meis/Shiva 1993) such essentializing perspectives are not totally compatible with the values adopted by these movements. Although the movements, particularly Chipko, made use of the cultural symbol of nurturing associated with women, the conflict is not based on essential masculine vs. feminine values. Instead, the two movements, drawing on the Tagore-Gandhian
notion of anti-nationalism reject the *hegemonic* masculine values of rationality and aggression without a concomitant rejection of *all* masculine values. The core perspectives of sarvodaya and swaraj are based on a rejection of rigid boundaries between masculinity and femininity rather than a valorization of one particular perspective.

6 Conclusion

These two cases indicate the continuing potential of non-violent conflict resolution as alternative weapons of the marginalized. Indeed, several movements around the world have adopted similar techniques in the face of extremely repressive systems. From the activism of mothers seeking information about their lost children in Chile (Noonan 1995) or Argentina (Radcliffe/Westwood 1993), women facing security guards in Greenham Commons, UK (New 1997), or students facing tanks at Tiananmen Square (Calhoun 1997), such principled approaches have been used repeatedly to challenge state sanctioned violence. States are forced to craft responses to such methods of conflict resolution, and the fit of the responses, when it is publicly enacted, determine the outcome of the conflict.

Would such methods of conflict resolution work in any societal situation? I would argue that the methods described are more successful in contexts which are not highly bureaucratized. The success of these movements depends on the availability of alternative cultural (and spiritual) symbols that provide a sense of common purpose to potential members of the movement. Such decentralized activism also depend on the existence and/or development of primary group networks that make up *communities*. The extent to which written rules and regulations structure every move of people, how homogenized is the culture of the society, and the nature of media
dissemination of the account of the protest in any society, are likely to have an interactive influence on the outcome of the conflict. Thus, the principle of non cooperation, has to be enacted through a variety of methods in different contexts. Indeed this would account for the difference between the strategies used by Martin Luther King and Gandhi to uphold the same principle – non-cooperation as ethical means of resolving conflict.

In situations of extreme fanaticism and unfettered violence, such as the structured program to exterminate Jews in Nazi Germany, the success of non-cooperation may not be as readily evident. Nevertheless, taking a longer term view of history, it is apparent that the discursive strategies and arbitration adopted by various Jewish groups, crafted a more lasting influence on world history than the short-lived, victorious outcome of Nazi violence. More importantly, the strength of purpose not to succumb – in the sense of not relinquishing one’s Jewish identity and heritage – in the face of extreme suffering, to use sacrifice as a means of defending a group’s principles and way of life, are now part of the collective history of the world’s marginalized people.

Finally, non-cooperation as a method of conflict resolution has ramifications at the international level. In the era of burgeoning militaries and rapid increase in the rate of deaths attributable to human agency (rather than natural calamity), non-cooperation and other non violent methods of conflict resolution pose an ethical challenge to the normalization of the use of extreme force in interactions between societies. To the extent there exists a hierarchy between states, in terms of access to means of violence, non-violent methods of conflict resolution are likely to remain as alternatives to violent resolutions of social conflict at the international level.
References


Political Violence, Human Rights, and Military Strategy: The Mexican Case

Markus S. Schulz

1 Introduction

Political violence is no accident. It is embedded in social-structural, institutional, and political-cultural contexts. Cycles of violence are related to changes of these contexts. Recent Latin American history is marked by consecutive waves of authoritarian military regimes, guerilla warfare, and transitions to democracy. Political visions, ideas about proper goals, legitimate strategies and rights are not confined to any single country but – for better or worse – traverse borders, are received in, and impact multiple localities. This article takes the Mexican case for an examination of the conditions under which transnational public discourse can impact the arcane discourses, strategies, and tactics of military actors and contribute to the resolution or mitigation of political violence.

Within the tumultuous recent history of Latin America, Mexico was long seen as a hoard of stability. Its regime seemed relatively mild and democratic, especially when compared to the brutal dictatorships of the Southern Cone. Many political refugees from the region appreciated being granted asylum in Mexico. The human rights abuses and the political violence in Mexico were not much publicized1 until January 1994, when the guerilla uprising in Chiapas took the general public and the academia by surprise. Since then a wave of human rights violations, political murders, armed conflicts, and massacres

1 Even the otherwise comprehensive volume edited by Briesemeister and Zimmermann (1992) did not feature a chapter on political violence and human rights.
made headlines. After more than seventy years in power, Mexico’s ruling party accepted electoral defeat and allowed a candidate from the opposition to take over the presidency on 1 December 2000 in a peaceful transition. To gauge the challenges Mexico is facing, it is necessary to question whether the Mexican system had really changed over night and to rethink the old assessments in the light of these recent events. In the following I will first outline the changing perception of the Mexican political system and the changing relations between state and civil society. Next I will discuss the continuities and ruptures in the relation to law and violence during recent Mexican history. The analysis of the origins and the subsequent course of the conflict in Chiapas will then serve as a window for gaining instructive insights into the dynamics of transnational public discourse, the shifting strategies of military actors, and the interdependence between local, regional, national, and global processes. The final section considers the general conclusions for the social dynamics of the use and the limitation of political violence.

2 The Revolutionary Legacy: Between Democracy and Dictatorship

Political violence existed in all eras of Mexican history. It played a role in the conquest through the Spaniards and during the independence struggles. Escalations of conflict can be traced back to the time of the rural uprisings during the time of the Aztec rule (Katz 1988). The current regime derived from a historical trauma: the Mexican Revolution, during which more than a million Mexicans lost their lives. Ending the repressive dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz (1876–1910), it had begun in 1910 as an uprising of liberal forces and expanded to an uprising of the rural masses. Various armies fought against each other until Venustiano Carranza won power with his
constitutionalists in 1916. A year later Mexico’s relatively progressive constitution turned into effect, enshrining, as the first constitution world-wide – and two years before the Weimar constitution – not only civil and political but also social rights (cf. Madrazo 1993). The presidential policies of Alvaro Obregón, Plutarco Elías Calles, and Lazaro Cárdenas resulted in the institutionalization of the current regime, which is led by a clientelist elite with a very powerful president at its apex and whose centralistic-corporatist structure penetrates the country’s political, economic, social, and cultural institutions.

The regime gave itself a highly progressive image. The ruling party claimed to be the heir of the Mexican Revolution and pointed to the text of the progressive constitution. The political elite defined – in the words of Mexican historian Lorenzo Meyer – the nation’s “historical goal” as “the development to a modern industrial nation” (Meyer 1990: 4). In line with its “revolutionary” politics, the state engaged in redistributive measures and took on the role as proprietor of key industries, such as petroleum, mining, electricity, railway, and banking. Yet these measures were eventually reversed under the presidencies of Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas. Over time almost all state enterprises were being privatized. Rising foreign debt and low tax income made the redistributive measures increasingly unfinancable. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) opened the Mexican market to foreign influence. A substantial portion of the Mexican population continues to live in economic marginality. The regime maintained its remarkable stability by acquiescing social and political opposition through an efficient mix of co-optation, adaptation, and repression. The Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Revolutionary Institutional Party; abbreviated PRI) had managed to
stay in power uninterruptedly from its inception in 1929\textsuperscript{2} until December 2000, when electoral defeat had become undeniable.

Early commentators, such as Tucker (1957), Tannenbaum (1960), and Scott (1964), were quite positive about the Mexican system, all deeming it to be on the way toward full democracy. In his classic study *Democracia en México* (1965), Gonzáles Casanova used the term ‘democracy’ with irony. More recent studies characterized the regime as “authoritarian” (Centeno 1994: 32; Cornelius/Craig 1991; Meyer 1990; Middlebrook 1986; Smith 1979), “semi-democratic” (Levy 1989; Gómez Tagle 1993) or “semi-authoritarian” (Camp 1993: 175). The Peruvian novelist and politician Vargas Llosa (1990) called it a “perfect dictatorship”, arguing that the Mexican regime is, in contrast to the Soviet Union and Cuba, a well camouflaged dictatorship, which leaves space for criticism, but only as long as it does not endanger the regime’s overall existence.

Two major factors were pushing over the last decade the Mexican regime’s human rights violations and democratic deficit more and more into the limelight. The first reason is the Latin America-wide wave of democratization, which changed the contrast foil, in front of which the Mexican regime is being perceived. Second, the relation between state and civil society has changed in Mexico. The regime met with increasing criticism, lost legitimacy, and fractured into quarreling factions of reformers and non-reformers. Civil-societal groups emerged and demanded democratic control and respect for human rights.

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\textsuperscript{2} The party was founded in 1929 under the name *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Party; PNR). The name was changed in 1938 to *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana* (Party of the Mexican Revolution; PRM). The present name was adopted in 1946.
Many Mexicans do not believe in their political efficacy because of a long history of electoral manipulations. According to a poll conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* in August 1994, 56.2% of the questioned Mexicans thought that they could not do anything against electoral manipulation (cited in Camp 1996). The demand for clean and fair elections became increasingly louder (Alianza Cívica 1994). President Salinas saw himself urged to announce in 1988, shortly after his heavily contested electoral victory, the end of the one-party regime and a new era of political competition (cf. Cornelius/Craig 1991: 1). The Mexican transition is not smooth at all but profoundly embattled. This finds its expression in the increase of political violence and the mounting accusations of corruption at the highest levels. The new Mexican president, on to whom many hopes for change have been projected, will need to forge compromises with various parties, since his party, the *Partido de Acción Nacional* (National Action Party; abbreviated PAN) lacks majority in Congress. This task will not be easy.

3  Political Violence

Violence as an instrument for the repression of opposition was a feature of Mexican everyday life. Aspects of a “culture of fear” (Corradi/Fagen/Garretón 1992) were quite present in Mexico, although it did not reach the severity of the dictatorships in the Southern Cone, where state terror penetrated the whole of society. In general, the Mexican regime dealt with dissent in a highly selective manner. Opponents of the regime were – following the principle of ‘sugar-bread and lash’ – either co-opted or persecuted. Key figures of the 1968 student protest, for example, were lured into the government administration by lucrative positions. Though prior to this, hundreds of students were shot during the infamous massacre on Tlatelolco
Place, an event that led to a fundamental shift in the perception of Mexican politics. Since then repression was seen as an integrated component of the Mexican system of governing. However, upon close examination, the Tlatelolco massacre was not the regime’s sudden fall into sin. The regime’s history is instead marked by a continuous chain of acts of state violence. Among these are the 1946 massacre of unionists in Léon; the 1952 attack on the Henriquistas in the Alameda Central of Mexico City; the 1958 repression of the teachers movement; the 1959 repression of the railway workers movement; the 1960 shooting of peasants in Chilpancingo, Guerrero; the 1961 repression of the navists in San Luis Potosí; and the 1962–64 persecution of the Jaramillo movement with the eventual killing of its leader and his family. Police and military fought during the 1970’s and early 1980’s a prolonged guerra sucia (‘dirty war’) against emerging rebel groups, especially the rural Partido de los Pobres (Party of the Poor) in Guerrero. Amnesty International (1998) counted more than 400 unresolved cases, in which individuals “disappeared” under circumstances that suggest the responsibility of official security forces. The majority of cases occurred in the context of counter-insurgency measures conducted by army and police in that period (Amnesty International 1998). Americas Watch (1990) and Amnesty International (1991, 1996, 1998) have documented in detail how the authoritarian structures of Mexico’s political system facilitated violations of human rights and allowed the perpetrators’ impunity.

4 The Security Apparatus

The organs of the Mexican regime’s human rights violations and repression are the military, the police, intelligence agencies, and state-sponsored or state-tolerated paramilitaries. Unlike the military of other Latin American countries, the Mexican military did not appear as a
political actor of its own during the last several decades. After the historical trauma of the Mexican Revolution, which had left more than one million dead, the political influence of the Mexican military was eventually contained during the presidencies of Cárdenas (1934–40) and Ávila Camacho (1940–46), the latter being the last general ascending to the office of presidency (see Davis 1995). The generation that had actively participated in the fighting of the revolution was over time replaced by younger cadres with professional training, who occupy today the leading positions. The relations between government and military were significantly tightened during the Salinas presidency, as Camp (1993) notes. However, the concentration of deadly weapons, the existence of hierarchical structures and of a system of order and obedience present always a potential of virulence. Centeno (1994) argues that the military still maintains a certain degree of autonomy and veto power. Tensions between military and state leadership, especially in times of serious conflicts, such as in 1968 after the Tlatelolco massacre and in 1994 after the Zapatista uprising, became rarely public (compare Wager/Schulz 1995). According to Serrano (1995: 441), the Chiapas conflict was not only an endurance test of the civilian control over the military but also revealed “the institutional fragility on which the subordination of the armed forces rests”. Military observers however agree that the possibility of a military coup d’état is in Mexico even in the long term almost unimaginable (Ronfeldt 1985; Wager 1995). The military is loyal to the regime and stands ready “to manage episodic, small-scale conflicts throughout the nation” (Ronfeldt 1985). Relative to the size of its population and economic strength, Mexico has one of the lowest military budgets in all of Latin America and even world-wide, which comes as no surprise given the lack of serious external threats. The task of the Mexican military is less the defense of the national borders but rather the repression of internal challenges. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Mexican official
military expenditures – measured in US dollars constant to 1995 values – increased from 1097 billion in 1990 to 1828 billion in 1994, the year the Chiapas rebellion commenced, and fluctuated thereafter between 1615 and 1759 billion. As shares of the gross domestic product, these figures represent a rise from 0.4 to 0.6 percent from the earlier to the later 1990’s (SIPRI 2000).³ The Mexican Army consists of about 130000 soldiers,⁴ the Navy of 37000 and the Air Force of 8000 (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998). As Americas Watch (1990) and Amnesty International (1991) document, the Mexican military committed time and again human rights violations when conducting operations inside Mexico upon political demand. The arrests of Mexico’s drug czar General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo in 1997, and of the generals Francisco Quiróz Hermesillo and Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparo in September 2000 on charges of collaborating with the Juárez drug cartel indicate to corruption in the highest ranks (cf. Weiner 2000).

While the military had until the early 1990’s in most parts of the population a decidedly positive image, the police did not nearly enjoy as much respect, if it was not outrightly hated as an institution seen as thoroughly corrupt and frequently connected to organized crime (Barry 1992). In his study of the Mexican police, Portillo Vargas (2000: 12; own translation) finds corruption so widespread that he considers “illegality” to be the “rule, not the exception”. Only twelve percent of the Mexicans trust the police, according to a public opinion survey (Basáñez 1991). Police troubles reach back to its original

³ By different calculations, the United States Central Intelligence Agency lists the Mexican military expenditures in fiscal year 1999 to measure 1 percent of GDP (CIA 2000). The CIA’s estimates of the world average military expenditure as share of world GDP is 2 percent (CIA 2000).

⁴ This figure includes about 60000 conscripts, who are drawn by lottery and have to serve four hours per week for one year (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1998).
establishment during the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, when even known criminals were recruited (Barry 1992: 61).

Mexico’s intelligence service was restructured after the 1985 murder of a United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent made its links to drug traffickers undeniable and led to pressure from Washington. The consequence was the abolition of the Federal Security Directorate, which had been established in 1947 by President Miguel Alemán, and the simultaneous creation of the General Directorate of Investigation and National Security (DISEN), which was only three years later replaced by the Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN). According to Aguayo Quezada’s (1996) analysis, CISEN “deteriorated” soon after the initial reform efforts and is far from achieving operational efficiency, though most dangerous is the lack of supervision by the legislature and the public.

Apart from the military and the police, paramilitary organizations must be mentioned too. It is quite possible in Mexico that charros (union bosses) and caciques (rural strongmen) employ – with ostensible impunity – death squads to squelch opposition with an arsenal of methods ranging from sophisticated threats to physical violence, torture and murder (Camp 1993). Paramilitary forces were also employed by the government against rebellious students and urban guerrilla groups. For example, the infamous Los Halcones, who were responsible for the massacre of students on 10 June 1971, were provided with a headquarters inside Military Camp No. 1 of Mexico City. The same military camp served later as operational base for the paramilitary Brigada Blanca from its creation as a counterinsurgency force against urban guerilla in 1976 until its dissolution in 1983, when its involvement into the drug trade became evident (López y Rivas/Sierra/Enríquez del Valle 1999). The relationship between
paramilitary organizations and state security forces will be further discussed in the context of the Chiapas conflict.

5 Discourses of Legitimation

The use of political violence relies on its legitimacy. The core principle of Apter’s discourse theory of political violence is that committing political violence requires discourse (Apter 1997). An analysis of the discourses of legitimation is the key for a better understanding of political violence. The analysis of the discourse about the legitimate use of violence in Mexico helps to understand why different social actors act the way they do.

Barry (1992: 62) noted that “[b]oth the police and the military have justified violent repression of civilians by their fears of the reemergence of armed leftist insurgents in Mexico”. For Aguayo Quezada (1997) the central argument that the Mexican regime uses for justifying human rights violations is the so-called ‘state thesis of national security’. According to this thesis, national security has priority over the respect for human rights, which can be put out of effect when dealing with opposition. Rochlin (1997) showed how the discourses about drug trade and crime rates, which increased in the wake of neoliberalist economic policies, are used for the militarization of police functions. On the other hand, the regime suffered from shrinking legitimacy and was increasingly pressured to respond to more and more massive criticism of the human rights practices of its security apparatus.

The increased national and international protest against continued human rights violations had let president Salinas during the weeks before the formal negotiations about the North American Free Trade
Treaty (NAFTA) in June 1990 to upgrade the human rights office of his governmental secretariat (*Dirección General de Derechos Humanos en la Secretaría de Gobernación*), which was established only two years before, to the more free-standing human rights commission *Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH)*. The CNDH was successful in the investigation of a few cases, but still lacked the decisive prosecution mandate. The constitutional reform of September 1999 is meant to ensure the necessary independence from the acting government. Amnesty International (1998) observed since 1994 a marked increase of new cases of disappearances with the involvement of security forces, mostly in the context of counter-insurgency measures and anti-drug operations.

6 The Rebellion in Chiapas

Neither the public nor academia had expected an armed guerilla uprising in Mexico. As an OECD member country, Mexico seemed on the best way to join the league of wealthy nations called the First World. On the very same day however that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) took effect, some 3000 indigenous peasants occupied in the south-eastern Mexican state of Chiapas the municipal centers of Ocosingo, Las Margaritas, Altamirano, Chanal, Oxchuc, Huixtán, and the touristically important San Cristóbal de las Casas, a city of 100000 inhabitants.

In its “Declaration from the Lacandon Rainforest”, the insurgent *Ejército Zapatista de la Liberación Nacional* (literally the Zapatist Army of National Liberation; EZLN) demanded “work, land, housing, food, health care, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and peace” (EZLN 1994a: 51). The insurgents saw themselves within a tradition of more than five hundred years of resistance against
repression and exploitation since the Spanish conquest. They denounced NAFTA as “death sentence for the indigenous” and declared “war” against the Mexican government (EZLN 1994a).

The war lasted twelve days. The insurgent Zapatistas retreated soon after the uprising but were pursued by the superior equipped federal troops who grew rapidly to more than 10000. The U.S.-based Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch/Americas (1994) documented in detail the Zapatistas’ and the federal army’s violations of the Geneva Convention and of human rights. Relatively little was brought up against the Zapatistas compared to the charges against the federal army, which was accused of torture and summary execution of civilians. At least 145 individuals were reported to have lost their lives in the twelve days of fighting; including 38 members of the state police (Seguridad Pública del Estado) and 13 soldiers. The number of persons displaced by the war was estimated to number between 20000 and 35000 (Physicians for Human Rights/Human Rights Watch/Americas 1994).

Photographs of shot civilians with hands tied were spread by the media around the world and increased the dismay about the federal army’s brutality. Protest against the war mounted quickly in Mexico City as well as in other Mexican cities. The urban-popular movements mobilized their members within a few days for demonstrations. Protest was also staged abroad, particularly in the United States and Canada, but also as far as Italy, Spain, France, England, Germany, and Switzerland.
7 The Causes of Conflict

What were the origins of this conflict? What caused the bloodshed and what factors ended it? In search for an answer I will analyze first the socio-economic context and then the structure of political-military opportunities, the social network capacities, and the communicative praxis (for a theoretical discussion of these concepts see Schulz 1998).

The most immediate reasons for the armed uprising were the economic marginalization, which did not seem to be overcome but to be worsening. Galtung’s (1978) concept of “structural violence” can be used to accurately describe the situation of the indigenous rebels in Chiapas on the eve of the uprising. Such conditions of structural violence can lead to physical violence. The socio-economic situation of the rebellious peasants resulted from the interplay of specific local, national, and global factors.

Chiapas is with regard to the per-capita income one of the poorest Mexican states, despite the fact that it provides more than half of Mexico’s hydroelectric power and significant portions of petroleum and other natural resources. The income of 59 percent of all Chiapanecos under employment is below the official minimum salary (CIACH/CONPAZ/SIPRO 1997). The illiteracy rate is 30 percent and thus three times higher than the national average (CIACH/CONPAZ/SIPRO 1997). The social inequality is in Chiapas more severe than in most other Mexican states (Nigh 1994; Collier 1994b).

Chiapas is the Mexican state with the highest percentage of indigenous in its population. The majority are Mayans who speak mostly Tzeltal, Tzotzil, Chol, Tojolabal, or Zoque. Like elsewhere in Mexico, the indigenous are among the economically and politically most disadvantaged (Bartra 1993; Benjamin 1996; Bennhold-
Thomsen 1982; Bonfil Batalla 1996; Friedlander 1975; Psacharopolous and Patrinos 1994; Rus 1994; Stavenhagen 1975, 1983, 1994; Lee Van Cott 1994; Wasserstrom 1983). When visiting cities, such as San Cristóbal de las Casas, they are often confronted with social disrespect and discrimination from the part of the white ladinos. The ladino-dominated institutions put them in cases of conflict frequently at disadvantage.

Chiapas never had the benefit of a major land reform (Nigh 1994; Collier 1994). From 1915 to 1920 – the time in which the legendary Emiliano Zapata fought with his peasants army in Morelos against the encroaching sugar plantations – the Chiapanecan *mapaches* took large tracts of land violently from the indigenous. Many of today’s mighty landowners can trace their huge estates back to this time (Kanzleiter/Pesara 1997). 6000 rancher families own more than 3 million hectares of land, i.e. the same as much as the entire sector of the 200000 Ejido- and communal land owners. Although the State was considered a potential ally in the struggle against the regional elites, the federal government refused time and again the application of article 27 of Mexico’s revolutionary constitution, which had a provision for land redistribution. A quarter of all currently open Mexican land petitions are in Chiapas. The population growth increased the problem of the lack of arable land (Whitmeyer/Hopcroft 1996).

In competition over the scarce resource land, essential for the agrarian way of life, the indigenous peasants had few chances against the more powerful ranchers who had the better connections to the local and regional state institutions. When indigenous peasants organized themselves and tried to become more actively involved in the political process, the hacienda owners sent their so-called *guardias blancas* (White Guards) (Nigh 1994). Peaceful protest marches were time and
again broken up violently by the police (Harvey 1994; Nash et al. 1995).

The scarcity of arable land and the tensions within indigenous comunidades along religious and party-political conflict lines led over the last decades to violent expulsions. In Chamula, for example, PRD-supporters, Protestant converts, and reform-minded Catholics were scared away or violently evicted by the ‘traditional’ catholic, PRI-voting majority. The colonization of the tropical Lacandon Rainforest by migrants from the Chiapas highlands and other regions of Mexico over the last thirty years did not solve the land problem (Ascensio Franco/Leyva Solano 1991; Collier 1994a, 1994b; Méndez Asensio/Cano Gimeno 1994). A portion of the Lacandon Rainforest is since 1971 a protected and UNESCO-supported Biosphere Reserve (Arizpe/Paz/Velázquez 1996; O’Brien 1998).

The causes of the Chiapas conflict exist not only at the local, but also at the national and global level. The federal government choose time and again not to intervene into Chiapas’s extremely unequal power and property relations in order to secure the loyalty of the local economic elites, which controlled the leading positions in government and party at the state level (Harvey 1994).

At the global level are those forces at work that steer single nation-states toward certain policies. The “national competition states” (Hirsch 1995; see Altvater/Mahnkopf 1996; Teeple 1995) compete with one another in attracting the capital that is necessary for the smooth functioning of their national economies. This narrows the leverage for democratic decisions about redistributive measures. A country such as Mexico is thus pressured to adopt the austerity policies of a “structural adaptation” to the logic of the world market. Networks of neoliberal technocrats, often trained in the United States,
used the particularities of the Mexican political system for gaining and then maintaining the control of the clientelist state apparatus (Centeno 1994). The implementation of capital-friendly development policy, for which NAFTA was an important element, had been facilitated by the existing corporatist-authoritarian structures.

Salinas’ neoliberal modernization policy had disastrous consequences for many Chiapanecan peasants. The dissolution of the Mexican Coffee Institute (Instituto Mexicano del Café; INMECAFE) brought down the price for coffee, an important cash crop. The federal monies from the highly propagated PRONASOL/Solidarity program typically reached not those who needed it most but those with the best connections to the local bosses. Salinas’ reform of article 27 of the Mexican constitution was intended to end the legal possibility of land redistribution once and for all. NAFTA threatened the peasants producing for the Mexican internal market to bring them into direct competition with grand-scale North American farmers, whose prices were for many products, especially corn, much lower (Harvey 1994; García de Leon 1995; Nigh 1994; Saxe-Fernández 1997).

These indicators taken together – the lack of land, the low income, and the bleak future prospect – amounted to a situation of relative social deprivation for those parts of the population who participated in the uprising.

Social deprivation is a necessary but not yet a sufficient explanatory factor for an uprising (see Tilly 1978). Conditions of relative social deprivation exist in many locations throughout the world without the occurrence of rebellions. It thus can be assumed that additional factors must have played a role. The deprivation model helps to explain the preconditions for an armed uprising but it is insufficient for understanding its dynamics. It leaves unexplained how as few as 3000
poorly equipped indigenous were able to hold out against the Mexican government apparatus and several ten thousand heavily armed federal troops and win sympathies on a national and international scale. A better understanding of the conflict requires a significant expansion of the explanatory model. It is therefore necessary to consider the political and military opportunity structures that indigenous peasants of Chiapas are faced with (cf. Schulz 1998).

The insurgent indigenous of Chiapas had made the experience that the normal political channels, with which they could have improved their social and economic conditions, were closed. Election results inconvenient for the local bosses were regularly manipulated. Peaceful demonstrations and efforts to form unions were met with violent repression. A report by the independent Mexican organizations Centro de Información y Análisis de Chiapas (CIACH), Coordinación de Organismos No Gubernamentales por la Paz (CONPAZ) and Servicios Informativos Procesados (SIPRO) counted for the six years period, in which the large estate owner general Absalón Castellanos was governor of Chiapas, a total of 153 political murders, 692 arrests, 503 kidnappings with torture, 327 disappearances, and 29 attacks at demonstrations (Ciach/Conpaz/Sipro 1997).

An authoritarian closure of political channels does not lead automatically to an uprising. Uncoordinated riots could occur spontaneously when long-standing frustrations transform into aggressions and suddenly erupt in the presence of an igniting event. The Zapatista uprising however was not spontaneous at all, but patiently prepared over the course of several years (EZLN 1994b). The plan of an armed uprising belonged to the “action repertoire” of the insurgent population group (see the concept of “repertoires of contention” in Tilly 1978). Both diachronic and synchronic experiences were relevant for the rebellion in Chiapas.
The Zapatistas named themselves after the Mexican revolution leader Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919), who is venerated for his fight for socio-economic reforms especially by the peasants of the South. Further historical action models were provided by the many guerilla movements in other Latin American countries and by the long history of contention in Chiapas itself (cf. García de León 1985).

The decision for an armed uprising was to become likely only under the precondition that it presented a certain chance for success. Success is likely if the group is strong enough or if the opponent – in this case: the regime – is weakened. These conditions were met on the eve of the rebellion. The regime’s legitimacy was already eroding since the heavily contested election of 1988, which had brought Salinas into the presidential office amidst massive protests. When the Zapatistas rose up in arms, only eight months were left for the next presidential elections, whose outcome was as uncertain as never before. Within the ruling PRI, the tensions increased between the reform-minded and the hardliners of the old style, the so-called “dinosaurs”; a number of high-level political murders made it later apparent.

Yet the Zapatistas alone could never have endured the confrontation with the regime. According to Zapatista sources, the EZLN grew during the six-year period prior to the uprising from a few hundred members to about 3000 (EZLN 1994b). Their equipment varies between modern AK-47 machine guns, machetes, and rifle dummies cut out of wood. Early Zapatista documents indicate hopes for similar groups in other parts of the country to rise up too in a general mobilization against the regime.
The Intervention of Civil Society and the Cease Fire

As soon as the federal troops began mobilizing for their counter-attack, the EZLN began to retreat and refrained from new military offensives. President Salinas announced cease-fire on the twelfth day of fighting. Two days before he had already replaced his Minister of the Interior Patrocinio Gonzáles Garrido, a hardliner and former governor of Chiapas, with Jorge Carpizo MacGregor, who was known for his human rights expertise. Secretary of State Manuel Camacho Solís was sent to Chiapas for negotiations. The bishop of San Cristóbal, Samuel Ruiz García, was entrusted with the role of a mediator.

How was it possible that the phase of hot fighting ended so quickly? Let us look at the several reasons from both the Zapatistas’ and the government’s perspective. The Zapatistas were already retreating on the second day of the uprising because of their military inferiority vis-à-vis the federal military. Yet this factor was not a sufficient cause for their dispense of military attacks. The Sendero Luminoso (‘Shining Path’) in Peru for example would also be no match to the state army in any direct military confrontation, but is infamous for its violent terror tactics. The Zapatistas refrained from such practices and pursued a more conciliatory, negotiation-oriented course. Words became more important in the Zapatista struggle than weapons. The media – print, radio, TV, fax, and the internet – became the central arenas for the fight between regime and Zapatistas (cf. Schulz 1998; see Cleaver 1995, 1996; Ronfeldt/Arquilla 1998).

When the Salinas government decided to stop the fighting, it was confronted with enormous media attention and massive national and international protest. It had to consider that a prolonged and ‘dirty’ war would not only have been damaging for Salinas’s personal
ambitions regarding the chair of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but also for Mexico’s image in the eyes of foreign investors, a high risk given Mexico’s dependence on the world market. The politically shaken and internally divided regime had to avoid above all economic turbulence, especially with presidential elections only a few months ahead.

The mobilization of huge crowds for demonstrations in Mexico City’s Zócalo (at times numbering about 100,000; cf. Huffschmid 1995) and in numerous other cities in- and outside of Mexico was a decisive condition for the end of hot combat. This leads to the question, how did this mobilization come about? An answer can be found by examining what I call the social network capacity of the Zapatistas (cf. Schulz 1998).

The regime’s shaken legitimacy is closely linked to the formation of the Mexican civil society, which began to re-define its relationship to the state and led since the mid-1980’s to a foundation boom of new non-governmental organizations (NGOs), including human rights organizations, neighborhood initiatives, and indigenous groups (Aguayo 1995; Olvera 1995). The social networks that these socially committed groups provided were a crucial resource for the Zapatistas, especially when considering that their military capacity was no match for the state forces. By winning the sympathy and support of a broad spectrum of external groups, the Zapatistas were able to compensate their lack of internal resources with social network capacity. Fax and the internet enabled the Mexican Zapatista supporters to establish contact even to groups in other countries and in other parts of the world. A precondition for the formation of transnational support was that Mexico’s rural and urban democratic movements were not isolated from each other but linked through numerous personal and
organizational ties that were being utilized for communication, mobilization, and co-ordination.

The next question that arises is, how were the Zapatistas able to win so much sympathy and support within and outside of Mexico? An answer can be found by examining the Zapatistas’ *communicative praxis* (cf. Schulz 1998).

The Zapatistas called the PRI regime a “dictatorship” and its overthrow the reconstitution of the state of law (EZLN 1994a). They cast themselves as the heirs of the “true” founders of the nation (EZLN 1994a) and justified their insurgency with reference to Article 39 of the Mexican constitution, which locates the national sovereignty in the people and guarantees the “inalienable right” to freely choose its form of government. The Zapatistas’ demands for nation-wide reforms and democratization went beyond immediate regional or sectoral self-interests and thus opened the door for broader alliances.

The Zapatistas seem to have learned from the mistakes the old Zapatistas committed during the Mexican Revolution as well as from the errors of other guerilla movements. Subcomandante Marcos (EZLN 1994b: 64–65, 152) and other Zapatista leaders (e.g. Major Benjamin in EZLN 1994b: 73; Major Mario in EZLN 1994b: 75) distanced themselves explicitly from the avantgardist guerillas of Maoist or Guevarist couleur (see Rhode 1994). Though this had not always been the case. Marcos admits in an interview that the EZLN was originally founded as an avant-garde guerilla group with the aim of overthrowing the regime (EZLN 1994b: 290). Yet over time this goal had been abandoned and replaced with the idea of creating “a democratic space where the political parties, or groups that aren’t parties, can air and discuss their social proposals” (EZLN 1994b: 298). The Zapatistas are thus not aiming at the escalation of
violence and the destruction of the state or the taking over of state power.

The Zapatista project is rather oriented at the principle of “self-limitation”, a feature it shared with the Eastern European democracy movements of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s (see Cohen/Arato 1992; Goldfarb 1989; Touraine et al. 1983). The term “self-limiting revolution” was coined by Jacek Kuron in the context of the Polish union movement Solidarnosc (‘Solidarity’) (Cohen/Arato 1992: 32). It describes the break with the fundamentalist revolutionary tradition that had too often led to dictatorship and the repression of civil society. The aim of a “self-limiting revolution” is, in the words of Cohen/Arato (1992: 32), “the construction of a highly articulated, organized, autonomous, and mobilizable civil society”. The Zapatistas pursuit of a “self-limiting” project won them sympathies and allies from a broad spectrum of democratic NGOs.

Subcomandante Marcos turned out to be an ideal interlocutor between the Mayan peasants and the urban sympathizers in Mexico and in the (post-)industrial world. His study of sociology and communication at universities in Mexico and Paris (Schmidt 1996: 16) and his many years of living among the indigenous in Chiapas (EZLN 1994b: 199) helped him to bridge the cultural gaps.

The efforts to build coalitions and the awareness for the international situation distinguishes today’s Zapatistas from their predecessors during the Mexican Revolution, who failed to understand the importance of these factors only after it was too late (Wolf 1969; see Warman 1988, Womack 1969). The experience of other insurgent movements – e.g. the Cuban and the Nicaraguan – shows that coalition building is a decisive precondition for success (see Wickham-Crowley 1992). The new Zapatistas appear to have learned
these lessons and searched for allies in all of Mexico’s civil society and abroad. Their openness made them a crystallization core for a transnational “antisystemic movement” (Amin/Arrighi/Frank/Wallerstein 1990; see Castells 1997) that stemmed itself against the contemporary mode of globalization (Schulz 1998; see REDaktion 1997). The intervention of a broad spectrum of groups from civil society helped the Zapatistas to achieve the relative success of getting with the government onto the negotiation table and thus rewarded a moderate action strategy that used not terror but dialogue.

9	Entrenched Power Structures and the Limits of Conflict Resolution

Although the fact that civil-societal intervention led to an end of the hot phase of war gives reason for optimism, the underlying causes for the rebellion in Chiapas have not disappeared at all. Instead, the living conditions of the indigenous in the conflict zone have worsened. Within and among comunidades the tensions between the supporters of the Zapatistas and the ruling party and between the “traditional” Catholics, Protestants, and reform Catholics have increased. The indigenous pursue in this situation varying strategies. Only a part of the indigenous belongs to the EZLN or its base communities (bases de apoyo). Other parts hope for co-operation with the PRI government or follow an independent third way. The land takings by indigenous groups in the wake of the Zapatista uprising were quite numerous. The Mexican government seemed to follow a shifting double strategy. On the one hand it began to pump millions of dollars into development projects that were much needed. On the other hand it closed the military cordon around the Zapatistas’ retreat area. The government’s military offensive on 9 February 1995 was stopped within five days, after 100000 Mexicans demonstrated against it in front of the National
Palace. A second round of negotiations began on 20 April 1995 but did not bring any break-through. The police and the military acted time and again against the pro-Zapatista “autonomous municipalities” (municipiosautonomos). This escalated for example in April 1998 in Taniperlaintandiez de Abril and in May 1998 in Amparo Agua Tinta. In June 1998, 164 persons were temporarily arrested in NicolasRuiz. On 10 June 1998 eleven persons died during fights in El Bosque, including two police officers. Some ten thousands displaced persons are still living in fear and under inadequate conditions in temporary refugee camps.

The local elites demanded from the government a more rigorous course against the Zapatistas and exercised increasing pressure on the state government. Ranchers and large estate owners began, more or less openly, with the formation or reinforcement of their White Guards (guardias blancas). These and other paramilitary groups were typically closely allied to the local PRI organization and tolerated, if not supported by the security forces (López y Rivas/Sierra/Enriquez del Valle 1999). A former army commander’s White Paper had become public, which suggested counterinsurgency measures, such as the training and armament of paramilitary units, and the observation and intimidation of the civil population (Marín 1998; Foley 1999).

The Mexican human rights organization Centro de Derechos Humanos “Miguel Agustín Pro Juarez” described in its report (1998) the following armed groups: the Primera Fuerza, the Máscara Roja, Los Chinchulines/Frente Cívico ‘Luis Donaldo Colosio’, the Alianza SanBartolomé de los Llanos, the Fuerzas Armadas del Pueblo, Paz y Justicia, the Movimiento Indígena Revolucionario Antizaptista (MIRA), the Degolladores, and the Tomás Munzer group (see also the report by Conpaz/Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas/Convergencia de Organismos Civiles por la Democracia 1997). These paramilitary groups made systematic efforts to
intimidate those comunidades that supported or sympathized with the EZLN or simply tried not to be controlled by the PRI. Several indications pointed to their responsibility in violent attacks, including the massacre of forty-five unarmed villagers in Acteal in December 1997 (Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas 1998; see López y Rivas/Sierra/Enríquez del Valle 1999). The human rights organization Centro de Derechos Humanos Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, which is closely related to the diocese of San Cristóbal, compared the situation in Chiapas with a “civil war” and spoke of a “low intensity war” (1998). In August 1998 a committee of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights asked the Mexican Government “to give high priority to the fight against impunity for the authors of grave violations of human rights” (Foley 1999).

In the meantime the situation also worsened in other parts of Mexico. The economic crisis that began with the crash of the peso in December 1994 led to soaring unemployment and increasing crime rates. A wave of political murders indicated an escalating fracture of the political elite. The most prominent cases included the murder of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential candidate of the PRI in March 1994 and the subsequent murder of the police chief of Tijuana, who was in charge of the investigations; this went on with the murder of José Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the PRI secretary in September 1994 and the murder of Polo Uscanga, a Supreme Court magistrate in the following year.

In June 1995, seventeen peasants were killed by security forces in a hold-up in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero. The governor had to lay down his office when videotapes of the massacre and indications of an involvement of high-ranking state officials became public. In June 1996, exactly one year after the massacre of Aguas Blancas, the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (literally the Popular Revolutionary Army; EPR) made its first public appearance. Significantly better
equipped than the EZLN, it undertook in a period of less than two years at least 44 attacks in seven federal states and Mexico City, during which, according to official information, 57 soldiers and police officers were killed (Foley 1999).

The EPR is particularly active in the states of Guerrero and Oaxaca and in locations where land conflicts are especially tense. The government responded with the immediate militarization of these regions. The human rights situation is there practically in the same predicament as in Chiapas but not nearly as much noticed internationally (Foley 1999). The EPR pursues, in stark contrast to the EZLN, a rather old-style strategy of guerrilla warfare, for which it won little sympathies and no broader impact.

10 Conclusion

What conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the origins and the course of the conflict in Chiapas? Which general hypotheses may be formulated based on these insights? Relative socio-economic deprivation is a precondition of violent resistance, which can occur precisely when the channels of political influence are closed, and when at the same time, the regime is weak enough that violence can appear not only legitimate but also opportune. In the case of the conflict of Chiapas the precondition of socio-economic deprivation was given through the interplay of global, national, regional, and local factors. Peaceful opportunities of political influence were largely non-existent due to the authoritarian local structures. A military surprise attack remained a possibility. The formation of a guerilla and the plan of an armed uprising belonged to the action repertoire of the rebellious population. Role models existed in a several centuries long history of rural uprisings in Mexico and in Chiapas as well as in the form of the
guerilla movements of other Latin-American countries. Yet the results of the historical predecessors were mixed, suggesting thus innovations in the action repertoire.

After the initial success, the Zapatista discourse completely discarded the maoist-guevarist approach and emphasized the concepts of civil society, democratization, the fight against NAFTA and the hegemony of global neoliberalism. The Zapatistas were able to gain worldwide media attention from the very beginning of their uprising and linked up to a broad spectrum of organizations and individuals in Mexico and abroad, which were ready to support their cause with solidarity demonstrations. The national and international pressure was strong enough to let a regime that suffered from internal fracture and contested legitimacy to opt for ceasefire and negotiations.

The intervention of civil society had a mitigating impact on the conflict and led to a relatively quick end of the hot phase of war. Yet it could neither help to prevent the militarization of the region nor the emergence of paramilitary groups and the beginning of a low intensity war. Efforts to change the entrenched power structure in Chiapas met with the stern resistance of the local and regional elites. Until recently the situation in Chiapas was at a stalemate, which cost especially the rebels and the supporting communities a high price.

A new era begun on 1 December 2000 with the inauguration of Vicente Fox as Mexico’s new president. For the first time in more than seventy years the ruling party had to admit defeat on the national level and had to give up power. How the changes at the top can lead to a consolidation of democratic procedures, more social equity, and a resolution of violence, remains to be seen. The same is true for Chiapas, where the new governors comes for the first time from the ranks of the opposition. The old, entrenched power structures are
collapsing. The future will show whether the demands of the state’s poor and disenfranchised will be met or whether the local bosses manage to restructure their control.

The analysis of the conflict in Chiapas showed how local, national, regional, and global dynamics are each determined by their specific logics and yet are mutually influencing one another. In this sense the question of political violence and human rights does not stop at borders.

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Consociational Approaches to the Resolution of Identity Conflicts in Plural Societies

Hugh Harris

1 Introduction

The end of the cold war and the ascendancy of global capitalism, the world trade organization, and the spread of democracy have raised optimism that the 21st century is likely to be more peaceful than the previous one. The theoretical underpinnings of capitalism and free trade as determinants of peace have a rich pedigree in the works of Montesquieu, Kant, and Ricardo who theorized that trade between nations would create mutual dependency and consequently trading nations would be less prone to go to war against each. Equally important is the theory that capitalism and its attendants of the rise of a middle class, civil society, higher levels of education and literacy are social requisites for the maintenance of democracy by diffusing if not eliminating religious, linguistic, ethnic and cultural identities as the basis for defining individual interests (Lipset 1993). Hence, democracy and capitalism would modernize society and moderate, if not transform parochial identities into national identities and homogeneous societies, and thereby reduce the chances of conflict between identity groups within (Rustow 1999). Democracy as a force for peace is further expanded into a theory of democratic peace. This theory suggests that democracies are less likely to go to war against other democracies (Rummel 1983).

The Weberian cultural school of thought paints a less harmonious picture of the future (Huntington 1993; Barber 1995). The central tenet in this school of thought is that economic change is not a
predictable determinant of cultural change. The degree to which traditional values persists varies even among the advanced industrial democracies (Inglehart/Baker 2000). The United States, for example, has been held onto its traditional values more so than its advanced western democratic counterparts. Huntington (1993) argues that the accelerated penetration of capitalism and democracy and their attendant cultural values are clashing with deep seated traditional cultures and values, and particularly in Islamic cultures, is the fuse that is likely to ignite a clash between civilizations.

Both of these schools of thought are futuristic, though they are not without historical empirical referents. I suggest, however, that the major conflicts in the future are likely to occur within states than between states. Such conflicts will erupt along lines of identities in various dimensions of language, ethnicity, religion, culture, or various combinations of these dimensions. The empirical referents of this projection are ongoing and new conflicts that have resulted in the lost’s of more lives and refugees than any interstate war since the end of the end of World War II. Ted Gurr (2000) in his *Minorities at Risk Project* documents 70 serious identity group conflicts in five regions of the world between 1993 and 1994. Uppsala University’s peace department in Sweden noted a decline in armed conflicts from 56 in 1992 to 25 in 1998 (Tongeren 1999). Rupesinghe and Anderlini (1998) document for 1996 19 major internal conflicts, 42 lower intensity conflicts, and 74 lethal violent conflicts.

It is not so much the number of conflicts that matter as their frequency and magnitude. The significance of domestic identity conflicts is that they have the potential to regionalize or internationalize conflicts. Africa’s first war between states in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is linked to ethnic conflict in Rwanda. The conflict between Jews and the West Bank Palestinians is a prime example of an identity
conflict that has international implications. Terrorism stemming largely from that conflict and also rejection of western values among Islamic fundamentalists have internationalized that conflict.

Much of the literature on peace studies focuses on third party mediation, preventive diplomacy, or economic sanctions to prevent or to resolve identity conflicts that take on the dimension of political violence. A sufficient amount of attention has not been directed in studies of the linkage between the design of institutions and identity conflicts. This paper seeks to contribute to peace studies by examining how the design of consociational or power sharing arrangements is a necessary though not a sufficient condition for the prevention and the resolution of identity conflicts in plural societies (Lewis 1965; Lijphart 1977; Ake 1996).

2 Identity Conflicts

It is not always clear which conflicts are the social construction of ethnic entrepreneurs, or that germinate from objective inequalities against a particular minority or majority group. It is alleged that the ethnic politicians in Bosnia have enriched themselves and continue to profit from politicization of ethnicity. Of course minority identity group grievances in particular countries might very well be a problem of class. Nonetheless, when discrimination and inequalities disproportionately coincide with, for example, ethnicity the problem takes on the dimension of ethnicity more so than class. Ted Gurr (1995; 2000) classifies ethnic identity group grievances and ethnic conflicts that emanate from state discrimination, imposed or through benign neglect, against 275 minority groups in 116 countries in six regions of the world. As expected the types of grievances and conflicts vary across countries. It is beyond the scope of this paper to delineate
from general to country specific dimensions of political grievances and dimensions of conflicts. But what can be inferred from the *Minorities at Risk Project* is that absence of political representation, or representation that is symbolic and not efficacious in the allocation of resources or respect for culture is a major cause of identity group conflicts. The problem is to resolve these grievances that would prevent them from escalating into violent conflicts that might lead to movements for territorial secession.

### 3 Theories

Although politics is not a mono-causal factor of identity conflicts, it is nonetheless both a cause as well as a solution to the problem in plural societies. Weber (1978: 389) observed this problem of mutual causation, “(...) ethnicity facilitates group formation in the political sphere (...) and the latter inspires the belief in common ethnicity”. Since politics determines who gets what, when and how, the prevention or the resolution of identity conflicts demands a political solution. Therefore what matters are the rules for political representation. This raises the Madisonian problem of which rules and political system would best manage societal conflicts while maintaining a stable majoritarian democracy in plural societies. In the *Federalist Paper No. 10*, Madison’s approach to the problem was a class analysis of how to control factions that divided along lines and especially among those who have and do not have property. The latter are always in the majority and Madison’s concern was how to prevent them from tyrannizing the minority. Madison did not conceptualize the problem in the context of identity groups as defined in this paper. But this omission was and continues to be addressed by political theorists. Almond and Verba (1965: 7) raised, though not in support of it, the cultural determinant of democracy in western societies. “How
can a set of arrangements and attitudes so fragile, so intricate, and so subtle be transplanted out of historical and cultural context?” The answer to this question became the conventional wisdom among political theorists, and is still held by some, that the prospects for democratic stability under majority rule are more likely to take root and grow in homogeneous than in heterogeneous societies (Almond/Verba 1965; Dahl 1971). For example, ethnic homogeneity, and capitalism, facilitated the development of stable democracies in Northwestern European countries and former British colonies in America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The indigenous peoples in these former British colonies were excluded in both theory and practice as citizens in their respective country. Nonetheless, in spite of the misclassification of these countries as democracies, it was further suggested that democracy in societies with deep identity group cleavages along lines of ethnicity, culture, and race were even more problematic (van den Berghe 1981; Decalo 1992).

4 Power Sharing

But majoritarian democracy is a normative value. In the 1960’s following decolonization in which one party rule and political instability characterized the unfulfilled democratic imagination in Africa, H. Arthur Lewis (1965), offered an alternative to majority rule for plural societies in West Africa. Lewis advanced a normative concept that ethnic based power sharing in federal political systems held out better prospects for democracy and stability in West Africa than the-winner-take-all majoritarian Westminster political models. Lewis argued that majoritarian rule is not democratic when the majority group exercises monopolistic power that excludes cultural minorities from representation, or if they do have representation it is not efficacious in the determination of policy outcomes that affect
their cultural interest. Hence, he argued that the Westminster model of winner-take-all elections and majoritarian rule would offer no protection to the minority in plural divided societies. In effect, this zero sum game of winners and losers in which the latter are excluded from decision making would politicize ethnicity as the foundation of group interest. The politics of exclusion would exacerbate ethnic tensions, conflicts and political instability. Lewis analyzed the problem of ethnic pluralism as not how to eliminate it through assimilation, but how to manage it. The core argument in Lewis’ theorizing on ethnic power sharing is that cultural pluralism is a reality, whether a social construction or primordial. Lewis concluded that in ethnically divided societies popular participation in government institutions by all major ethnic groups is more inclusive and therefore it is a closer approximation to democracy than the majoritarian model that is more exclusionary.

5 Consociational Democracy

Arend Lijphart developed the concept of power sharing into the theory of consociational democracy. Its empirical referents are drawn from case studies of power sharing in the smaller European democracies of Austria, Belgium Netherlands and Switzerland. According to Lijphart (1977) neither of these countries fits the model of cultural homogeneous societies and nor do their respective political systems conform to the Westminster model. All four countries are plural societies with crosscutting cultural cleavages along linguistic, ideological, or religious lines. Yet in contravention to the earlier conventional wisdom that plural divided societies as compared to homogenous societies were not good candidates for maintaining stable democracy, all four countries have successfully managed their respective cultural cleavages and have remained as consolidated
democracies. Lijphart attributes their democratic success to the adoption of consociational principles of power sharing.

The four distinguishing characteristics that make up the core elements of consociational democracy are (1) representation of all the major groups in a grand coalition in cabinet appointments; (2) proportional representation in parliament; (3) a minority group veto or consensual decision-making; and (4) cultural autonomy. The adoption of these principles across the four countries varies in that some are formalized through the constitution or have become institutionalized through custom or informal understandings. For example, in Belgium the constitution mandates that there must be an equal number of French and Dutch speaking members in the cabinet. In Switzerland, the constitution mandates that the chairmanship of the executive must be rotated among the seven executives of the major language and geographic regions.

Consociationalism is an ideal type, and so is majoritarian democracy and some countries will approximate it closer than others. Lijphart (1977) for example, classified Austria and Switzerland as more thoroughly consociational than Belgium and the Netherlands. Therefore both in theory and in practice no two countries have or are likely to adopt and practice in identical fashion the four characteristic of consociational democracy. Although Lijphart posits that all four principles must be adopted for a country to be classified as a consociational democracy, this does not mean that all four elements must be adopted for the successful prevention or resolution of identity conflicts.

Consociationalism has not received as much analytical attention as a normative and empirical theory as much as it has from its critics (Barry 1975; van de Berghe 1981; Brass 1991; Halpern 1986;
Horowitz 1985) who see little prospect for this form of government in societies divided along social cleavages of race, ethnicity, religion and culture. Nonetheless the idea of consociationalism is beginning to gain attention as an alternative to majoritarian rule in plural divided societies. This is evident in consociational proposals that have been advanced to resolve violent secessionist movements led by the E.T.A. in the Basque region of Spain, the Corsica Nazione party that seeks independence for the island of Corsica from France, and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Hardliners within government and within the liberation movements have rejected consociational arrangements that would grant limited autonomy to these regions. Rwanda and Burundi have fared no better in rejecting consociational arrangements. The 1993 Arusha ethnic power sharing accord was an attempt to resolve tensions and violence that had occurred between the Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda since independence from Belgium. The plan was never implemented and it died with its Hutu president in a plane crash that set off a well-planned 1994 genocidal war against the Tutsi, and politicide against moderate Hutu elites. Burundi has a similar history of ethnic conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsi. The Hutus and Tutsi agreed under the 1992 Charter of National Unity to ethnic parity of representation in the one political party, UPRONA, in the central government and among its 16 provisional governors (Lemarchand 1994). The assassination of the first Hutu elected president by Tutsi extremists derailed the consociational attempt. The rejection of consociationalism does not mean that it is not a viable alternative to majoritarian rule. But it does raise the question of why it is so rare when it seems so plausible as an alternative to majoritarian rule in plural divided societies?

Lijphart identifies nine conditions that are conducive to consociationalism. These conditions, however, are drawn from the experiences of the four smaller consociational democracies. The
domestic and the geopolitical context in the four smaller European
democracies, however, were significantly different than those in non-
western countries that experimented with consociationalism. In
Switzerland, for example, consociationalism evolved sequentially over
a 500 years (Lehmbruch 1993). The adoption of consociationalism
ensured the dominant political elite’s that they would not be excluded
from power. What is instructive from the Swiss case is that
consociationalism was not adopted from a sense of rectitude or
idealism to create a more inclusive democracy, but from the realities
of self-interest of elite’s to hold onto or to gain power. In Belgium and
the Netherlands consociationalism was a gradual response to
segmental pluralism that evolved across time. Notably, but with the
exception of Austria, the smaller European countries were in the
process of democratizing and had histories of identity group elite
cooperation and accommodation before the adoption of modern
consociationalism. All of the other countries in table 1, with the
exception of Czechoslovakia, which is a special case, were former
colonies that had no previous histories as states, nation-states or the
modern democratic experience.

There is however the overarching condition that elite’s must be
willing to cooperate and to accommodate the interest of the minority
through power sharing arrangements. Why should the majority share
power? The conventional wisdom as well as logic, suggests that first
and foremost elite decisions are guided by self interest to maximize
their chances of holding onto power, to gain power, or to ensure
guarantees of protection of their material gains and their lives if they
lose power. This is of course the rational choice explanation that
elite’s calculate cost and benefits of cooperation, non-cooperation,
power sharing or the monopolization of power. Hence, power sharing
arrangements are the outcomes of complex bargaining that is not
always bilateral, but in most instances it is a process that includes an
array of actors as well as external actors who serve as mediators or coercers.

Table 1 reveals different paths taken toward the adoption of consociationalism. In Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland consociationalism evolved relatively peaceful and without violent identity conflicts. In the other countries either the crisis of decolonization or civil war preceded the adoption of consociationalism. On the eve of independence identity elite’s contending for political power in cross-national settings were all confronted with a similar problem of how to consolidate their respective newly created multi-ethnic state that had no previous history as a state or nation-state. To be sure there were also less noble concerns of personal power and privileges among some leaders than the construction of a stable state and nation-state. To a large extent the colonial imprint inadvertently or deliberately favoring a particular ethnic group as well as configuring colonial administrative governments that closely coincided with ethnicity, reinforced or cemented ethnic identities as political communities in post-colonial politics. In effect, on the eve of independence from colonial rule the politicization of ethnicity was a crisis that threatened the survival of states created by the colonial power. Unlike western European states that became nation-states over hundreds of years, the former colonies became states, but not necessarily nation-states, instantaneously. Identity group elite’s and masses both feared domination or even extinction from the tyranny of majority rule by an ethnic majority or larger ethnic alliances (Young 1976; Horowitz 1985). Unless minority concerns and fears were addressed, the transition from colonial rule to independence could erupt, and it did in some countries, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, into communal violence, rebellion, civil wars, and wars of secession.
Table 1: Consociational Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Historical Event</th>
<th>Cleavage</th>
<th>Consociationalisms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Segmental Pluralism</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1917–1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Segmental Pluralism</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>1943–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1943–1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1989–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1945–1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1947–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Decolonization</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>1960–1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Segmental Pluralism</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>1970–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>1972–1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>1980–1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1989–1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>1994–1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>1995–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1996–present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Nationalism</td>
<td>1998–present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6 Decolonization

Population imbalance and the fear of majority rule was the primary reason why consociationalism was adopted in Lebanon on the eve of independence. The imbalance was bipolar. Muslims made up 70%
compared to the 30% Christian population. These divisions were not monolithic. Within the Muslim religion there were 5 legally recognized Islamic groups, and among Christians 11 groups were legally recognized. The Westminster model would not have been viable for this plural divided society. In 1943 on the eve of independence the National Pact was agreed to by the various religious identity group elite’s that provided for informal power sharing arrangements between Christians and Muslims. A Maronite selected by the legislature would hold the office of president. The Prime Minister would be a Sunni Muslim appointed by President after consultation with religious leaders. Seats in the legislature were apportioned along religious identities. The experiment failed when Lebanon underwent internecine religious wars due in large part to the Palestinian problem with Israel. Muslim elite’s wanted the president to be more accommodating to Palestinians, and the Maronite Christian president supported by Israel, was less sympathetic. The Palestinian problem had a spillover effect in destabilizing Lebanon’s consociational arrangement. Also the increase in the size of the Muslim population led to demands for a system that would give them more representation. But for 12 years the consociational experiment was successful in maintaining peace between its complex array of politicized religious identity groups. What followed was 16 years of religious civil warfare.

In 1989 former members of the 1972 power sharing government endorsed the Arab League’s proposal to restore the earlier power sharing arrangement with some modifications. The proposal recommended a transfer of power from the Maronite President to the Prime Minister, and an increase in parliamentary seats to accommodate the diverse religious identities, and the termination of civil service appointments on the formula of six Christians to five Muslims. This proposal, the Tarif Accord, was adopted by
constitutional amendment in 1990 and Lebanon returned to the consociational experiment. Despite Israel’s military occupation of a safety zone in Southern Lebanon and its cross border wars of attrition with the Hezbollah that seeks to expel Jews from Israel, the power sharing accord has remained in tack and continues to maintain peace between its religious identity groups.

After the partition of India it was still confronted with the problem of multi-polar identity imbalances in the dimensions of religion, language, caste, and culture. But the fear of domination manifested itself along lines of the two largest religious groups, Hindu and Muslims. The latter as the minority feared domination by the former. India responded to the problem of identities with the adoption of states configured to reflect language diversity, proportional representation, and an informal custom to accord representation of the major elite’s in government. The most disadvantaged group, Harijans, was accorded guaranteed quotas in education and the civil service. Even though there is occasional communal violence along lines of religion, India has remained as a stable democracy despite the absence of the social requisites of democracy. Consociationalism is attributed as the institution that has managed but not prevented or resolved India’s identity conflicts. Nevertheless, the management of these conflicts has been an important factor that has stabilized Indian democracy since independence (Lijphart 1996).

Cyprus is cited as a consociational failure (Brass 1991: 336). At the advent of independence it also had the problem of population imbalance in the ethnic dimension. The Turkish Cypriot minority, 40 %, feared domination by the 60 % Greek Cypriot majority. A consociational arrangement adopted under the auspice of negotiations with Great Britain on the conditions for independence was an attempt to address the ethnic imbalance. The experiment failed only after three
years as ethno-nationalist identities surged to the forefront. The demise of consociationalism was also spurred by external intervention in Cypriot politics by Greece and Turkey. Ethnic cleansing has partitioned the country into a Turkish Cypriot dominated north that claims itself a separate nation-state, and a Greek dominated Southern part of the Island that is recognized by the international community as the legitimate government of Cyprus. The green buffer zone that is an effect a boundary between the north and the south is still manned by U. N. peacekeepers. Given that 98.7% of Turkish Cypriots live in the north and a similar percentage, 99.5%, of Greek Cypriots live in the South the country is partitioned de facto into two separate nation-states. Yet, the power sharing elements remain in the constitution. Positions reserved for Turkish Cypriots, the vice president, three cabinet seats, and 24 seats in the legislature remained unfilled.

7 Civil War

Even though Austria had a history of elite accommodation, it was nevertheless the civil war that was the catalyst for the adoption of consociationalism. The crisis that confronted its elite’s was the problem of how to bring about national political and economic recovery from religious and ideological cleavages of the civil war that preceded World War II that was followed by authoritarian rule, and Nazi conquest. Power sharing in the political arena, and a corporatist approach to labor and capital, was the post war policy adopted by Austrian elite’s. Economic recovery and political stability would require taming conflicts along religious class as well as class ideological identities. The experiment ended in 1966 not as a failure but as a successful transition to majoritarian democracy.
Civil war was also a catalyst for power sharing in the Sudan. The administrative division between the north and the south by the British in 1924 planted the seeds of separatism between the two regions. In 1955 the southerners launched a rebellion for a separate-nation state as they correctly perceived that the north would dominate in the post-colonial Sudan. The war began in 1956 on the eve of independence between the Islamic North and the Christian and indigenous identities in the South that lasted for seventeen years. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement ended the war with a consociational arrangement that granted the south autonomy and left the state united as a single entity (Kasfir 1990). The attempt to invoke Islamic law in the 1983 by Colonel Muhammad Gaafur al-Nimery who came to power under a coup in 1972, and who had agreed to the power sharing agreement for the south, sparked a renewal of the war by the south. The civil war in the Sudan is now Africa’s longest and deadliest civil war (Lesch 1999). The war however is at a stalemate. There is speculation that the north, which is also confronted with a rebellion in its region from groups opposed to Islamic law might be willing to recognize the South’s return to the autonomy or even its secession.

Zimbabwe and South Africa are examples of protracted civil wars that did not appear to be resolvable under democratic majority rule. Yet both made successful transitions from white minority oligarchic to black majority democratic rule. A major inducement that ended the civil wars in Zimbabwe and South Africa was stalemate. Neither side could defeat the other without total destruction of the country that would leave no victors but only losers.

In Zimbabwe after a seven-year war of liberation against white minority rule the combatants on both sides with pressure from Great Britain and the international community agreed to a peace settlement. The 1979 Lancaster Agreement negotiated under the auspices of Great
Britain provided for multiparty proportional elections, and a guarantee of 20 seats in parliament to white Zimbabweans for 7 years. There was no minority veto, but it required a two thirds vote to amend the constitution which enshrined human and property rights. These were major concerns of the white minority that owned over 90% of the farmland. Redistribution of property was a major rallying point in the armed struggle against white minority rule. Robert Mugabe the first elected president under the one-man one vote formula of majority rule, in a goodwill gesture formed a multiethnic unity government of black and white Zimbabweans (Sithole 1995). The five year transitional consociational arrangement ended in 1985, and Zimbabwe regressed to a one party state. Nonetheless the peace has been maintained between whites and blacks, and also between the former followers of the two ethnically based liberation movements, Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African people’s Union that ended up fighting against each for power as independence from Britain became an inevitability.

South Africa is the one country that was given little or no chance for a peaceful transfer from a white minority oligarchy to a majoritarian democracy that would be ruled by the black majority (Horowitz 1985). The cleavages were so deep that not even Lijphart considered South Africa as a candidate for consociationalism (Lijphart 1977). A complex array of factors led to the transfer of power from white minority to black majority rule. The armed struggle by the ANC, internecine violence between the latter and the Inkatha movement was creating conditions that weakened governance. International economic sanctions, capital flight high levels of unemployment and a recession were the economic factors that also contributed to the seismic change in South African politics. Cold calculations by the ruling minority elite’s assessed that their bargaining strength was at is peak. To postpone the inevitable could mean an escalation of the civil war and a
weakening of their bargaining strength. It was not from a sense of rectitude that the decision was made to transfer power. The ruling white minority calculated correctly that they could negotiate a settlement that protected their citizenship, human, and private property rights. Not surprisingly the white minority proposed as a condition for multiparty elections Lijphart’s model of consociationalism. The new interim constitution proposed by the National Party would require power sharing in the executive. A coalition of presidents who would serve on a rotating basis and decisions would be by consensus. The white minorities in the upper house of parliament would have veto power, and the lower house would require super majorities to pass bills, and regional autonomy. A criticism of consociational democracy is that the minority veto could lead to immobilism and maintenance of the status quo. This is what de Klerk and his National party had in mind from the outset: the protection of white minority privileges and advantages.

There was white fear that multi-party elections and majority rule would lead to the tyranny of black majority rule. Even the most intrepid opponent of apartheid, Helen Sulzman, Liberal Party member of parliament, was also opposed to majority rule without constitutional guarantees for the white minority. The African National Congress (ANC) after having been excluded from South African politics was in no mood to settle for a consociationalism that would maintain the political and economic status quo. The ANC’s non negotiable demand was for winner-take-all elections and majoritarian rule. Four years after Mandela’s release from prison negotiations for a multiparty democracy were stalled. Political violence between the ANC and the Inkatha movement in particular, in which the latter was surreptitiously supported by South Africa’s security force to disrupt the democratization process, and the ANC’s resort to protests, boycotts and strikes were spiraling out of control and the country was on the
precipice of a major civil war. Joseph Slovo, head of South Africa’s
Communist Party and a member of the inner circle in the ANC,
proposed a five-year sunset clause for power sharing that was similar
to the agreement reached in Zimbabwe. A national unity government
would ensure representation of the ruling National Party and other
major identity groups. The president would be elected by parliament.
A party that won 80 seats in parliament would be entitled to
appointment as one of the two deputy presidents. It was a foregone
conclusion that the National party would win at least 80 seats under
the proportional rule system. The threshold for a parliament seat was
very low. As little as one half percent of the vote would entitle a
political party to a seat in parliament. This would guarantee
representation of right wing as well as black nationalists, Pan Africans
Congress, who opposed any form of a united multi-racial South
Africa. Political parties that won 5% of the vote would have a seat in
the cabinet. This was another guarantee that the national party would
have representation in the cabinet. Proportional representation further
ensured the National Party seats in both upper and lower houses. The
Inkatha Party that was primarily Zulu based and led by Mangosuthu
Buthelezi who was just as intransigent as white Afrikaners in
demanding guarantees for regional autonomy, was assuaged with the
consociational arrangement. Limited regional autonomy on cultural
matters in the 9 regions would result in political control by Inkatha
and cultural autonomy in its predominantly Zulu KwaZulu Natal
region. The National Party would likely predominate in the Cape
Town region. The constitution guarantees civil, human, and property
rights. Most importantly it protects private property and the pensions
of civil servants. This was a major concern to the Afrikaners who
make up 80% of the bureaucracy. Amendment of the constitution
requires 2/3rds rather than a simple majority in parliament. This is not
a veto, but it is an attempt to require a near consensus to amend the
constitution. In the 1999 elections the ANC’s vote was just short of
2/3rds and moderates within the ANC were pleased that they would not have to deal with constitutional revisions demanded by factions within the ANC that could exacerbate white fears of subordination by the black majority. And it is even less likely that the ANC will continue to garner over 60% of the vote in parliamentary elections as it becomes accountable for unfilled pledges to improve the abject living standards of the black majority.

The adoption of the consociational principles in the transition government allayed white fears that a black majority would not do to them what they had done to the black majority: exploitation and disenfranchisement. Although the five-year consociational experiment has expired, and South Africa is a majoritarian democracy, the level and intensity of political conflicts that tore the country apart along lines of ethnicity is no longer salient. Peace to a large extent is also attributable to the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that was empowered to recommend amnesty for crimes committed as political acts by the state, the ANC, and other political groups. The army and the security forces that had committed crimes in the name of the state were recognized by the ANC as pivotal forces that could smooth the rail for a transition to democracy or derail it. The TRC, a neutral commission of highly respected jurists and citizens headed by the respected Archbishop Desmond Tutu provided an escape hatch for those who could prove that violence was committed as a legitimate political act. Class conflicts are far more amenable to resolution than identity conflicts. This is how the ANC had interpreted the struggle since its founding as a multi-racial and its commitment to an undivided multi-racial and multi-cultural South Africa. This well ideology of the ANC, although there were some doubts about its main ally the Communist Party of South Africa, furthered whites assurances that there would always be a place for them in the country.
Nelson Mandela was the key figure that reached out to whites in the attempt to dampen fears of the future under black majority rule. Mandela’s internal diplomacy to the Afrikaner community, the one most resistant and suspicious of democracy and black majority rule also paved the way for a peaceful transfer of power. Mandela allayed white fears in symbolic acts. He named his presidential residence in Cape Town in Afrikans as the Place of Mercy. Met with the widows and wives of the leaders of the Apartheid and black activists. Mandela paid a special visit to Betsie Verwoerd, 94 years old, the widow of the architect of the Apartheid and listened to her petition in Africans to protect the rights of white Afrikaners. President Mandela invited to lunch his former prosecutor, Percy Yutar, who sought the death penalty against him when he was tried for treason and eventually sentenced to life imprisonment (Meredith 1998). These were significant symbolic acts designed to allay white fears of black rule.

The five year transitional government gave the former ruling National Party seats at the decision making table in the executive, cabinet, and parliament, but not power to determine outcomes. It provided the major parties, ANC and the National Party, and the numerous other parties, and particular the extreme parties on the extreme left and right, a forum in which to articulate interests and differences under an arena of power sharing that was less threatening than a winner-take-all model. Finally, F. W. de Klerk and the white minority needed a face saving device from their demand for a consociational government. The transitional consociational government gave them that cover. They could at least claim to be in the inner circles of power in the executive, the cabinet, and parliament.

In both Zimbabwe and South Africa consociationalism was adopted specifically as a transition to majority democracy. The five-year transition could be viewed as allowing time for the white minority to
absorb the shock of the sea change in politics. It would have been more difficult for the white minority to adjust to or to accept an overnight change to majority rule. It also allowed for elite’s who had never interacted with each other in formalized political settings to develop greater understanding of their respective concerns, fears and aspiration that could foster mutual trust and civility.

The Federal Republic of Ethiopia is embarking upon a consociational experiment that is in response to its particular history as a multiethnic society of 60 million people, 12 major ethnic groups, 131 sub-ethnic groups, numerous cast groups, 80 different spoken languages (Levine 1974). There are also religious identities of Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Jews, and traditional religions. After the overthrow of the military dictatorship, the Derg, spearheaded by the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Tigrean liberation Front, both ethnic based, and several other ethnic based liberation movements, the victors were confronted with the problem of how to meld together the centrifugal ethnic tendencies that had been suppressed under a century of ethnocratic rule by the Amharas that was succeeded by nearly two decades of military rule. The Eritrean problem was resolved early in an amicable agreement that it would be allowed to secede from the federation. The strategy of the various liberation movements that formed a coalition under the umbrella of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front was to recognize rather than attempt to suppress ethnic identities. The Ethiopian constitution is unique to Africa and to most of the other regions of the world. The core of the new constitution is the recognition of cultural pluralism among its different nationalities. The regions are configured along lines of nationalities and even with the winner-take-all elections the major nationalities will have representation in the national parliament. Identity majority configured districts also have minorities. This issue was addressed in allocating 23 seats in parliament for the smaller
nationalities groups. The executive, cabinet, and the judiciary are balanced with representation of the major nationalities. The University of Addis Ababa reserves seats for disadvantaged students from regions that were deprived of education under education policies that favored the Amharas, Tigreans and Eritreans. The victorious Tigrean lead army that overthrew the military dictatorship army is becoming fully integrated. The Army is always a factor in African politics. The regions exercise cultural autonomy. There is a clause in the constitution that permits regions to secede from the federation. This can be conceptualized as a potential veto over policies or non-policies that affect the interest of its diverse nationalities. Even though there are armed rebellions in the south, east and western regions of the country they are not serious threats. The country thus far has been relatively successful in managing its nationality conflicts.

Bosnia is a case in which the external community, the United States and NATO intervened military to stop a triangulation of genocide and ethnic cleansing committed by Bosnian Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Military intervention by the international community came only after ethnic cleansing had divided Bosnia into three ethnically dominated regions. This de facto segregation paved the way for the signing of the Dayton Accords in the creation of a tripartite consociational government. Three executives represent each of the major groups Croats, Muslims, and Serbs and the chairmanship is rotated among the three. In both houses of parliaments each group has veto power. Each region administers its own cultural affairs and maintains its own army. Thus far, this power sharing arrangement has been relatively successful in managing political violence. However, this might be attributable to the presence of armed peace monitors. More chillingly ethnic cleansing has reconfigured the Bosnia state into what are de facto three ethnic states. One of the conditions that favors group autonomy is that it requires a high degree of ethnic territorial
segregation. In the case of Bosnia ethnic segregation was not natural, but the result of ethnic cleansing. Over a million internal displaced refugees await a return to their homes. Perhaps as three separate nations within a nation, or confederation, consociationalism might succeed in managing ethnic peace without the presence of peacekeeping forces.

The Troubles in Northern Ireland between the Irish Protestant and the Irish Catholics seemed to have defied a solution. The 1998 Belfast Agreement has raised hopes that the Troubles are about to end in a consociational arrangement and limited home rule or devolution under Britain’s unitary political system (de Braidun 1999). The agreement provides for proportional representation in the 108 member assembly. Concurrent majorities by the nationalists and the unionists are required to pass bills. This is in effect a veto if the parties remain cohesive in their voting behavior. Cabinet appointments are allocated on a proportional basis of the vote attained in elections. This insures representation of the major parties. Despite the splinter factions within unionist and nationalists that favor or oppose the accord, or peace, and sporadic breakdowns in the cease fire agreement, and Britain’s suspension of home rule, and now a return to home rule, the level of political violence has declined significantly. After years of internecine war peace is close at hand between the Catholics and the Protestants, but tensions between these communities continue to smolder and conflagration of violence is always present. Power sharing, and not to ignore a complexity of internal and external pressures, was a significant factor that led to the end of civil war.
Conclusion

The consociational experiment for those countries that gained independence from colonial rule was an attempt to address the fears of tyranny of majority rule by the large ethnic identity group that could postpone independence or end up in a civil war. In those countries that experienced a civil war the consociational arrangement served as a transition that allowed time for national healing. In Zimbabwe and South Africa it was adopted specifically for five years before the transition to majority rule. In other countries it ended without a set timetable. The most important outcome is that war or civil strife did not follow when consociational experiment ended through non-violent means. And for countries that made successful transitions to majoritarian democracy the consociational principle of proportional representation was retained. This electoral principle enhances the chances of representation of minority parties and it is more effective in managing identity conflicts than the winner-take-all rule (Cohen 1997).

Despite the mixed results of consociationalism it continues to be advanced as a solution to the problem of identity conflicts in plural societies. Although partition might in some instances be the only viable option, it also has its unintended consequences. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since partition. Both are nuclear powers and the unresolved irrendentist aspirations of the Muslim majority in the state of Kashmir to be joined with their kin in Pakistan is a tinderbox that could explode into a nuclear war between these two countries. The partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states has had a lasting consequence of warfare with no end in sight. Less than a decade after Eritrea peacefully succeeded from Ethiopia those countries fought a bloody border war. Partition is not a viable option for Rwanda or Burundi. The groups are not geographically segregated
and the partition of these countries would leave them economically unviable. The creation of separate Hutu and Tutsi state is not viable either. It would require massive relocation that would be a violation of human rights. Furthermore the Hutus and the Tutsi have more in common linguistically among themselves in their respective country than they have with their counterparts in the bordering country.

There is not a magic formula for adoption or the success of power sharing arrangements. The precondition for adoption of consociational arrangements however is that elite’s must be willing to cooperate, accommodate and accord the minority special rights of representation and decision-making. This is a stringent condition, which is what it is and should be for the success of power sharing arrangements. It is also a tautology. But it is also a tautology for the maintenance of majoritarian democracies. Ruling elite’s are not likely to accommodate the minority and share power with them from a sense of rectitude. Or in the case of a ruling minority share power or transfer power to the majority which was the case in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The motivations for adoption of consociationalism are no different than the motivations that led to the adoption of democracy in the older democracies that resulted from disputes between classes. The more inclusive system of proportional representation was the outcome not from idealism but from struggles between classes at the turn of the 20th century in Western Europe. And it was not always the working classes who made demands for proportional representation. In some instances it came from the bourgeois who were, or about to become outnumbered with the expansion of the franchise to the working class (Rokkan 1970).

From this study a tentative conclusion is that a national crisis might be the catalyst that influences identity elite’s to come to the bargaining table. Although the focus here has been on decolonization and civil
wars, the expansion of global capitalism and democracy while bringing about new freedoms and material wealth are also creating new tensions in heightening ethnic identities as well as creating economic inequalities. And as countries increasingly become more heterogeneous identity tensions are likely to increase and if left unmanaged they could erupt into a national crisis. There are at least 525 identity groups that might be candidates for secession (Nielsson/Jones 1988). This doesn’t mean that secession sentiments will arise or if they do that they will be violent. But the potential is there for new separatist movements to arise, violent and non-violent. Indonesia is an example of a country that appears to be unraveling from secessionist demands. East Timor has voted for secession, and the Acehs are now also demanding secession. It might not be feasible for domestic, regional or international peace for the international community to remain on the sidelines as observers to internal war that reek havoc on millions lives under the doctrine of national sovereignty. It cannot and should not in cases of genocide or politicide wait until both sides have become exhausted from civil strife as the incentive for combatants to come to the peace table. The human suffering and the millions of refugees that flee to bordering or western European countries internationalize such conflicts. International intervention in selected conflicts has been relatively successful. The international community was essential to mediating and facilitating negotiations toward power sharing in Lebanon, Cyprus, the Sudan, Zimbabwe, Bosnia and Northern Ireland. The economic sanctions against South Africa also had an impact on the resolution of that the conflict. A similar role by the international community might bring about similar results in some of the longstanding identity conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Spain, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Palestine, and perhaps even France.
9 References


Policemen or Soldiers? Organizational Dilemmas of Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations

Karl W. Haltiner

1 Peace Operations in Crisis

During the ten years which we call the post-cold war period, the armed forces of the Western democracies have been used primarily for what we can call interventions of a policing type, be it in classic peacekeeping and humanitarian missions or in more muscular peace restoring operations.¹ Post-cold war soldiers were and are used to prevent potential armed conflicts, to enforce law and restore public order, to mediate in unsolved conflicts and protect minorities in cases of humanitarian catastrophes, to organize and monitor elections, find and help displaced persons and refugees, and to reconstruct war-damaged civil institutions and infrastructures. As Col. Lt. Schwarz, German commander of KFOR, has put it: “Tank platoon leaders became municipal officials, staff-S3-officers managers for the removal of refuse and grenadiers founders of elementary schools.” (Schwarz 2000: 33). Ground troops were, with the exception of the Gulf war in 1991, rarely involved in heavy combat of the traditional kind. Soldiers were and are used as diplomats, referees, public servants, street workers, constables and policemen but rarely as what

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¹ ‘Classic’ peacekeeping is based on consent and cooperation of the conflict parties as well as on the impartiality of the peace forces. Peace troops monitor agreements that have already been reached by the conflicting parties and contribute by doing so to a climate of lasting settlement. They are lightly armed for self-defence. ‘Muscular’ peacekeeping aims at a wider range of tasks, including the separation, disarming, and attempted restoration of peace between conflicting parties, the protection of safe havens and the rebuilding of civil institutions, and military-assisted delivery of humanitarian aid. (Dandeker/Gow 1997: 334; see also the definitions of Lewis 1993 and Eisele 2000: 38. The German General Eisele was a leading officer of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN-headquarters in New York for many years.)
they were originally trained and skilled for, namely as soldiers. On the whole, however, the record of the post-cold war generation’s preventive and curative peace support and humanitarian missions is inconclusive, according to many observers and experts even doubtful. Next to a few obvious success stories stand many near and some complete failures (see the detailed reports of Berdal 1993 and of Williams 1998). Already in 1994, Roberts concluded in an Adelphi paper of the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies that “the concept of peacekeeping is in crisis” (Roberts 1994: 93). Critical analyses such as Dennis C. Jett’s (2000) book Why Peacekeeping Fails are receiving widespread attention. The fact that between 1991 and 1998 the number of active UN peacekeeping personnel has been decreasing markedly, after a sharp rise immediately after the end of the cold war, indicates a certain disillusionment, at least with regard to UN-led missions. NATO, with IFOR and SFOR, may have been more successful in the implementation of the Dayton peace treaty than the UN with its classic peacekeeping operations, but according to Williams’ recent analysis, it remains unclear “whether it [the NATO mission] offers a model for future peace support operations” (Williams 1998: 65). The same can probably be said of the ongoing KFOR mission.  

It is often overlooked, that in the past 10 years armed forces have not only been used abroad for new missions out of area but also more than ever before for police assistance missions within their own territories to control what could be called the secondary effects of war conflicts, such as mass immigration of asylum seekers, terrorism and ethnic conflicts between different groups of immigrants in the host country. Such in-area police assistance operations by the military took place in

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2 See for instance the sarcastic title of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 February 2000, 3: “Mitrovica or the Failure of a Concept” referring to the incapacity of soldiers to control riots and the lack of civil police on the spot.
Italy, Ireland, Austria and Switzerland. Chiefly in Switzerland they have been criticized as improper because of lacking training and skills and an insufficient empathy of the soldiers doing this kind of police work.

2 Constabularization of the Forces?

No doubt: In Western states a trend towards the constabularization of the military can be observed. The use of national armed forces as international and national constables has gained importance both in terms of frequency and intensity. As a result, the classic task of national defence has become an issue of secondary importance. But are soldiers qualified policemen? Are traditional military organizations the proper instrument for handling policing operations of the new kind in and out of area? Can armed forces in their traditional structure be used as multi-functional instruments to reach diverse goals?

There are doubtless many reasons for the above mentioned low number of success stories of armed forces as far as the so-called new missions are concerned. Worth mentioning are for instance the imprecise political mandates and the notoriously unclear structure of leadership in UN missions. Furthermore, conflicts vary in nature and intensity and have their own histories. Frequently, it seems, peace forces are used half-heartedly and for symbolic reasons only because the will to find enduring political solutions is lacking. Further reasons for the near or actual failures could be listed easily. Some of the most important reasons for potential failure – and this shall be the theme of this paper – may well lie in the unfitness of traditional military organizational structures for any tasks that are not of a combative
nature. Maybe we have not yet developed the military model apt for the new policing tasks.

The well-known constabulary concept of Morris Janowitz, often claimed to be the founding idea for peace forces, does not refer to a new organizational model of forces. In his famous study *The Professional Soldier* he speaks of a constabulary force “when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture” (1960: 416). When Janowitz wrote the book in the early sixties, constabulary force did not imply a new kind of military organization but rather a concept of professional ethics and a new set of self-concepts of soldiers. The concept referred to the changing role of forces used for foreign interventions in that cold war period and not to a new format of force (Janowitz 1960: 418). The notion ‘constabulary’ did not refer to the police in organizational terms. He made that clear by saying: “The constabulary concept does not refer to police functions in this historical role. On the contrary, extensive involvement of the military as an international police force – except as the reserve instrument of ultimate legitimate force – would hinder the development of the constabulary concept in international relations.” (Janowitz 1960: 420)

Many studies have been written about the so-called new missions of armed forces in the post-cold war period and about the forces’ changing political and strategic function in a new world order (see for example Burk et al. 1994). Many analyses have been carried out and much empirical work has been done with regard to the soldier’s changing role in the new missions and his difficulties, motivational strains and stress in adapting to the requirements of the so-called peace support operations (Segal 1984; Segal 1985; Bartone et al. 1996; Britt 1995). The macro- and the micro-level of the military-
related post-cold war changes are well documented. But to my knowledge, only few attempts have been made to focus on the consequences of the new missions on the basis of an organizational approach. In this paper I try to analyze a few dilemmas and operational strains of peace operations from the perspective of the sociology of organizations.

Organizations are – from a sociological point of view – goal-oriented social systems. The task of an organization is the key to the understanding of its specific structure (Blau/Scott 1962; Etzioni 1975). As a rule, new tasks as well as the growing complexity of these tasks have consequences for the organizational structure, the management system, the profile of qualification and the recruiting of personnel as well as the identity of the organization. Therefore, the hypothesis can be put forward that the effort to try and solve new military tasks of a policing nature with traditional military structures creates dilemmas and tensions that endanger if not rule out the reaching of the organization’s goals.

On the following pages I will try to outline the typical characteristics of police and military organizations. Then, some of the currently observable strains and dilemmas in peace operations shall be listed with no claim for completeness being made.

3 Two Unequal Sisters: The Police and the Military

3.1 Police Organizations: Bottom-Up Organizations

The police and the military can be considered polar types of coercive organizations (Geser 1994). What they have in common is their armedness, the fact that their personnel wears a uniform and is
educated in an intraorganizational manner and that the two together define the state’s monopoly of power. They differ, however, in their societal function. The key to an understanding of the differing nature and structure of the two organization lies in their main organizational tasks.

Police forces stabilize a certain social order. The term police derives from the Greek ‘polis’ and refers to the keeping up of a politically defined justice in a community. One of the means of the police is the use of ‘soft power’. In order to prevent intrasocial “micro-violence” (Geser 1996: 70) the police may make use of controlled force while respecting at the same time the integrity of persons and goods as much as possible.

According to its assignment, the police is supposed to react to disturbances of the public order in the shortest possible time span observing the criteria of nonpartiality and adequacy. Nature, place, and time of incident are generally unpredictable (Geser 1996: 46). The single police officer is exposed to a multitude of sometimes diffuse and contradictory expectations. Possible missions include tasks as diverse as guarding, protection, aid, rescue, and mediating. His rules of engagement are based on bargaining not on destroying (Vicaire 2000). The more he acts as part of a network of external relationships to the local community, from which he extracts vital information for his work, the better can he carry out his mission. Therefore, police organizations are, as a rule, environmentally open organizations, i.e., their close integration into their social environment provides them with relevant information for their actions and is therefore an important prerequisite for their success. At the same time, these are the ideal conditions for a high learning capacity of the organization.
The diversity and the possible ambiguity of the areas of action confronts the police officer with highly diverse role expectations and demands excellent psychological, social and professional competences. He has to deal with ambiguities which are part of his everyday surroundings. A clearly defined image of the enemy is lacking and would only be an obstacle. The quality of police work is therefore “heavily dependent on the quality of lower level policemen: on their moral integrity, sound judgement and personal authority as well as on various professional skills” (Geser 1994: 1). The police officer at the lowest hierarchic level must have relatively large ‘on-the-spot’ decisional competences and must be multifunctional.

In a police organization the people in the lowest hierarchic positions often obtain information relevant for action before their superiors do. They are the first ones to perceive and interpret relevant actions in their environment and have to decide about whether or not to react and whether or not superiors need to be informed (Geser 1996: 46). While strategic decisions are not without importance they are comparatively insignificant. Therefore, police organizations are controlled by way of flat hierarchies and are organized in a rather decentralized fashion. The chain of command is only of secondary importance. The quality of police organizations is evaluated by assessing the work being done at the base of the organization. From a perspective of organization theory police organizations are bottom-up organizations.

3.2 Military Organizations: Top-Down Organizations

Other than the police, military organizations are specialized on threatening and using collective violence against foreign armed forces. In other words: They are focused on inter-social macro-violence or on ‘hard power’.
The mission strategy for military operations is of prime importance for the quality and the performance of the organization as a whole. The use of focused and massive macro-violence demands a high degree of coordination. The organizational rationale is therefore based on a leadership strictly structured from top to bottom with a closed chain of command organized according to the principle of centralization. This assures that the central forming of willpower and planning process can develop into the actions of the organization as a whole. The information relevant for action moves from the top down, the competence to initiate action is strongly limited at the bottom of the hierarchic structure (Feld 1959; Lang 1965).

The borderline case of a war is the measure of the quality of organization not only in times of war but also in times of peace. The organization in all its details is stamped by the capacity for massive force application and the risk of macro-violence. The military is probably the only kind of organization that risks its destruction by aiming to reach its goals. The preparation of operations is aimed at including as many uncertainties as possible. An extreme degree of formalization, rules, standards of procedure and leadership structures are supposed to guarantee calculable and coordinated behaviour of the members of the organization even under conditions of highest stress and in case of failure of parts of the organization.

Operations including violence on a large scale, on which the military organization remains focused are rather rare. However, if they do occur, they normally demand the use of a great number of people and resources. Therefore, military organizations are janus-faced: In times of peace they tend towards routine and bureaucracy, in case of emergencies they have to face the utmost turbulence (Geser 1996). Because missions of that kind are comparatively rare it is mainly simulation on which military training is based. The low amount of
feedback into the social environment is apt to lead military organizations to an overly strong inward orientation. Their structural prerequisites for permanent learning are weak (Lang 1965: 838; Battistelli 1991).

As a rule, military organizations are accommodated in barracks and garrisons separated from the civil world. Members are being taken care of in a totalitarian fashion. Soldiers generally live in “total institutions” (Goffman 1961). The community is valued higher than the individual, there is the primacy of the collective. In the military rationale the individual is instrumentalized and de-individualized in favor of the group, i.e., it is expected that the soldier sacrifices his individual freedom and, if inevitable, his life for a collective goal he may not being able to enjoy anymore. Morale and cohesion as well as a high corps spirit are vital ingredients for combat motivation and are part of the socialization and training. Therefore, extrinsic motivational instruments such as money are usually insufficient incentives. As a rule, intrinsic motivational elements play a role as well (Lang 1965; Geser 1996). The military, while being a highly bureaucratic institution, has therefore strongly communitarian structures. This only reinforces the tendency towards inward orientation, or even “castellation” (Huntington 1964).

Military organizations show a high degree of labour division and soldiers usually have specialized functions in specific army branches with limited space for action and limited responsibilities. Soldiers are either combatants or in charge of logistical auxiliary tasks. Multi-functionality on the level of the units is hardly necessary.

In classic military operations the enemy can be identified, making it easier for the soldier to show unambiguous behaviour as a player in traditional warfare. The soldier’s actions are aimed at attacking and
destroying an enemy, if necessary by all means. Ambiguous situations are disconcerting for the soldier and often provoke the falling back on trained, reflex-like behaviour. Military organizations are therefore, according to their internal rationale, top-down organizations.

4 Organizational and Operational Dilemmas and Strains in New Missions

In order to make the typological differences very clear, the police and the military may have been presented as ideal types in a Weberian sense. Thereby it becomes obvious that these two coercive organizations are not as similar in nature as one is inclined to believe. They show considerable differences when looked at from a perspective of organizational sociology. It follows, therefore, that police organizations are not capable of taking on military tasks and traditional military organizations cannot easily take over policing tasks. If armed forces are used as constables, as they mostly are in the new missions, dilemmas and strains will develop due to the different organizational rationales and structures. Some of these dilemmas shall be looked at in more detail. In the course of this, political aspects are temporarily neglected.

4.1 The Dilemma of Force Intensity

By its very nature the organization of the military serves the focused use of force on the macro-level. Most peace support operations were confronted with unprecedented threats and the use of force on the macro-, the meso- and the micro-level. But only in rare cases the involved troops had to resort to a major use of force on the macro-level. Major force was either used in an initial stage such as in the Pre-
Dayton actions of NATO in Bosnia, in the Kosovo war and in the East Timor intervention. Or it was used in cases of continuing conflict, in which the deployed troops were forced to intervene heavily by force such as was the case in Bosnia. Four dilemmas can be observed with regard to the use of armed force in a police manner (Roberts 1994: 102).

Firstly: The organizational prerequisites, the military doctrine and the socialization of military personnel from the commander down to the soldier make the military personnel apt to recur to the use of heavy force when in doubt – given that the necessary weapons and equipment are available. Experience shows that mainly the suppression of armed and unarmed riots and armed robbery can create delicate situations for the use of military weaponry (Eisele 2000: 122). The limits imposed on peacekeepers in the use of hard power can become an element of stress and demotivation of the soldiers in the theatre (Maisonneuve 1997: 151–152). Soldiers consider themselves misplaced. It was “not what we trained for which was green” (Winslow 1999: 5). Among the Canadian SFOR troops in Bosnia special measures had to be taken to ensure troops would not “defend” material “too vigorously” (Winslow 1999: 7). Rules of engagement for the limited use of weapons were considered by soldiers as frustrating. “I essentially had to wait until I was fired upon before I could draw my weapon! My personal safety was jeopardized. As well, as a peace officer I found it frustrating that I couldn’t use anything but lethal force (i.e. no intermediate weapons)” (quoted from Winslow 1999: 7; similar complaints among French soldiers are reported by Gilles 1996: 140). Examples for a harsh use of hard military power as a reaction to provocation could be found in Somalia, Bosnia, and in Kosovo.
It comes as a paradox that the knowledge about the above mentioned fact can also lead to the exact opposite. There are cases in which an inappropriate restraint in the use of macro-violence created more damage than good when seen from an ex-post perspective. One could be reminded of Srebrenica, for instance, or Sambia in May 2000.  

Today, a tendency can be observed to loosen restrictions for the use of weapons. It may not only serve strictly the purpose of self-protection but also to ensure the fulfilling of the mandate-based tactical missions. Eisele (2000: 110) speaks of more “robust” rules for the use of force.

Secondly: While the use of intentional and focused force on the macro-level may help to maintain or restore the credibility and authority of the peace force it may also increase the risks for lightly armed parts of the same peace force in vulnerable positions. This could be observed in Somalia and in the UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia. The risk of using force on the macro-level implies that all troops in the intervention theatre are capable of using force and be it only for self-defence. A differentiated labour division between lightly armed peace keepers in the role of referees and peace enforcement units as potential players in the same operation is inconceivable (Dobbie 1994; Eisele 2000: 39).

Thirdly: Complex interventions with the use of force can lead to collateral damages such as the killing or injuring of civilians. Peacekeepers can be accused of acting in a colonial manner or as a kind of occupational force. Psychological tensions are thereby intensified and can enhance uncontrollable escalations of violence.

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3 Almost a battalion of soldiers of UNAMSIL was taken prisoner by one of the conflicting parties, the “Revolutionary United Front”, because they refused to defend themselves thereby risking the lives of noninvolved local civilians. For more examples of the ambiguity in the use of force, especially in an environment with civilians and children see Eisele 2000: 109.
Kosovo (Mitrovica) and the reactions to the many raids against the war lords of Somalia could currently serve as examples.

Fourthly: The use of force might undermine the perceptions of impartiality of the peacekeeping forces and can thereby provoke the failure of the entire mission or threaten to erode the support of local allies and supporters (Dobbie 1994). The role-change from referee to player works only one way. A change back from the role of player to the role of referee is usually impossible.

Fifthly: The UN command system, especially, is long-winded and often not capable of deciding quickly about the use of force when the lives of peacekeepers are at stake. The capability for coordinated and focused operations, usually inherent in military organizations, is undermined.

4.2 The Centralization Dilemma

Firstly: As already outlined, the high degree of centralization in military organizations originates directly from their task to threaten others with the use of force on a strategic level and to actually use massive force. The top-down rationale ensures the high degree of coordination and control, which is needed for the application of macro-violence. This centralization may prove functional for peace enforcement operations of a muscular kind including focused violence. But with tasks containing the risk of meso-violence and demanding a wide distribution of the peace force, initial dysfunctions of the top-down organizational doctrine are obvious. They become even more dysfunctional in missions of an almost purely civilian nature. Examples are the protection of minorities in safe areas and the guarding of the weapons surrendered or taken from parties in a
conflict. As soon as the non-combative policing tasks come to the foreground the problems generally demand a deon-central organization including the delegation of competences including the use of force on a meso- and micro-level. Maintaining close contacts to local officials, monitoring and running elections, military observations, demilitarization, organizing or supervising the distribution of food, providing security by establishing a patrol service, accompanying convoys, enforcement of law and order, public health, local reconstruction support in the area of engineering, reestablishing of governmental or police functions etc. imply small-unit activities and competences for rapid decisions at different points in time and space. The high complexity of on-the-spot tasks and the demanded flexibility of action and tolerance of ambiguity on the basis of the information that is available renders a long chain of command obsolete or simply turns it into a nuisance. The top-down rationale would have to be switched more easily into a bottom-up rationale.

Secondly: The delegation of competences to autonomous or semi-autonomous groups and small units strengthens the authority of the lower ranks and dysfunctionalizes the medium officer ranks to the point of being mere transmitters of orders from the top to the bottom and of basic information from the bottom to the top. In a Canadian survey, enlisted soldiers reported working with interpreters and having social interactions with local civilians as their major work experience (according to a poll by Last 1997 cited by Winslow 1999: 18). “It is one of the characteristics of peace operations that it is sometimes the lower level of command (...) that have to deal with humanitarian agencies’ differences. (...) In a UN tour captains are getting experience because decision making is pushed down lower.” (Winslow 1999: 5) As a consequence the organizational mid-structure loses its leadership competence in favor of a mere coordinating task. Its function is more of a reactive than a planning nature, because if they continue to be
held responsible in the centralized system they are often left with the role of political “damage-control” only (Mackinlay 1994: 160). This often results in a certain de-motivation in higher ranked and mid-level officers. Also the grass root level, enlisted men and NCOs not familiar with taking over responsibilities in their hierarchical military position, often complain about being responsible alone for delicate missions such as convoy protection, demining support and so on (Gilles 1996: 133–139).

Thirdly: A special kind of problem is posed by ambiguous command and control conditions. Namely operational mandates and chains of command of supranational institutions are often insufficiently clear. Especially Western nations hesitate to subordinate completely their military units to the supranational command. For their in-the-theater operations Contingent Commanders may not only receive orders from the UN Force Commander but also have to ask for the approval of their far-away national superiors. This creates dilemmas for the national Contingent Commands, especially when the demands of the Force Commander go beyond national restrictions. In order to avoid problems, Contingent Commanders can get frustrated and be tempted not to act at all (see the Swedish report in Bell 1999). Both the double command chain as well as growing passivity can endanger the mission. Immediate intervention of national governments into operational actions can jeopardize operational control. The Dutch government intervened during the Srebrenica crisis in July 1995 when it became obvious that air-strikes could harm the besieged Dutch

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4 A notable example for this is the case of the Italian General Loi who, during the Somalia intervention in 1993, refused to obey the orders of the American UN Force Commander to join an operation in Somalia. Another case is reported by Winslow (1999: 8) referring to the Canadian fully mechanized battalion in UNPROFOR. Against national restrictions but according to the will of the Force Commander the CANBAT had to function as a Force Reserve since they were the only troops on the spot to grant operational flexibility.
battalion in the enclave (Berdal 1993; Mackinlay 1994; Williams 1998; Bell 1999; Gilles 1996: 142f.).

On the other hand, military commanders on-the-spot, who interpret their mandate in their own fashion, sometimes ascribe to themselves unauthorized autonomy. This endangers a mission as well. Spectacular examples are the diplomatic scandal about French UNPROFOR general Jean Cot and the argument between the UN headquarters and the Italian government in the case of General Loi in 1993 in Somalia as well as the one between NATO commander-in-chief Wesley Clark and KFOR commander Michael Jackson about how to deal with the surprising Russian move into Kosovo in 1999.

4.3 The Differentiation Dilemma

Firstly: The demanded high competence of experts calls for specialization, differentiation and extended division of labour on the level of units and individuals of the armed forces. However, the type and mixture of problems and tasks to be coped with can not be foreseen, because – as was made clear in Somalia and in Kosovo – pure humanitarian and policing missions can easily turn into combat missions. The coexistence of an all-level threat during the ongoing mission calls for different levels of readiness for the use of force on all levels. The unpredictability of actions to cope with stands in the way of a division of labour and calls for preparation for a large array of operations at any time. Therefore, it is not possible to separate ‘protection units’ from traditional ‘combat units’. Consequently, the UN generally renounces to supplement lightly armed peacekeepers with more heavily armed peace enforcement units (Roberts 1994: 102; Bell 1999). “Even on the level of individual roles, structural differentiation between soldiers with different training and
professional profiles is not an adequate solution.” (Geser 1994: 9) The new soldier is therefore ideally a polyvalent allrounder, a ‘miles protector’, if not to say a military ‘Superman’, qualified not only for combat but also a guardian, a diplomat, an expert in international law, a mediator, an interpreter, a paramedic and a person capable of empathy (Däniker 1992; Geser 1994; Bredow/Kümmel 1999).

Secondly: The effort to keep up the integration of the operational troops by means of a high ‘esprit de corps’ can lead to a certain arrogance and tribalism that can sometimes be observed in combat elite units. The communitarian element of military cohesion, the procedures to create strong primary group bonding by suppressing individuality, essential for the success of traditional war combat operations, has proved completely dysfunctional in certain peace operations (Bosnia: Canadian paras, Somalia: Italian paras). The behaviour of the peace force can degenerate into the arbitrary behaviour of a threatening occupational power with all the consequences that can endanger the whole mission.

4.4 The Formalization Dilemma

The exposure to specific life risks, in which the military organization functions accentuates its tendency to predetermine and codify the range of responses its members have to employ under various circumstances (Battistelli 1991: 13). To ensure the proper behaviour under stress military organizations have over time developed more than any other kind of organization standard operating procedures laid down in manuals and rituals. Formalization of procedures and formal ranks serve to control the behaviour of masses of human beings under conditions of combat stress. Military education and training are supposed to internalize highly formalized behaviour in the members
of the organization in an almost ritualistic manner. In situations, however, that demand more innovative and creative behaviour based on autonomous responsibility, rules, formalization, and standardization turn into obstacles. Soldiers will then wait for orders in situations where personal initiative would be appropriate. Especially in unstructured peace operations where the rapidly changing tasks and situations as well as the high complexity of tasks call for non-formalized, adequate, differentiated and flexible behaviour, the rigidity of military formalism proves to be highly dysfunctional. Bartone, Adler & Vaitkus (1996) conclude on the basis of several empirical studies that peace and humanitarian missions tend to create specific role ambiguities, stressors and situational contingencies, unknown in classic military operations, for the involved military personnel.

4.5 The Civil-Military Dilemma

It is opposed to the communitarian, inwardly focused nature of the military organization to encourage close relationships across system boundaries. Armies have therefore little experience in working with civilians. “The military mind, accustomed to a rigid operational structure, can find civilians haphazard and undisciplined, and working with a multinational force with a large civilian component can be a new and difficult experiment.” (Williams 1998: 34; see also Reimann/Bennett 2000: 8) Particularly problems concerning the cultural gap between civilians and the military in terms of gender, age and race have been reported (Winslow 1999: 13). Tensions between the both ideologically and motivationally differently dispositioned members of NGO’s, who remain in the interventional theater for a long time, and the quickly rotating military personnel (6-months-rule) are frequent.
5 Conclusions: Police-Soldier or Policeman versus Soldier?

Apparently, peacekeeping and similar policing missions are non-essential and uncomfortable missions for traditional military organizations (Bar-Haym 1995: 3). The basic principles of the military organization and its inner rationale are opposed to the basic principles of the police organization in many ways. From this, at least three different strategies for the future of military based peace support missions can be deduced.

- The first strategy is based on the assumption that the military will transform itself and will mutate into a military-police hermaphrodite, thereby risking the loss of its traditional military skills and identity. The rigid military organization must become more flexible, the education of officers and soldiers must be broadened and become polyvalent and the professional identity must fit the new expectations. This approach is firmly taken by Hans Geser, a sociologist at the University of Zurich. He argues that “the new type of security problems cannot readily be assigned either to police forces nor to military forces, because they are characterized by a complex and constantly shifting mix between centralized and decentralized manifestations of violence” (Geser 1994: 3). According to him, a third type of organization is to be developed, which combines the ability to focus military capacities, allrounder flexibility and the demanded short reaction time of police forces (Geser 1996: 48). Moskos (1992) has a similar direction in mind when he argues that armed forces in a “warless society” will be built and trained for a large range of missions beyond defence. It also seems obvious that expectations directed at this new kind of military force and its soldiers can only be fulfilled by a large-scale professionalization and specialization of the troops.
The second strategy claims that a transformation of traditional military organizations and its moral order is impossible for reasons having to do with their inner nature. This strategy opts for a withdrawal of military organizations from the peacekeeping and policing business. The German conflict researcher Lutz Unterseher (1999) recently contested Geser’s proposal of a hybrid organization of the third type by arguing that police organizations would do better in peacekeeping functions than the military while the latter does better in peace enforcement operations where massive force must be ready for use. This implies that a clear distinction can be made between peace enforcement operations on the one hand and peacekeeping operations based on the consent of the conflict parties on the other hand. The problem, however, according to Unterseher, lies in the lack of ready policemen.

A third strategy seeks to combine the advantages of military and police organizations by including them both in peace missions in a two-phase approach. In an initial stage the military is to secure and control the territorial space. The presence of capacity for hard power is needed for psychological as well as for physical reasons to prevent confrontations between the conflicting parties and to ensure cease fire agreements. In a second stage military police, mainly gendarmerie troops take over for maintaining and enforcing law and order and for assisting the peace building process. (A third stage may even include a handover from military to civilian police). In the second stage the military’s mission is reduced to auxiliary tasks for the police. The forces remain in a stand-by position in the background. Not surprisingly, this third model is mainly supported by police officers and commissioners (Colonel Vicaire, France; UN-Commissioner Hakan Thelin, Sweden).
Many arguments can be found in favour of the first strategy. Today, modern organizations change rather quickly, in a kind of co-evolution with their relevant environments. New information technologies allow new forms of organization based on network structures with flat hierarchies. Therefore, military organizations can be expected to prove themselves, in a process of trial and error, as good learners and to develop more flexible and modular structures without losing their combat capability on the macro-level completely. The experiences from military policing interventions of the last ten years that are relevant for the organization should be analyzed more systematically and profoundly. New organizational models are to be tested. In addition, the post-cold war reality shows that a clean separation between peace enforcement and peacekeeping is impossible. The two forms of operation often mix in an unforeseeable way.

What remains essential is the capability for macro-violence as a last resort to secure not only the unknown social and military environment but also the safety of the intervening civilian and military personnel. The bad experiences in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and in several African missions of lightly armed UN-peacekeepers taken as prisoners by conflicting parties serve as lessons learned. As a rule, police (UNCIPOL) do their duty unarmed and depend on armed forces for their safety. As an organization they lack the critical mass to separate or to stay between conflicting parties. Up to now, their function was limited to supporting or building up the local police. Some of the most important prerequisites for the second strategy are therefore not given. Experience also shows that cooperation between the military and the police in peacekeeping missions has not been free of tensions (Jett 2000: 86–91). Furthermore, the second strategy implies an available amount of civil police, which in the near future will not be possible to grant. In spite of the declared will of the Western nations to send up to
6000 policemen to Kosovo only 2000 have been deployed so far (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, March 2000, No. 25/26: 9).

There is some truth, however, to the third strategy, insofar as the question needs to be raised whether in the theater of intervention a more differentiated division of labour between civil and military organization could contribute to a greater success of peace support operations. The SFOR- and the Kosovo experience at least point in that direction. Primarily special military police corps such as the French 'National Gendarmerie', the Italian ‘Carabinieri’ or the Spanish ‘Guardia Civil’ have simultaneous military and police capacities and come close to the hybrid organization postulated by Geser (see Eisele 2000: 122). The fact that over the course of the last ten years the share of civil policemen among the deployed UN-peace personnel has been on the rise, points in the same direction (Williams 1998: 17).

At the end we are left with the hypothesis of the former UN secretary Dag Hammerskjöld, still worth a debate, that while soldiers are least able to function as peacekeepers, they are also the only ones who can do the job. It implies that the potential of using focused force, if needed, is an essential prerequisite for a successful peacebuilding and for order-related work of the non-military type. However, the capacity to use force may only be a necessary but not a sufficient quality.
6 References


Why Germany Sticks to (Mostly Fictitious) Universal Conscription

Wilfried von Bredow

1 Introduction

For the political system of Germany and its armed forces the decade of the 1990s was, indeed, a very interesting period. The Bundeswehr lost its immediate enemy, the Nationale Volksarmee of the GDR and incorporated it. Shortly after, the size of the combined armed forces had to shrink from about 600000 soldiers to 370000 soldiers. The old defence and deterrence missions lost their political and military relevance. Instead, new missions had to be learned and new constraints of multilateralization had to be responded to. Since 1990, the Bundeswehr has been in a situation of permanent organizational stress. The stress is not yet over, for the German armed forces are still facing structural problems. First, their budget is lacking behind the growth of their missions. Secondly, their organizational transformation, although remarkably efficient in itself, is slowed down by an undetermined political leadership. Thirdly, the general framework of civil-military relations needs a thorough overhaul which is delayed by the misleading impression generated by public opinion figures that the Bundeswehr can rely on firm and durable public support. These are structural problems, because in order to solve them deep and so to speak radical reforms are necessary. The necessity of reforms has been widely accepted ever since the end of the East-West conflict which changed the security landscape in Europe and beyond. It is certainly easier to proclaim the need of reforms than to implement them. Undeniably, the Bundeswehr has been exposed to quite a lot of
important changes. The argument of this paper is not to minimize the importance of these transformations (von Bredow 1995). The scope of the challenges to sophisticated armed forces like the Bundeswehr (von Bredow/Kümmel 1999) transcends, however, the zeal of reforming them displayed by the responsible military and political leadership. Understandable as this may be, the future will teach us that the too timid Bundeswehr reforms of the year 2000 amount to a wantonly missed opportunity.

2 The Reform of the Year 2000

On 14 June 2000 the Federal Government approved another reform package for the armed forces which had been prepared by the Minister of Defence. This reform is one of the salient political projects of the Socialdemocratic-Green coalition government which was elected into power in autumn 1998.

2.1 Reasons for the Reform

The thrust of this reform is to make the Bundeswehr fit for taking part, together with other European and NATO forces, in peacekeeping missions or other kinds of humanitarian interventions. The emerging European security landscape seems to render the main traditional mission – territorial defence – mostly obsolete. The spectrum of threats to national and international security is different from what it was during the East-West conflict. NATO’s growth toward East Central Europe and the attempts of the European Union to create common and self-reliant military structures, generate the necessity for a comprehensive re-designing of the German armed forces. Usually,
big organizations are not very fond of the task to re-design or, as some people prefer to say, re-invent themselves, especially when they have been in a state of quasi-permanent changes over a longer period, and have been suffering serious reductions in their size.\(^1\) On the other hand, the half-hearted reforms of the previous government had led to an uncomfortable cleavage between the poorly equipped troops earmarked for territorial defence and the better equipped so-called crises-reaction-forces. Furthermore, the yearly cuts in the military budget made it more and more impossible for the Bundeswehr to buy and use the newest sophisticated weaponry and material. The danger of falling behind the other European armed forces and thus being unable to fully co-operate in multinational missions became imminent.

2.2 Emergence of a New Bundeswehr

We can distinguish several dimensions of the current reform necessity:

- From a political perspective, the main challenge continues to be the preparation of the German armed forces for taking over more responsibility in the framework of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). Within the next decade, a more cohesive European security policy will have to be planned and developed. This policy demands higher mobility and flexibility on a strictly professional level and in terms of adaptability to a multinational civil/military framework.

\(^1\) The former Inspector General Dieter Wellershoff presented a collection of caveats against the latest reform plans to reduce the size of the Bundeswehr (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 May 2000).
- From a **military** perspective, the Bundeswehr has to concentrate on missions other than territorial defence. The broad spectrum of peace missions, rapid crisis reaction, and conflict de-escalation demands a different and more efficient training of the soldiers, a high degree of professionalism, and a different kind of equipment and armament.

- From an **organizational** perspective, all existing structures have to be questioned and revised. The size of the armed forces has to be diminished, for the mass army format does not respond to the new challenge in a satisfying way.

- From a **budgetary** perspective, the necessary resources for a thorough modernization of the armed forces have to be made available.

- And last but not least, from the perspective of **democratic legitimacy**, the reforms have to be accepted by the public, and they have to be designed in a way that the fundamental features of the post-World War II civil/military culture like *Innere Führung* and the *Citizen in Uniform* are not endangered.

This is quite a dramatic situation, for the Bundeswehr has to be reformed in a rather comprehensive approach. Comprehensive reforms are, however, not very popular with the German political system, which has been rather inflexible over the past two decades. Most of Germany’s reform energy has been absorbed by the unification process the result of which is mostly regarded as unsatisfactory. The current government has to cope with numerous reform issues at the same time: taxes, old age pensions, health, education, to name just the most controversial issues. It is, therefore, more than understandable that the reform of the armed forces does not figure among the most
visible reform projects of the government. The Social Democrats and the Greens in the coalition government have different ideas about the future Bundeswehr.

At first glance, the stunning pace of Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping in using the relative success-story of the intervention in Kosovo 1999 for a short reform debate and a quick decision about the reform priorities, could appear as an intelligent move. But some doubts remain. The response to the challenges is only half-hearted. The modest alterations of the recruitment system for the armed forces is a case in point.

3 Conscription in Germany

When the Bundeswehr was founded in 1955, the East-West conflict was in one of its coldest periods. Germany was divided in two states, each of which was integrated into one of the antagonistic camps. The political confrontation threatened to escalate into a military one. An East-West war in Europe would involve the two German armed forces. National loyalties would have to be neutralized by an alliance loyalty. This seemed to be an extremely difficult situation, both in military and in psychological terms, not so much for East Germany which was under the firm grip of the Soviet Union, but for West Germany which had just begun to develop as a democratic society.

One of the devices to guarantee the dominance of Western values in the Federal Republic’s newly founded armed forces was a set of axioms, rules, norms and codes of behavior named somewhat cryptically Innere Führung. It was set forth in order to integrate the military organization as much as possible into its civil environment.
The democratic Staatsbürger in Uniform (citizen in uniform) became the model for the new German soldier. There was a second reason for trying to institutionalize this democratic concept: “In contrast to the armed forces of other countries, whose military history developed without interruptions, the Bundeswehr is a new creation. It was the declared will of the lawmakers to integrate the new German armed forces as much as possible into the industrially developed and democratically constituted society of the Federal republic, to prevent military life from developing once more independently of its society, and to prevent the new military from becoming once again a state within a state (...) Conscription was conceived as a clamp holding together the armed forces and society.” (Fleckenstein 1988: 188)

3.1 Defence and Deterrence from the 1950’s to the End of the East-West Conflict

When introduced, conscription was not very popular among Germans (especially among the youth), but it became astonishingly soon accepted as being the legitimate off-spring of democracy, as the first Federal President Theodor Heuss had called it. Together with conscientious objection which had been implanted into the Grundgesetz (constitution) already in 1949, conscription slowly became part of West Germany’s political culture (von Bredow 1992: 289–303).

One of the main reason for this unexpectedly smooth development was the strategic framework in which the Bundeswehr was designed to operate. Key words to describe this framework are: territorial defence, deterrence, near-total integration of the Bundeswehr into NATO structures, and the comparatively high public regard for the
concepts and institutions of civilian control (see von Bredow 2000). The East-West conflict, the division of Germany and the various scenarios of military confrontation in central Europe along the Iron Curtain made West Germans aware of the potentially dangerous situation in which their society and private lives were flourishing. To impede the escalation of the Cold War into a hot war, a mixture of firm determination against threats and credible offers to co-operation to the potential enemy seemed appropriate. Conscription was regarded as an expression of this firm determination to defend the country and the Western values against any attack from the Soviet Union and communism. Conscription was also the only suitable means to build up armed forces of about 500000 soldiers, for professional armed forces of that size were much too expensive.

Conscription and conscientious objection functioned in a kind of peaceful co-existence. Sure, in some periods, especially the wild years of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, as well as during the first half of the 1980’s, the Bundeswehr found itself exposed to sometimes vitriolic political criticism and had difficulties recruiting conscripts with a high-school diploma (Abitur). But in spite of these difficulties and the steadily growing figures of conscientious objectors, conscription remained a both militarily useful and publicly accepted recruitment system in the Federal Republic.

3.2 Conscription and Civic Service

It is generally acknowledged that the state has the legitimate right to call the nation’s young men for a certain time into the armed forces. Those who are handicapped, too feable or due to other reasons are exempt from military service, can follow their usual life without any
other interference from the state. The story is different, however, for those who physically and socially could and should become conscripts but prefer to become conscientious objectors. They are obliged to serve in an alternative service (Ziviler Ersatzdienst), later called civic service (Zivildienst).

After unification, the German governments (a Christian Democrat/Liberal coalition under Helmut Kohl until 1998, a Social Democrat/Green coalition under Gerhard Schröder since 1998) have been confronted with the task to re-define Germany’s security policy. Generally speaking, they have been trying hard (though probably not hard enough) to cope with this task. But both governments avoided altering the recruitment system of the armed forces. Many neighboring countries, among them the Netherlands, Belgium and most conspicuously France, ended the draft system in the 1990’s. Germany did not yet follow.²

There is a military and a social reason for this conservatism. The first one will be discussed in the next chapter. The social reason is connected with the strange position of the civic service which (most) conscientious objectors are obliged to fulfill. To put it bluntly: The civic service has developed over the years in a way that it is now more or less indispensable for the functioning of some important layers of the German health system and some other community-oriented work.

² Some observers forecasted the end of the draft in case of a Social Democrat success in the general elections of fall 1998. The Social Democrats won the election, but they did not even attempt to abolish the draft.
Table 1: Number of Applicants for Conscientious Objection

<table>
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</table>

Total Number since 1958: 2,491,316


The bulk of civic servants are performing their duty in the fields of nursing and welfare work: nursing assistance and welfare, mobile social service, ambulance and rescue services, and individual care for disabled persons. But they are also found in the offices of environmental groups, public libraries or non-commercial sport clubs (Kuhlmann 1992). It would be certainly feasible to change that system. One option is to take in paid personnel for these functions.
The other option is the introduction of a voluntary social service year (probably for men and women). Both options are not very popular with the powerful social welfare organizations which make use of the services of conscientious objectors.

Table 2: Average Number of Conscientious Objectors Serving in the Civic Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<tr>
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<td>31872</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>89051</td>
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</table>

Source: Bundesamt für den Zivildienst.

The establishment and deep-rootedness of the civic service in German society is one of the main reasons why politicians in the two big political parties SPD and CDU/CSU are more than reluctant to abolish conscription. The smaller parties with fewer connections to the semi-private welfare organizations are trying to please the young voters by rejecting the draft. Most recently, the Liberal Party (F.D.P.) adopted this policy. As long as the informal grand coalition of the bigger
parties and the welfare organizations continues, and no public pressure against the draft is applied, things will stay as they are.

4 Not a Professional Problem

There is a second very important reason for Germany’s reluctance to follow the French example and abolish or suspend the draft: The anticipation of growing recruitment problems of the armed forces once they are deprived of the quasi-permanent influx of young draftees. The current plans of the Ministry envisage a reduction of the size of the Bundeswehr from 340000 to 277000 soldiers. About 150000 soldiers will be available for missions of military crisis intervention, 105000 soldiers serve in basic units. About 22000 positions are available for instruction courses. The majority of the soldiers are serving longer terms or are professional soldiers. The new Bundeswehr counts with no more than 77000 conscripts per year. From 2002 on, the conscripts will have to serve for nine months. It will be possible to split this period in six months basic military service plus three months military exercise at a later stage. Conscripts will also have the choice to stay up to 23 months with the Bundeswehr (Varwick 2000: 61–64).

Evidently, the armed forces have no difficulties living with this recruitment system. It is not a guarantee, but is at least a clever device to make sure that every year a certain number of young men with a positive attitude towards the military get an impression of how it is like being a soldier. Conscription has become, in fact, a kind of

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3 The Ministry prepares the publication of a White Paper with a comprehensive overview on the reforms. Its publication was announced in autumn 2000 but is still pending.
4 Those young men without a generally positive attitude towards the military usually become conscientious objectors.
prolonged internship. When some of the interns decide to stay and become professional soldiers, the armed forces already have a certain picture of their personalities.

As long as the conscript part of the armed forces is comparatively small, the armed forces are certainly interested in keeping it alive. The question whether conscription is still an adequate recruitment system is not a military one, but a question about the relationship between the state and civilian society. As long as the legitimation of conscription in terms of material and non-material contribution of the citizens to their common good is not put into question by strong political groups, it will remain.

5 Next Steps (Stumbling?)

It may well be, that Germany continues to stick to conscription even when it has become still less universal. The armed forces face a more serious problem in the years ahead: Their reform costs a lot of money, and especially the preparation for the new missions will emphasize the need for new equipment and weapon systems. The financial framework for the coming years seems to be too narrow in order to achieve the ambitious goals of the reform. So the political and military leadership of the Bundeswehr may have to re-consider some of the basic pillars of the current reform in the very near future. And they may come to the conclusion, as many did before them, that the Chinese compliment about the interesting times is nothing but a friendly disguised malediction.
6 References


Motivating Soldiers. A Challenge for Officer Education

Heiko Biehl, Ulrich vom Hagen & Reinhard Mackewitsch

1 Introduction

The military leader has to cope with a whole bunch of tasks: to lead the unit under his command, to interpret and implement orders received and to train his unit. For the military superior, the particular challenge lies in his function as a leader of the soldiers under his command. An appropriate officers’ training should take this fact into consideration (Busch 1997) since, from the viewpoint of the military organization, one of the central tasks of an officer consists in augmenting the performance of the soldiers he is responsible for. To do so, there are, in principle, at least three options (Oetting 1990: 40): First, the officer can ameliorate his soldiers’ capabilities by training and exercise. Second, he can work to increase the organization’s capability of perfectly employing the qualities and capacities of the soldier by measures such as optimizing organizational processes or the use of the existing resources. Third – and this is the point we intend to focus on below – the officer can try to motivate his soldiers in order to reach optimal performance (Manning 1991: 466).

But to enable an officer to motivate his soldiers requires that he is aware of those factors encouraging the motivation of the individual soldier, and of those thwarting it. Meanwhile it is common sense in scientific debate and among military practitioners that, together with the change of the character of missions, these influencing factors also have been changing (Bartone/Adler 1999). The question of soldierly motivation and its influencing factors is constituting the core of the
research project ‘Bundeswehr Missions Abroad: KFOR’ conducted by the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research at Strausberg.

This is the first German study with such a focus, because missions abroad became a reality for the Bundeswehr in the 1990’s only. Within the framework of multinational operations, about 70000 soldiers have so far been assigned to peacekeeping or peace enforcing missions abroad. Particularly the engagements in SFOR and KFOR – currently about 8000 soldiers – can be seen as the ‘standard missions’ of the German armed forces today. As a result, assignments abroad are shaping the professional and personal situation of Bundeswehr servicemen and servicewomen. But only little is known about how the soldiers perceive their assignment and about their personal convictions to fulfill their tasks. In our study we lean upon the findings of military sociological research, and particularly on the surveys by scientists from the U.S. Army Medical Research Unit-Europe who are experienced in interviewing troops during assignments abroad (cf. Siebold et al. 1999: 14–17). Before presenting our research approach, however, some clarifications are needed.

2 What is Assignment Motivation?

In the following, the term ‘assignment motivation’ is to be understood as a behavior-influencing attitude of the individual towards his tasks, his organization and his activities during a given assignment. In our apprehension, assignment motivation is not a unidimensional attitude but encompasses the following components: Assignment motivation means (1) to identify positively with one’s role and the assigned tasks; (2) to show one’s willingness to comprehensively use one’s own resources for the sake and the success of the task or mission and to act
in the spirit of the organization; and (3) to develop a pride of one’s own activities.

This definition of motivation is partly corresponding with other constructs that are customary in military sociology, such as commitment, combat morale and sense of duty. Therefore we want to explain in brief the differences we see between these notions and the term ‘assignment motivation’ and why we do prefer the latter.

- Commitment evaluates the fundamental attitude towards an organization (Moser 1996). We are concentrating our interest, however, on the attitude towards the assignment. The assignment will end after six month, the soldier nevertheless keeps on belonging to the military organization (Gupta 1987). From our point of view, commitment is a concept that is broader and more fundamental than assignment motivation, even if both notions are interacting (Metz-Göckel 1996: 92).

- For quite different reasons we refuse work satisfaction as an applicable construct. This notion – in civilian contexts certainly fruitful – is not appropriate to the reality of military assignments since here we find a more significant “contrast between requirements of the organization and individual interests” (Roghmann/Ziegler 1977: 171). In military contexts, sense of duty is a rather relative notion.

- Combat morale, on the other hand, does not reflect the reality of current assignments, at least in the German meaning of this term, because of its lack of combat elements.

For these reasons, we do not use the above-mentioned terms, but ‘assignment motivation’ instead. Our guiding research question is how to reach it? Studies that have been conducted in different temporary and military-cultural contexts did attribute a different significance to
the factors. Whilst the older American military sociology emphasized the importance of comradeship and the primary group (Shils/Janowitz 1948; Stouffer et al. 1949), recent studies are pointing to the relevance of family and superiors (Segal et al. 1999). The only German empirical research, on the other hand, takes the evaluation of societal and political support for the key variable influencing the motivation of the soldier (Lippert/Klein 1998). With our study, we want to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the different explanations.

3 Method

Our study is based on a mix of three methods for an in-depth examination of our hypotheses. Before formulating the hypotheses, those spheres influencing assignment motivation had to be identified. Hence, we conducted explanatory expert interviews, analyzed and interpreted empirical studies from other nations as well as written reports by military leaders on their experience in missions abroad, and consulted the relevant regulations and directives (Biehl/vom Hagen/Mackewitsch 2001).

A further step consists in examining our hypotheses and our main survey instrument – a quantitative questionnaire - in a pre-test. From 18 July to 3 August, the project group stayed with the German KFOR contingent in PRIZREN and its surroundings for purposes of pre-testing and participating observation. This participating observation covered all the German camps, participation in the essential tasks of the different units and subunits, and furthermore visits of German headquarters, KFOR headquarters at PRISTINA, the U.S. camp Bonsteel and the UK general hospital at PRISTINA.
We used two different ways to distribute the questionnaires among the soldiers. Some units and subunits were asked to assemble those soldiers who volunteered to participate in the survey at a definite time and place. There, the soldiers filled in the questionnaires under the presence of a member of our group. The second way consisted in instructing the battalion commanders and unit leaders in the survey. They were asked for organizational support by ensuring that each and every soldier in their area of responsibility would receive a questionnaire and arranging for the anonymous return of the filled-in questionnaires to the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research.

It turned out that the first procedure entailed high effort and low benefit (read questionnaires returned) whilst the second one proved to be practicable and efficient. 1650 questionnaires were returned which is equivalent to 36 percent of the German KFOR contingent. As regards rank composition, the sample is representative.

The main part of our study started in October 2000 as a panel survey. Apart from an interview before the assignment – still in the home country – it is intended to do two surveys during the assignment (in the beginning and towards the end) as well as an interview with returned soldiers. Thus it will be possible to register changes in attitudes over time. At the present stage of our project we are able to present the results of our pre-test.
4 Results

We measured ‘assignment motivation’ by means of the following scale:

a) I am proud of being a soldier within the German KFOR contingent.
b) I identify with my field of duties.
c) I am essentially contributing to the mission accomplishment of my unit.
d) I like to be a soldier of the German KFOR contingent.
e) I support the mission of the German KFOR contingent.
f) I could recommend a comrade to enlist in the Kosovo mission.
g) If possible, I would immediately return home (repatriation).
h) I would enlist as a volunteer in a prospective assignment.

In the course of the analysis it turned out that it does not matter how we handle our motivation scale, whether we construct a Likert scale from these items, or calculate with the factor values of the rotated analysis of main components, or enforce a unifactorial solution, or use the item ‘your motivation’ that is common in American surveys: our essential explaining factors constituting the base of our interpretation remain stable in the multivariate regression analysis.

For most of the explaining factors tested there is a pronounced correlation with assignment motivation. From our point of view, this results from the fact that most of the questions require ‘weak’ evaluations only. They do not refer to ‘hard’ events or actual behavior. For these reasons we go without a detailed presentation of bivariate relations here and just show the multivariate regression analysis:
**Table:** Stepwise Regression  
Dependent variable: Assignment motivation (unifactoral solution from motivation scale)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Influencing factor</strong></th>
<th><strong>Beta and significance</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political support</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to the organization</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitments to the tasks</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army-family-adjustment</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary enlistment</td>
<td>.16**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in higher superiors</td>
<td>.11**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Explained variance: corrected $R^2$ | .59

** P <= 0.01

Further Variables taken into consideration: Infrastructure (factors: accommodation, leisure, communication); benefits (factors: economic and non-economic ones); success of the mission; support (by parents, partners and friends); society (factors: interest, support); care (factors: chaplaincy, medical service, psychological service, family care center); cohesion (factors: comradeship, superiors); training level of the unit; equipment; duty (factors: attractiveness, leaves of the camp, stress factors, security of planning); age; service/department; rank category; gender; education; problems with lack of sexuality; emotional strain of the family by separation; physical reserves; mental weariness; trust in first-line superiors; number of assignments abroad.
5 Discussion

The evaluation of the political support of a mission obviously is of prime importance for the motivation of German soldiers in mission. Thus, our result corresponds with a survey from 1985 where Klein/Lippert (1998) pointed at the supreme importance of political legitimacy in their study *Morale and its Components in the German Bundeswehr*. The concept of *Innere Führung* oriented at the citizen in uniform obviously comes into play here. This concept conveys the image of the politically informed citizen soldier, capable of his own opinion of societal and political relations. During his assignment, the German soldier thinks in political dimensions. As conceived of by this leadership concept, he has been ‘ politicized’ and gathers a great deal of his motivation from these convictions.

For the military organization this may constitute a problem inasmuch as this organization is only partially in a position to influence the development of political opinions of its soldiers. Apart from the political socialization in the armed forces as an organization, opinions among the comrades, among parents, partners and friends will certainly impact on the individual soldier. The same is true for public and published opinions.

It has to be underlined that the Bundeswehr’s KFOR mission was not at all unanimously supported by the German population. This is not surprising as the participation in NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia was the first combat mission of the Bundeswehr – and above all under the reign of a Red-Green government. Only a small majority of Germans supported the air strikes against Yugoslavia. In the Eastern part, the territory of former GDR, the majority of people even refused NATO’s course of action. The KFOR mission also met less support in the New Länder than it did in the former West German Länder.
We only can presume here to which extent the dominance of political attitudes and opinions is due to the relative calm of the KFOR mission. Nevertheless it seems to be plausible that the higher the risk level the more duty aspects would gain in influence on the soldiers’ motivation. The importance of the variable ‘commitment’ measuring a long-term attitude, however, seems to be immediately plausible. Those with narrow ties to the Bundeswehr will not basically change their attitudes under assignment conditions. Thus, the Bundeswehr will have to take care that ‘good’ soldiers will be deployed to such missions.

There are still other influences. Given the six months of separation from the family it is not surprising that an unsuccessful family-army arrangement has a negative influence on the soldier’s motivation (Segal 1986). Next, a German specific is hidden beneath the category command/volunteer. Only temporary-career and regular soldiers are currently deployed by order. Draftees and reservists principally volunteer. Temporary-career and regular soldiers also have the possibility to volunteer. We found that the volunteers to this mission are better motivated than the commanded ones – a result that does not surprise at all. The trust in higher superiors is the sixth explaining factor, reflecting both the trust in the personalities concerned as well as in the military organization as a whole.

It is remarkable that the influence exerted by superiors is left behind other factors. What does this mean for the military leader and for his training and education? Is there no possibility for the officer to influence his soldiers’ motivation? Is he less important than the other determinants? The truth is far from that!

Our results actually indicate that a soldier does not only think in soldierly textures, and he is not only motivated by soldierly textures.
The soldier is rather an individual who, also during an assignment, is characterized by political, social and family (i.e. non-military) categories (see Moskos 1968). And this is just the point to be considered by a military leader and by his training and education. Given the particular challenges of operations other than war, the officer is not only a superior to implement military knowledge. To impart political conviction and to lend support in private and family affairs also counts among his duties. He is asked to consider the soldier under his command not only as a military expert assigned to the mission with the best equipment and optimal training, but as an individual whose convictions and out-of-duty affairs will influence his behavior on duty. The military leader will succeed in motivating the soldier and calling for his best performance only when taking these aspects into consideration. Thus, motivating soldiers is a task that does not only ask for the military capabilities of a leader but goes far beyond that.

In the current low-intensity conflicts, the officer is faced with the challenges as a military leader on the one hand, and on the other as a susceptible partner for private and family problems as well as a political opinion maker. For the officers’ training and education this means that it is essential to train and educate officers globally and not only in special disciplines. An officer must not only be a military specialist but he has to obtain competencies on the social, communicative and security-political fields. If not, he will only insufficiently fulfill his task to motivate the soldiers under his command. Speaking in concrete terms: a broad officers’ training and education including civilian elements (such as university studies) is indispensable. A globally trained and educated officer will be more successful in leading and motivating the soldiers under his command.
References


III. South America: The Armed Forces in Regional and Domestic Contexts
The Armed Forces of the Southern Cone of America on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Some Alternatives for Change

Virgilio R. Beltrán

1 Introduction

The usual task of the Social Sciences is to describe and interpret past events trying to find regularities that will explain human behavior. In fact, these Sciences are not a great deal of help in predicting behaviors, except as probabilities of their occurrence in the future. Nevertheless, the temptation to attempt probability judgements with regard to the future is irresistible. If we can somehow imagine explicit or implicit models of social events, their internal logic (Weber) will help us to venture predictions.

Within South America, consisting of societies based on former Iberian colonization, the Southern Cone has seen the development of nations whose geographical proximity and peripheral position within the world economic and power constellation has led them in recent years to perceive their destinies from shared viewpoints. As part of this view, security and defense issues generate debates regarding a possible new strategic perspective, which is not always clearly appreciated by the significant actors in each society.

The changes suggested by the set of contemporary phenomena known, by way of simplicity, as globalization reach the ‘southern tip’ of the world at different speeds. The economic and financial effects arrive rapidly and are felt immediately, as are the influences of communications and technology (not always cutting edge) which affect these societies. Globalized values and attitudes have been
rapidly disseminated via the mass media. From the high regard for Human Rights and environmental issues to everyday habits and customs.

The consequences for defense and security problems are perceived more slowly by the sectors of the elite responsible for them, an understanding which is also blurred by the recent history of relations between the armed forces and the political power they are supposed to serve. In the regional framework of the Southern Cone of America, the constituent countries have speeded up their interdependence at all levels. They have made clear progress in maintaining peace between neighbors and are attempting to set up a common economic unit in the shape of the MERCOSUR (Hirst 1996).

Our presentation will focus only on certain countries in the area: Argentina, Brazil and Chile which, with their individual peculiarities and differences, may be representative of the changes on the strategic horizon in this part of the world. The recent history of their democratization and return to the rule of law goes part of the way to explain the characteristics of the constitutional governments that followed the military interventions (Diamint 1999; Fitch 1998). In all three cases, the armed forces assumed political power at times when the subversive and terrorist activity of left wing sectors seemed to endanger the stability of their respective societies.

In Brazil (Stepan 1974; Flores 1996; Fujita 1998; Rizzo de Oliveira 1998; Zirker 1996), the armed forces and strategic sectors of civilian society achieved an agreed, peaceful solution, in the context of reasonable economic prospects. In Chile (García Pino/Montes Ibáñez 1994), the armed forces, after a harsh process of social discipline and the shaping of modern elites, left government with good reserves of power and significant civilian sectors as their allies. They also
managed to get a constitution voted that provided a legal basis for the succeeding constitutional governments of Presidents Alwin and Frei. In Argentina (Norden 1996; McSherry 1997), the military government failed on all fronts, economic, international (Malvinas) and political, the latter due to the political cost of repression. The transition, in this case, occurred in solitude – their allies had abandoned it – and with absolutely no reserve of real political power.

Until approximately three decades ago, these three countries formed visible or tacit alliances among themselves and with other countries in the region, founded on the old idea of balance of power, expressed basically in its military dimension. The contemporary debate, however, has to do with cooperation in common security issues, the redefinition of the regional strategic picture, an analysis of a possible pluralistic security community (Buzan/Weaver/de Wilde 1998: 62) among the nations in the area, the consequences of the MERCOSUR on security and defense policies, the influence of the United States security policy for the hemisphere, all in order to identify threats, determine strategic postures, assess capacities, organizations, deployment, equipment and other issues pertinent to their armed forces. Discussions are going on about common threats to the region, which should be identified. Some form of cooperative mutual security and common defense could well be analyzed, as well as thought be given to whom this collective military response should be assigned.

This analysis should take into account the existence of a real, declared peace zone in the Southern Cone, on the one hand, and the vague nature of the possible threats, on the other. Many people fear that any international or supranational military organization will necessarily gravitate towards the leadership of the United States and be orientated by the interests of the continent’s hegemonic power. In the purely
regional sense, it also seems difficult to rule out Brazil’s demographic and political weight and its firm tendency to leadership.

Nor can the crisis of identity and the anxieties arising from the new missions of the armed forces throughout the world (Downes 1988; Dandeker 1999; Norden 1996) be ignored; on some occasions this causes a kind of military perplexity in the face of the new global and regional conditions, and on others it is manifested as a defensive clinging to outdated formulae for the analysis of strategic problems, which fail to incorporate the new data on the global and regional situation. Concern about these changes also creates a sense of insecurity among the military establishment, who feel their professional identity and vocational commitment are being threatened, so their analysis of the situation at times appears to be imbued with these feelings.

The sense of crusade with which the region’s armed forces undertook the struggle against subversion may have been related not only to their conservative ideological stance – shared with the majority of the world’s military – but also to the discovery of a transcendent, patriotic mission which, at the time, reinforced their institutional identity and demonstrated the relevance of the military profession in the context of the east-west-conflict.

2  The Burden of the Past

As Mario Fernández Baeza, Chilean Defense Minister, said on 24 March 2000: “We cannot free ourselves of the weight of the past by feeding the illusion that it does not exist, nor by decreeing its end from the heights of power.” The format of the latest military interventions in the Southern Cone have been of an institutional nature, that is,
produced by the military institutions as such, acting as structures for action, facilitated by their high level of professionalization. The Chilean military government may be seen as an exception, insofar as General Pinochet was able to establish his personal authority shortly after the overthrow of President Allende.

In all three cases, however, the anti-subversive doctrine and procedures had been learnt from French officers and their doctrine of Revolutionary War, in the first instance, and from American instructors (School of the Americas, for example), subsequently. This way of understanding the conflict as a duel between two worlds, Christian and capitalist on the one hand and atheist and communist on the other, led to the conviction that they were involved in a struggle to death, final, lacking all rules. The military governments thus pursued to total destruction of the members of the armed left and their satellite organizations. The results of these critical situations were processed differently in the three countries.

Brazil made a smooth transition to constitutional government, with no major visible consequences of the ‘dirty war’. Chile, whose military government accomplished positive economic reforms, managed to pass a constitution giving safeguards to the armed forces and legitimizing the succeeding government. In both countries, a significant part of the population and their political actors support the armed forces. The scores from the ‘dirty war’ are part of a process of transition managed with balance and wisdom by politicians and armed forces.

The process in Argentina, however, was much more traumatic. The military government failed to correct the economic problems, particularly the country’s chronic inflation. It wiped out the terrorist factions and their satellite organizations, but at a political cost the
military institutions would have to pay soon afterwards. It squandered the strong popular support it enjoyed at the beginning of its administration, which it failed to recover when it invaded the Malvinas Islands (an operation conceived without due regard, among other things, for the international context). The transition (1983) precipitated the year after the military defeat, in elections in which the candidate furthest placed from military interests triumphed. The military are thus left on their own and this leads to the subsequent judgement and condemnation of their commanders under the new administration.

The political constellations resulting from the transitions and the history of the three nations give rise to profiles and basic perceptions of the respective political and military situations which could be briefly characterized as follows (Escude/Fontana 1995):

a) Regarding the situation of the armed forces and the political elites

Argentina shows the characteristics of an as yet unresolved transition. The armed forces remain isolated from the political process and their relationship with the political elite is a kind of ‘peaceful coexistence’. The military does not threaten coups d’état or exert pressure on the political power, but at the same time the armed forces are not truly led by the civilian authorities. The political efforts of both leaderships seek to get rid of the ‘consequences of the war against left wing subversion’. There are relatively few civilians who concern themselves with security and defense issues. The armed forces maintain a frozen institutional position, which has delayed, so far, the development of up-to-date strategic thinking.

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1 These contribute to various “strategic cultures”. “I define strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols (i.e. causal axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs (...).” (Johnson 1996: 222)
Brazil has completed a smooth, full transition, after a lengthy military government. There are significant sectors of the military, business, political and diplomatic elites with similar perceptions of the country’s ‘manifest destiny’ in the region and in the world. Through expressions of autonomy and even in confrontation with the United States, Brazil seems to be pursuing regional leadership as a springboard for a more important role in world politics.

As from the presidency of Lagos in 2000, Chile is starting a process of structural change in civilian-military relations, aimed at improving the constitution inherited from General Pinochet’s military government (Baeza 2000; Ortiz 2000). Perhaps it will gradually leave behind its historical distrust with regard to possible threats from its neighbors, which has long resulted in a completely understandable feeling of insecurity, but which is starting to dissipate, in particular due to its geo-economic relations with Argentina.

b) Defense and security policies

Argentina, in its constitutional periods from 1983 onwards, has followed a sinuous and relatively undefined course in security and defense policies (Sain 1996; López 1999). It has clearly delimited – unlike Brazil and Chile – the military mission as exclusively external, i.e., with regard to threats from beyond its territorial limits. It has passed laws and planning directives which have apparently not been adequately implemented. The guidelines for the policy of international security, particularly during the Menem administration, have emanated from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Also during this presidential term, the country became firmly aligned with United States hemispheric security policy and has maintained its contribution to the peace missions ordered by the United Nations Security Council. The political inheritance of the ‘dirty war’ and the disconnected leadership – or lack of leadership – on the part of the political leaders,
have conspired against the drawing up of a coherent international security policy, directed by the civilian authorities.

In Brazil, the initiative in defense and security policies has remained in the hands of the armed forces, associated with their allied elites. There is constant intellectual feedback between academics, the military, the diplomats and the businessmen, all aiming at maximizing Brazil’s international role. The setting up of the Ministry of Defense (which replaced four Ministries headed by military officers) was the result of a long process of negotiation. The main strategic concerns have to do with the effective occupation and control of their huge territory, Amazonia in particular, the threats of instability from the Andean Arch and surveillance of the South Atlantic.

The defense and security policies of President Lagos’ administration in Chile are directed at: I) strengthening the authority of the Ministry of Defense; II) modernizing the strategic concepts of the Chilean armed forces in the region and bringing about their greater participation in international security missions under the authority of the United Nations Security Council; III) reformulating the sources of public financing of the armed forces (Rojas Aravena 1994) and IV) reviewing compulsory military service. All this with a clear orientation towards re-establishing the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

c) Security policies in the hemisphere

Argentina, after a crisis of ‘Third World-ism’ during President Alfonsín’s term (1983–1989), moved under the Menem administration (1989–1999) to a clear alignment with the security, disarmament and regional pacification policies led by the United States, at the same time as it brought about Argentina’s implicit disarmament through drastic budget and personnel reductions (Centro de Estudios Unión
The government also sold off a good proportion of its military industries. It dismantled Project Condor II, a theater missile – whose construction had been begun under the previous government – due to pressure from the United States (Diamint 1997). This behavior was rewarded in 1998 with Argentina’s designation as “Major Extra-Nato Ally” by the President. The country also accompanied United States policies in the Organization of American States, particularly in its Hemispheric Security Commission.

Brazil does not accept inequality – particularly technological inequality – between the countries of the center, in particular the United States, and the periphery. In international fora, its diplomats refer to technological inequality as a kind of ‘apartheid’. However, Brazil was attracted by Menem’s government to a policy of control of arms of mass destruction and nuclear disarmament, and also agreed to collaboration between the two countries on security and defense issues, in a gradual interlinking of formal and effective gestures (for example: combined system of naval surveillance, search and rescue, military exercises). The Brazilian military industry, vigorous in the 1960’s and 1970’s has been gradually reduced, concentrating on certain more spectacular undertakings. Brazilian diplomacy emphasizes the classic concept of sovereignty in its hemispheric relations and does not easily accept the continental leadership of the United States. As the undoubted senior partner in the MERCOSUR, it has a natural inclination to regional leadership as a means of supporting its aspirations to an international role.

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3 Until then this status had been granted only to Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan and South Korea.
From its origins, Chile has had civilian and military elites who were jealous of the security of their borders and their independence from their neighbors. In the last decade, a significant part of these elites has shifted to a more geo-economic conception of relations with their neighbors and the continent, through economic integration – mainly with Argentina – and confidence building measures. The constitutional governments have controlled the zeal for modernization of military equipment on the part of some civilian and military sectors, supported by the armed forces’ relative financial autonomy. The country has joined the network of agreements for regional pacification and stabilization led by the United States (Franko 2000, 1996).

3 The Region’s Strategic Transformation

During the period of Hispanic-Portuguese domination, the strategic relationships of the parts of these empires in what today is the Southern Cone reflected the European conflicts between the colonial powers. These were also manifested in the period of independence, in many cases generating border and territorial problems that still exist. From the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine (1823) European influence declined and United States’ increased. This situation was also colored by distance. The countries of the South like Argentina allowed themselves a divergent political and diplomatic orientation, in this case based on its relations with Great Britain. In other words, the Monroe Doctrine had greater validity in the Caribbean than in Rio, Santiago or Buenos Aires (Cisneros/Escudé 1999).

With regard to military doctrine, organization and equipment, the countries of the Southern Cone also followed European models until the 1945 Post War period, when they progressively adopted such elements from the United States. In the same way, local strategic
literature and thinking (Child 1990) follows the same general lines as the European models (France, Great Britain, Prussia, Italy), with the logical ingredients from the local geo-strategic situations and the institutional perspectives and interests of the armed services.

Also to be taken into account are economic and commercial agreements such as the MERCOSUR, CARICOM, the Andean Pact, etc., which may gradually gravitate towards the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005. Belonging to this regime requires the existence of minimum thresholds with regard to respect for human rights, political stability, functioning judiciary, respect for private property, smooth functioning of markets, reduction of military expenditure, etc., as pre-conditions for joining the area of co-prosperity.

This operation faces some degree of competition from Europe, from local nationalism’s (both in the United States and South America), from what remains of left-wing opposition (as those that oppose the World Trade Organization), from political ‘fatigue’ due to neo-liberal reforms and their consequences (marginalization, extreme poverty, etc.), from quasi-democratic systems, such as the countries of the Andean Arch and the subsistence of narco-states (Colombia).

Latin America could also be divided into countries moving towards mature capitalism and progress, and others which could remain isolated, stagnating or in hopeless poverty that is, countries increasingly integrated into the global economy through the United States (without ruling out Europe and Asia, of course) and others remaining in or returning to third world conditions (Peters 1999). Argentina, the Brazil of President Cardoso, the Mexico of President Fox, Chile and Uruguay seem qualified to join the first group, though this is in no way predetermined. Others would continue with populist systems, endemic instability, overwhelmed by internal conflicts and/or
harassed by drug traffickers. The consolidation of liberal-democratic institutions within economically efficient States will be the key to stability in these societies and their chance of joining the globalized world on reasonable bases, as some Eastern European societies are managing to do.

If this brief description bears any relation to reality, it seems highly unlikely (though not impossible) that there will be any conventional conflicts between the Latin American countries, except for brief, minor confrontations such as the Peru-Ecuador conflict of 1996. At the moment and perhaps for the foreseeable future, none of the Southern Cone nations is capable of undertaking a surprise attack or an attack on the depth of a neighboring territory. Few nations in the world enjoy this capability and in the American continent there is only one (Dunnigan 1993: 24).

On the other hand, there have been significant cutbacks in military budgets, particularly in some Southern Cone countries, due partially to the loss of political lobbying power on the part of the armed forces, and also due to the widespread, thoroughgoing implementation of relations of peace and cooperation. This area is currently remarkable for the progress in the reduction of threats and the predominance of geo-economic linking considerations over geo-strategic relations of mutual distrust.

The practical issue is precisely regarding the design, equipment, training, deployment, etc. of the armed forces in the light of the new strategic horizon, characterized, both by the low probability of military conflicts, and the vague nature of conventional threats. The key question is: what kind of armed forces are appropriate to this politico-strategic situation and, furthermore, if there is a need for armed forces as in the past. The responses range from total resistance
to change past models to the illusion of thinking of a ‘brave new world’ with no armed forces or their transformation into security police forces to deal with the so-called new threats. These are characterized as low intensity conflicts or operations other than war, such as the fight against the drug trafficking, international peace missions, disaster relief, search and rescue tasks, environmental safety, the fight against terrorism, etc.

There are also solid grounds for maintaining that conventional war between developed countries is highly unlikely, due to the unacceptable destruction caused by modern combat methods, the psychological attitude of the population in modern societies, the work of the international bodies and the intervention of the ‘ordering’ powers (Spillman/Wenger 1999; Burk 1998). If we look at empirical reality, we see that states, which are the units of international policy, always maintain military capabilities expressed through their armed forces as a guarantee of their existence, as protection of their interests and, paradoxically, to maintain peace.

What is the strategic horizon of the nations of the Southern Cone of America as an area of peace and geo-economic cooperation under some form of United States tutelage? (Rojas Aravena/Smith 1994; Rojas Aravena 1999). The Southern Cone nations also have the intention of entering the world market in the best conditions permitted by their natural wealth, their socio-political organization, their diplomatic skill and their abilities to adapt and negotiate.

These nations show characteristics of a pluralistic security community. That is, a group of nations which have decided to withdraw the geo-strategic security component from issues of mutual concern, so that the treatment of such issues, even those involving conflict, does not lead to threats to the security of the national units involved.
A pluralistic security community, however, cannot rule out internal or international imbalances requiring military stabilization. Resorting to military force also becomes necessary when the conflicts generated in one or more countries in the region affect the stability of another country or set of countries in its or their area of interest.

The possible transformation of neighboring democracies into different kinds of more aggressive governments also requires military reinsurance. Finally, even considering this area as a peace zone, the situation cannot be guaranteed for ever nor is there any assurance that currently non-existent threats will not appear in the future in some other shape. All these assumptions point to the need for armed forces with defensive military capabilities, to provide defense and maintain stability, both in the country they belong to and also throughout the neighboring system.

In the Southern Cone of America, regional cooperative security has been discussed and sponsored by the hemispheric bodies (OAS and the Commission of Hemispheric Security) as a means of reshaping the regional strategic horizon with concepts analogous to those applied in Europe by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and in A Programme for Peace of the General Secretary of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992). This policy has been received reluctantly so far by the larger Latin American countries such as Mexico and Brazil, with indifference by many others and has been supported by a few, such as Argentina under the Menem administration.

In this area, there has often been a link between trade and economic agreements and security policies. Evidently, the two levels of relations support each other, but one is not always a direct consequence of the
other. In the case of the American continent, the likely future merger of the largest markets may produce strategic consequences that cannot be ignored (Franko 2000).

Trade between the United States and the rest of the Americas is growing at a faster rate than trade between the United States and Europe and Asia. Exports from the United States to the rest of the continent represent 44% of its total exports and of that figure exports to Latin America account for 20%. These data should be taken into account in any analysis. According to the projections by the Government of the United States, by 2010, trade with Latin America will exceed joint trade with Europe and Asia and, if Venezuela, Canada and Mexico are among the first 4 oil exporters to the United States (33% of the oil imported by the United States in 1999), the symbiotic relationship between North and South America would suggest that both the MERCOSUR and some other similar agreements will be subsumed within the Free Trade Area of the Americas – unless the Government of the United States and/or its Senate think otherwise.

Why not imagine something similar for the security agreements in the hemispheric context, and at the same time different from those of the structure of the European Union? Is it not to be expected that the security agreements rather ingenuously being studied, without the slightest sign of materialization, in the Southern Cone, will go the same or a similar way? (Carales 1992). Could both types of economic-diplomatic agreements be the “building blocks” for hemispheric constructions of the areas most developed and compatible with the interests of the continent’s “hegemon”? (Schulz 2000)

The ongoing erosion of traditional sovereignty may turn national governments into regional powers responsible for security, stability, economic progress and predictability. They could be partners in a
cooperative community of prosperity, with a role – to be negotiated – in the world market (Buzan/Diez 1999: 50; Auel 1998: 1).

Even under this assumption, states as the units of domination and control (Auel 1998: 4) should be preserved and protected by the military force appropriate to their geo-strategic position, with the main purpose of maintaining and extending the human security (Cawthra 1998) of their inhabitants and the protection of a set of interests common to all the states in the Southern Cone. These could be: 1) sustained economic development, 2) national protection of human rights, 3) environmental control in the region, 4) the continuity and perfection of the rule of law, 5) the adequate working of the domestic market and the appropriate entry into the international market and, 6) maintenance of the zone of stability, peace and cooperation.

The situation described here in general terms confirms that conventional wars are unlikely (Mandelbaum 1998/1999; Freedman 1998). This does not remove the possibility of “show off wars”, aimed at showing off the armed forces, with not always realistic political and military objectives, that set in motion international bodies and pacification pacts in order to recover stability.

In the region, the network of pacts for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, confidence building measures, arms control agreements, good management of international relations, running of the armed forces by constitutional officers and, finally, the disciplinary authority of the United States, mean that military conflicts, when they do occur, would be of the type mentioned above.

The same cannot be said of the internal conflicts which threaten or seriously affect as yet unconsolidated political and institutional systems, though fortunately such conflicts do not currently exist in the
Southern Cone. Agencies of the US government and certain NGOs are devoting their resources and their time to the “demilitarization” of Latin American societies. In some cases, it is being studied how to improve the “control” of the military by civilian governments, when it would be more useful at this stage to ensure the stability of the political systems and the economic viability of certain Latin American states (Falcoff 1999; Hunter 1996). Part of this instability is no longer due to military pressure for political room but to “fatigue” due to the results of neo-liberal policies, and also the corruption attributed to civilian rulers. Thus, Hugo Chávez won his fourth consecutive election on 30 July in Venezuela with a populist program. In Ecuador and Peru the populist element and military loyalties are crucial to semi-democratic systems (IIS 2000; Fitch 1998; Joxe 2000). Colombia is in the midst of an open internal war (Franko 2000; Klepak 2000; Marcella 2000; Massot 2000; Passage 2000). In several parts of the continent the question of the viability of constitutional democracy and the rule of law, is reappearing.

4 The Shadow of the Eagle

Paraphrasing H. Kissinger, in Latin America nothing can be done without the agreement of the United States, and even less, against its interests. Recognizing US hegemony in the Hemisphere is only to understand a fact of life that must be taken into account in any political or strategic analysis of the continent (Art 1998/1999; Blanchard/Mansfield/Ripsman 1999/2000).

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4 There are discussions in this respect between the United States State Department and the Defense Department. The Center for International Policy (www.ciponline.org) and the University of Texas, for example, have study programs and make recommendations for the “demilitarization” of Latin America.

5 In Washington the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies operates at the National Defense University (www.ndu.edu/chds) to train Defense administrators.
One of the guidelines of US external and security policy is the concept of “Shaping the World”, i.e., trying to shape the world to make that nation’s global policies more viable (Clinton 1996; D.S. 1998; Jordan/Lovelace/Young 2000). In the Hemisphere, this orientation translates into policies for achieving stability in the continental scenario. Stable democracies, control of the armed forces (as a destabilizing force), regulation of conflicts, sustained economic growth, guarantee of human rights, free enterprise and open markets. Instability, the generic threat, is considered to be a regional issue and not each society’s individual concern (Cope 1999: 63, 78; Oakley 1999; Olney 1996; Schulz 2000).

Among the “new threats” are: drug trafficking, illegal migration, terrorism, smuggling (arms), the mafias and the non-state armed groups with both political and economic aims (Clinton 2000; Cope 1999; Hurrell 1998; Mc Caffrey 1996; US Army War College 2000). In answer to these dangers, policies of reinforcing governability and orientating the armed forces towards the new threats have been implemented. Such measures provoke anxiety and insecurity among the military of the region with regard to the new roles to be assigned to them in these changes (Zisk 1993: 18; Goodman/Mendelson/Rial 1990). In their societies, a transformation into intermediate forces with adequate capacity to face the new threats is perceived basically as a loss of political relevance.

In the light of these policy proposals, the countries of the Southern Cone have undertaken their own changes of direction. Brazil has independently reformulated the deployment of its land forces on its northern border, the source of Andean instability, and in Amazonia. The navy protects the South Atlantic.
Chile has sent its army to the desert regions in the North and South, while its navy is alert to its responsibility over its “Mar Presencial”, a concept that extends the area of the Pacific of interest to it (Book of the National Defense of Chile 1998; National Defense Policy of Brazil 1996).

In Argentina, national defense remains undecided, with heavy budget cutbacks, is harassed by the left due to the results of the war against subversion, while the country continues its policy of peaceful military rapprochement with its neighbors. Laws and directives have ordered a tentative study of modes of military integration with its neighbors (mainly Brazil and Chile). Meanwhile, it does not know what to do with its status as a major non-NATO ally conferred to it by President Clinton.

In all cases, the policies oriented towards the “new threats” also provoke distrust in the local military elites, since they would reduce their budgets and their social status even further. Besides, if international and supranational modes of cooperation to confront the “new threats” are engendered, they would almost certainly be under the influence of the United States or of regional institutions such as the OAS, in which the United States predominates (Art 1998/1999: 102).

A good indicator of the direction of US hemispheric security policy is an examination of the Southern Command missions. These are: to manage military-military relations to promote democracy, stability and a collective approach to regional security, as well as supporting activities against the drug trade. Its strategy in this theater of operations is directed at: 1) building cooperative security in the

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region, 2) aiding local armed forces to define their own strategic issues, in a framework of respect for civilian authority and human rights, 3) supporting the national strategy (of the United States) against drug trafficking, 4) studying the future problems of the Southern Command and, 5) responding unilaterally or multilaterally to any crises that may threaten the stability or the interests of the United States.

With regard to the armed forces-armed forces relationship between the United States and its Latin American partners, this is hindered by the marked technological gap. The huge advance in US military technology is becoming an obstacle to inter-operability even between American forces and their NATO allies, and their future allies in Europe and other continents (NATO Review 2000; Bostock 2000; Brzezinski 2000).

Interoperation with less technologically developed countries, such as those in the Southern Cone, gives rise in the doctrine of the American armed forces to “vertical” coalitions, in which the technologically more advanced components exercise leadership and control of the combined forces (Libicki 1995: 27; Fleckenstein 2000). However, technological superiority raises new operational problems. When the opponent does not have modern forces, i.e., when conflicts are “asymmetrical”, the technical superiority of one of the parties does not always lead to its victory (Mattheus 1998; Metz 2000; Ronai 1998; Scales 1999). This happens particularly in environments such as bush, jungle and urban combat (the Vietnam and Afghanistan wars are suitable examples). The conflicts arising from the “new threats” are typically asymmetrical.

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Interoperativity between armed forces is one step within a continuum of the following concepts, which the countries of NATO aspire to accomplish: compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability, and, finally, community.
Participation of the armed forces in operations against drug trafficking is being discussed in the Southern Cone, as a transnational threat with national effects, particularly, corrosive for the institutions of the countries affected. Drug trafficking in the Southern Cone is mostly associated with transit to the areas of greatest demand (United States and Europe) and with money laundering, rather than with cultivation of the original species and the industrial processing of narcotics. In the Southern Cone, the issue is being raised in the banking system and customs. It is therefore clear that the police forces, the security forces (Gendarmerie) and customs officials as well as the banking system are the appropriate authorities to combat drug trafficking and money laundering.

The US hemispheric security policy, with the agreement of the local governments, has implemented operations including military forces in the struggle against the drug barons. These policies are being or have been applied correctly in the Andean Arch from Colombia to Bolivia, where the police and security forces have often been totally outdone by the “narcos” in fire power, economic resources and even in support from the population. In certain cases, such as Peru in the recent past and Colombia currently, the drug trafficking organizations allied with the rural guerrilla forces have put or are putting the very existence of the state in serious danger.

Furthermore, the armed forces of the Southern Cone firmly resist suggestions of participating in the struggle against drug trafficking, not only for reasons expressed above, but also because they think their mission lies at a more intensive level of military action. In the case of Argentina, the Law of National Defense (№ 23.554) does not allow the armed forces to participate (and even to carry out military intelligence) in internal conflicts, as a result of the events of the 1976–
1983 process, a situation different from Brazil or Chile, where the armed forces have retained that area of competence.

5 Final Comments

The Southern Cone, which has been defined as a peace zone, has a positive net of agreements for democratic stability, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, military cooperation, confidence building measures, not only among the member nations, but also between Argentina and the United Kingdom after the Malvinas conflict. Any diplomatic initiative, hemispheric conference or bi- or multilateral agreement for the maintenance of peace and stability is often diplomatically accompanied or generated by the United States.

The persistence of the tragic consequences of the anti-subversive war of the 1960/1970’s introduces elements that distract and disturb, that focus people’s attention and produce political attrition in the armed forces of Argentina and Chile (more in the former and less in the latter). This has contributed, to the slow pace of change in the strategic approach and in thinking and planning its operational consequences in the armed forces. It has also affected the civilian administration of national defense, which has failed to achieve the necessary freedom of action to think or obtain the organizational skills required for the modernization of the military.

Such constraints are not perceived in Brazil. The armed forces preserve greater autonomy in relation to the political power, represented by the Ministry of Defense, and can develop their strategic thinking almost independently and form alliances with other key sectors. This support enables them to develop military equipment
in line with their conception of a significant world political role for their country, shared with those groups.

The Chilean transition process has yet to deal with General Pinochet’s political fate, currently under discussion in that country. An intelligent, well established political class will probably find a satisfactory solution to this issue. In this case, these qualities also contribute to facilitate the process of adaptation of the Chilean civilian and military leaderships, added to their traditional, justified shared discomfort regarding their geographical situation (lack of strategic depth).

In Chile, the autonomy of the armed forces, inherited from the previous military government, will probably be converted into viable constitutional civilian-military relations, as has been the tradition in this country for many years. The assurance of peaceful relations with Argentina and its Northern neighbors may contribute to the redefinition of its strategic horizon.

In Argentina the armed forces, due to their lack of political power and significant allies in civilian society, would seem to be the most susceptible to transformation by the civilian political authorities. However, in 16 years of civilian government no changes have been seen in the perception of the new strategic horizon (except for participation in peace missions), despite the legislation passed by Congress and the provisions of the White Paper on National Defense (1999), since they have not given rise to important executive decisions applicable to the armed forces. The political administrative measures have been restricted to heavy budget cutbacks and, along with them, a reduction in personnel and the obsolescence of their equipment, thus leading to a ‘hibernation’ effect.
In Brazil, politically recognized armed forces, with important allies in society and government, with whom they share the idea of their country’s ‘manifest destiny’, have developed their own planning directives for the defense and occupation of their territory and their image in the world.

If the new US administration decides to continue with its project for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and manages to overcome the Senate hurdle, that global agreement would probably become the trade and economic pole of attraction of the continent. The added value of the MERCOSUR will be a tool for collective negotiation in the FTAA. The President-elect of Mexico, Vicente Fox, is giving clear signs of interest in associating his country with the MERCOSUR, perhaps trying a step towards a closer association with NAFTA (North America Free Trade Agreement).

On the other hand, setting up security agreements in Latin America and in the Southern Cone in particular provides greater difficulties. Only the United States can exercise diplomatic pressure on this direction, but potential leaders in the region such as Brazil are reticent to follow this kind of initiative. This is added to the national feelings of sovereignty of the countries involved and the purely military difficulties connected therewith: command and control, interoperability, nationality of the supreme commander, definition of threats and objectives of military missions.

In our opinion, the most unfavorable alternative for the security of the Southern Cone seems to be the ‘petrification’ of national strategic conceptions, doctrine and military structures. The practical result is the subsistence of ‘baroque’ arsenals and a lack of connection of a pacified region with the globalized context. This isolation seems to constitute the most direct route to the dissolution of the local armed
forces, due to a lack of functionality in the contemporary strategic sphere. It is wise to remember also that a further lowering in the social level of recruits may incorporate populist, anti-liberal attitudes, which are also destabilizing, particularly in the light of the ‘fatigue’ due to neo-capitalist reforms.

With the partial exception of Chile, the resources devoted to national defense have been constantly reduced, particularly in Argentina where military ‘hibernation’ leaves the armed forces increasingly outdated technologically and in the reception and development of information relating to the modern strategic context.

Modern armed forces (the Southern Cone forces are not) are studying the consequences for their organization, equipment, doctrine, ethos, etc., of the growth in Operations Other than War. This effort of flexibility, adaptation and modular structure to face these new missions is considered to be part of the globalization of security (Nun 1997).

If the likelihood of conflicts with a military component is low (but not zero), particularly in the Southern Cone, while Operations Other Than War seem more likely in the 21st Century, the ingenuous question that arises in some sectors is the traditional: “Why armed forces?” So far, all countries, with two or three exceptions that prove the rule, maintain armed forces, which they organize and consider to be an essential part of the state. There seems to be no doubt that in the final analysis security dealing with external or internal threats – even though they may not currently exist – lies in the existence of armed forces with the capacity to face existing or possible threats and protect the population, their possessions and the constitutional authorities. The security of each state is increasingly understood as a condition for the security of their neighbors and of the international system. To
maintain its stability, the latter is also supported by international organizations and by the disciplinary strength of the leading powers. In this conception of the international system, the prevailing legitimate objective of national armed forces is to maintain or achieve peace and stability.

Reasonable, controlled expenditure on reasonable defense is like expenditure on insurance. It may seem expensive when no accident happens, but is cheap when one does. This expenditure serves to prevent an accident, which insurance cannot do. With similar characteristics to the French Gendarmerie, both Argentina (National Gendarmerie), and Brazil (Military Police) and Chile (Chilean Carabineros) have federal or national security forces with reinforced structures and equipment for dealing with internal security missions such as migrations, federal crimes, rural policing, judicial aid, riot control, smuggling, etc. These forces have been called intermediate forces to indicate both their police and domestic security functions. These missions overlap, at least theoretically, with those defined as Operations Other Than War.

The lack of definition of military roles appropriate to the current strategic situation in the Southern Cone, the suggestions from US policy on hemispheric security, the weight of the recent political history of the local armed forces (particularly in Argentina and Chile) and the growing demand for Operations Other Than War, have contributed to the continued lack of definition over the important issues relating to the future of the armed forces in the region as differentiated institutions with specific missions (Perelli 1993).

Thus, for example, the struggle against drug trafficking, referred to above, is defined by the Argentine Minister of Defense, R. López Murphy, as a “strategic threat” (La Nación 09/06/00). Drug trafficking
is a transnational threat, since it is not originated only into a state, but is operated by criminal organizations beyond the nation’s borders. This danger certainly lies both outside and inside the borders. Those involved are not enemies but criminals, they are not sent to prison camps under the Geneva Convention, but are punished by criminal law applied by judges in the courts.

6 Conclusions and Assessment

Security and defense policies in line with those developed by the United States find greater acceptance in some civilian administrations such as Argentina than in the other countries in the Southern Cone which share military distrust thereof. The participation of the local armed forces in the fight against drug trafficking – which would justify their transformation into intermediate forces – is not only resisted by them but currently appears to find no support in the situation in the countries of the Southern Cone. Budget constraints could lead sectors of the military leadership to accept such missions, since they see that (external) resources are directed to the intermediate forces and not to the armed forces.

The network of peace and security that includes the Southern Cone should be maintained and extended through bi- and multilateral agreements and the development of non-offensive attitudes to defense, as significant elements in the defense planning of the countries in the area. These elements would also be a way of reducing military expenditure without reducing the security of each and every one of the countries.

Although economic agreements and military coalitions do not run on the same track and follow a different logic, they are not alien to each
other. Hence, the two speed process in Latin America may have considerable importance in the continent’s strategic development, where lasting military alliances in the classic mould seem unlikely, but the formation of ad hoc coalitions for stabilization operations do seem possible and, perhaps in the medium term, regional instruments for the same purpose should be thought of.

The treatment of security and defense issues by the holders of political roles should be changed from the consideration of armed forces as political actors to develop a true capacity for analysis and administration of the military capacities. To this end it is also necessary to train civilian experts in security and defense, who properly understand their country’s, their region’s and the continent’s strategic context, global trends and the nature of military sub-culture. It would not be a question of appointing only political allies of the military to the defense administration, nor of introducing anti-military ideologues into the bureaucratic system, but of setting up and maintaining a professional sector able to establish a bridge for management and control between the political authorities and the military institutional leadership.

The temptation of not changing anything in the defense and military policies or the extension of the interests of military institutions to mercantile, banking and industrial activities or others unconnected with the profession, as has occurred in some countries in the Caribbean and the Andean Arch, seems to be the best route to a slow breakdown of military institutions, through the erosion of their ethos and their specific capabilities. The armed forces are necessary as forces suitable for combat and not as bureaucracies. Their mission is to maintain and ensure both peace and security in their own society.
As J. Keegan (1994: 384) rightly says: “(...) a world without armies – disciplined, obedient and law abiding armies – would be uninhabitable. Armies of that quality are an instrument but also a mark of civilization, and without its existence, mankind would have to reconcile itself either to life at a primitive level, below the ‘military horizon’, or to a lawless chaos of masses warring, Hobbesian fashion, ‘all against all’.” The lack of armed forces capable of providing security to the society that engenders and sustains them or their transformation into intermediate forces lacking that capability, would simply create the conditions for the possible development of dangerous situations of regional instability. Armed forces with clear defense capabilities have always contributed to security and stability.

The increasing grey area of Operations Other Than War offers a wide range of military or quasi-military missions, whose allocation to the armed forces is the subject of local legislation and political decisions of the civilian leadership. This broad field of action requires great flexibility and versatility on the part of the armed forces, which must be trained to operate in ad hoc modular groupings for each mission.

The adoption of a non-offensive defense posture⁸ would, in our opinion, complement the Southern Cone stabilization process via the control of offensive weapons agreed between countries, and not indiscriminate disarmament due to lack of resources. The explicit adoption of a non-offensive defense posture by one of the countries of the Southern Cone considered here could induce the rest to adopt similar policies. That would relieve their military budgets, make a definitive contribution to peace in the region, enable cutbacks in the

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⁸ These concepts are available in “Study on Defensive Security Concepts”, United Nations, Study Series Nº 26, New York, 1993 and Document A/47/394, United Nations Secretariat General. A set of studies with this conceptualization applied to the region is to be found in: Cáceres/Scheetz 1995.
armed forces of each one without weakening their security conditions and would strengthen the possibilities of explicitly building a pluralistic security community.

The developing maturity of the societies of the Southern Cone towards robust political institutions, a strong, independent arbitral state and their proper integration into the global market would facilitate the rise of modern armed forces, subordinated to the political power and with the necessary functional autonomy, which would gradually acquire some of the features of C. Moskos’ occupational model. This will in turn be more likely if the Southern Cone enters the area of faster entry into the globalization process (Sachs 2000).

A diplomatic effort will be necessary to explain to the State Department and to the Pentagon that a defensive forces design is compatible with US strategic objectives in the area, that it should facilitate access to military equipment with these characteristics, that direct participation of the armed forces in the struggle against drug trafficking is not appropriate in the Southern Cone and that the transformation of the armed forces into intermediate forces, appropriate for that mission, would mean creating conditions that could give rise to problems at nearby countries and regional levels.

There is still a need throughout the area for public discussion of these issues, with the participation of the political, diplomatic and military leaderships, to draw up strategic concepts adapted to the current reality of the Southern Cone, the Hemisphere and the globalized world. Otherwise, the defense institutions may remain isolated from contemporary strategic, political and social changes and increasingly, some of them will cease to provide the public service for which they are intended.
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1 Introduction

A new more varied, fluent, and complex reality has replaced the former bipolar order based on a confrontational pattern. Latin America has not been an important actor in the definition of the processes of change. Nevertheless, it has played a significant role in the all-out perspective. The international system has shifted from the nuclear-threat-supported stability to another form, where negotiation, consensus, and plurality are deemed more important as the best formula to guarantee the security and prosperity of the states. The former tools of collective security and regional security are becoming obsolete, or otherwise have proved to lack efficacy in the regulation of modern conflict.

In this new and complex international scenario, the interests of the various nation-states have diversified, giving place to multiple agencies that require mechanisms that will guarantee more cooperative and solid relations among the nations. It is not only a matter of avoiding conflict and warfare tension, but of facing new risks. Bearing in mind this purpose, the idea is to increase international cooperation in such crucial topics as the promotion of democracy and human rights, the strengthening of peace, the preservation of natural resources, the regulation of common spaces, the liberalization of world trade, and the struggle against drug trafficking. It is an unquestionable reality, nevertheless, that the political and strategic scenario of the American Southern Cone is
Currently characterized by the transition from old relationships of competitiveness or conflicts to others that single out incipient and clearer cooperation links.

Certainly, the transition from the concepts of hemispheric defense, Cold War, and balance of power, to post-Cold War and military cooperation has been very fast, but this does not mean that the states have lost their capacity for conflict within the international system. Generally speaking, it may be said that during the last decade there has been an increase of the controls referred to defense topics, and that these no longer face self-referring designs (like the defense policies), but also consider the signals of the regional aggregate (collective security policies).

In Latin America, the trends toward globalization and regionalization have been combined with other elements that have favored and produced benefit for integration. Thus, for example, the new political affinities have facilitated integration and cooperation among regimes that had very different – and often opposing – ideological projects in the past. The affinity in the development envisioned has reactivated a new integration process, less rhetorical but more effective. The development of novel economic cooperation and politically harmonious forms has enabled Latin America to show a wide range of regional, sub-regional, and bilateral agreements. They are probably somehow complex and disorderly, but have bettered the commercial, financial, and investment links among the countries of the region and the great international centers (Valdés 1999: 8).

Among the sub-regional agreements, the Southern Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur, MERCOSUR) represents one of the most significant and promising economic zones of integration of the Americas. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and the associated
states of Bolivia and Chile form the MERCOSUR. For the time being, MERCOSUR is the formal, and predominantly economic face of a wider regional integration process that considers the social, educational, cultural -and possibly security and defense-aspects.

The political decision of the governments to advance regional integration – meaning by this the coordination between two or more states, which preserving their own essential identity, complement themselves and act in common agreement in specific fields of activity, usually in economy and culture – imposes extended roles. These are more complex, and sometimes contradictory (Thauby 1997: 16) for the armed forces of the participating countries. These roles are derived from the need to simultaneously satisfy the reinforcement of the national power of each country, without weakening regional stability, and secure and protect national interests, participating time in the building of a regional international security regime. At the same time, if we believe that defense is the array of actions – including the call on military force – the object of which is to protect the vital and strategic interests of a state, in order to guarantee its security it is possible to clearly see the close link between defense and foreign and economic policy and therefore, with the integration process. The MERCOSUR project, because of its relevance for national development, is among such interests. And correlative, the country’s security becomes consolidated by the interrelationship between defense and development.

If by integration we mean the process of forming a community of extended space, nothing impedes that this phenomenon is extended or restricted because the political will of the participant states determine it. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile stating that within the strategic field, the security of the state also requires the necessary defense capacity to counter real or potential aggression, whether it implies risks, threats,
or conflicts which is difficult given that today the armed forces are requested to reduce expenditures (Rial 1994: 39). But one has to acknowledge that interstate relations of the region have fundamentally been of a power type, in spite of the changes currently under way.

Our hypotheses are:

(1) The process of regional integration requires the armed forces to maintain their traditional roles, but to increase their focus on other activities differing from such roles.

(2) The capacity of the armed forces to harmonize roles and tasks – sometimes contradictory – might significantly influence the success or failure of the integration process.

2  Repercussions of MERCOSUR on the Role of the Armed Forces

2.1  Traditional Roles of the Regional Armed Forces

From the beginning the states of the region have struggled to physically and geographically incorporate their territories; to politically, socially, and culturally integrate their populations; to consolidate different national identities; and to secure a domestic and international security condition enabling them to materialize their respective national development projects. Interstate relations have been power relations oriented to promote each country’s national interests. The armed forces, as relevant operational components of the respective states, have played a fundamental role in the shaping of national power. According to Morgenthau (1963), the relations among countries has historically been mainly shaped in “realistic” terms, where power has been the main tool of the state, because of the
absence of permanent and important political, economic or security interests shared among them.

Since they were born, the states in the region committed themselves to the task of creating and increasing the necessary national power that would save them from the imperial control of other regional or countries. This would enable them to negotiate the differences that might arise with their neighbors in the best possible conditions, and to influence regional relations for their own benefit, directly linking national power – particularly in its economic and military components – with welfare and development. The military preparedness and military action of the states was initially oriented to assume control over their own territory and population. Then, to expand it where feasible, and later – once contact was established with the military advanced forces of their neighbors – maintain it.

Once the territorial consolidation stage was finished, the political objective of military preparedness of all regional countries aimed at mainly creating a deterring capability that would turn it too risky to use force and thus alter the territorial agreements reached. To strengthen political and military power, the states were protagonists of economic roles through the application of protection, planning, or directly productive policies. Within this general process of national strengthening by means of a protagonist state, the armed forces were active and relevant instruments. Since the independence stage, the regional national political projects were particularly – and often – competitive, in their wish to exert – or protect themselves against – some type of hegemony, leadership, or influence by other states.

The acceptance by our countries of multiple development and supremacy projects, allows us to state that the armed forces, as active part of them, shaped and provided the foundation for the national
warfare hypotheses, based on the identification and quantification of the conflicts of interests arising from such projects. In this sense, as long as the projects remain differentiated – a situation not yet surpassed by any country or group of countries in the world – it is possible to say that conflict hypotheses of a different nature, magnitude, or intensity will prevail. This will depend on the importance or characteristics of the differences or the current or potential degree of conflict of the opposing interests or with respect to the regional common project, if this exists.

The various geographical configurations, population distribution, ethnic diversity, economic and social development, various degrees of domestic political stability, and the existence of armed or criminal political groups determine the national projects that bestow on the armed forces the country’s proper security tasks. In some countries of the region the physical, social, and active participation tasks of the national project continue being executed by the armed forces. In others, they are no longer necessary or have otherwise been assumed in various degrees by other state institutions.

In all the regional constitutions and strategic planning directives, national defense, the nation’s protection of vital interests, the preservation of territorial integrity, and the protection of citizens, is the main of the armed forces. Simultaneously, considering the size of their territories, the countries continue employing their armed services in the unfinished task of effectively incorporating the territories – particularly the most remote and inaccessible – to national social life under governmental control. The contribution of the armed forces to

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1 An excellent discussion on “vital interests”, what they are and who determines them can be found in Brodie (1978: 330f.).
the integration of the nation, incorporating the territory to the state’s active life, is still in force.

- In the case of Chile, the armed forces have submitted proposals that have been well received by the government. Thus they have become committed as advising instruments (Holzmann 1995: 183) and executors of the state – within their own subsidiary role – in tasks of the state’s action and control on marginal territories (Chilean Army 1991), over maritime areas of interest (Chilean Navy 1990; Martínez 1993) and over space.

- In the case of Argentina (National Defense Decree 1116/1996), its national strategic planning directive states that “the military instrument will collaborate in the civil defense environment, with the due national, provincial, and municipal organisms to support the national community, and eventually the countries in the region, in scenarios of national disaster, epidemics, and in any other circumstance as determined in accordance with the National Constitution and the laws”. In its national strategic concept it states that “in peacetime the concentration (of forces) will secure the territorial presence of the State in geographical vacuums”.

- In Brazil (National Defense Policy 1996), the directions of the national defense policy include “maintaining the participation of the Armed Forces in subsidiary actions pointing toward national integration, civil defense, and the socioeconomic development of the country, in harmony with its constitutional destiny”.

National defense, the nation’s protection, territorial integration and preservation, social action within the subsidiary role of the state, and the commitment with national interests are all traditional roles of the national armed forces that with some difference in magnitude or intensity among the various countries are still in force, though some
aspects may present contradictions among the countries or with respect to an eventual community project.

There is a permanent and intense effort to define and differentiate the respective nationalities, in order to reaffirm values that are in function to territorial integrity. Also to obtain and maintain the loyalty from ethnic minorities or unconnected social groups that remain far from the action of the state and to communicate and promote the acceptance of specific national projects. This effort determines the shaping and existence of consolidated cultural realities that will not cease to exist by means of a political resolution, because they represent values, concepts and world visions that are deeply embedded.

Differing with Europe, in Latin America the process of globalization and integration in the economic and social environment occurs through a process of productive conversion. In it new sectors are born and others die, leaving aside social segments – because of age, education, geographic location, and others – which are unable to incorporate themselves to the national social and economic life. This becomes worse because of the low quality of the education available to some social sectors and in some cases because their skills are oriented into another context.

Another factor of the lack of domestic integration in some countries arises from the remainder of the political and ideological armed struggle. This war left decided and experienced small groups that shifted into criminal activities, and terrorists that have highlighted the citizens lack of security, complicating the drugtrafficking problem and all associated violence.

The armed forces as an important factor for the shaping of nationalities have not only formed and communicated the universal
social values, but also the specific values, principles and aspirations of national political projects. These on occasion have included antagonistic or competitive components with reference to other countries of the region. The fact of different national projects that simultaneously exist with an eventual community project would demand that the armed forces of the region carry on the traditional roles within a context that tends to economic integration. This would imply a cultural contradiction whose conciliation would be a hard but imperative task, evolving in its nature and longstanding.

2.2 MERCOSUR as an Integration Process

The acceptance of the liberal economic system and the setting aside of economic nationalism enable the integration process of MERCOSUR, which demands a change whose cultural internalization and political consolidation is still a challenge in many countries. Within the domestic environment of each country, once the political decision is made, to start the integration process, there is an increasing number of actors that appear with various types of interests. This triggers a heterogeneous advance that in turn gives way to reactions from other sectors of the domestic and foreign societies with different perceptions of the level of benefit, which therefore become instability factors. The legitimacy of the policies within the societies, particularly those referred to integration, becomes a key factor for the survival and continuity of the process.

During the historical stage that came to an end with the Second World War, the trading state, mainly represented by Great Britain, obtained its power from territorial wealth. This produced colonial territorial expansionism and the expansion of the domestic output capacity, subject to various degrees of the state’s direction. This was used as a
way to unify and develop national power under the international perspective of competitiveness of a ‘zero sum’ type.

This nationalistic economic criterion that has been in force in our region until lately, is clearly described by Friedrich List (1941) in *The National System of Political Economy*. Alexander Hamilton (1791) who designed the initial stage of the United States development and security policy shared this vision. Protectionism, autarchy, and expansionism were the key instruments of this development and security model used in Latin America during many years, that would be modified with the introduction of the liberal complement. Nevertheless, it has not been proved that this economic liberalism has been understood, accepted, and incorporated equally in all the countries of the region. Moreover, it seems that finding a common denominator will be a long process subject to ups and downs.

On the other hand, the liberal economy tends to social enhancement through exchange and association, and aims at security through dependence and integration. It waives complete economic and productive autarchy as the ideal end, reducing them to some critical aspects, because it considers them less efficient economically. In the modern and liberal state the productive capacity is still important, but less than before, and the space given by the manufacturing activity has benefited service activities of high value added, such as financial concepts, design, consulting, and services.

In the economies that develop faster, capital, manual labor, and information will be increasingly significant, replacing the traditional prosperity factors. Possibly, due to their mobility, their economies will seem to be international because of the transnational corporations. Now and increasingly in the future, capital mobility will augment, and goods will increasingly be produced closer to their final destiny; that
is, abroad – under the jurisdiction of other governments – for export markets.

This view complicates the capacity of the traditional state, both to control and protect national interests, and demands a significant cultural change. The liberal state orients its effort toward negotiation with domestic and foreign capital, to attract it and stimulate growth and maintain it within its economic sphere, even though under foreign jurisdiction (Rosecrance 1996: 45).

Furthermore, the liberal state would progress toward reducing the state’s apparatus, abandoning its productive role and adopting the roles of ‘negotiator’ and ‘protector’ of national interests abroad. These would materialize through negotiation, in order to create, to modify, and comply with international regimes being shaped through the aggregate of international agreements regulating interrelationships. The negotiating state would become the political counterpart of transnational corporations or businesses. Nevertheless, the liberal state is an integral unity in the political, economic, and military sense. The coherence and consistency of its strength, the stability and efficiency of its political system, its economy, and its armed forces are its ‘stature’ or ‘weight’ within the international system. Therefore, the main attribute of such states, in order to attract investors, would be its stability and integral development.

Any risk assessment that an investor may do concerning a country will include – further to the political, economic, social, legal, infrastructure, and physical security variables among others – the capacity and efficiency of the state’s apparatus, that includes the military component of its national power. This means the stability of civil-military relations, capabilities and technological level of the military forces, organization, projection capability, flexibility to exert
influence over other areas, and international prestige or credit. Summing up, the quality of its contribution to national power within the international context that is what the investor cares for.

On the other hand, as negotiator within the context of interstate conflict, a country economically developed with an underdeveloped military power, whether politically, strategically, or technologically, will lose a significant part of its credibility. Both from the economic and political standpoint, national power – its military dimension included – plays an important role when assessing the capacity to negotiate of the liberal states, though they manifest themselves more subtly and indirectly that in mercantilistic states.

The regional integration projects – MERCOSUR in this case – start with a joint political initiative of the states, and it is a decision that stems from clearly identifiable actors, who initially may exert certain control over them. Nevertheless, when the agreed elements begin to be in force, relations are channeled through multiple actors that surpass the governmental limits, thus becoming complex (Nye/Keohane 1988: 23). Such relations have multiple channels connecting the societies: Governmental agencies – ministries and organisms of the state –; relations among political elites – parliamentary, international, political commissions –; informal links among non-governmental agencies – ecologist, religious –; among multinational corporations – banks, enterprises; and transnational organizations – postal, telecommunications.

Integration is channeled through interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations. The complexity and diversity of the topics determines that hierarchies cannot be established among them, and that domestic policy matters will be hard to distinguish clearly from community topics; for example, phytosanitary or port legislation. Such
a situation, plus the mercantilistic structures and policies produce a variety of conflicts of different nature and level. There is little practical experience in the region on how to manage them, therefore it is easy to predict a long – and sometimes hazardous – process of learning.

The ability to govern – understood as the capacity to regulate and manage social demands, and the mechanisms of political legitimation; and generally such non-structural aspects that provide continuity to the political system beyond the capacity of regimes to just stay in power – is the key factor for the viability of the integration process (Holzmann 1991: 15f.). The conflicts within each society are factors affecting the viability of the integration process, but may affect its rationality itself. The states can not always surpass the filters of dominating particular interests organized as corporate groups and impose a national interest that may be felt as such by all the community.

Governments start integration processes using the political legitimacy each one of them has at the moment of decision-making. Nevertheless, they must obtain a commitment and adhesion from most of the relevant political and institutional actors, including the various political forces and the armed forces, to honor the commitments agreed, in spite of the costs and sacrifices. They must also exert such a control, in terms of intensity and duration, on the national interests of the sectors, so as to enable the existence of stable, uniform, and impersonal policies.

Economic globalization implies worldwide competition among countries and products, and in all competition there must necessarily be winners and losers. In this sense, globalization establishes a difference among persons, groups, and nations rewarding those with
more capacity to adapt and inexorably punishing the less flexible. This generates two superposed fracture lines: Differentiation among countries, and fragmentation within societies.

Consequently, we may affirm that globalization benefits more rapidly and directly the ‘modern’ and ‘integrated’ social sectors, and postpones social groups marginally placed geographically and those working in sectors without economic value of exchange. By the same token, some countries will benefit from the process before and in greater degree than others; a combination of events that might generate domestic and international instability. In this sense, failure or success in the incorporation, participation, and commitment of the armed forces and other institutional, economic, and political actors in the drawing and implementation of integration policies and in the management of international conflicts surrounding them, will weaken or strengthen the process.

2.3 National Political Projects, Dependence, Interdependence and the Use of National Power

Leadership and international primacy are important, because as noted by Huntington, “the states pursue primacy to increase their security, promote their interests, and shape an international environment that reflects their interests and values.” (Huntington 1993: 70) This confirms that the competition of interstate power does not cease with either regional or worldwide integration, but persists changing the instruments and procedures, in order to try to lead the shaping of more favorable scenarios for the respective nations. And as both levels of integration develop amid a significant degree of uncertainty, governments have the duty to be cautious and avoid putting at risk their national interests.
The regional integration process starts with the economic interest, the juridical structure, and the general acceptance of the democratic and liberal political system, without pretending to coordinate a common political project. This legitimates the question about the real compatibility of the respective national political projects, which in turn determine the respective demands for security.

The integration process generates economic relationships of dependence and interdependence that are the source of power for some of the parties that request to be compensated with other means or in other areas. Thus, the continuous negotiation of the association terms becomes a critical element of the relationship among the members of the process. Within the regional relationship of MERCOSUR, the need to maintain a balance of the negotiation power among the community partners makes it necessary to consider the relation between regional integration and national power. At this stage the armed forces fulfill dual roles: To shape national power and secure national interests, and support the progress of the integration process and become the military dimension of the community to be formed.

The most frequent conflicts of interests in the years to come will deal with very different matters; economic, ecological, cultural, religious, etc. And in an international environment tending to regulate such conflicts, economic power will be a significant element in determining the primacy or subordination of the states. And even though it would be desirable to consider that altruism was primordial for persons, enterprises, and nations, reality shows that “the governments continually sacrifice economic efficiency for security, autonomy, and other values, at the moment of political decisions” (Nye/Keohane 1988: 22f.). They put into action all their resources of national power, including military power, when they are aware that the stakes are high.
There is a high degree of uncertainty as to the features that the international system will definitively acquire, at the regional, hemispheric, and global level, and uncertainty calls for caution and to take security measures. The whole integration process takes place in the international environment that evolves in search of a new configuration. There is the perception in all countries that national societies are in a fast process of change that makes them face new issues. Among them, one of the most recurring is to harmonize the need of having competitive economies with the simultaneous creation of the social consensus to avoid societal fragmentation (Rossel 1996).

Many attempts to predict the political behavior of countries, individually or grouped, have failed. This is due to various reasons (Jervis 1991/92) that will continue to be valid in the near future. Among them are the following:

- The limited knowledge of the political and social processes that rule us.
- The variety of elements that are a part of such processes is ample, complex, diverse, and insufficiently understood.
- The system is dynamic, the action of the academics and the learned about the political processes tends to generate phenomena of self-fulfill prophecy.
- The systematic action of out-of-the-region governmental and non-governmental organisms generates effects that when they influence on the actions of the rulers and public opinion, may lead them to adopt unforeseeable decisions.
- Though regional phenomena condition the governments’ international behavior, in many aspects their action is guided by exclusively domestic motivations.
The current international, global, regional, and sub-regional scenario has no previous background to act on, it is completely new, with such interrelated systems, that what happens in a country extends to and affects another one, generating unpredictable feedback loops.

Lastly, the past or current events in each country have influence on its future and mark its behavior.

The impossibility to foresee with a degree of certainty implies a significant degree of uncertainty in the processes for the determination and implementation of policies to national governments and states. This means they have to design various scenarios and make the necessary provisions, in order to have the capabilities – including the military – to control the most varied scenarios if these materialize.

The idea that somehow sovereignty would be in a struggle against development impairing integration and that law would be becoming an autonomous international principle – a universal law on some sort of worldwide civil society – seem to lead many to the belief that economy and law are the only means to aim at integration. Nevertheless, there is no certainty that integration restricted to such environments would, in the short term, lead to political rapprochement, nor that it will contribute to the reinforcement of the community’s collective identity (Delmas 1996: 19f.). In this sense, the question posed by Claudio Fuentes (1997: 3) is pertinent, “Do we wish to advance a society of mutual benefit? A negative answer to this question implies that we are only trying to obtain leverage from situations at the historical moment of cooperation we are currently living. A positive answer implies much more than signing bilateral agreements. It would imply the need of providing substantial content to the relation, provide it with instruments, and progressively increase
the bilateral work, (and) certainly the market will not be the one that will do all that.”

The economic forces are increasingly marginal of the will of the states, and the requirements imposed by economic competitiveness in worldwide markets do not contribute to facilitate the generation of common political projects. It seems that economic integration, even if it were successful, would only be limited to the integration of economies without generating shared political projects, even more when there are no threats from the outside that would somehow call for political agreement and military cooperation. The strength of the integration process is a case of _affectio societatis_; it is the materialization of the political will to be together and share a common destiny. Economic interests are not enough. It is worthwhile asking oneself if the political projects of development and international integration of each of the countries of MERCOSUR are complementary, competitive, or excluding. This is a crucial issue to be solved, in order to advance in the study of the national and regional security problem of the MERCOSUR members; an issue not yet dealt with.

The creation of the regional international regime aimed at creating conditions that will facilitate economic exchange and the development of interdependence relations in turn creates a scenario where each country’s individual national security must go hand in hand with the needs and effects of such interdependence. Interrelation becomes a simple exchange when there are no reciprocal costs. Nevertheless, when such exchange reduces autonomy and imposes a certain behavior, obligations, and burdens, it becomes interdependence, and MERCOSUR has the potential to create it. When interdependence is only one way we have dependence; that is, when the state is determined in a certain degree by foreign forces. And if
interdependent relations are not always in mutual benefit or symmetric for the parties, much less are the dependent relations.

In this sense, what provides the sources of power to some actors over others is the lack of symmetry of the relation, one of whose significant factors is the military component of national power. There are many historical examples of integration processes among countries, some motivated by security reasons, and others due to economic reasons; some of them successful, others a failure. And one of the hardest problems to solve is the way asymmetry in the national power of the partners is reflected when the time comes to negotiate opposing or conflictive interests. “Integration is a conflictive process, in the sense that interests or objectives are opposed among the various actors of the integration, with negotiation being the most frequent solution.” (Holzmann 1996). That is, integration would be a conflictive process negotiated among states with different relative national power, both in terms of magnitude and relative importance of the elements that shape them.

From this standpoint, the forms or means that each government moves, in order to generate resources to negotiate and obtain the best conditions or advantages, is fundamental. It is so to define and comply with the rules to use the influence or political power that is generated by the military component of national power, and identify its effects on the role of the armed forces within the context of regional integration. The balance of power among the states of the region is dynamic and may be more so in the future; therefore, the criteria established to regulate the convertibility of national power of the partner states is a permanent task.

Traditionally power has been associated to having certain resources, such as population, natural resources, economic size, military forces,
and political stability. Though such factors are still important, other factors such as technology, education, and economic growth have increased their relative value. Such new factors, that imply a high degree of power diffusion, detrimental for the state (Nye 1990), are mostly under the control of private actors – national or foreign – that make their decisions contingent on benefits in terms of their own particular interests. In this sense, we may expect the states to diminish their capacity to lead and control integration processes, limiting themselves to the definition of general rules, and then face the consequences and negotiate the conflicts that may arise.

If the tools of power change, the strategies for their use should change too. This means that power diffusion implies that in economies in the process of liberalization such as ours it becomes increasingly difficult to directly transfer one type of capacity to another. For example, to transform economic capacity in political power, because we have seen that the state’s control is limited in that area; or transform economic capacity in military capacity, because besides it is time-consuming, it would precisely weaken the prevailing factor in the power equation in this foreseen international world. The use of military capacity to obtain direct economic leverage would be too costly, and would probably lack efficacy, considering the mobility of economic factors, mainly the financial one.

In general, the ‘discount rate’ in the direct transformation from one type of power to another will be very high. Therefore, it will be the hierarchy of the topics in conflict that will determine the risks each state will run to directly transfer power from one factor to another. Possibly the weight of military power will be indirectly felt in the relation with the other partners, and will be directly felt and will dominate the relation when the element at stake is the state’s survival or another interest or value highly graded (Nye/Keohane 1988: 45f.).
There is no shared regional political project, but if there were one, the
unavoidable competitiveness for primacy or leadership would make us
accept that it exists and new conflicts would surface among the
partners calling for their negotiation. Negotiation is “the need to attain
a strategic leverage enabling (each country) to safeguard the defined
objectives, the country’s credibility and the possibility to obtain better
conditions for sustainable development” (Holzmann 1996: 6).

If the relations among the countries in our region effectively show a
mix of variable proportions of power relations and interdependence
relations, the key seems to be the capacity of governments to
determine, in each negotiation, the measure and type of proportion of
the elements that are present in each type of relation – of power and
cooperation. Then they would be able to select both the instruments to
be used and to assess the eventual transfer from one type of national
power to another.

On the other hand, considering that the behavior of governments is
under the influence of their leaders’ personality, their domestic
political needs, and their own internal conflicts, we must consider the
features of the decision-making processes of each country and the real
capacity and will to negotiate the institutions created by the
community. To this respect it is convenient to consider the opinion of
the former Israeli representative to United Nations and former
Minister of Foreign Relations from 1966 through 1974, who guards us
against exaggerated optimism when judging the behavior of states and
the capacity of collective agreements. He says: “All governments
make their decisions on behalf of national interest and later explain
them in terms of a sacrificed altruism. The truth is that in diplomacy
there are no collective solutions for individual crises.”
It also seems clear that the relations with out-of-the-community states and groups, both for each country and the community as a whole, will mainly continue being power relations. And the negotiation of controversies will adjust itself to the characteristics of such relations; that is, with the applicability of military power proper of such type of relation. Such considerations enable us to foresee three types of requests to the military component of national power. Firstly, to indirectly support intracommunity negotiations within a framework of cooperation; secondly, in direct support when dealing with vital or very important topics; and thirdly, in general support to negotiations with out-of-the-community countries or groups with which power relations are maintained.

2.4 Roles of the National Armed Forces in the New Regional Political and Economic Reality

From the above paragraphs it may be concluded that the national armed forces of the countries in the region maintain their traditional roles as follows: Component of national power; final instrument for definition of national defense; collaborator to the state for social integration and national territorial consolidation; eventual guarantor of domestic order and security. All these roles must be harmonized with the tasks of international projection of national power and regional cooperation.

As with all states, the armed forces of the countries in the region will continue being a substantial part of domestic and international national power. As a consequence of the geographic, social, and political features of each state, they will continue to participate in different degrees and forms in tasks related to the state’s action that will contribute to national social and economic development. They
will also generate the adequate domestic security frame that each government deems necessary. The enlargement of the physical environment of the role includes tasks related to the protection of territory and the exclusive economic zone. While we have opposing or competitive elements within national political projects, the role of regional military deterrence and the coercive instrument of the armed forces will continue to be in force.

If we accept that within the integration process framework, power relations and cooperation relations will continue to coexist, we have to accept that in this new environment, national power projection should also be a compound. That is, a power component, the expression of which would be materialized in the traditional environment of deterrence, and in the economic, and also political cooperation, the maximum expression of which is precisely military cooperation. This cooperation expression – fundamental to shape the security regime that accounts for the economic integration process and generates the mutual confidence needed to progress in all the process – is opposed to the traditional deterrence role. Nevertheless, both roles may be harmonized if deterrence is based on the knowledge and correct assessment of the capacity to act of the actors, if they do not become a threat.

The foundation that will enable the armed forces to significantly contribute to regional integration process is the following: The transparency of national security policies; the respect for the international commitments acquired; stable rules of the game in all the areas of the relation; the keeping of each type of conflict within its corresponding area without trying to transfer military power to other areas; deterrence because of knowledge and respect instead of lack of knowledge and uncertainty. This process will necessarily be gradual, conflictive, and long, and its success is not guaranteed.
Final Comments

In a successful integration process and while there is the will to integrate, it is hard to transform one type of power into another – for example, military capacity into political power – without causing stress to the all-out process. The projection of national power in regional relations may assume a form of competitiveness in search of *primacy*, through the articulation of internal resources of power, in order to generate greater international ‘negotiating capacity’. This would be reflected in the agenda’s capacity of determination and of generation of attractive and convenient policies for all.

Within the current international environment – regional in this case – the assessment and employment of political power is close to Lasswell and Kaplan’s (1950: 77) proposal. That is, “the amount of power of an actor is a function of his weight (degree of participation in decision-making); set of conditions (values that may exert influence), and dominion (the quality of those that receive the influence).” Therefore, within an economic integration framework, *leadership* as a form of political action – including its military component – might be more efficient than *imposition* as a form of relationship.

Lastly, the creation of an effective leadership capacity requires the projection of the national state’s capacity for action toward the regional and international environment by means of military actions in peace operations, human relief, ecological disaster control, and military technical cooperation among other activities. If such activities were jointly performed with other countries in the region, they would demand some degree of interoperability among the forces of the participating countries.
4 References


1 Introduction

The demise of authoritarian regimes in Latin America has led to a wave of speculation about the durability and depth of the new democracies. This literature on democratic “consolidation”, however, presents a tangle of confusion. While the concept of a democratic transition is relatively easy to define and operationalize, the same cannot be said of democratic consolidation. For Higley and Gunther (1992) as well as for Przeworski (1991) consolidation basically means the fact that political actors agree to respect the democratic rules. This definition is problematic. For example, Colombia has been electing successive democratic governments for the last thirty years, yet it would be hazardous to say that there is a consolidated democracy in that country. According to Huntington (1991) a democratic regime is consolidated when it passes the “two turnover” test, in which a government loses an election to the opposition, and the latter is not able to elect its successor. However, this definition is also problematic. As one scholar (Schneider 1995: 221) observes, Japan has not passed this test, the United States only passed it around 1840, and Chile could be considered a consolidated democracy on the eve of the 1973 Pinochet coup.

In the face of the difficulty in operationalizing the concept of consolidation, we agree with the suggestion of Schneider (1995: 220–221) to disaggregate the democratic regime. In this way, the focus of the analysis ceases to be whether or not the political system as a whole is consolidated. The emphasis shifts to how different components of
democracy function. In our case, that is civil-military relations, and more specifically, military justice and how this affects the exercise of citizenship. During the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, it is not sufficient to remove the military from the presidency, replacing it with civilians elected by the people. This could be the principal characteristic of an electoral democracy, but it is insufficient to define a democratic regime. For this, it is necessary to create new institutions that allow civil society to recapture political spaces that were appropriated by the apparatus of the authoritarian state. Institutions that protect the interests of old and new political actors are incapable of great political transformations.

One aspect of consolidation about which there has been relatively little theorizing is the role of military justice, which has a special jurisdiction. During military regimes, it is expected that this jurisdiction will be enlarged, while during democratic times it will be shrunk. In authoritarian Brazil (1964–1985) (Pereira 1995, 1996; Zaverucha 1993, 1998) and Chile (1973–1990), enlarged military jurisdiction enabled military courts to prosecute civilian and military opponents. Stepan suggests that where such jurisdictions have been shrunk back to their original size and civilians are no longer subject to them, consolidation has proceeded further (Stepan 1988: 97). Indeed, according to a Chilean commission created in 1990 by former President Patricio Aylwin, one factor that facilitated disregard for human rights during the Pinochet regime was a military penal code that violated basic human rights in several of its articles. In contrast to the Pinochet regime, a state of war was never formally declared in Brazil. While Chileans were tried by councils of war, Brazilians were tried by military courts according to military codes in peacetime. Amazingly, these codes are still valid today.
The role of military courts in democratic consolidation is important for several reasons. First, the existence of separate court systems (one civilian and the other military) with different procedures and sentencing structures, in which the military system affects large segments of the population (and does not function merely to discipline infractions of military rules and regulations by military personnel) violates, in a systematic and institutional way, the principle of equality before the law essential to the idea of the rule of law (Zaverucha 1999). Second, a major claim on behalf of democracies is that they offer citizens more protection from arbitrary state abuse and violence than authoritarian regimes (Przeworski 1991: 31; Tilly 1995: 370). Yet in regimes like Brazil’s, where military police, in practice, often obtain substantial immunity for their crimes in state military courts (Bueno 1995), this protection is greatly diminished. Third, authoritarian regimes attempt to increase the military’s jurisdiction (so as to judge crimes committed by civilians, political crimes, and/or crimes committed by off-duty military personnel) in order to increase the costs of opposition collective action. If this cost becomes high enough, people will be too intimidated to oppose the authoritarian government. It is unjustifiable, however, that such intimidation continues to occur in a democratic environment.

In Brazil, military courts today retain many of the considerable powers they gained under authoritarian rule. Many categories of civilians may still be prosecuted in the federal military courts for crime such as insulting the armed forces’ personnel, writing graffiti on military barracks or throwing a stone during a political rally. The Federal military is also largely protected from the jurisdiction of civilian courts, with military courts the venue for charges against them even in the commission of off-duty crimes (Zaverucha 1999). This is a severe limitation on the jurisdiction of civilian courts, because federal forces are constitutionally responsible for maintaining law and order.
in domestic affairs. Furthermore, even though the military regime created a new code of military justice in 1969, the post-1985 regime has left this almost intact, reflecting the large degree of continuity in patterns of military justice in Brazil.

This paper analyzes the system of military justice in post-transition Brazil. It argues that an enlarged and insulated system of military courts rewards the armed forces with special prerogatives and violates the principle of equality before the law. Part of a larger study of military justice in Brazil and Chile, this paper is part description and part analysis, drawing upon comparative, normative, and legal perspectives, while remaining a work of political science rather than of legal scholarship. Some description is unavoidable, because detailed knowledge of how military court systems work in Latin America is presently unavailable in political science. The main thrust of the paper is to show that Brazilian military justice constitutes a largely unreformed authoritarian enclave within the state, with a much broader jurisdiction than that of its counterparts in older democracies.

The paper is organized into three sections. Section I puts Brazil’s system of military justice in comparative and theoretical perspective, arguing that authoritarian politics tend to enlarge the scope of military justice, while formally democratic regimes do not necessarily shrink it. Section II continues the comparative analysis, arguing that in political systems with low legitimacy such as Brazil’s, military courts are used to legitimize the armed forces’ control over the means of violence. This section also points out that even when reforms of the system have been made, such as in 1996, these changes have been incoherent and unconstitutional. Section III exposes the authoritarianism inherent in the current organization, composition, and procedures of Brazilian military justice, ending with a brief description of the pinnacle of the system, the Superior Military Court.
2 Politics and Federal Military Justice

The word “court” (foro) comes from the Latin “fuero” which means a tribunal, i.e. the place where judgment occurs. From this point on in this paper, court and military jurisdiction will be used as synonyms. In the Middle Ages and until the end of the twentieth century, in Europe and in Latin America, the military court had the character of a privilege. Not only crimes committed by members of the military were subject to military courts, but also those committed by their family (Romeiro 1994: 76). Military justice was more a privilege than a special court, as it is now known (along with electoral, labor, and other kinds of special court).

In Spain at the end of the eighteenth century, twenty distinct courts existed, ranging from those for particular professions (ecclesiastical, military, etc.) to the city of origin of the accused. Within the military there were special courts according to the social condition of the defendant (noble or plebian) or the regiment (infantry, cavalry, artillery, etc.) (Robles Valenzuela 1990: 6).

The French Revolution established the principles of modern penal jurisdiction, stripping it of its character as a feudal privilege. From that point on, some countries began to recognize the difference between a privileged jurisdiction and a special court. Special courts are those competent to judge special matters (i.e. military, electoral, labor, etc.) outside of ordinary law. One could conclude that ordinary justice is generic and military justice is a subset of that, and for this reason, military justice should not have fewer guarantees than the former. If it were to have, it would be a privileged jurisdiction or a special court.
Special courts are those not consecrated in the constitution and which arise in a moment of internal or external danger. In other words, they are courts that are not ordinarily “natural” in the sense that a citizen appears within a jurisdiction that is not known or fixed beforehand. However, a special court can be natural if a previous law designates a judge as responsible for exercising authority within a specific jurisdiction. In the same way, nothing necessitates that a special court violates natural law, which rests on two pillars: a) no-one can be judged by an institution established after the fact; and b) among the pre-established judges there exists a hierarchy of responsibilities that excludes any alternative decided upon by any individual’s discretion.

Military justice in well-established democracies is neither a system of special courts nor a privileged jurisdiction. To prevent the military penal jurisdiction from constituting a sort of professional caste justice, democracies seek to abolish military penal jurisdiction or impose severe restrictions on the latter’s scope, prohibiting it from judging civilians and judging only those crimes that are strictly military. The same cannot be said of countries with authoritarian regimes or fragile democracies.

As has been noted, there is a clear connection between politics and the armed forces, on one hand, and the existence and extent of military justice on the other. And one of the privileges protected by military justice is the military institution, which is an organ of the state (Peixoto 1988: 221). In Brazil, article 142 of the constitution confers on the armed forces the attribution of guarantor of constitutional powers, the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, and “law and order”. But Brazilian military justices is part of the judicial branch. Therefore, in a marked distortion, the armed forces supervise the power that must judge them. The notions of order and disorder involve ideological judgments that commit the armed forces to a certain vision
of state and society which, for its part, is subject to stereotypes and prejudices about the (un)desirable behavior of certain individuals.

We call the belief that the internal functioning of military justice can be separated from what occurs outside it, or the socio-political context, the fallacy of autonomy. It is impossible to hope that military justice is reformed in accordance with democratic norms if the political system of the country also does not move in the same direction. For this reason, the way that military justice functions in a given country is one of the indicators of the democratic health of that country. The relationship between politics and military justice varies with time, as military justice is the military-judicial arm of the state. The basic function of any legal system is to resolve conflicts arising in the socio-political environment. These conflicts are governed by a system of rules (the Military Penal Code) and processed institutionally (according to the Code of Military Penal Procedures). There is also the possibility that the military justice system works to resolve problems of the administration of the state more than to resolve the problems of members of the military corporation. The norms and institutions of military justice are influenced by and influence the socio-political context from which conflicts arise. This context, for its part, can also be in a state of flux.

In a democracy, the political actor is not only an individual but also a citizen in the sense of a legal person who carries rights and obligations arising out of the social contract (O’Donnell 1999: 305). Civiliansizing military justice is something more than a mere legal question, but also a political question, as the judiciary is part of the state, reflecting the correlation of forces between civilians and the military in the political system.
In all political systems, military justice is used to regulate the military’s use of violence in the sense of making the armed forces more efficient in their function, which is to protect the sovereignty of the country from the threat of external enemies. Since without hierarchy and discipline, the armed forces cannot exercise that function, it falls to military justice to rapidly and severely punish deviations from prescribed behavior. There is much more concern in military justice to maintain military order than with impartiality and independence, since military courts are part of the armed forces (Gómez 1998: 242). Military justice guarantees the principle that “who commands may judge”, and administrative-disciplinary power is mingled with the penal power based on the sovereignty of the commander in chief. This is a pre-liberal vision which still prevails in Chile, because there the first level of military justice takes place in military barracks. In Brazil, Councils of Justice existed within the barracks to prosecute and sentence enlisted men and women for the crimes of desertion and insubordination. The 1988 constitution abolished this practice, and such crimes are judged in military courts today.

The distinctiveness of the military profession nurtures the idea that the military form a society apart from the civilian world, and for this reason need a different juridical treatment. This distinctiveness, however, is declining with the passage of time, as many military personnel live off base and engage in technical work, while the armed forces are moving towards a greater degree of individualism and privacy among their members (Sherman 1974: 1402). At the same time, institutions such as the police (even with a military aspect) and fire brigades, which also need to carry out their missions with precision and discipline, are governed by civilian laws.
With the growing legitimacy of liberal democracies, it is difficult to reconcile the principle of “who commands must judge” with the principles and rights of a modern penal code, which demands procedural guarantees for those involved in criminal cases. According to Sherman (1974: 1402) “military leadership doctrine now favors persuasion over authoritarian domination and views the commander’s objective as instilling high initiative and morale rather than rigid discipline”. Military penal law has therefore been losing its legitimacy and has begun to be contested. The common citizen has begun to demand the “civilianization” of military justice, in the sense that he or she can see that military justice is much more linked to the institution of the military or the policies of a particular government than they are to the protection of the citizen, including the military citizen. If it is irrefutable that military justice has different origins from civilian justice, it is decreasingly clear that both have different purposes.

Leaders of political systems which suffer from low legitimacy try to use military justice for other purposes. Military justice is used as a means to legitimate the military’s control over the means of internal violence, inducing the citizen to accept the military as a protector of the nation and guardian of the established order.

To use military justice as an instrument for the regulation and control of society it to try to guarantee that civilians, like the military, will conform, and consequently reproduce military values as they are seen by the dominant political group. Abstract values such as “national security”, “nation”, and “reputation of the armed forces” are evoked to demand sacrifices which are not always democratic. Since this symbolic construct is far from the problems of everyday life, it needs to be reified through its interpretation into concrete rules of conduct (Lapierre 1954: 260). Therefore, without the maintenance of what the military calls “law and order”, it is impossible to secure the “security
of the nation”, and critics of the armed forces undermine the “good reputation” of the military.

The great variation in military court jurisdiction, an outcome of both internal and international political factors, reminds us that such jurisdictions are socially constructed and must be socially controlled. It is possible to divide countries into four categories which reflect diverse degrees of military jurisdiction in peace time. These are:

i) No Military Justice

Countries in which military courts have jurisdiction only during a war, and enjoy no jurisdiction at all in peace time (examples: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Germany). Napoleon Bonaparte was against the judging of military personnel by military courts. His well-known phrase is that “military law is the common law with a military cap”. He also said that “justice in France is: a French citizen is a citizen before being a soldier; if, in the interior, a soldier kills another soldier, he committed, without doubt, a military crime, but he also committed a civilian crime. Therefore, it is necessary that all crimes be submitted first to civilian jurisdiction when that is present” (Mera 1998: 50).

ii) Restricted Military Justice

Countries in which military courts have jurisdiction in peace time but are not allowed to try civilians (examples: Italy, the United Kingdom, the USA).

iii) Intermediate Military Justice

Countries which allow civilians to be judged in military courts in peace time, but only if civilian behavior is deemed to threaten the security of the armed forces or the country’s external security (examples: Argentina, Uruguay).
iv) Broad Military Justice

Countries which adopt a very broad military jurisdiction. Examples of these are Franco’s Spain, Marcos’ Philippines (during the martial law imposed between 1974 and 1981), Pinochet’s Chile and contemporary Brazil. In all four of these cases, military courts recognize as military ordinary as well as political crimes. The illegal acts may be perpetrated either by a member of the military, a civilian, or both together. It is noteworthy that the 1967 Brazilian Constitution (article 122) and its 1969 amendment (article 129), both enacted at the peak of the military regime’s repression, gave the military courts a narrower jurisdiction than did the “democratic” 1988 Constitution. Because a complementary law to regulate military justice has still not been created, civilians can be prosecuted in military courts for any crime committed against military personnel or property. In 1967/69, military court jurisdiction extended only to civilians who had committed crimes against national security or military institutions.

Another way to appreciate the ample military justice jurisdiction that exists in Brazil and Chile is to discern those factors that determine the jurisdiction in these countries: a) *Ratione materiae*: military crimes or crimes considered as such; b) *Ratione personae*: common crimes committed by military personnel, in one of the three circumstances that the law recognizes: b.1) *ratione temporis*: in war time or during a military campaign; b.2) *ratione legis*: the crime is committed while the accused is in military service or because of such service, and b.3) *ratione loci*: the crime is committed in a military or police installation.
Due to these three reasons for assigning jurisdiction (because of the person, the crime, or the place of the crime), military justice ends up being superior to ordinary justice in relation to public order, resulting in constant conflicts of jurisdiction, which slows the progress of cases. The jurisdiction of military penal law is so broad that even though by law military justice is specialized justice, in certain circumstances it functions like a court of privileges and instead of judging military crimes comes to judge crimes committed by the military. Hence its legitimacy is being questioned constantly for having made the terms privileged forum and specialized justice synonymous.

Because of these three factors, the military courts have a broad jurisdiction. The definition of military crime is also very broad, as can be seen in article 9 of the Military Penal Code approved in Brazil in 1969, at the height of the political repression of the military regime, having as its object the protection of military personnel who engaged in such repression. The following are considered military crimes in peacetime:

I. Crimes that are covered in this code when they are defined in a different way in civil penal law, or those anticipated in it, regardless of who commits them, except for social disposition;

II. Crimes outlined in this code, even though they may have the same definition in civil penal law, when they are committed a) by military personnel on active duty or similar status against military personnel in the same or a similar situation; b) by military personnel or active duty or similar status in a place subject to military administration, against reserve military personnel, retired military or someone similar, or against a civilian; c) by military personnel on duty, on a commission of a military nature, or in fornication, even outside the place subject to military administration, or against reserve military personnel, retired or
similar status, or against a civilian; d) by military personnel during maneuvers or exercises against reserve military personnel, retired or similar status, or against a civilian; e) by military personnel on active duty or similar duty against assets under military administration or military administrative order; f) by military personnel on active duty or similar duty who, although not being in the service, uses arms belonging to the military or any war materiel under military guard, supervision, or administration to commit an illegal act;

III. Crimes committed by reserve military personnel, by retired military personnel, or by civilians against military institutions, considered as such not only those included in category I but those in category II as well as in the following cases: a) crimes against assets under military administration or contrary to military administrative order; b) in a place subject to military administration, against military personnel on duty or assembled, or against an official of a military minister or military justice, in the exercise of a function inherent in the accused’s office; c) against military personnel in formation or during a period of readiness, alert, observation, exploration, exercise, encampment, billet, or maneuvers; d) even if outside of the place subject to military administration, against military personnel engaging in a function that is military in nature, whether in discharging sentry duty or guaranteeing and preserving public order or administrative or judicial order, when legally requisitioned for that purpose or in obedience to higher legal command.

On 7 August 1996, Law Number 9299 was signed by the Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. It changed article 9 of the Military Penal Code and article 82 of the Code of Military Penal Procedure. Article 9 of the Military Penal Code was modified by revision of subsection c of section II, revision of subsection f of the
same section, and the addition of a paragraph, leaving the following language: “Article 9: Military crimes in peace time are considered to be (...) First paragraph: The crimes detailed in this article, when intentional against life and committed against civilians, will be submitted to the jurisdiction of civilian justice.” Article 2 of Law Number 9299/96, for its part, changed article 82 of the Code of Military Penal Procedure and added a new passage so that article 82 read as follows: “Article 82: Military jurisdiction is special, and except in intentional crimes against life practiced against civilians in peace time, the following [crimes] will be subject to it (...). Paragraph 2: In intentional crimes against life committed against civilians, military justice will forward the documents from the military-police inquiry to ordinary justice.”

With regard to the modification of Article 9, Section II, Subsection c of the Military Penal Code, and the revision of subsection f of the same text, detailed commentary is unnecessary here. However, when Law Number 9299 sent to common justice intentional crimes against the life of civilians committed by military personnel, it was completely unconstitutional. In dealing with the jurisdiction of federal military justice, article 124 of the Constitution determines that “military justice is responsible for trying and judging cases of military crime as defined by law”. The jurisdiction of state military justice is spelled out in article 125, paragraph 4 of the Constitution, which determines that its responsibility is to try and judge military police and military firemen of military crimes as defined by law. Note that state military justice does not have jurisdiction to try and judge civilians, in contrast to federal military justice. This decision does not make juridical sense, although it does obey a political logic.

This jurisdiction can be modified directly through a constitutional amendment that attributes to ordinary justice the trial and judgment of
military crimes, or indirectly, by means of ordinary legislation, changing the definition of military crime. As it happened, the Federal government decided to send some military crimes to ordinary justice by means of ordinary legislation. Note that instead of modifying the definition of military crime, Law Number 9299/96 merely transferred intentional military crimes against the life of civilians to ordinary justice. Recall that the first paragraph added to article 9 began with the expression “crimes that this article deals with”, and these crimes are precisely military crimes, as the heading of the article determines (“Military Crimes in Peace Time”). A different outcome could have been achieved if the new language had been, for example, “intentional crimes against the life of a civilian committed by military personnel are not considered military crimes”. (But in this case we would have had a tacit revocation of article 205 of the Military Penal Code, or an abolitio criminis, with all its consequences.)

The difference between the example above and the actual law is simple. The first changes the definition of military crime, and the second changes the jurisdiction of the judgment of military crime. As we have already stated, the law can only alter the definition of military crime, never its jurisdiction, a matter that is exclusively constitutional.

The majority of the crimes dealt with in the Military Penal Code protect juridical principles of a general character, and are not related to the military values and interests of discipline, obedience, and military service and can, for this reason, be committed by civilians. Military justice in this way has assumed characteristics alien to what should be its sole end: to discover and judge behavior that harms or threatens the interests and well-being of the armed forces. To permit this broad jurisdiction is to legitimate the vision that the armed forces are something apart from society and because of this need a justice system that is practically entirely autonomous. This is a grave
distortion in the role of the armed forces, a form of militarism that is common in the Third World. The military corporation places itself in a political role that involves it in matters that are typically civilian (Zaverucha 2000), without any principle of democratic legitimacy, and uses military courts as a preferential arena for the resolution of conflicts arising from this role, impeding the construction of democracy.

Thanks to this broad definition of military crime, the military courts can judge military personnel, both for military crimes proper and for crimes improperly construed as military, as well as civilians for “militarized” crimes. A crime is properly (or exclusively, or essentially) military when it violates juridical principles protected solely by the Military Penal Code. In the latter there are only damages that are exclusive to military interests, such as desertion, sleeping on guard duty, mutiny, abandoning one’s post, and cowardice before the enemy (Astrosa Herrera 1985: 86). Military crime is confined to the military environment.

The improperly attributed military crime is that which violates juridical principles protected both by the Military Penal Code and the ordinary penal code. In this type of crime, there is a simultaneous harm to both military and common interests, as in violence to a superior leading to wounding or death, theft of military property, the transport of drugs in a military airplane, robbing a supermarket, and shooting a spouse with a military revolver. In the latter cases, the criterion that the crime occurred in a military environment is not sufficient to qualify it as military crime; it is necessary also to examine the military condition of the person accused of the crime.

“Militarized” crime is ordinary crime committed by a civilian that violates the common penal code and is only imagined to violate the
Military Penal Code. Examples are throwing a stone at the head of a military officer during a demonstration, and injuring the good name of the armed forces in the media. Here, we are dealing with the application of military law to conflicts in civil society whose solution should be subject to the principles and assumptions of common civilian jurisdiction.

No consolidated democratic regime admits the kind of “militarized” crime alluded to above, or a definition of common crimes committed by military personnel that is as broad as that of Brazil and Chile. These are typical of authoritarian regimes or of countries with fragile democracies. There are intermediate cases in which civilians are not judged, but the jurisdiction of military justice extends to military personnel who commit common crimes against private parties and state agencies, even when these crimes violate juridical principles that are not strictly military (Mera 1998: 47).

Nevertheless, the modern tendency is to abolish military justice in peace time or to accept only the definition of military crime that limits itself to the failure to fulfill duties stemming from military office. If the function of the armed forces of a democratic state is to defend national sovereignty against external aggression, then “the only strictly military juridical principle that deserves penal defense is the protection of the community or the external security of the state. In other words, the juridical principle is related to the capacity to maintain peace vis-à-vis foreign states and at the same time to guarantee the defense of the state before external threats in peace time. This juridical principle acquires more relevance, naturally, in war, when the defense of the state requires force capable of operating rapidly and effectively against the violation of the state’s sovereignty by a foreign power, which requires that the hierarchical principle of the organization is reinforced, along with discipline and obedience,
opening the possibility of the criminalization of certain infractions, because these become more serious” (Romeiro 1994: 232).

It is necessary at this point to distinguish between three concepts: penal military jurisdiction, military penal law, and military disciplinary law. The fact that military crimes exist does not mean that their investigation and judgment must be necessarily done by a specialized military court. As we have seen, certain countries have eliminated military court jurisdiction in peace time, but preserved the existence of military crimes “because they recognize the existence of a particular juridical principle that justifies special protection by a penal instrument (Horvitz 1998: 79). These crimes go to the jurisdiction of ordinary justice. Therefore, the specific offenses that occur within the armed forces justify the existence of a penal or disciplinary military law but not necessarily a military penal court jurisdiction. In the same way, labor, electoral, economic, or other crimes could be treated by ordinary courts rather than special courts (Mera 1998: 28).

Penal military law is a law of war, the final purpose of militaries. Therefore, military penal jurisdiction in peace time is justified only due to the fact that in this period, the armed forces prepare themselves for the possibility of war. Military jurisdiction should restrict itself to the juridical principles that affect this type of training. For this, military penal in time of war should be broader than in peace time, because it is during war when the necessity to protect national interests by force intensifies. The death penalty, for example, is accepted by Brazilian military penal law in war time but not in peace time.

It is not acceptable to argue that the protection of the internal security of the state should be an object of military penal law. This is a role that falls on society as a whole and not merely the armed forces. To
confer on the Brazilian and Chilean armed forces the task of guaranteeing “law and order” and “the institutional order of the Republic”, aside from being a political distortion, affects military penal law, making it a protector of non-military juridical principles (Mera 1998: 47–48).

Penal law is an instrument of social control. In other words, the penal intervention of the state is justified only in the face of the gravest attacks against vital juridical principles and always when these cannot be protected in any other way (Mera 1998: 49). Another distortion is to use military penal law to resolve disciplinary matters within the armed forces. For this it is sufficient to have a rigid disciplinary code. The necessity of punishment arises only when the conduct results in the violation of juridical principles, and not merely to repress certain ideas or propagate dominant views of society which are seen as appropriate to maintain a given social or moral order (Horvitz 1998: 102).

The object of disciplinary law is the infraction which involves the breaking of a regulation or superior order of a general character – something less grave than a crime. The principle “no crime without law” applies to penal law but not to disciplinary infractions, because there can be infractions that are not spelled out by the regulations (Romeiro 1994: 74). This infringes the rights of military personnel, because the nature of the infringement is described by the applicator of the sanction, who is thereby transformed also into a legislator. What is worse, both the infraction and the punishment are indeterminate, and the accused only knows a posteriori what was prohibited. We are dealing here with a violation of the principle of military-administrative transparency, which demands that disciplinary infractions are spelled out in rules and that such rules clearly determine the scope and limits of the punishable behavior. The
incompatibility of this state of affairs with the rule of law deepens when we look at Article 50, Section LV of the Brazilian Constitution. In the latter, the defendants or litigants in a judicial or administrative process “have the right to know the exact description of the conduct of which they are accused as a guarantee of an adversarial and adequate defense, since no one can defend himself against unspecific, vague charges (…). In this manner, it is not permitted that the administrator is transformed into a legislator, creating charges in accordance with his pleasure or hate, leading to juridical or administrative insecurity in which at any moment the defendant could be punished on the mere caprice of the possessor of disciplinary power.”

While penal jurisdiction has as its substance crime, the substance of disciplinary jurisdiction is the infraction. For this reason, it does not fall within disciplinary jurisdiction to exercise juridical functions, because this is inherent in military penal jurisdiction, just as it does not fall within disciplinary law to protect juridical principles.

Even having made this clarification, it is difficult to determine with what criteria we must delineate the conceptual and legal boundaries between the two military jurisdictions. This is true in particular of cases in which there is a similarity between the military juridical principles affected by both disciplinary infractions and military crimes (discipline, obedience, military service, and so on) (Mera 1998: 26–27). There is a certain unanimity in the legal commentary that there are no qualitative differences between penal and disciplinary violations, and that one can only make quantitative distinctions between them, in terms of an ascending order of gravity, in which the penal jurisdiction is reserved for the gravest violations (Horvitz 1998: 108).
Before this complex panorama, there frequently arises the “ceremonial fraud”, in which military legislation describes as disciplinary infractions, and punishes as such, violations that are really crimes. There are also cases of disciplinary infractions punished with penal punishments, such as barracks prison. The accused’s right to defend himself via guarantees that include the right to due process is taken away as if they were nothing in such instances. The tension between military procedures and civil rights will persist as long as legal scholarship fails to resolve the distinction between military crime and military infractions.

4 The Penal Legislation and the Military Penal Process in Brazil

The first military code was set forth in 1891 and went into effect in 1899, via Law Number 617 of 29 September 1899. It was called the Penal Code of the Navy. Until 1934, military justice was part of the executive branch. After the promulgation of the constitution in that year, it was incorporated into the judiciary. The Constitution of 1934 institutionalized via Article 63 the judges and military courts and agencies of the judicial branch, canceling their administrative character up to that time. On 24 January 1944, under the dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas, the new Military Penal Code was promulgated.

Armed forces, military police, and military justice are all institutions associated with public safety. They help reveal the sociopolitical nature of a country. As is common practice in authoritarian regimes, with the advent of the Brazilian military regime in 1964, the specter of military legislation grew significantly. Its purposes were threefold: to protect the members of the repressive forces by making it difficult to try military personnel on active duty or even obstructing civil courts
from doing so; to make it possible for civilians to be tried by military courts for committing civil or political crimes, thus increasing via intimidation the opposition’s costs of engaging in a collective act of deviance (Tilly 1990: 100), and to legitimate state-sponsored violence in the eyes of citizens, thus inducing them to accept the norms of the established order (Pereira 1994: 15–34).

On 27 October 1965, Institutional Act Number 2 redefined the scope of military justice established in the Constitution of 1946. Article 8 strengthened Paragraph 1 of Article 108 of the Constitution of 1946 by means of the following revision: Paragraph 1: This special forum can be extended to civilians in the case law for the repression of crimes anticipated in Law 1802 of 5 January 1953. Paragraph 2: The jurisdiction of military justice in the crimes referred to in the preceding paragraph, with the penalties attributed to the same, will prevail over any other penalty specified in civil laws, even though such crimes have the same definition in these laws. Paragraph 3: It is incumbent upon the Superior Military Court to try and to judge governors of states and their ministers in crimes referred to in the first paragraph and incumbent upon the Councils of Justice in all other cases.

Thus civilians came to be tried more readily by military courts. The jurisdiction of military justice and its sentences prevailed in new crimes over civil justice and ordinary laws, and the courts designated to try governors and their ministers ended up being the military courts. The Constitution of 1967 and Constitutional Amendment Number 1 of 17 October 1969 (also known as the Constitution of 1969) incorporated into the legal document the principles adopted by the institutional acts. What had been an act of exception was thus transformed into a constitutional clause. The Constitution of 1967 defined the jurisdiction of military justice in this way: Article 122:
Military justice must try and judge, in the military crimes defined by law, military personnel and similar persons. Paragraph 1: This special forum can be extended to civilians in the explicit cases of law for the repression of crimes against national security or military institutions, with ordinary appeal to the Supreme Court. Paragraph 2: It is incumbent upon the Superior Military Court to try and to judge state governors and their ministers in crimes referred to in Paragraph 1. Paragraph 3: The law will regulate the application of the penalties of military legislation in wartime.

Article 129 of the Constitution of 1969 repeated Article 122 of the Constitution of 1967 but with two important exceptions. First, in Paragraph 1, the possibility of appealing to the Supreme Court disappeared. Second, the expression “in wartime” disappeared from Paragraph 3, meaning that the law will regulate the application of the penalties of military legislation in wartime or in peacetime. The Constitution of 1969 consequently reflected the climate of growing authoritarianism in Brazil in that civilians’ appeal to civil jurisdiction was foreclosed, and the law would regulate the penalties of military legislation not only in war but also in peacetime.

It should be remembered that the military regime was increasingly committed to fortifying the role of the military police as part of the repressive apparatus. In Minas Gerais, for example, the military regime created the Counterinsurgency School of Imbiraçu. Its purpose was to teach military police techniques of interrogation, assessment, and interpretation of subversive propaganda as well as how to fight and survive in the jungle. In legal terms, Decree Law Number 667 de 2 of July 1969 stipulated in Article 3 that it was the duty of the military police to “execute exclusively, except for missions peculiar to the Armed Forces, the day-to-day policing, as planned and outfitted by the qualified authorities, for assuring fulfillment of the law,
maintenance of public order, and exercise of the constituted powers.”
This same decree created the General Inspectorate of Military Police,
an agency link and responsible for control of the military police up.
Still nowadays, the military police is under partial control of the
Army.

To complement the Constitution of 1969, the military junta (which
governed Brazil due to the disability of General-President Arthur da
Costa e Silva) issued three decrees. Decree-Laws Numbers 1001,
1002, and 1003, all dated 21 October 1969, regulated respectively the
Military Penal Code, the Code of Military Penal Process, and the Law
of the Organization of Military Justice. These legal documents,
written at the height of the political repression, remain valid today.
Consequently, these laws are incapable of normalizing or regularizing
democratic transformations in military justice. Brazil is one of the few
countries that, upon ending an authoritarian regime, preserved the
penal codes of the ancien régime. In Chile, for example, political
leaders created a new Military Penal Code after the democratic
transition.

The authoritarian regime had a clear interest in militarizing the laws of
the country. After all, the law makes up part of the ideological
structure of any government, whether democratic or authoritarian.
Therefore the law will always accompany the exercise of violence and
physical repression. That is to say, there is an ideology that legitimates
such violence. In the case of democracy, it would be dominance with
consent of the subordinated. In authoritarianism, the domination takes
place without such consent, resulting from the systematic use of
political repression.
Military law is a law for internally organizing the armed forces which can only have a general applicability in time of war. To plan for the general application of military law outside of a war situation is to distort its essence. Legitimating this kind of distortion, the Minister of Justice Luiz Antonio da Gama e Filho, in expounding the reasons for the new Code of Military Penal Procedure, disclosed that he was attempting to make military personnel more immune from civil regulation: “The bill (projecto) sought to create a codification that would embrace all matters relative to military penal procedure, without those implementing it having except in very special and unforeseeable cases, to fall back on civil penal legislation, as often happens because of omissions in the Code of Military Justice (Código de Justiça Militar) currently in effect. It also had the purpose of translating into positive precepts the military tradition and its practices and customs, protecting the principles of rank and discipline that rule the Armed Forces. Thus from the military police investigation and criminal training to the verdict, those principles are meticulously prescribed.”

The Constitution of 1988, which was indubitably democratic in origin, thus ended up charging things for the worse with Article 124: “Military justice is to try and to judge the military crimes defined by law. Sole paragraph. The law will proved for the organization, the functioning, and the jurisdiction of military justice.” Instead of military justice taking on the role of trying mainly military personnel who have committed strictly military crimes and limiting to the maximum the trying of civilians, Article 124 stipulated that military justice was to try military crimes defined in civil law. But because the law was not turned into regulations, despite the constitutional revision of 1993, the legal document that define what is a military crime continues to be the Military Penal Code of 1969.
This innovation would have been useful only if it had been accompanied by a civil law that restricted to the maximum the substantive definition of military crimes and had accepted only under very special circumstances the trying of civilians by military courts. Or the change could even have precluded this practice and stipulated that active-duty personnel could be tried by civil courts. As it was, the Federal Constitution of 1988, hailed as the legal landmark of a new political era, did not democratize many principles that had oriented military justice during the authoritarian regime.

In fact the jurisdiction of military justice is even greater. Article 109, Section IV of the Brazilian Constitution states that “federal judges are responsible for trying and judging political crimes and penal infractions committed to the detriment of goods, services, or interests of the Union or its autarchic entities or public enterprises, excluding those infractions that fall under the jurisdiction of military and electoral justice”. This article was used by the Military Prosecutor’s Office to characterize as a military crime the involvement of Air Force officers in the transportation of cocaine in military aircraft.

Military justice is an organ of the judiciary, according to Title IV, Chapter III of the Federal Constitution. The following bodies are organs of military justice during peace time: São órgão da Justiça Militar em tempo de paz: the Superior Military Court; the Court of Correction; the Councils of Justice; the Judge-Hearing Officers and Substitute Judge-Hearing Officers. In war time, these agencies are organs of military justice and the forces in the field: the Superior Councils of Military Justice; the Councils of Military Justice and the Judge-Hearing Officers. In peace time, military justice is divided into twelve districts of military justice jurisdictions.
For each district of military justice there is a corresponding court, except in the first district, where there are six courts, the second and eleventh districts (two courts) and the third district (three courts). The courts have a mixed jurisdiction in that they deal with cases from the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The courts are institutions of the first instance and each one of them has a judge, a substitute judge, a director of the cabinet, and two advising officers of the court and other staff, in accordance with the law. These staff are generally civilians.

Before a case reaches the court, the commander of the unit where the accused is located opens an investigation. The ideal is that the investigation is only opened in cases where the evidence of the crime is not in doubt. When it is in doubt, an inquiry or rapid probe should be initiated. It is not uncommon for a case to arrive at court, and after a costly process, the judge concludes that the incident was nothing more than a disciplinary infraction. Furthermore, article 24 of the Military Penal Code of Procedure indicates that the investigation has to be forwarded to a judge “because the military authority cannot order the closing of an investigation even if conclusive evidence exists that the crime did not occur or the defendant was not guilty”. It should be remembered that any military crime directly affects military institutions. In the military procedural code, for example, only public penal actions are recognized, not private ones. In these matters the case is begun by the Federal Military Prosecutor’s Office. Even when the victim withdraws charges against the accused, the penal action is not ended. The state in such an instance prevails over the individual.

According to Article 9 of the Code of Military Penal Procedure, the police-military inquiry “has the character of provisional instruction, whose essential purpose is to supply the elements necessary to the proposing of a judicial action on the criminal act.” It therefore becomes a part of the judicial phase of the penal proceeding. To this
end, the police-military inquiry gathers pieces of evidence surrounding a criminal act, evidence with which it attempts to investigate the truth regarding the authorship and the costs that the damage might entail. Such pieces of information furnish the Military Public Ministry with elements for proposing the penal course of action. Thus it seems that the accused can be sentenced only after the penal course of action has been proposed.

Yet events do not always transpire in this sequence. For example, during the IPM to determine the damage or the loss of military materiel, the authority that launches the inquiry sets itself up as a judge in permitting the investigative function of the inquiry of crime to turn into the determination of guilt – that is to say, when an institution of the military executive acts as if it were a judicial court. The preoccupation of the military command with disciplining the troops overrides the requirement of a system of impartial judgment. The head of the IPM determines the indemnification of damage or loss in cases where there are indications of culpability on the part of the military, without allowing a technical defense of the individual indicted.

In truth, one cannot speak of a technical defense in the inquiry proceeding because no guilt has been determined, nor any trial or trial relationship established. Therefore, “defense” is understood to mean the ability of the accused to face the IPM without providing information that could end up compromising the accused later on, when the IPM is sent to the military court. During the IPM, a military has no right to a defense attorney. The principle of conflicting rights, meaning the ability of two parties to have equal opportunities to exercise powers, faculties, or subjective rights, is observed only after the IPM arrives at the military court. The situation worsens in cases involving the disappearances of military weapons because the
administrative punishment is generally greater than the penal punishment. This being the case, the accused in such cases often end up being acquitted in the military court. Such acquittals are wrongly viewed as a sign of corporativism being practiced by the court when they should be considered the fruit of the arbitrariness of the official directing the IPM. In a case where the lost weapon belonged to a civilian police, a disciplinary administrative trial would be opened when the principle of conflicting rights is contemplated, meaning that the policeman would have the right to defend himself.

The IPM is a tool of inquiry just like the civil police inquiry. A difference between them is that while the civil police inquiries are carried out by officers trained in law, the IPMs are conducted by officers without judicial training. But the inquisitorial nature of the IPM is substantially reinforced by the higher rank in the military hierarchy of the one responsible for conducting the IPM in relation to the person indicted. Moreover, it is a common situation that the witnesses are uniformed colleagues of the accused. The constraint tightens if the witnesses are lower in rank than the indicted. Thus one can grasp how difficult it is to reconcile the ideal of democratic justice based on equality with the military hierarchy, which by definition differentiates markedly between the one who commands and the one who must obey.

In addition, the well-known economic inequality existing in Brazilian society flourishes during the compiling of an IPM. Article 306 of the CPPM stipulates the eight questions that must be asked of the person indicted, whose responses can be used for or against the accused. An enlisted person is unlikely to have as much legal knowledge as those in the officers corps. Consequently, an enlisted man is more defenseless than an officer in responding to an IPM. This inequality is accentuated when the trial arrives at the Auditoria for judgment.
Officers generally have the wherewithal to hire a good private attorney. Enlisted persons, given their precarious economic condition, have to avail themselves of the legal assistance offered by the Federal Military Justice Public Defender’s Office. Article 71, Section 5 of the CPPM says that “the enlisted persons will be defended by an appointed lawyer whose assistance is obligatory”.

According to Article 18 of the CPPM, the president of the IPM can order temporary imprisonment for military as well as civilians for thirty days, renewable for another twenty days, except in the case of those caught in the act or those having a written order based on qualified legal authority. Such discretion was kept in the Constitution of 1988, which states in Article 5, Clause 51: “No one will be imprisoned unless caught in the act or by written order except in cases of military transgression or military crime per se, as defined by law.” The president of the IPM need only communicate the detention to the appropriate judicial authority. Preventative imprisonment, however, still requires the authorization of a judge. Curiously, a civilian cannot be detained temporarily by the highest authority of the civil police judiciary without the consent of the judge. During the drafting of the Constitution of 1988, the civil police lobbied to obtain the legal right to impose temporary detention for five days, rather than thirty, and submission of the act of justice, instead of mere notice. The members of the constitutional assembly vetoed this request of the civil police but kept intact the undemocratic prerogative of the head of the IPM.

Other authoritarian prerogatives of the head of the IPM remain in force. This official can keep incommunicado, with a judicial authorization required, any accused person who was legally arrested for a maximum of three days (Article 17 of the CPPM). In a civil police inquiry, the accused also can be kept incommunicado for up to three days. In the meantime, the incommunicado status will be
imposed by an order approved by the judge, at the request of the police authority or the agency of the Ministério Público. Another example of authoritarian prerogatives arises in Article 16 of the CPPM. This article requires that the military inquiry be kept secret although allowing, with the consent of the military authority, the attorney for the accused to look into the inquiry. In civil inquires, the imposition of secrecy is somewhat less restrictive: “the authority will assure in the inquiry the secrecy necessary to elucidating the facts or demanded by the interests of society” (Article 20 of the Code of Penal Procedure).

Once the IPM is finished it is sent to one of the Federal Military Court, which orders that it be opened to the Military Public Ministry, which examines the IPM and brings an indictment or does not. If an indictment is made, the trial is directed to the hearing judge, who accepts or rejects. If the judge accepts the indictment, one of two types of military councils is set up: a Special Council of Justice (when the accused is an officer) or a Permanent Council of Justice (when the accused is an enlisted person). Both councils are composed of four military judges (who do not necessarily have legal training) and a civilian judge, always following the hierarchical principle that a military officer of lower rank cannot judge a fellow officer of higher rank.

Such a composition encourages the military judges to participate in trials much more as members of the armed forces than as judges. If the real idea was to promote the integration of civilian and military judges, it would be possible to stipulate that the majority on the court be trained in law. In theory, it falls on the presidents of the Councils of Justice to instruct judges. In practice, however, the person who does this is the civilian judge, who is usually the only judge in the court trained in law. On the other hand, and in contrast to civilian justice, it
is the civilian judge who reports the case and writes up the opinion, even when he is in the minority. Therefore, the civilian judge often has to justify a verdict that he voted against. The verdict is given publicly and in writing.

Therefore, the military justice system is formed by professional soldiers and judges, a mixture of the professions symbolized by the sword and the robe. The Dutch occupation of northeast Brazil in the seventeenth century is an influence here, because such a mixture was used in the city councils that the Dutch created. In contemporary military justice, the first level consists of a civilian judge, along with four military judges who are chosen by lottery from among officers in the Navy, Army, and Air Force in active service in the place where the court is located. Officials posted outside the court facilities, but in the court’s district, are chosen to serve on military courts when this is necessary. It is curious that one of the reasons given for the existence of military judges is that they are capable of understanding the problems of the barracks. Nevertheless, the members of the Military Public Ministry and the Federal Public Defender’s Office, as well as other defense lawyers, are civilians.

This situation gives the Brazilian judicial system an unusual hybrid character, also creating a rather comfortable situation for the military. Although the majority of judges is military, the onus of military court decisions does not fall mainly on the military, because military justice is formally part of the judiciary. Thus, for example, if a charge against a torturer is rejected by a Federal military court, the burden of responsibility falls on the court and not on the military institution, despite the possibility of military’s commanders influence over the judge. In sum, all decisions made by military justice are the responsibility of the civil judiciary.
Theoretically, no relation of dependence or subordination exists between military courts and military commanders. In practice, the reality is different. Although Brazilian military justice, in contrast to its Chilean counterpart, is judicialized, with a distinct career path for its judges that has the same characteristics as a judicial career in the civilian courts, this feature applies only to the civilian judge and not the military judges. The fundamental principle of job security or tenure does not apply to these military judges, denying them real independence. Military judges, because they are active duty personnel who return to the barracks after serving in the military courts, are not free to make their decisions purely on the law, without any other considerations. Their behavior as judge is observed by superior officers who will decide on their promotion. The lack of impartiality and independence of the military courts in Brazil results from the predominance of the hierarchical relation, the majority of active duty military personnel who are the judges, and the veiled political influence that surround them.

It is therefore an illusion to believe that military justice is immune from the influence of the armed forces. This does not mean that it is completely subordinate to the armed forces, but there is a grey area in which decisions are made without the awareness of political circumstances and the values and interests of the armed forces. We shall return to this point when we discuss the Superior Military Court in the next section.

On the councils, the highest-ranking officer serves as the president of the council. Inexplicably, the civilian judge does not judge – not even the crimes brought before the court. This task falls to the military councils. The civilian judge conducts the proceedings, has the right to vote, helps settle technical issues, and is also charged with formulating the questions to be asked of the accused and the witnesses, the judge’s
own queries and those submitted by the other military judges. The civilian judge is charged with executing military sentencing, but the judgment is actually made by the collegial military agencies. It can therefore be said that the president of the military council has more power than the civilian judge in that the latter always sentences but never judges the crimes charged by the military courts or those involving manslaughter.

The Permanent Council of Justice is active continuously, but there is little that is permanent in its composition. In fact, the term of its members lasts only three months. Such a short term hurts the performance of the council, which is made up exclusively of officers. A single trial passes from one council to the next, no matter what phase it is in. Consequently, council members lack the necessary background to analyze the trials placed before them, especially given that most trials last for more than a year. In such cases, the same trial will pass through the hands of four groups of officers. It therefore must be expected that information will be lost, which could lead to the impunity of a guilty person or the condemnation of one who is innocent.

The Special Council of Justice, which is also made up exclusively of officers with more seniority than the officer being tried, is not temporary in duration. It is made up specifically for each trial, allowing its members to accompany the trial from the beginning to the final sentencing. Thus its officers are led institutionally to maintain a relationship with the accused officer that differs from the one maintained with an accused enlisted person. Moreover, each officer knows that one day he could end being judged by a fellow officer for something that he is passing judgment on today. Consequently, it is easier for intra-institutional corporativism to operate in favor of the
officers corps. The Special Council of Justice is dissolved after its work is finished.

Military councils have the full power to absolve, to condemn, or to deliberate over preventative detention or pardon for the criminal caught red-handed. Yet such absolute powers are handed to members of the corps by unreliable means: the councils are formed following a public lottery among active-duty officers. In some cases, officers previously tried and convicted in the military court are invited to participate in judging crimes identical to those that they committed in the past. The use of a drawing can thus select officers who are not morally fit to participate in a conselho passing military judgment. Moreover, most of those selected in the drawings are not trained in the law and are therefore lacking in the technical knowledge necessary to apply it. Such a random selection process invites legal controversies. The actions of the Federal military courts are monitored by the Judge-Prosecutor, with a jurisdiction that encompasses the entire national territory. The Court of Corrections is located in Brasília.

Another major injustice in military penal legislation is that the Assistant of the Ministério Público cannot practice certain acts that are guaranteed by civil legislation, specifically it is impossible to appeal in whatever circumstances without the concurrence of the Ministério Público. According to the CPPM, Article 65, I, the Assistant cannot enlist witnesses, except to call for depositions from them, nor order the issuing of writs of mandamus or petitions or any judicial proceedings that delay the course of the trial, except with the concurrence of the judge and after a hearing by the Ministério Público, when dealing with the verification of fact on which clarification of the crime depends. Nor can the Assistant petition for appeal, except under an executive rule to disallow the request for assistance. Therefore if a military accused of having killed a civilian is acquitted, the Assistant
cannot appeal the verdict, however absurd it might seem to him. But if
the crime was committed by a civilian, the Assistant could appeal the
absolving verdict. Moreover, Article 25 of the CPPM forbids the
investigation of the files of any IPM, which means that if new
evidence arises, a new IPM must be started. The time factor works in
favor of the accused because time obscures evidence and supports the
legal prescription.

Article 65 of the CPPM favors the military regime in two ways. The
first arose because the Ministério Público had virtually no autonomy
and bent much more to the coercion of the military regime rather than
defy it. This being the case, if a military court at the lower level found
a soldier innocent for political reasons, it was sufficient that the
Ministério Público did not appeal the verdict for the accused to go free
because the hands of the Assistant of the Ministério Público were tied.
Second, in a case where a civilian accused of a crime was found
innocent but the Ministério Público wanted to punish the accused for
political reasons, the ministry could appeal to the Superior Military
Court (STM) and thereby keep the accused in prison for several more
years until a new trial took place.

The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention of the United Nations
considers military courts excessive when they have the following
characteristics: a) When they are composed only of military
personnel; b) When they judge civilians for committing military
infractions, because only military personnel should come under the
jurisdiction of the Military Penal Code; c) When they judge military
personnel accused of crimes against civilians; d) When they permit
only military institutions to conduct investigations (Mera 1998: 329).
With the exception of item “a” above, Brazilian military courts have
all of these characteristics. The situation in Chile is even worse: at the
first level of military justice there, all four features exist.
The monopoly of investigative power referred to in “d” above deprives many investigations of independence. The police-military investigation requires an independent president who will have his activity guided exclusively by the law, without any hierarchical obligations interfering. If this is not the case, it is possible that the law will be manipulated according to political or other interests distinct from juridical reasoning. To leave investigations in the hands of a president who is also a military officer subjects the investigation to the orders of the officer’s superiors. The officer can be charged with insubordination for his handling of the investigation, reducing the latter’s transparency. The functional independence of an investigation is therefore not compatible with the rigid observance of the hierarchical principles that mark military life.

5 The Superior Military Court

After a military council is installed, a defendant in a military court case is indicted by the Military Public Ministry, and the trial proceedings are conducted by the civilian judge. Decisions of the military courts can be appealed to the second and practically final stage, the STM. This is the appeals court for military justice, which does not respect the principle of jurisdictional unity. Only in cases involving constitutional issues can an appeal be made from this level to the Federal Supreme Court (STF).

The STM, with its headquarters in the Federal capital Brasilia and a national jurisdiction, is composed of fifteen judges with guaranteed tenure and who are nominated by the president and approved by the Senate. Three of these judges are Navy admirals, four are Army generals, three are Air Force generals, and five are civilians. All the military judges are active-duty officers at the highest career rank they
can attain. It is common for the civilian aspirants to a judgeship on the STM to ally themselves with military leaders who can influence the president. In this way they arrive at the court already committed to a certain vision of the armed forces. As Zaffaroni (1995) observes, “a judge is not partial because he [or she] has a political affiliation, but because he depends on a political party or pressure group for his nomination, his job, his promotion, or firing”.

During the military regime, when the STM judged close to 1100 cases per year, including crimes against national security, its numbers were increased to fifteen judges. In 1998, the STM judged only 527 cases in 106 sessions, but even so maintained the same number of judges. These judges can count on the use of official automobiles and the assistance of 238 staff members to serve them. The civilian judges, who must be over 35 years old and less than 70, are chosen by the president with the following criteria: a) Three must be lawyers of noted juridical knowledge (notório saber jurídico) and unblemished conduct (conduta ilibada), with more than ten years of professional conduct; b) Two must be jointly appointed from among judges and members of the Military Public Ministry.

The military judges remain on active duty in special units of the Navy, Army, and Air Force. They are, therefore, part of the executive branch, although they perform their duties as part of the judiciary. This is an anomaly. When they retire they go to the reserves, and remain on the payroll of the judiciary with salaries equivalent to those of members of the Supreme Court. For this reason, competition to become an STM judge is fierce, and to attain the position is equivalent to earning a “fifth star”. Before the 1988 constitution such judges could be in the reserves. Paradoxically this constitution, which marked the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, established the principle that the exercise of military justice is compatible with
military hierarchy. In no case can an officer of lower rank judge a superior officer or someone with more years of service. Consequently, the reason that the STM judges are in uniform is so that an active Brigadier General has precedence over a reserve general. This makes it even more difficult to demand that the military judge appreciates the reality of cases in all their multiple facets, because as an active duty officer, he cannot separate his intelligence and emotion from the military corporation.

It is important to emphasize that these judges want to be seen as military officers first and judges second. This also appears to be the vision of the Senate. While civilian judges are drilled in their technical knowledge, the same does not occur with the STM’s military judges because they are not trained in the law. As they are the majority, and because the STM is an appeals court, the military judges will review the opinions of civilian judges at the first level. The military judges have a legal advisor who supplies an opinion that the military judge can accept or not.

There is more. Although the civilian judge at the first level of military justice has various powers as a single judge, he cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus, a constitutional right. It rests exclusively with the STM to respond to applications for such writs made throughout Brazil. Could it be that the STM does not believe that the first level judges have the technical capacity or juridical competence to exercise such a role? Or could their monopoly of this duty be due to political considerations? After all, the Code of Penal Justice of 1938 and the Military Penal Code of 1969 recognized the right of lower court judges to issue writs of habeas corpus. In both periods there was a dictatorship: one civilian (Vargas) and the other military.
The STM tends to see the first level military courts through the lens of military hierarchy rather than judicial hierarchy. The distinction between jurisdictional functions and the chain of command, which is not marked at the first level, is maintained and emphasized at the STM. The STM judges serve with tenure and remain on active duty, and so have a special career. It is true that in this sense they are less subject to the military chain of command than those who serve in the Councils of Justice, but even so they are affected by the game of politics. The STM has been used by the military, the president, and the Senate as a prize to give to high military officials for exemplary conduct, in accordance with the dominate political current of the time; to take officers away from the control of troops if they are seen as capable of causing problems, again in accordance with the dominant political current; or as a means of reciprocal exchange of favors between the president and the armed forces.

On 7 August 1996, Brazil’s President Fernando Henrique Cardoso approved Law No. 9299. As has been discussed previously, this bill directed to civilian courts premeditated crime committed by a member of the military against the life of a civilian. The military Ministers became furious and then on 20 Agusto 1996, President Cardoso sent to the lower house of Congress a new bill excluding federal military personnel from Law No. 9299. This meant that Federal military personnel would not be tried by civilian courts even if they committed intentional crimes against civilians. In the end, this bill did not need to be considered by Congress because the STM quickly decided that Law Number 9299 was unconstitutional. On the other hand, the STJ, the appeals court of state military justice system, considered the same law constitutional. This gave civilian courts with a jury jurisdiction over the case of military policemen in the state or Para who were accused of intentionally killing members of the landless movement who had
been demonstrating on a highway when they were ordered to be removed by the military police.

The STM and the STJ are courts of the same level, and they have combined to create a perverse new bifurcation of military crime, which now seems to be defined in terms of first and second-class military personnel. Since these decisions, if a member of the Federal military and a member of the state military kill a civilian together, the court system will consider the act a military crime for the first defendant and a common crime for the second. There is no juridical logic in such treatment, but there is a political one. Another political decision is to allow that civilians who commit military crimes be judged in Federal military courts but not in state military courts. Since the property and interests of the military, whether Federal or state, are not differentiated in the Military Penal Code, there is no juridical reason to treat civilians differently in this manner.

Another legal anomaly arose with the passage of Law Number 9099, of 26 May 1995, which deals with special civil and criminal judgments. According to this law, crimes of lesser offense, such as light bodily injury committed by military personnel, can be resolved more rapidly in civilian small claims court. While this law is being respected in state military courts, the STM issued Opinion Number 9 with the following statement: “Law 9099 (…) does not apply to Federal military justice.” The military lobby in Congress achieved what it wanted, in that on 29 September 1999 Congress approved Law Number 9839. This law added article 90-A to Law 9099 so that it read, “The dispositions of this law do not apply to military justice.”

The STM feared that basic military principles such as hierarchy and discipline were affected by Law Number 9099. This argument, however, if it is valid, must be applied only to crimes that are really
military crimes. Improperly characterized military crimes cannot be treated differently from common crimes, because they are also common crimes. Identical facts demand the same penal response, at the risk of violating the constitutional principles of equality before the law and proportionality.

6 Conclusion

The literature on democratic consolidation has generally ignored the question of military justice. Yet military justice affects the rights and citizenship of millions of Latin Americans, in and out of uniform. Analysts have often seemed to presume that the mere removal of the military from the presidency will be sufficient to establish vigorous democracy. However, since long-running military regimes engaged in considerable institutional re-engineering, democracy also involves reclaiming institutional space within the state on behalf of democracy. One of the most crucial areas in which such a struggle can take place in a new democracy is the legal sphere, involving constitutions, courts, and the delimitation of rights and obligations of citizens.

In Brazil, military justice has undergone very little change, despite the transition from authoritarian rule. The jurisdiction of Brazilian military justice, for example, remains very broad compared to that of most other democracies. We suggest that this outcome is due in part to the Brazilian political system’s relatively low level of legitimacy. Military justice has not been a mere means of enforcing discipline within the armed forces. Instead, it has reflected the armed forces’ high degree of political involvement in domestic politics. Military courts are used to legitimate the armed forces’ use of coercion and violence internally, and of inducing citizens to accept the military’s presumed role of protector of the nation and guardian of the
established order. This amounts to militarism in the judicial sphere, in which military courts constitute a preferential arena for the resolution of conflicts arising from the military’s heightened role in domestic politics. As such it is a distortion of the original purpose of military justice, which was to maintain the effectiveness of the armed forces as a guarantor of security from external threats.

The specific mechanisms by which the present situation of military justice was achieved in Brazil have not been laid bare in this paper. Instead, we have focused on exactly how military justice functions, and in what respect this functioning is problematic for democracy. We have argued that Brazilian military justice does not meet international standards of judicial impartiality and fairness. There is a basic tension between the procedures of military justice, on one hand, and the civil rights of civilians and military personnel, and the principle of equality before the law on the other. Investigations carried out within military justice grant authoritarian prerogatives to the head of the investigation. Other authoritarian vestiges can be found scattered throughout the entire system. Furthermore, the hierarchy of the military institution vitiates the independence of military courts, making them instruments of corporate control more than autonomous, judging institutions. This can be seen at the highest level of the system, the Superior Military Court, whose members are active-duty generals and admirals whose position is the equivalent of a “fifth star”. At the same time, the formal integration of military justice and the civilian judiciary lends the status and authority of the latter to military courts, even when what often amounts to self-policing fails to punish the most egregious criminal cases.

While the organization, composition, procedures, and political uses of Brazil’s military courts are problematic for democracy, there is no ineluctable logic that will necessarily propel their reform. The
democratization of the legal sphere depends upon the democratization of the rest of the political system. In Brazil’s illiberal democracy, where the temptation of leaders to use force to maintain order is strongly present, the status quo in military justice may be likely for the foreseeable future.

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